

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN CAMBODIA

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BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
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UNITED STATES SENATE
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PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN CAMBODIA

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 1 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Alan Cranston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Cranston, Biden, Sarbanes, Kerry, Robb, and Murkowski.

Also present: Senator Kerrey.

Senator CRANSTON. We now open this session of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This is the third hearing this subcommittee has held in the past 9 months on events in Indochina. During this time, we have witnessed some progress.

It is noteworthy that we are discussing this issue following an apparent successful meeting in Thailand between two of the major antagonists, Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen, and during a meeting of all four Cambodian factions in Indonesia. I hope that these talks will be fruitful, as well as additional ones planned for next month by the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council.

Both the Prince and the Prime Minister should be congratulated and encouraged in their efforts to put aside longstanding differences for the larger good of their nation.

The administration is also to be commended in the attention it has given this issue and the effort undertaken since the collapse of the Paris conference on Cambodia last August to encourage a return to the negotiating table. Without a doubt, achieving peace in Cambodia and restoring full diplomatic relations with the Indochina nations would be a major accomplishment.

Yet, the challenge to peace posed by the genocidal Khmer Rouge, armed by China, cannot be underestimated, nor can one underestimate the obstacles to the peacemakers now engaged in trying to forge a United Nations-sponsored settlement of this issue begun recently under the good auspices of the Australians.

The progress toward a U.N.-sponsored solution and the problems encountered is the principal focus of today's hearing. Even as we examine these diplomatic initiatives, however, I think it is extremely important that we begin to address the problems of the Cambodian people, those that remain in a ravaged land and those that fled. It is not too soon to begin discussing and formulating plans for Cambodia's reconstruction.

We have an excellent report commissioned by USAID and authored by Columbia Prof. Robert J. Muscat on "Cambodia: Postsettlement, Reconstruction and Development." The United Nation Development Program conducted a similar analysis published last August entitled "Kampuchea Needs Assessment Study."

None of the authors of these reports, however, were permitted to visit Cambodia. I would suggest that now is the time to send a World Bank or other international lending institution team into Cambodia to assess what needs to be done for Cambodia's reconstruction and how to implement it.

At the same time, USAID should begin working with the nongovernmental organizations and multilateral lending institutions to plan for a multinational aid program for Cambodia and should also begin working with international relief agencies to prepare for the reintegration of Cambodian refugees back into their country. Such an initiative, I believe, would help encourage rather than discourage talks now underway for a U.N.-sponsored settlement, reminding the factions of the substantial carrot that awaits them if they could agree on peace.

While we focus today on the Australian initiative for U.N. trusteeship of Cambodia, however, I think it is equally important that we discuss alternative policies should this initiative fail. I would encourage the administration to begin contingency planning. Nothing would be more disastrous than to have present peace efforts fail only to be replaced by more conflict fueled by outside powers.

We have a distinguished group of witnesses. I welcome all of you, especially Senator Muskie. I ask unanimous consent that his excellent report based on his factfinding trip to Cambodia, "Exploring Cambodia, Issues and Reality in a Time of Transition," be a part of the record.

He will be followed by Assistant Secretary John Bolton of International Organization Affairs, who has worked closely on the U.N. initiative; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Lambertson, who has testified many times and always insightfully before this committee.

We will conclude with a public panel: Michael Horowitz, a Washington attorney and former member of the Reagan administration, who was recently in Cambodia; Prof. Helen Chauncey of Georgetown University, who is a China scholar and has followed closely China's relations with Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge; and Dr. Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists, who has visited Cambodia several times in the past few months and written widely and effectively on this issue.

Before calling our first witness to the table, I want to ask Senator Biden if he has any opening remark.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have very brief opening remarks. I apologize to the panel for my lack of a voice, although Secretary Muskie, knowing me well, may be delighted that I lack my voice today.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend our former colleague, Secretary Muskie, for appearing before us today on the Cambodian situation. As he notes in his trip report, too few American officials, including this Senator, have visited Cambodia in the last decade. In assessing the situation firsthand, Secretary Muskie has made an

enormous contribution to our knowledge of the situation in Indochina as it exists today.

For too many months, Mr. Chairman, the Bush administration's policy toward Cambodia has been adrift, sailing an uncharted course with Prince Sihanouk, an unpredictable ally at best, and the People's Republic of China, the chief patron of the murderous Khmer Rouge. In particular, our support for a Khmer Rouge role in an interim government has increased the possibility that the unthinkable, a return of power to the Khmer Rouge, may occur.

Thankfully, the administration is edging away from this position. Though many questions remain unanswered, there is a flicker of hope that a peaceful resolution of the conflict can be achieved. Whatever is decided this week in Jakarta and in other world capitals, U.S. policy should be clear: no return to power in any form for the Khmer Rouge.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of former Senator Muskie. His wisdom, his insight and his impact on American foreign policy throughout the years have been monumental. I have said it before privately, and I will say it publicly. I have only been here 18 years, but Secretary Muskie is the brightest man with whom I have ever served. I mean this sincerely. I have never known anybody who has a more thoughtful approach when he speaks.

I remember his admonition to me, which unfortunately it took me much too long to learn, and I will paraphrase. I am very careful these days about paraphrasing and quoting. You tell an old joke about the fellow in Maine who says we like our silence. I forget how the joke goes, but when you speak you warrant being listened to, as your record has indicated. I am delighted you have taken the time not only to have made the trip and issue this trip report but to be here today.

I might add that the Senator from Massachusetts and I are here because of you and others but also due in no small part to a fellow named Tom Vallely who has spent a great deal of his time and effort recently dealing with this issue and was so concerned that I might be in the Judiciary Committee that he sent me a cable from Cambodia—I think he is in Cambodia now if I am not mistaken—to make sure that I attended.

I assure you, Mr. Secretary, I did not need the cable to attend, and I look forward to hearing what you have to say.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Joe.

Senator Kerry has been deeply interested in this particular responsibility we have and the unfortunate events in Cambodia. It is a pleasure to call upon him for any opening remarks at this time.

Senator KERRY. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for calling this much needed hearing. I am delighted to join with Senator Biden in welcoming the distinguished Senator and Secretary of State, Senator Muskie with whom I had the pleasure of having a lunch recently to discuss this issue and his trip.

I join with you in marveling at Tom Vallely who is a former Marine who served in Vietnam and who understands as well as anybody some of the causes of the current dilemma in which we find ourselves. I appreciate his commitment and efforts on this.

I cannot think of many issues in foreign affairs today where the moral imperatives for us in this country are quite as clear as they really are with respect to Cambodia. Our policy in Cambodia was a stepchild directly of our involvement in Vietnam, and when the Vietnamese ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979 we should probably have joined in rejoicing with the Cambodian people.

The Vietnamese had for a number of reasons, not the least of which was a massacre in a small town that I frequented often in Vietnam, a place called Phut Tien right up near the coast in the Gulf of Thailand near Cambodia. Pol Pot had committed an atrocious massacre there which finally prompted the Vietnamese to say enough of this, and they moved in to take care of the situation.

They did what really many people in the international community had simply been unwilling to contemplate doing. We refused to recognize the new regime which was subsequently installed. Not only did we refuse to recognize it, but in a knee-jerk response we organized an international boycott of Vietnam and Cambodia and campaigned to have the Khmer Rouge assume Cambodia's seat in the United Nations. That may have looked OK then, but in retrospect I think we have to admit that it took us down the wrong path.

Worse, we conspired with China and Thailand to keep the Khmer Rouge in business along the Thai-Cambodian border. There is a really sad aspect to that chapter of conspiratorial engagement in the survival of the Khmer Rouge, whom we are quick to talk about publicly having to keep from coming to power. We have been dealing with them for years and permitting them to exist for years.

I have a sad memory of that, also. One day I left the town of Phut Tien as commander of my gunboat and took the CIA into Cambodia where we met with the Khmer Rouge, and I personally watched the delivery of weapons to the Khmer Rouge in exchange for information. I really did not understand what was going on at the time. I asked a lot of questions about it and subsequently grew to understand the nature of that relationship and the multifaceted aspects of our expediency and willingness to deal with them.

Since then, obviously Pol Pot's forces have continuously engaged Vietnamese troops in a low-intensity conflict. Meanwhile, the international community, particularly the United States which helped create a situation of instability that allowed Cambodia to become the killing fields it became, looked the other way and basically held its nose.

If the sole goal of our foreign policy is to rid Cambodia of the Vietnamese, then obviously it was a success. However, that never should have been the goal of our policy in that region.

Two years ago we in Congress took a small action to try to redress the imbalance of the past years, and House Joint Resolution 602 was signed into law by President Reagan. It specified that all parties seeking a settlement of the conflict in Cambodia, including the United States, should have among the highest priorities the restoration of a free and independent Cambodia and the protection of the Cambodian people from a return to the power of the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

Then last year on the eve of the Paris negotiations, we passed in the Senate by a vote of 97 to 1 the Pell amendment, which called

on us to support the establishment of the Cambodian Government that included Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communist resistance but which most of all was determined to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge to power.

I will end very, very quickly, but I want this as part of the record. The reality is we have allowed ourselves to become the prisoner of Prince Sihanouk and the People's Republic of China's recalcitrant position that the Khmer Rouge have to be incorporated into a solution of the problem. As a consequence, the so-called non-Communist resistance continues to ally itself at least militarily, if not politically—and it is very unclear as to what degree either is true today—with the Khmer Rouge forces in the field.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the lessons of the recent elections in Nicaragua, the recent elections in Namibia, to which I know that the Secretary will refer in his testimony, and the elections in the Philippines must have taught us something about the ability of the international community to assist in bringing about the responsible policy that permits people to choose freely their future.

I cannot think of a better moment for us to deal with the reality that there cannot be a military solution, that there has to be a political negotiated solution, and that we, because of the bizarre role we have played over the years much of which is psychologically entwined with Vietnam, must be central to the process of bringing about that determination.

We here must stop providing any aid, military or otherwise, to any group allied to the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, we must recognize the changes that have taken place in the entire region, which I know, again, the Secretary will address. We ought to deal with the existing government of that country that is in place and capable of delivering services, the Hun Sen government.

If we truly want to make real the words of the President who talked in his inaugural address about Vietnam being over, then we have to realize it is not going to be over until we reverse the policies that still live with us as a consequence of our bitterness and some of the policies that were put in place as a consequence of our feelings about the war in Vietnam itself.

I personally am convinced that the China initiative lost a major opportunity to make Cambodia part of the solution, and I am convinced that we could move to a whole new relationship not only with Cambodia but with Vietnam and the entire Indochina region.

That is why I think it is so critical for us to be here today, for this hearing to take place, and for us to now engage wholeheartedly, significantly, in the effort to piece together a new policy for this region that recognizes the new world we are living in but also recognizes the linkage of that change to the real purging of the Vietnam period both from our policies as well as from our souls.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, John.

My two colleagues on the committee have underscored the great importance of this issue. America has a deep responsibility, it seems to me, to seek to be a constructive force in bringing peace and stability to Cambodia.

Cambodia's woes began with the incursion by the United States into Cambodia in the course of the Vietnam war. And ever since, that pathetic country and its tragic people have been in turmoil.

Now, perhaps, we at long last have an opportunity to play that constructive role. And we could have no better guide than our first witness, Ed Muskie, about whom Joe Biden spoke very eloquently, as did John Kerry.

The importance of this particular hearing and issue is I think underscored by the fact that this is Ed Muskie's first return to the U.S. Senate as a witness since he left our company 10 years ago to become Secretary of State.

Ed, it is a great, great pleasure and privilege to have you with us to give us the benefit of your views and your great knowledge on this subject.

STATEMENT OF EDMUND MUSKIE, CHAIRMAN, CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY

Mr. MUSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and Senator Kerry.

For 10 years I have been following that main rule to which Joe made reference, that one should not speak unless one can improve on silence. I hope that I can do that.

But, in any case, it is good to be back. I had forgotten how comfortable this room can be. It was more comfortable on that side. But I think it will be comfortable on this side.

As all three of you, I think, have indicated, it is time that we began to focus on the Cambodia situation. It has really been on the back burner, I think, of public interest and public attention for much of the decade, until the last 2 or 3 years. And it is just beginning to emerge.

And it is clearly necessary to consider a new approach if any progress is to be made.

And so I agreed to travel to Cambodia in my capacity as chairman of the Center for National Policy. It was my intention to observe firsthand the conditions there, and to develop a direct assessment of the effects and the consequences of present U.S. policy.

My questions as I prepared for the trip were these: What is the reality of the situation in Cambodia today? What are Vietnam's objectives? And are they consistent or inconsistent with U.S. interests?

What about Cambodia's neighbor, Thailand, an important United States ally? And what about China's commitment to the Khmer Rouge? Can peace be brought to Cambodia? Is genuine self-determination a possibility?

You have had my report, "Exploring Cambodia," and if you read it, you will find that I satisfied myself as to the answers to those questions.

I was in the region about 2 weeks, in Cambodia itself for almost a week. I traveled overland from Ho Chi Minh City to get to Phnom Penh. And I was able to spend a day at Angkor Wat.

I talked with heads of state, with soldiers, with civilians, with government officials, and with representatives of nongovernmental

organizations from this country and others, who are working there to be of service to the Cambodian people.

I spent a good deal of time with officials of the American Government, both here in Washington and in Bangkok, discussing Cambodia prior to my visit there, and afterward.

I had not been in Cambodia since 1965. I tell you frankly that I was shocked at what I saw this time. This country was clearly devastated by the Khmer Rouge. They not only killed large numbers of people, they also destroyed the infrastructure and the economic and social fabric of the country.

There has been a visible rebuilding. It is modest, but it is real. It occurred in large part while the Vietnamese were still there. The Cambodians would be irrational if they had not preferred the results of the Vietnamese invasion to what had gone on before.

The indigenous Cambodian Government is not one that should be impossible for the United States to interact with. It is not beyond the pale, as a matter of international comparison. It is Communist, but not rabidly ideological. It is in the process of making efforts to liberalize.

From the conversations I had and from my own observations, I have concluded that a fundamental redirection of U.S. policy must take place if we are not to contribute to a return of tragedy to this nation.

This report describes the development of the trip and provides both direct excerpts and overall summaries of key meetings that I held. The material speaks for itself, generally, but a few points should be stressed.

First, as noted, the Government of Cambodia in the fall of 1989 was a Communist government in form, but it also included many non-Communists from earlier regimes. It did not appear monolithic. It did demonstrate pragmatism.

Second, from my observations not only of the government and its administration of Cambodian society, but also from what I saw of the searing evidence of the devastation of the Khmer Rouge period, and what I learned about the dominance of the Khmer Rouge in the resistance coalition, it became clear that the central question for U.S. policy had to be simply this: Why should we insist on dismantling the existing government prior to elections and thereby risk the return of chaos?

Under the circumstances, this appears to be the critical choice if we really hope to move Cambodia toward a better future in which the stability required for genuine and lasting self-determination can be maintained.

I think it is important in bringing perspective to this point to look at what is different in relation to Cambodia today, as compared to the period during which I was Secretary of State.

It is patently obvious that the Soviet Union would like to reduce its commitment to Vietnam, not increase it. So that is an important change from 1979 and 1980.

Second, in Vietnam itself it is obvious that economic development is the preoccupation, not military adventurism. Just as is the rest of the region, Vietnam is trying to grow.

So that is the second change.

Third is the change in Cambodia itself. It is not a country run by Vietnam. It is run by Cambodians. Again, I encourage everyone to go see for him or herself. You may not like the government, but it is definitely Cambodian.

There has never yet been a Cambodian government elected in a genuinely democratic election. And this government is no exception. And I emphasize that it is not an exception. Sihanouk inherited his power from the French. Lon Nol inherited his from force of arms. Hun Sen inherited his from the Vietnamese. He appears to have used it to benefit the country as much as to benefit a specific regime.

I would encourage all who are interested in him to read the report of my meeting with him in this document. It is long, 18 pages, and I think quite interesting and instructive.

Finally, of course, there is the issue of China. And here is where the United States confronts a dilemma that we have not yet faced up to. As long as we continue to support China's wish to bring back the Khmer Rouge, we are on the wrong side in Cambodia.

Historically, the two forces in the region that have been perceived as seriously threatening to their neighbors and each other have been Vietnam and China. Other countries in the region, especially Thailand, have long seen a need to balance between the two.

It is clear to me that Vietnam is ready for peace, for improved relations in the region, and ready to reduce hostility with China. China's objectives are less clear. But on the crucial issue of the Khmer Rouge, they have not yet shown any real sign of flexibility as far as one can tell.

Again, let me stress that there is nothing to be said for bringing back the Khmer Rouge. Phnom Penh has been intransigent on this point; so has Hanoi. In this, they are right, and we should support them, not oppose them.

This may seem like making strange bedfellows, but it is not nearly as strange as U.S. support for a coalition that includes the Khmer Rouge.

Now let me briefly say a word on the recent Big Five meeting in Paris.

Some signs are positive, but there were problems with Paris. First, nothing was said about genocide. And this, as you will recall, was one of the points at issue last summer in the international conference in Paris.

Second, there are a number of ambiguities in the recent Paris declaration that might be positive or negative, depending on what they are taken to mean.

For example, this statement is included in the communique that elections must be conducted in a neutral political environment in which no party would be advantaged.

It could imply a simple and desirable criterion for fair elections, or it could be intended to imply that advantages gained by the current government by virtue of legitimately earned political support must be eliminated, a little like insisting that there must be no advantage whatsoever to an incumbency.

There must be a concern with this process as it goes forward to ensure that we are working toward the right objective, genuine self-determination and conditions that will truly permit it.

Look what it took in Namibia. I was there for the election last November at the request of the White House. I saw it firsthand. As you know, in Namibia, the existing government remained in place. The U.N. saw to controlling the cease-fire, monitoring the electoral process, and the process of making the transition to a new government.

In Cambodia, at least as much as in Namibia, history requires that stability be maintained. The country is still fragile, but it functions. It would be a tragedy in my judgment to dismantle the present administrative structure.

It has taken 10 years to put it together. No one who looks at Cambodia who has any judgment, any experience, could seriously suggest such a thing as being constructive or even practical.

If the U.N. seat issue can be resolved so that the U.N. is truly neutral, and not associated with the Khmer Rouge, then it seems likely that some kind of Namibia-like model can indeed work with Cambodia. But it is extremely important how the details of the U.N. idea are filled in.

These are my thoughts, but really, I would ask only two things of U.S. policymakers. One, go to Cambodia. Take an honest look. We have favored the other side for many years. Let us be true to ourselves and look at both sides.

If we are going to tilt toward the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk, let us try tilting a little bit toward the other side.

There is a building that has been built on the access road to Dulles Airport that tilts in four directions. I do not know if you have seen it. I thought the Tower of Pisa was the only tilting building in the world, but that building tilts in four directions.

We are tilting in only one. I suggest that we tilt in another one, too, and strike a balance.

The second point I would make is that it is time to send China a message, plain and clear. The United States wants good relations with China, but if China values the United States good opinion, as we assume China does, then China can do this for the United States: say "Yes" to elections in Cambodia, and be satisfied with that.

Let us have a cease-fire in Cambodia. Let us stop the arms shipments. Let us have elections. Let us stop talking about powersharing in advance of elections. Let us have a new U.S. policy. We will talk to both sides. We will denounce the genocide that occurred at the hands of the Khmer Rouge in clear and simple terms.

We will send a clear message to China—elections, yes; destabilizing the country, no.

And I remember, Mr. Chairman, Senators, how many years this committee struggled with the genocide convention. And it was only in the last year or two, after I think a period of some 25 years since its creation, that we approved it. And yet we are on a side that refuses to recognize what so clearly has taken place in Cambodia, one of the worse genocides in the history of this century.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity, and I am ready to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Muskie follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MUSKIE

I would like to summarize briefly today the findings and recommendations of a trip to Southeast Asia that I made on behalf of the Center for National Policy, of which I am chairman. We have prepared a long written report that includes extensive excerpts from key meetings, that I would be glad to submit for the record, should that be desirable.

My intention today is to give the main points, and to take any questions members of the Committee might have.

For 15 years, from 1975 to 1989, as you Senators know, Cambodia was a nation largely outside of the consciousness of the American public. Senators Baucus, Danforth, and Sasser went there; Senator Robb has recently been there, exhibiting great determination; Congressman Steve Solarz went briefly.

Basically, though, the history of American involvement in Cambodia prior to 1975, the story of what happened in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge reign of terror between 1975 and 1979, and the facts of the 1979 Vietnamese invasion and 10-year occupation, were outside public focus in the United States.

As we know, all of this began to change with the release of the film, "The Killing Fields," detailing the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge, and with the plans of Vietnam to get ready to pull out. There began to be more press attention to the issue of Cambodia, and efforts were taken here in the Congress, and by the Administration, to step up aid to the non-Communist resistance guerrillas fighting the Phnom Penh government.

The Jakarta Informal Meetings, bringing together Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, were, I believe, considered positive, and a form of progress, by all of us.

Last year, of course, when the International Conference on Cambodia convened in Paris, many of us were very hopeful. But Sihanouk's commitment to the Khmer Rouge became an insurmountable difficulty, standing in the way of a political settlement: U.S. policy sided with Sihanouk and with China. Phnom Penh and Vietnam said "no" to the Khmer Rouge, as you know, and all of our hopes for a settlement dimmed, as the conference broke up.

Prior to the Paris conference, with the Vietnamese pullout that U.S. policy had long demanded on the horizon, it had seemed to me that the time might be approaching when the United States might be able to take on a new posture toward Indochina—positive and constructive—and begin to play a more active and leading role in the development of Southeast Asia.

The failure of the Paris conference was not a hopeful sign, however. It seemed that U.S. policy had only two choices at that point: To go along with Sihanouk's demand that the Khmer Rouge be imposed on Cambodia as the price of a political settlement, on the one hand, or to continue to support Sihanouk and his forces in a guerrilla war in coalition with Khmer Rouge, on the other.

It seemed to me that for all of us—whether members of the public, the press, Members of Congress, or U.S. Government officials, the most difficult problem in knowing what to think or do about Cambodia remained: A lack of concrete, first-hand information.

Clearly, it was necessary to consider a new approach, if any progress were to be made. I therefore agreed to travel to Cambodia in my capacity as chairman of the Center for National Policy. It was my intention to observe firsthand the conditions there, and to develop a direct assessment of the effects, the consequences of present U.S. policy.

I asked Senator Robb to travel with me on the trip, and he made every effort to do so, for which I was most grateful. I regretted that we could not take this trip together, but I saw that he was very determined to find a way to see Cambodia, and I felt that he would eventually succeed, which he has clearly now done. I assume that he felt, as I did, that the time was much too short, but even a short time is better than nothing.

My own questions, as I prepared for this trip, were these: What is the reality of the situation in Cambodia today? What are Vietnam's objectives, and are they consistent or inconsistent with United States interests? What about Cambodia's neighbor, Thailand, an important United States ally? Is China right or wrong in its commitment to the Khmer Rouge?

Can peace be brought to Cambodia? Is genuine self-determination a possibility?

I was in the region for about 2 weeks, in Cambodia itself for almost a week. I traveled overland from Ho Chi Minh City to get to Phnom Penh, and I was able to spend a day at Angkor Wat. I talked with heads-of-state, with soldiers, with civilians, with government officials, and with representatives of nongovernmental orga-

nizations.--I spent a good deal of time with officials of the American government, both here in Washington and in Bangkok, discussing Cambodia prior to my trip there, and afterward.

I had not been in Cambodia since 1965. I tell you frankly that I was shocked at what I saw this time. This country was, clearly, devastated by the Khmer Rouge. They not only killed large number of people; they also destroyed the infrastructure and the economic and social fabric of the nation.

There has been a visible rebuilding. It's modest, but it is real. It occurred in large part while the Vietnamese were still there. The Cambodians would be irrational if they had not preferred the results of the Vietnamese invasion to what had gone before.

The indigenous Cambodian Government is not one that should be impossible for the United States to interact with. It is not beyond the pale as a matter of international comparison. It is Communist, but not rabidly ideological.

It is in the process of making efforts to liberalize.

From the conversations I had and from my own observations, I have concluded that a fundamental redirection of U.S. policy must take place, if we are not to contribute to a return of tragedy to this nation.

This report describes the development of the trip and provides both direct excerpts and overall summaries of key meetings. The material speaks for itself, generally, but a few points should also be stressed.

First: As noted, the government of Cambodia in the fall of 1989 was a communist government in form, but it also included many non-communists, from earlier regimes. It did not appear monolithic; it did demonstrate pragmatism.

Second: From my observations not only of the government and its administration of Cambodian society, but also from what I saw of the searing evidence of the devastation of the Khmer Rouge period, and what I learned about the dominance of the Khmer Rouge in the resistance coalition, it became clear that the central question for U.S. policy had to be, simply, this: Why should we insist on dismantling the existing government prior to elections, and thereby risk the return of chaos?

Under the circumstances, this appears to be the critical choice, if we really hope to move Cambodia toward a better future; in which the stability required for genuine and lasting self-determination can be maintained.

I think it is important, in bringing perspective to this point, to look at what is different in relation to Cambodia today, as compared with the period during which I was Secretary of State.

Starting with the most basic fact, from the perspective of the United States, our relations with the Soviet Union are entirely different, because the Soviet Union is different. Yes, we both still have massive nuclear arsenals, bigger and more dangerous now than they were then. But, quite obviously, the international political "expansionism" of the Soviet Union is a thing of the past--absolutely for now, if not irrevocably forever (something that we cannot know at this point).

It is patently obvious that the Soviet Union would like to reduce its commitment to Vietnam, not increase it.

So that's an important change from 1979 and 1980.

Second, in Vietnam itself, it is obvious that economic development is the preoccupation, not military adventures. Just as the rest of the region, Vietnam is trying to grow. It has not been as successful, but that is in part because of our embargo on aid.

So that's the second change.

Third is the change in Cambodia itself. It is not a country run by Vietnam; it's run by Cambodians. Again, I encourage everyone to go see for him or herself. You may not like the government, but it is definitely Cambodian.

There has never yet been a Cambodian government elected in a genuinely democratic election, and this government is no exception. But I emphasize that it is not an exception. Sihanouk inherited his power from the French, and Lon Nol inherited his from the force of arms. Hun Sen inherited his from the Vietnamese. He appears to have used it to benefit the country as much as to benefit a specific regime.

I would encourage all who are interested in him to read the report of our meeting in this document. It's long, 18 pages, and I think quite interesting and instructive.

Finally, of course, there is the issue of China.

And here is where the United States confronts a dilemma that we have not yet faced up to: As long as we continue to support China's wish to bring back the Khmer Rouge, we are on the wrong side in Cambodia.

Historically, the two forces in the region that have been perceived as seriously threatening, to their neighbors and each other, have been Vietnam and China.

Other countries in the region, especially Thailand, have long seen a need to balance between the two.

It is clear to me that Vietnam is ready for peace, for improved relations in the region; ready to reduce hostility with China.

China's objectives are less clear. There was some sign while I was in the region last fall that China might be moving to deal more with Cambodian Government, and with the Vietnamese. But on the crucial issue of the Khmer Rouge, they have not yet shown any real sign of flexibility as far as one can tell.

Again, let me stress that there is nothing to be said for bringing back the Khmer Rouge. Phnom Penh has been intransigent on this point; so has Hanoi. In this they are right and we should support them, not oppose them. This does seem like strange bedfellows.

But, it is not nearly as strange as U.S. support for a coalition that includes the Khmer Rouge.

Now let me briefly say a word on the recent Big Five meeting in Paris. Some signs are positive: The goal is said to be self-determination through free, fair, and democratic elections; a U. N. role was stressed; diplomatic efforts were welcomed; and withdrawal should be verified.

But, there were problems with Paris:

First, nothing was said about genocide, and this as you recall was one of the points at issue last summer in the international conference.

Second, there are a number of ambiguities in the recent Paris declaration that might be positive or negative, depending on what they are taken to mean. For example, the statement that "elections must be conducted in a neutral political environment in which no party would be advantaged" could imply a simple and desirable criterion for fair elections, or, it could be intended to imply that "advantages" gained by current government by virtue of legitimately earned political support must be eliminated—a little like insisting that there must be no advantage whatsoever to incumbency.

There must be a concern with this process as it goes forward, to ensure that we are working toward the right objective: genuine self-determination, in conditions that will truly permit it.

Look at what it took in Namibia. I was there for the election last November, at the request of the White House; I saw it firsthand.

As you know, in Namibia the existing government remained in place; the U.N. saw to controlling the cease-fire, monitoring the electoral process, and the process of making the transition to a new government, after elections.

In Cambodia, at least as much as in Namibia, history requires that stability be maintained. The country is still fragile, but it functions.

It would be a tragedy to dismantle the present administrative structure; it has taken ten years to put it together. No one who looks at Cambodia, who has any judgment, any experience, could seriously suggest such a thing as being constructive, or even practical.

If the U.N. seat issue can be resolved, so that the U.N. is truly neutral, and not associated with the Khmer Rouge, then it seems likely that some kind of Namibia-like model can indeed work for Cambodia, but it is extremely important how the details of the U.N. idea are filled in.

These are my thoughts. But, really, I would ask only two things of U.S. policymakers: One, go to Cambodia, take an honest look, we have favored the other side for many years, let's be true to ourselves and look at both sides, (point about "tilting"); two, it is time to send China a message, plain and clear, the United States wants good relations with China, but if China values United States good opinion, as we assume China does, then China can do this for the United States: say "yes" to elections in Cambodia, and be satisfied with that.

Let's have a cease-fire in Cambodia.

Let's stop the arms shipments.

Let's have elections.

Let's stop talking about powersharing in advance of elections.

Let's have a new U.S. policy: We will talk to both sides; we will denounce the genocide that occurred at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, in clear and simple terms; we will send a clear message to China: elections, yes; destabilizing the country, no.

Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to appear before you today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very, much.

Senator CRANSTON [presiding]. Thank you very, very much. I am afraid we better recess briefly for this vote. Senator Kerry will be

back and resume the moment he gets here, and I will be back, and I trust the others very, very shortly.

Mr. MUSKIE. I am aware of this tradition. [Laughter.]

[Recess.]

Senator KERRY [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, I gather you had just finished your statement, and we are about to start.

Mr. MUSKIE. Yes, staying within the time limits.

Senator KERRY. Staying within the time limits. The Foreign Relations Committee never had a time limit that I know of, but I will accept that concept.

Let me ask you if I can if you might frame for us in your view beyond the comments you made in your opening statement, why is this issue important for us?

Some people in the United States might say well, you know, we are gone from there. It is not important, we cannot do anything, we should not care.

Would you state your view as to why this is something we not only should and can but ought to be involved in?

Mr. MUSKIE. Because we have intervened in that area of the country, that area of the world for the last 30 years.

Most of my Senate career, 22 years, was involved with the Vietnam war and its consequences and its aftermath. We have intervened, we have changed the history and the lives of that area of the world. So, from that point alone we have a responsibility to try to deal with the consequences of the interests of the people who have been impacted by it.

When I visited Cambodia in 1965 as a member of the so-called Mansfield Mission, which you may remember, I visited Phnom Penh. At that time it was not involved in the war, except to the extent that the war spread over its Vietnam border one way or the other. And then subsequently, of course, in the early seventies we invaded Cambodia and Cambodia was brought into the war.

So, we have been a part of it, we have been a part, and so we have a responsibility to deal with. I think that is number one.

No. 2, I think as a member of the community of nations and the United Nations specifically we have a responsibility to use those instruments to try to bring peace to this troubled area of the world.

We have been involved in other areas around the globe. Intervention, I think, underscores our responsibility, but I think we need to do it.

But then looking forward to the future, this area of the world has the resources to become an important and significant part of the so-called development of the Pacific Rim. More and more Americans are beginning to look to the Pacific Rim, all of the countries bordering the Pacific Rim, as an important part of our future, our economic future, and so on. It is an important part of the world.

There are those who believe it may become a more important part of our economic future than even Europe. I am not sure I agree with that, but nevertheless it is an important part. And Southeast Asia, Indochina, the very countries we are talking about have resources, important resources, and they can become an important market for us.

Increasingly the world in these amazing months and years that are passing here is looking toward the future of the world as something that can be developed rather than destroyed. And I am not sure we are doing a good job at it, but at least our focus has changed, and the Pacific Rim is an important part of it.

We cannot ignore the Indochina situation. We cannot sit by and watch something happen. And I think that if we were to sit by or if we were to be involved with the wrong policy which resulted in the Khmer Rouge coming back to power, it would be a tragedy for which the American people would blame their leaders. There is no question about it.

I think our involvement in Vietnam tugs at the conscience of all Americans today as it has for almost 30 years, and we simply cannot permit ourselves to be party to a policy or to circumstances that would permit the return of the Khmer Rouge to power.

What we should be looking for, working for and struggling for is free elections which will enable the Cambodian people for the first time in the last 50 years to choose their own future, and I think it is possible to be done. We have just finished our involvement in Namibia where fair elections resulted. A constitution was written by the constituent assembly that was elected, and the assembly has elected a president. So, this country that was the source of a bloody civil war, a bloody war for 25 years, is now on the road to a peaceful future.

Even Nicaragua. I certainly did not agree with many of our policies that preceded the events of this week, but now an election has been held there. The government in being stayed in place through the elections. There was no way of ousting it and notwithstanding that fact, free and fair elections were held, and a change was made. That government was ousted.

Now, we should follow those examples of Namibia and Nicaragua. The government in place I understand has said, incidentally, I do not know, Senator, whether you have seen the U.N.—the U.P. story out of Jakarta?

Senator KERRY. Today? No, I have not.

Mr. MUSKIE. It is interesting. I have it here.

The work of the conference was not completed, but there are these interesting developments out of it. For example, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced Wednesday his acceptance of a major United Nations role in bringing peace to the country.

In the final hours of the 3-day peace conference he said "all doubtful issues should be meticulously controlled and supervised by the United Nations so as not to let those issues be used as pretexts for the continuation of a conflict."

Continuing, he said, "the international body would be responsible for verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, assuring foreign forces were not reintroduced, supervising the end of foreign military assistance, and enforcing a cease-fire."

In addition to that, subsequently he said that the United Nations should organize the elections.

Now, that is a substantial role for the United Nations that goes far beyond—far beyond what he is reported to have been agreed to in the Paris Conference. So, he has been flexible. He has moved in

the right direction. He has gone a long way toward adopting the Australian plan.

And what is the position of the Khmer Rouge? Unchanged. They still insist upon the dismantling of Hun Sen's government and the establishment of an administration composed of the three coalition parties plus Hun Sen, requiring a dismantling of the government of Hun Sen, which Hun Sen has opposed all these months.

So, I think that—I have gone beyond your question, but what would you expect of a former Senator?

Senator KERRY. Well, I think it is very important.

Let me just say you are testifying, not me, but I might add that you brought up the issue of just resolving Nicaragua, et cetera, and the government stayed in place during the election process.

I might add to that it was not until you had an agreement among the parties brought about, incidentally, mostly by President Oscar Arias and Vinicio Cerezo and Napoleon Duarte and Manuel Ortega that you got an agreement not to have a military solution that you in fact greased the path for the election process to take place.

Mr. MUSKIE. Exactly.

Senator KERRY. And I think that was critical there. In fact, one of the election officials down there who remains nameless but commented to the chairman of the subcommittee that the best friend the Sandanistas had for 10 years was Ronald Reagan because he kept the military prospect alive which kept their ability to rule alive. And I think may be said to be true here.

Let me come for a moment. You mentioned again Vietnam and the concept of responsibility and then also articulated the other reasons we ought to be involved in this issue.

I just finished rereading Neil Sheehan's brilliant book "Bright Shining Lie," and I was, notwithstanding my involvement in that period of time and memories of it, just dumbstruck by the reiteration and articulation of the level of self-deception, the level of deception and the level of delusion that led our policy down the path in the 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965 area.

I wonder if, based on your knowledge of both events in the region and the history and now your journey you might share with us a sense of whether you see similar illusions operating here that have guided our policy, from which we must turn away in order to understand the region and come to the point that you have described as being a realistic approach.

In other words, is our understanding of Cambodian history, our understanding of the relationship of Vietnam to China, the relationship of China to Thailand and Cambodia as a buffer zone, and so forth—to what degree do our perceptions of how to resolve foreign policy issues only in the eyes of Americans versus the reality of the history of the region and some of their needs guide our policy and are we somewhat a prisoner of that?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, of course there have been many changes since the period before the Vietnam war. We had a view of communism at that time that it was monolithic, worldwide, and that we had to stop it wherever it emerged as a hostile force. I think that is why we went into Cambodia, into Vietnam at the time that we did. The domino theory, you remember all of that.

Well, I think we have been disabused of that notion. I think we see differences in Communist regimes, and surely we must now after the amazing events of Eastern Europe—communism is taking on all sorts of faces. It is a losing force, but it is not a worldwide monolithic force of the kind of the nature that led us, I think, into Vietnam in the first place.

Now, I am not sure I understand why our policy there is what it is. I have tried to understand it. We do not make a consistent defense of it. The consistency that we seek to establish for it is that it is what Sihanouk wants. In other words, he wants to move into free elections, to an interim government which includes the Khmer Rouge so that they are in the action rather than outside it.

That does not make any sense to me. Sihanouk is not our Secretary of State. He is not the President. He is a man who was never elected himself. He has been for and against the Khmer Rouge—his family suffered, I think, 19 killed at the hands of the Khmer Rouge—and he has not been back until recently in Cambodia for more than 10 years, so that he is not really on the ground, and he cannot really understand, I think, the interests and desires of his own people.

Now, I gather he has moved in and is living in Cambodia at the present time in one or two villages which are within the area that has been liberated by the resistance forces.

I do not see any comparison between the motivations that led us into the Vietnam war which were themselves wrong and the motivations which now are behind our present policy.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much.

I have had the privilege of having you alone for a moment. I cede back to the chairman, and I will wait for my next round. Thank you very much.

Mr. MUSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Senator Muskie, I gathered from your remarks in your statement that you said that the Chinese PRC want the Khmer Rouge back in power in Cambodia. Do you really believe that is a goal or are they trying to checkmate the Vietnamese and working for some solution other than something that they see as Vietnamese control?

I know they are backing the Khmer Rouge, but are they backing them all the way to power, in your opinion or seeking to do so?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, given their failure to indicate any flexibility on this question, they have not proved to me that that is not their objective because, as I see it, the Khmer Rouge are the dominant military force in the field there at the present time. If we do not in some way come up with a peaceful solution, and wait for the issue to be resolved on the battlefield, and the Khmer Rouge are continued to be supplied by the Chinese, it seems to me the odds are that that is where they would like it to go. They have not convinced me otherwise.

And given, you know, what our view of Chinese policy has been over the last year, I am not prepared to assume that they have a lesser goal, notwithstanding their participation in the Big Five meeting in Paris.

Senator CRANSTON. I think that is a very fine response and a very clear and strong one.

What is it you advocate we do on military aid for the non-Communist resistance insofar as we mean Sihanouk and Hun Sen?

Mr. MUSKIE. I think we should discontinue it.

Senator CRANSTON. Discontinue it?

I am not clear in my own mind whether it is lethal aid. It is not lethal aid, is it, at the present time?

Senator CRANSTON. Well, that has been advocated, but there is none going out at the present time, is there?

Senator KERRY. I think that is something that cannot be answered in open session.

Mr. MUSKIE. I think that is right. I will take that answer.

But in any case, I think the aid we are supplying enhances the Khmer Rouge position on the battlefield, no question about it.

Second, I think the human costs ought to be of concern to us.

Third, it is tilting, and the State Department tells me that it will not talk to Phnom Penh because that would be tilting. Well, that is a very small tilt compared to military aid to the other side.

And, in addition of course, I think it muddies our view about the Khmer Rouge. And finally, a cutoff of aid to me would be an important signal to China.

Senator CRANSTON. If China continues to give aid to the Khmer Rouge and they continue to be a strong force, particularly if they are getting aid and others are not, what then do we do, if the peace process is not moving?

Mr. MUSKIE. With aid? I do not think our aid is critical to the fortunes of the Khmer Rouge or those allied with the Khmer Rouge, especially with the Chinese as willing as they appear to be to supply whatever is needed, so I do not see that our aid is—

Senator CRANSTON. No, I was not really asking that. I was asking, if the Khmer Rouge continue to get significant aid from the PRC and they become an increasingly dominant force, if there is not any matching aid to others there, then what do we do?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, that is a very good question, Senator, because if that continues then there is a real danger that the Khmer Rouge will be returned to power and as far as I can tell, that would not make the Chinese unhappy, and then we would have to live with the consequences, and we do not have too much time to play around with this.

I would assume from what I have seen of it that the situation can become fragile. Public confidence is terribly important here. Up to now, I think, given the performance of the last 10 years, given the improvement in their lives of the last 10 years, the Cambodian people are reasonably happy with the government in place in Phnom Penh.

But if they continue to be isolated—the Hun Sen government continues to be isolated, then the Khmer Rouge is in the field with a dominant political force and with the ability, of course, to try to influence the people. Which way will they go? will they collapse, will the economy collapse? Confidence is a terribly important thing.

How long is this battlefield exercise going to continue? Everyone has assumed that it will continue for 6 months and that then everybody would return to Paris to try to talk again. Well, I am not sure that would be the case if the scenario you pose in your ques-

tion evolves. I think the Khmer Rouge would want to stay in the field. If they began to gain momentum, began to roll and the Chinese see it, and the Chinese really want to Khmer Rouge to win, the momentum could go in that direction very rapidly.

So, I think we have got to be concerned. We cannot assume that just sitting by indefinitely will somehow produce the kind of solution that we seek to impose on Phnom Penh.

Senator CRANSTON. Even if we manage to get a peace process that produces an election and assuming the Khmer Rouge lose there, or do not do well, do you assume they will continue fighting as long as they have any capacity and the arms to enable them to carry on a war?

Mr. MUSKIE. They may. The Khmer Rouge? They may. There is speculation as to what kind of military supplies they have been able to set aside and reserve, and so one can only speculate about that.

I would think that if the Chinese discontinue, if the Chinese were to agree—and incidentally, I would like to make this point. At the Big Five Meeting in Paris, all five suppliers of all sides in this contest in Vietnam were there. They could have agreed among themselves to stop the war in Vietnam.

Senator CRANSTON. I want to compliment you on this book. I think it is beautifully done. The Center for National Policy produced it, but it is laid out beautifully. Your material in there is just fascinating. I think everybody should read this that is concerned about Cambodia and our responsibilities there.

Mr. MUSKIE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CRANSTON. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to Senator Robb and then come back.

Senator CRANSTON. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Muskie. Thank you for coming and being with us today, and thank you for spending some time with me before a recent trip to that area and giving me an opportunity to accept that invitation to go and see for myself.

At the outset, may I for the record identify that tilting object on the Dulles access highway. It is one near and dear to my heart. It is Virginia's Center for Innovative Technology. I will say no more about it in this particular forum, but I do not want it to go as simply that tilting object on the Dulles highway, and you can understand my parochial interest.

Mr. MUSKIE. I will agree that it is innovative. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBB. It comes from one aspect of my former life and I do not accept responsibility for all of the artistic or aesthetic portion, I simply asked that it make a statement, and indeed it did.

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, it is attention-getting, which is something we politicians understand.

Senator ROBB. That is right, which indeed accomplishes at least part of its mission.

I am not prepared to share at length all of my observations here. As you know, because you and I had an opportunity to meet and discuss at some length your trip and your observations and I had a chance to read your report, and I did have an opportunity in the

last couple of weeks to visit and to visit all of the key players in this particular conflict, including Sihanouk, and Ranariddh, and including Son Sann and General Sak, including Hun Sen and including Heng Samrin, as well as meeting with the Vietnamese in Indonesia.

I wonder if you could just share with us—you alluded to it just a minute ago because of the Paris meeting, but your particularly drawing on your experience as a former Secretary of State and what the appropriate role for the Perm Five might be in the resolution of this question.

I ask it simply because there was both the meeting that Hun Sen had with Sihanouk in Bangkok less than a week ago. The third meeting—it is really not a JIM III meeting, but the third meeting in Jakarta and the meetings that have taken place already and another one that is upcoming for the Perm Five, there are those who believe that only agreement with the Perm Five can bring about any kind of a meaningful solution to this.

I wonder if you would comment on how important their role—obviously the Soviet Union and China are the two key players and the United States is a third player. The other two nations are less important in this particular equation. But how important is their role? What kind of closure do the members of the Perm Five have to come to before we can resolve this question in your judgment?

Mr. MUSKIE. First of all, may I say I am delighted that you were able to go to Cambodia. I wish you might have been able to travel with me when I went.

Senator ROBB. As you know I made an effort. My duties here precluded it.

Mr. MUSKIE. Let me say first of all the involvement of the Permanent Five in the situation as it exists is the clearest recognition of the importance of their role in bringing it to a close. I do not think there is any way that the problem could be resolved without the input of these five members of the Security Council. In addition, of course, they would be a key, I think, to arranging for the involvement of the United Nations, which increasingly seems to be perceived by all parties as an important key to a resolution.

Third, I think increasingly all parties seem to agree that the objective of all of this effort has to be the organization of free and fair elections. I do not think that could be done without the United Nations involvement, and that means it cannot be done without the involvement of the Permanent Five.

Senator ROBB. If there is no agreement by China particularly in this particular component, is there a way in your judgment, barring their agreement, to resolve this question if the other four members of the Permanent Five were to agree and if the United Nations plays whatever role it can in this?

Mr. MUSKIE. If all other parties were to agree on a resolution along the lines that I have suggested, or along the lines that others have suggested, and China does not agree, China clearly could be a destabilizing influence and destroy all possibility of a peaceful resolution in the region. She is the principal supplier of the Khmer Rouge, and the Khmer Rouge are an effective fighting force as we all know. So if they were determined to continue that partnership,

whatever the other parties involved were to agree ought to be a solution, they could be a destabilizing force if that is what they wish.

But what I have difficulty understanding in the present situation is that everybody seems to assume that unless China agrees, all others have to conform to her policy. There is no suggestion that China's policy should be amenable to influence by others who are involved.

Everybody says, you have got to get China to do this. You have got to get China to do that. I say, let us pursue our own policy if it makes sense to us, serves our interest and is supported by other parties. Then it is China's responsibility, in her interest as well as the interest of the people in the region, her responsibility to decide what her policy ought to be.

I cannot imagine that the China that we have been involved with for the last 10 years is interested in isolating itself from the rest of the world as a result of Tiananmen Square and as a result of its policy with respect to the Khmer Rouge. I find it hard to understand that they would continue to feel that that is in their interest.

So, if they are not—you know, if their feet are not in concrete on that possibility, then it seems to me they have got to begin to listen to other parties involved if they are open to persuasion at all, and that we ought to begin to try to persuade her to change her policy, rather than be content to ride her policy because she is insistent on it.

Senator ROBB. I am certainly not here to defend China or their actions in either this or the other arena to which you refer. I think to suggest that either—and our own State Department will be following you as a witness. I do not think that that would be an appropriate characterization of their role, although some might interpret it that way, or certainly those of us who have been concerned with this particular question, or may follow some course of action which could be characterized at least in part along those lines.

Let me just ask you one other question, if I could. I did have a chance also to visit some of the base camps and I did not have a chance to visit all of the areas, but particularly some of the larger ones in site 2 and elsewhere, where they have something on the order of 300,000 refugees.

I do not recall specifically if your report addresses a disposition of this group with respect to the question of elections or the U.N. process or your own proposal or not, but how can we integrate those forces, those individuals, back into a political solution which would involve some sort of a free and fair election which I think is ultimately the objective of just about all the parties concerned?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, I know that the Hun Sen government would have no problem with assuming its share of the responsibility for integrating them into the economy and the society, and I would assume that would be true of the other parties as well.

Now, there would be an economic burden to this, to find a place for these people and to find an opportunity for them to build futures for themselves, but that I think would be more effectively addressed after an election and after a government is imposed, but so far as participating in the election, I do not see any reason why that could not be done.

It was handled in the case of Namibia. Voters were permitted to go from South Africa into Namibia and from the bordering areas on the north of Namibia to participate in that election and there were no problems. It was resolved. It was worked out. I do not see why it could not be here.

Senator ROBB. Leave everyone in place until such time as the political questions had been determined by an election, but permit the people to cross the border as they did in Namibia?

Mr. MUSKIE. I would think that that is a legitimate objective of the U.N. in organizing elections. I would think it would be. Similar questions arose—I do not know about Nicaragua, but in the case of Namibia there were thousands of people that moved up to vote on election day.

Senator ROBB. Senator Muskie, thank you. I have a number of questions I would like to pursue with you privately in terms of observations, but I would prefer to do that privately rather than in a public forum.

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Chuck.

I am now going to go, before going back to Senator Sarbanes, to Senator Pell, the full chairman of this committee, who has one question he wishes to ask and then he has to leave to go elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

You touched on in your statement the question of the recognition of Vietnam. It has been now 15, 17 years that the war has ended and we have been out, and I was wondering if you could expand a little bit on your thought here about the advantages to the United States, the advantages to the world in general of recognition of Vietnam.

Mr. MUSKIE. I think we should move to normalization. We seem to add new conditions as events unfold. Originally I think we were principally concerned about the MIA/POW issue. General Vessey's report appears to indicate that that kind of cooperation was offered and given.

Then the next issue was Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia. That was done in September, and I am convinced that Vietnam is interested in staying out of Cambodia. There are recent rumors that some Vietnamese forces were brought in recently. I do not know what the facts there are, and we should verify that, of course, one way or another.

Then, finally, I am convinced that the Vietnamese are more interested in economic growth and development than they are in any military ventures, as I said, and we ought to be concerned with taking advantage of that change in Vietnamese priorities to build a future, or help them build a future in that area. I know that is very much on Vietnam's mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I share your view completely. I am very glad that you are back here.

Mr. MUSKIE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. I will now turn to Senator Sarbanes. Senator Sarbanes, I have to leave briefly, and if you would preside in my absence, if you can, or if you have to leave, then Senator Kerry will stay and he will preside until I get back. I will be back very shortly.

Senator SARBANES [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to welcome you to the committee. I apologize that I was not actually here to listen to your statement. I have had the chance to read it and also to look through the report, and I want to join Senator Cranston in his very strong commendation to you for this report. It really constitutes a major contribution, I think, to the debate on this important issue.

Even while I have been here I have heard you touch on this, and you may have addressed it even more directly before I came, so if I am plowing old ground I hope you will forgive me.

Do you think if Sihanouk and Son Sann could be brought into a coalition with the existing government, that that coalition could control the Khmer Rouge? If the Khmer Rouge were excluded? That is, I know, quite a change in some of the dynamics. But just posit that for a moment.

Do you think that combination of forces could control the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, I am no military expert. And I did not have an opportunity, of course, to examine the military posture of all segments of the resistance to evaluate their respective contributions.

But my impression is that the Khmer Rouge are by far the strongest military force in the field. There is a question, as yet undetermined, I think, as to how effective a force Hun Sen has at his disposal. He felt quite confident in my discussion with him, as you would see from the interview that is printed in that report, that the resistance, including all three factions of the resistance, would not be able to take over the government in the period ahead.

He seemed quite confident of that.

He suffered some setbacks, I think, but I do not think as yet that he has lost any of the cities. He has lost some of the countryside, and there is always speculation as to how important that might be.

But I think the military resolve or the present situation in the field is a speculative one.

Now, making the kind of shift that your question poses, I have great difficulty dealing with that. Because caught up in all of that would be the question of what the present suppliers of the various factions would do. The Soviets, of course, support Vietnam.

Senator SARBANES. Leaving China out of it for the moment—let us assume that the other suppliers would support the combination of Sihanouk, Son Sann, and Hun Sen. In other words, the purpose is to exclude the Khmer Rouge.

It is not clear to me why anyone wants to include them in anything. I am having difficulty following any policy that entertains that principle. But let us assume that you had the other three elements join together and the suppliers, other than China for the moment, supported them. Could that combination control the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. MUSKIE. That might be the situation, virtually, that you would have if there were elections without the support of the Chinese and the Khmer Rouge. That presumably could be the nature of the support that the elected government could rally around its side.

I think it would then depend upon whether or not, in order to hold the elections, the Hun Sen government had been dismantled. I think the assumption would be, from your question, that it would not have been. That the elections would have been held, the government in place, and then the government modified by the results of the election. And the two non-Communist resistance forces would then be supporting the government, along with Hun Sen.

I would think that government would have a shot at defending itself, and a good shot. But that is a nonexpert military judgment.

Senator SARBANES. You would say that, even with China continuing to supply the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. MUSKIE. It would then depend upon the willingness of the Soviet Union to continue its support of Vietnam and Cambodia. And we do not know what Vietnam would do in that situation either.

Senator SARBANES. All right. But, for the moment, I take it, you are positing that if you could combine those elements, they would have a good chance of being able to control the Khmer Rouge, even if China continued to supply them? Would that be your view?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, I guess I would prefer to modify your assumption just a little bit. I think that if you could move toward free elections, keeping the Hun Sen government in place, without the support of the Chinese, and with the Khmer Rouge outside the fold, I think that that result could be defended. I think it could be defended.

I think the burden would be on the Soviets and the United States to make sure that that could be defended.

Senator SARBANES. Now suppose, under this scenario I am suggesting that the Chinese stopped supplying the Khmer Rouge. What is your view then on the ability of this combination of elements to control them?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, the speculation is, as we discussed I think before you came in, that the Khmer Rouge have supplies cached away throughout the country that would enable them to continue for some time. But nobody really has any measure or any evaluation of what that might be.

They could be troublesome. But I cannot believe that the Khmer Rouge could hold out indefinitely against the rest of the world.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that there is any way that we could move to ease or perhaps end Sihanouk's dependency on China?

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, I think he has got to be concerned about what he wants his own future to be. It certainly has been a dominant factor in his life. He does not seem ready to cut it off. And he does not seem to see another road that he can travel.

It is of interest to me that within 3 or 4 weeks of the Jakarta meeting, preceding it, he resigned as head of the coalition and decided to move back into Cambodia to live. He had not lived there for more than 10 years. He has not been in Phnom Penh for more than 10 years.

I find it difficult to envision Sihanouk moving from the fairly comfortable life he has had in Beijing and living in the Phnom Penh which I saw last October. Maybe he is up to that. I am not sure.

He seems interested in trying to do so.

Hun Sen sees the value of Sihanouk. I do not think his opinion of Sihanouk is very high. But he will have to speak to that. I do not think it is. Because he thinks that Sihanouk has let him down.

You may remember that at the Paris conference of August of last year was the result of meetings in Jakarta between Sihanouk and Hun Sen. And the purpose of the conference was presumably to build on those Jakarta meetings. Sihanouk arrived in Paris and decided he wanted the Khmer Rouge on his side. It was his decision that destroyed any possibility that Paris had of reaching a solution in August, as far as I can see.

But Sihanouk I think can or cannot be an important part of the transition after elections, depending upon what he does between now and then. And as of now, I think he has not given us a very clear view of what it is that he wants.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I certainly want to join my colleagues in recognizing the commitment that you have made to address this dilemma.

I am concerned with what I view as a shifting of our policy with regard to Vietnam. Before the withdrawal, I think it was generally agreed that we would demand that the Vietnamese withdraw forces from Cambodia, participate seriously in the Cambodian negotiations and also that the MIA/POW progress had to be very positive to hasten normalization.

I think that lasted through 1989. And then, after the withdrawal, we put on other conditions—a condition that there be verification of the withdrawal, and that the Vietnamese must pressure Cambodia into an acceptable solution.

The justification for that, I gather, was that if we kept the pressure on longer, Hanoi would be much more helpful in the next round of international negotiations over Cambodia or some such thing. I never quite understood the logic of moving our position, because clearly there has been some movement by Vietnam.

Regarding the possibility of other countries going in, assisting Vietnam, I gather the Japanese are very interested, but somewhat hesitant to move in, as are the French, and other European nations.

I would like you to comment on the general appropriateness of the change in policy, as you see it, and as you get feedback from the Vietnamese as they look at a position that was steadfast and then changed, and how they view the attitude of the United States; and whether you think we can get a position where we are satisfied and decide to go in and perhaps provide some assistance.

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, I have difficulty in understanding the rationale. I think until the August meetings in Paris, my impression was that we considered Sihanouk an important part of any solution.

And I do not think I would quarrel with that, at the time, or have any disagreement with it. That would seem to have required an agreement between Hun Sen and Sihanouk, that hopefully Sihanouk might be able to persuade the Khmer Rouge to agree to. It seemed sort of logical and rational, on the basis of what we have been for before.

But then in Paris, Sihanouk, as I said a moment or two ago, became convinced in his own mind, apparently, that a political solution could not be achieved—a political solution leading to elections could not be achieved unless there was a powersharing government in the transition period to elections. And that the Khmer Rouge should be part of it.

Now I cannot believe that he has very strong affections for the Khmer Rouge personally. He lost 19 members of his own family, but nevertheless he appears to have been committed to that.

Now we had not been committed to that prior to this making that decision.

Senator MURKOWSKI. That is correct.

Mr. MUSKIE. And so then, we became convinced apparently, and apparently are still convinced that there has to be a dismantling of the Hun Sen government and a four-power, quadripartite government in place with the Khmer Rouge as an equal share.

Well, that is what threw the Paris conference into disarray as far as my view of it is concerned. But we have stayed with that ever since. We have opposed verification because we thought that without verification that would bring pressure on the Vietnamese to bring pressure on the Cambodians, to approve the quadripartite answer.

So, we have opposed verification of the very thing we asked the Vietnamese to do, to withdraw from Cambodia.

The only opinion I get among those in the administration I talk to is that they believe that withdrawal took place. Now whether something else has happened since is a subject of recent newspaper speculation.

But, in any case, we seem to have been persuaded by Sihanouk that you have got to have an interim quadripartite political solution, dismantling the Hun Sen government, and putting the Khmer Rouge in as an equal partner in this interim government, and moving toward elections.

Now my view of that is that I would rather have the Khmer Rouge outside than inside with the ability to create chaos and disarray. But, in any case, we do not seem to have changed that commitment to Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.

We say, using as strong language as we can, we are unalterably opposed to the return of the Khmer Rouge to power, and yet we seem committed to the course that, to me, seems most likely to return the Khmer Rouge to power. And we do not seem to change.

We object that Hun Sen has no flexibility in his position. We criticize the Vietnamese for not having flexibility in their position, by which we mean that they will not agree to the quadripartite solution that we have devised with Sihanouk.

Well, where is the inflexibility? On which side is it?

We committed to Sihanouk on this and we have not changed. Hun Sen and Vietnam have opposed the quadripartite solution. They have not changed on that. But they have moved. They have moved toward verification. They have moved toward U.N. involvement, toward U.N. involvement in the cease-fire, and in cutting off of material aid, and in the organization of the elections themselves.

Hun Sen has moved in those directions. Where have we moved?

I have not seen that we have moved at all.

Now we have, in the Paris conference of just a week or two ago, joined with the other permanent members of the Security Council to speak approvingly of the Australian approach. But there are details yet to be filled in on the Australian approach. Details that Hun Sen recognizes need to be considered, but which do not seem to have been resolved in the Jakarta conference which just ended a day or two ago.

So, where I see our policy—and you are going to have two Administration witnesses this morning, maybe they have a later word on what exactly our policy is that makes it look different than the way I have described it—but, I see our policy as having been committed to a quadripartite government, dismantling the Hun Sen government, a share of power for the Khmer Rouge, leading to elections.

On verification, in the Paris meeting of a couple of weeks ago, I think all five expressed an interest in verification, but they have not yet done anything to implement it.

So, there are all of these things still hanging in the fire. That is I see it, Senator.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And from the standpoint of the Vietnamese Government, in their view of our initial conditions, and now our revisiting what can you tell us about that?

Mr. MUSKIE. I know we discussed it. I discussed it with the Prime Minister.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, just briefly, if you could comment on what they are telling you.

Mr. MUSKIE. I will. It was the first subject they raised, really. Both Do Muoi, who is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, or the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister, Thach, that is the first subject they raised.

They just do not understand. They said they understood that their cooperation on MIA/POW was a condition. Then we added to that, withdrawal from Cambodia. Then we would not go for verification of that withdrawal, so they are left hanging on that one.

And then finally, the third condition we added is that they have to approve the quadripartite solution, notwithstanding their doubts about the security of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge.

They ticked it off.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, they are just throwing their hands up.

Mr. MUSKIE. They threw their hands up.

But they are still interested. They want to normalize with us. They want to normalize with China. They want to move toward economic development and growth. They emphasized that over and over again. There is nothing belligerent in anything that I encountered.

They would like to sell shrimp in the United States.

Now I do not know how successful they would be, giving the importance of the Caribbean shrimp fishery in the American market, but they are interested in a trade relationship with us.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Paul.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. I have used my time. I know we want to move on to the next panel. If I could ask just one quick question.

How do you think we should handle the U.N. seat? Do you see that as an impediment to the capacity of the U.N. to enter into this solution? Should we press for a vacating of the current holding of the coalition seat in order to assist the U.N. to move in and make the Australian solution palpable?

Mr. MUSKIE. I have had some exposure to that, and I understand that the Australians now have a 156-page report. For the last 2 or 3 weeks the Australians have been involved in talks with Hun Sen and, I think, with others to fill in the details of a transition government, how to do it.

There has been talk of a supreme council that would represent in a loose way all the parties, the four factions, but not a dismantling of the government. The U.N. would take over the organization of elections. Then with respect to those segments of the government that deliver other services, that really has not been spelled out yet. It is a detail that was left unresolved in the Paris meeting, left unresolved in Jakarta, and we still do not know where it stands. I hope to get more information on it.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much.

Senator CRANSTON. I guess that completes our questioning, Senator Muskie.

Mr. MUSKIE. You are very kind.

Senator CRANSTON. We appreciate very much your presence and the very helpful advice and the guidance you have given us. Thank you a great, great deal.

Mr. MUSKIE. Thank you very much.

Senator CRANSTON. Before proceeding to the next witness, I want to just note that Senator Helms is delayed. He asked me to point out to the subcommittee that while the full committee hearings of February 7 on China have been ordered to be printed, through inadvertence this subcommittee's China hearings of last November 7 were not ordered to be printed.

I chaired those hearings and was very impressed by the testimony of our witnesses, former Ambassador to China, Winston Lord, Dr. Meryl Goldman, and the Executive Director of the International League for Human Rights, Felice Gear.

Pursuant to Senator Helms' suggestion, I ask unanimous consent that the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee hearings held on China on November 7, 1989, be ordered to be printed.

We will now go to the administration panel, consisting of the Honorable John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, State Department, and Mr. David Lambertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the State Department.

We welcome you to this hearing. Secretary Bolton, I believe you will go first.

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BOLTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here today. I have a prepared statement which, with your permission, I would ask be included in the record, and I would pro-

pose in light of the hour basically skimming over and summarizing the prepared statement.

Senator CRANSTON. Good. That will be helpful, and the full statement will appear in the record.

Mr. BOLTON. Basically, Mr. Chairman, the interested countries of the region, the permanent five members of the Security Council and others came together in Paris this past summer in an effort to find a resolution to the conflict in Cambodia. Although the conference ultimately did not produce agreement, it did produce movement on a number of fronts, most notably the necessity for a comprehensive political solution.

There was also consensus, although incomplete at that point, on the need for a fairly substantial United Nations presence in the settlement process.

Most observers believe that the Paris conference broke down on the question of the power sharing arrangements among the four Cambodian factions during the interim period leading hopefully to free and fair elections. We believe that after the conference failed to reach agreement, it was important to see if there was not some other way that we could proceed in order to avoid continued bloodshed and, in particular, in order to avoid coming to power again of the Khmer Rouge.

Secretary Baker came up with the idea that perhaps one way to proceed, following on our experience with the Iran-Iraq conflict and the bringing to independence of Namibia, might be to have the five permanent members of the Security Council begin consultations, looking to see if they could create an equitable framework to propose to the Cambodian parties.

We began that process by a meeting of the permanent five in January where we produced 16 agreed-upon points which are listed in the testimony and which I will not repeat here. Of particular importance coming out of that Paris meeting in January was the agreement that the United Nations should play a larger role than had previously been envisioned, an enhanced role in the language of the five, and that the U.N. should administer, as opposed to monitor, free and fair elections.

Just a few weeks ago in New York we held the second meeting of the permanent five, focusing at that meeting on the two most vexing questions of a United Nations role, the question of the U.N.'s role in a peacekeeping operation in Cambodia and the question of a U.N. role administering the entire country.

We have in the course of our work, Mr. Chairman, among the five and other interested parties such as the Australians, come up with a list of possible functions the United Nations could perform in an overall solution of the Cambodian conflict, the two that I just mentioned, the most difficult, the peacekeeping and military aspect on the one hand and the administration of Cambodia on the other. There are a number of others listed and elaborated on in the testimony, repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country and the administration of elections.

Now many of these roles are familiar to the constituent parts of the U.N. family such as the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, but others are not; notably, a peacekeeping role in a mili-

tary situation involving guerrilla war and the administration of an entire country.

I discuss in the prepared testimony at some length some of the difficulties that a U.N. military force would face in the kind of military context we have in Cambodia. The successful U.N. military peacekeeping operations in the past have typically involved a disengagement of two obvious combatant parties. I mentioned the Iran-Iraq case a moment ago. The case of the U.N. disengagement observer force on the Golan Heights is another. The case of UNFICYP, the U.N. forces in Cypress, is another.

In Cambodia there are multiple parties and guerrilla warfare conditions, or at least the potential for guerrilla warfare conditions, which make the potential U.N. role much more difficult. There is the further difficult question of the monitoring of the withdrawal of all foreign forces and a number of others.

The second major difficult task that is being proposed for the U.N. is this question of U.N. administration of the country during an interim period leading up to free and fair elections. Basically, the permanent five have not moved very far in terms of reaching agreement in that area. Our view is that the U.N. presence throughout the country in a united administration should be of a size, scope and duration such that the political playing field is leveled and that no party uses the advantages of government to enhance their own prospects in the election.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I think we must be candid that we do not know exactly what that means in terms of the numbers of people who might be involved, and the intrusiveness of the U.N. role both horizontally and vertically. By horizontally, I mean how visible the United Nations must be out in the countryside, vertically by how deep one must go within the various ministries of the Cambodian government in Phnom Penh.

As Senator Muskie said, the Australians have spent some time there doing research which has proven very valuable which we are reviewing now, and we anticipate that a properly structured U.N. factfinding mission which could supplement the work of the U.N. mission that was sent out this summer would be appropriate in the relatively near future to give us more information to help us answer the question of exactly the size and scope of the U.N. force.

We have had extensive discussions with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and with members of the Secretariat who are concerned with events in Cambodia. The Secretary General has taken the unprecedented step of setting up a task force inside the Secretariat composed of a variety of different officials who would be involved in a U.N. role in Cambodia. We have discussed with them a number of kinds of questions which I have raised today. They have raised other questions such as the definition of foreign forces, as I mentioned, the exact nature of the cease fire and how militarily the blue helmets would act inside Cambodia, questions of disarmament and demobilization of existing combatant forces, and the depth and extent generally of the U.N. involvement.

As I am sure you will agree, the task we have before us is complex and sensitive. In designing a U.N. role to implement a comprehensive settlement, we must keep in mind feasibility and affordability. Any U.N. operation must be effective and efficient. Obvi-

ously, it will be costly. While such costs are breathtaking, the world community cannot afford to turn its back on the more than a decade of human tragedy that the Cambodian people have experienced and the risk that if we do nothing the Khmer Rouge will once again sweep to power.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. If the committee finds it suitable, Mr. Lambertson, who is here representing my colleague, Assistant Secretary Solomon, has a number of comments on the general political situation in the region.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BOLTON

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the role of the United Nations in facilitating and implementing a comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian conflict. As we all are too well aware, the road to peace in Cambodia has proved to be rough and circuitous; and we still have a substantial way to travel. We believe that the United Nations can play an important and salutary role in moving the peace process in Cambodia forward and ensuring that the Cambodian people do not have to experience yet another decade of tragedy.

The year 1989 was a dynamic, if ultimately unsatisfactory one in terms of the Cambodian peace process. The United States agreed to participate in last August's Paris Conference on Cambodia in the hope and expectation that it would achieve a comprehensive settlement. Needless to say, we all were disappointed when it did not. Although fully aware of the strong differences among the Cambodian parties on fundamental issues such as powersharing, we had hoped that those differences could be bridged and a comprehensive settlement realized.

However disappointing the results of the conference were initially, reflection allows a more positive view. The Paris conference confirmed the necessity of a comprehensive political settlement; a partial settlement was perceived as a recipe for continued violence. It achieved accord on most of the "external" elements necessary for a comprehensive settlement. On the technical level, the conference participants accomplished a good deal of valuable work on the specific elements involved in mounting a peacekeeping operation, international guarantees, rehabilitation, and repatriation. Finally, and importantly, there was also a virtual consensus that the United Nations must play a central role in the settlement process.

While the Paris Conference brought the peace process closer to a comprehensive settlement, the conference foundered on the central question of powersharing. The parties clearly were not prepared to make the compromises necessary to permit formation of a coalition government that could guide Cambodia during a transition period leading to free and fair elections.

Since the conclusion of the Paris Conference, the United States priority has remained redirecting the focus in Cambodia away from the battlefield and back to the negotiating table. Anything less than a comprehensive political settlement will leave an unstable situation which we fear will work to the advantage of the Khmer Rouge. The longer the fighting continues, the greater the opportunity for the Khmer Rouge to succeed, a possibility which no one favors.

Our specific focus has been on working with the major powers and interested countries within the region to try to bridge the differences between the Cambodian parties and to bring about a comprehensive settlement. Following the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Secretary Baker suggested that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, France, the Soviet Union, the U.K. and the United States—meet to attempt to craft an equitable framework for a settlement that could be recommended to the Cambodian parties.

In response to the Secretary's suggestion, representatives of the Perm Five met in Paris in January to renew the peace process. After 2 days of intensive discussions the Five agreed on a set of 16 principles to guide their efforts. These principles included, *inter alia*, agreement that: No solution could be obtained by force; a comprehensive political settlement, including the verified withdrawal of foreign forces, a cease-fire and cessation of outside assistance, was required; an enhanced U.N. role was vital to achieving a solution; fair and free elections must be conducted under direct U.N. administration; the elections must be conducted in a neutral political environment in which no party would be advantaged; and a Supreme National

Council should be formed as the repository of Cambodian sovereignty during the transition period.

Of particular importance was the agreement that the United Nations should play a larger role than had previously been envisioned, an "enhanced" role in the language of the Five, and that the U.N. should administer, as opposed to monitor, free and fair elections.

Several weeks ago, the Perm Five held a consultative meeting in New York to continue exploring the issues associated with an enhanced U.N. role in Cambodia. Representatives of the Five began more detailed exploratory talks on the key issues that remain to be resolved, such as the nature and timing of a cease-fire and military disengagement and the extent of U.N. administrative involvement in Cambodia. These are difficult and contentious issues. We made substantial progress on the military/peacekeeping aspects of a U.N. role, but there still is disagreement on the extent to which the forces should be disarmed and demobilized. Thus, much work remains to be done. And, as is usually the case in issues in which the stakes are high for the principal parties, the devil is in the details and working these out will be a necessary, if painstaking process.

The Perm Five are tentatively planning to meet again in Paris the second week in March. In the meantime, discussions at the working level will continue in New York to identify and work out areas of agreement between the Five. As well, the Five will be able to draw on any conclusions from this week's meeting in Jakarta at which the Cambodian parties and ASEAN are seeking to narrow political differences.

We have identified a number of potential functions that the U.N. and various of its component agencies could play in a Cambodian settlement. Among these are:

- **Peacekeeping and military aspects:** This would include activities to restore peace, minimize future civil war, and establish a secure environment for elections. The U.N. forces would have to monitor the cease-fire, cessation of outside military aid, the disarmament and demobilization of factional forces and the formation of new armed and police forces.

- **Administration of the country:** The purpose of this would be to maintain government stability, deliver essential public services and achieve a neutral political environment during the transition period. The U.N. would have the responsibility of ensuring an environment for free and fair elections by neutralizing or diluting the existing administrative structures so that the country is run in a neutral manner, not favorable to any faction.

- **Repatriation:** This would entail assisting the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons.

- **Rehabilitation/Reconstruction:** We foresee the U.N. involved in a coordinating role, meeting basic humanitarian needs perhaps along the lines of Operation Sala'am in Afghanistan.

- **Administering Elections:** The U.N. would actually conduct the elections to ensure they are free and fair.

Many of these roles, such as the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons are familiar to the U.N. family, but certain others are not, notably a peacekeeping role in a military situation involving a guerrilla war and the administration of an entire country.

Ideally, we would hope to see the conflict cease as quickly as possible, with a voluntary cease-fire taking effect at the time of the settlement signing. The formal cease-fire would commence when U.N. forces are deployed to monitor it adequately. At that time, the U.N. would begin verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, monitoring the cessation of outside assistance and implementing the agreed disarmament and demobilization facets of the settlement. An operation of this nature in the Cambodian environment will be extremely difficult.

U.N. operations to monitor cease-fires have been most successful where there are only two opposing forces, deployed on opposite sides of a clear line of demarcation such as on the Iran-Iraq border and in Cyprus. The difficulties in monitoring a cessation of fighting and separating forces to diminish the possibility of further conflict—whether accidental or intentional—are significantly greater when there are multiple parties to a conflict who are spread around a countryside, when there are numerous small units operating under conditions where command and control systems are rudimentary at best, when there is at best only grudging agreement to end the fighting. In Cambodia, the fact that there are no clear winners and losers on the battlefield, and that the parties have fundamentally different expectations for a settlement, means it will be important to get clear (and agreed) operating procedures for the U.N.

The substantial involvement of the U.N. in the administration of a state would also be an unprecedented and admittedly extremely difficult task for the U.N. However, the rationale for the U.N.'s attempting this exercise is compelling. The neutral administration of Cambodia by the U.N. would bypass the seemingly intractable issue of how the Cambodian parties would share power fairly in the interim period. Also, the idea of an enhanced role for the U.N. is that it would assume day-to-day responsibility for administering Cambodia, thereby helping to ensure a "level playing field" for Cambodian elections. By substituting U.N. administrators for the PRK in Phnom Penh and the provinces, the U.N. would effectively neutralize the advantages of incumbency that the PRK possesses. By operating nationwide, the U.N. would limit intimidation by any party.

A substantial U.N. presence would give the people of Cambodia confidence that they were in fact in a transition period and that their exercise of their franchise would be truly meaningful. In addition, the presence of U.N. administrators and peacekeepers would provide a strong inhibiting factor to the outbreak of renewed fighting during the period prior to the elections. Concomitantly, it would help to prevent the return to power of the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

This is fully in accord with the administration's position. We would hope to see a U.N. military and civilian presence large enough to be effective and visible, thereby demonstrating to the Cambodians that they are in a true transition to free and fair elections. We believe, most importantly, that the general administrative authority in Cambodia must rest with the senior U.N. representative if the elections are to be meaningful. U.N. officials should replace YRK and CGDK administrators wherever deemed necessary to ensure the neutrality of government operations and to limit intimidation. The U.N. presence may have to reach down to the district level and be most intrusive in those areas of government activity that are crucial to the conduct of fair elections. At a minimum, ministries such as internal security, defense, and information would need significant numbers of U.N. personnel either to perform essential functions or to monitor the activities of incumbents. In other parts of the government, we believe U.N. officials would have to "shadow" the conduct of key bureaucrats to ensure their neutrality.

During preliminary discussions we have had with U.N. Secretariat personnel we have identified some of the detailed and politically sensitive questions which will have to be addressed if we are to implement a U.N. operation of this magnitude, including:

- the definition of foreign forces: there was disagreement at the Paris Conference on what constituted "foreign forces"; the resistance allegation that many of the Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia are disguised soldiers will have to be dealt with; obviously identifying guerrillas in opposition to main forces also will be extremely difficult.

- the nature of the cease-fire: is it simply a cessation of fighting or does it imply steps should be taken to prevent a recurrence; should it be a cease-fire in place or should the armed elements be regrouped?

- disarmament and demobilization: should the armed elements be totally disarmed and demobilized or should the factions be permitted to maintain some level of armament; what should the timing and pace of disarmament and demobilization be? In Namibia experience suggests demobilization may increase rather than decrease tensions.

- depth and extent of U.N. involvement: In addition to the extent of administrative involvement, what powers will the U.N. have, executive only or also legislative and judicial? Will it have responsibility for economic policy?

As I am sure you will agree, the task we have before us is complex and sensitive. Whether the parties have the will to compromise, indeed whether there is agreement among the outside parties that a political settlement is necessary are still unanswered questions. Finding the answers to the many questions and issues which remain will be a daunting task. It need not be impossible, but it will take patience, imagination and enormous political will among all the parties involved in this tragic conflict. In designing a U.N. role to implement a comprehensive settlement, we must keep in mind feasibility and affordability. Any U.N. operation must be effective and efficient. Obviously, it also may be costly. We are hopeful that other interested nations will contribute generously to this vital undertaking and we could then see some sharing of these costs and a concomitant lessening of our financial obligation. In any event, while such costs are breathtaking, the world community cannot afford to turn its back on the more than a decade of human tragedy that the Cambodian people have experienced and the risk that, if we do nothing, the KR will once again sweep to power.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. Yes, we would like to hear from you, Secretary Lambertson.

STATEMENT OF DAVID LAMBERTSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have submitted a statement for the record. I would like to summarize few of its key points.

Senator CRANSTON. Fine. Your statement will appear in full.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The objective of United States policy toward Cambodia continues to be a comprehensive settlement which ensures that Vietnamese forces are out of that country, that the Khmer Rouge are prevented from coming back into power, and that the Cambodian people have an opportunity to determine their own future through free and fair elections.

We believe that while, as Secretary Bolton points out, this is going to be a complex undertaking, it is achievable, and it is going to be possible to structure a framework that can bring a durable peace to Cambodia. We are convinced that only such a settlement, a comprehensive settlement in which the international community is fully engaged and supportive, can ensure against a resurgence of the Khmer Rouge.

Needless to say, I hope, this administration and the United States remains totally opposed to that abhorrent group, and we will do all that we can to see that a negotiated settlement provides workable measures to contain it. Indeed, we recognize that the ability of a negotiated settlement to fulfill that task, guarding against the return of the Khmer Rouge, will be the truest measure of its success or failure.

If a comprehensive settlement is to be achieved at all, the final step of which is to be a free and fair election, such a settlement must also address the political monopoly now enjoyed by the PRK as a result of the long Vietnamese occupation.

The Phnom Penh regime must accept the necessity for a strong and effective United Nations presence during the transition period. The aim of such a presence is not to put the PRK at a disadvantage but, as Assistant Secretary Bolton has noted, to level the playing field so that the election is free and fair. Hun Sen and his supporters should not fear such a contest.

The United States continues strongly to support Prince Sihanouk in his efforts to bring peace to his country. Sihanouk will have a central role in any negotiated settlement. If he and his supporters were unable to play that role, the contest would become essentially bipartite between implacable Communist enemies, and prospects for a negotiated solution would recede rapidly.

For Sihanouk and the non-Communists to have political credibility, they must also maintain their viability and their independence on the ground in Cambodia. Hence, we and other governments intend to continue our assistance to the non-Communist resistance. Our own assistance, I should add, is of the nonlethal variety.

We continue to believe that Vietnam has both the ability and the responsibility to contribute to an acceptable political settlement of

the Cambodian conflict, and we hope it takes the opportunity represented by the emerging consensus with respect to an enhanced United Nations role to do that.

Vietnam should accept and it should encourage Phnom Penh to accept a significant United Nations military and administrative presence during the transition period. A comprehensive settlement built around such a United Nations presence would not jeopardize Vietnam's strategic or political interests. On the contrary, by working with the international community toward such a settlement, Vietnam would advance its interests and could open the way toward the normalization of relations with the United States.

None of what I have said with respect to normalization of relations, incidentally, is new to the Vietnamese or represents a new condition for normalization. It has been part of our position for several years, dating back at least to the early 1980's.

As I noted in my prepared statement, Vietnam also understands quite clearly that continued cooperation with us in the effort to account for our men missing in action in Southeast Asia and on other important humanitarian issues will affect the pace and the scope, as we put it, of the normalization process.

As Mr. Bolton's statement made clear, there are indeed many obstacles remaining in the path toward a comprehensive settlement of this kind, and yet significant progress has been made, and there is an unmistakable momentum. We will do everything we can to keep that process going, to hasten it in order to achieve as soon as possible a solution that will serve the best interests of the Cambodian people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lambertson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID F. LAMBERTSON

Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee once again to discuss the situation in Cambodia and our efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement there.

It was almost exactly 5 months ago that elaborate publicity marked the withdrawal of Vietnamese combat troops from Cambodia. Recent press accounts have raised new questions as to the reality of that withdrawal, or whether some Vietnamese troops have since returned to Cambodia.

While we have not yet confirmed these reports, these questions in turn underscore three points: That in the absence of negotiated settlement fighting is likely to continue to escalate—a situation most likely to benefit the Khmer Rouge; that the need to find a negotiated solution has become increasingly urgent; and that the key to such a solution, in the view of a growing number of governments, is a significant United Nations role in putting in place a comprehensive political settlement.

As we pursue an enhanced U.N. role in Cambodia, United States policy is geared toward bringing about a settlement whose key elements would include the international verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops; effective measures to prevent a Khmer Rouge return to power; an end to the political monopoly of the Phnom Penh regime during the transition period; and genuine self-determination for the Cambodian people through free and fair elections. We want to restore independence and peace to a country which has seen more than its share of tragedy. This is why the administration, as Assistant Secretary Bolton has made clear, has been so active in the diplomatic and political efforts underway to promote a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict. We believe that a durable political settlement in Cambodia is achievable, and that such a solution can bring to an end the suffering of the Cambodian people, reestablish a free and independent Cambodia, and enhance the political stability and economic prosperity of Southeast Asia.

We remain convinced, in particular, that only a comprehensive political solution can establish the stability necessary to prevent a return to dominance of the Khmer

Rouge. The United States remains unalterably opposed to this abhorrent group, and is fully mindful of its legacy of brutality and depravity. A durable settlement must therefore incorporate concrete measures to contain the Khmer Rouge, including an effective United Nations monitoring and peacekeeping force.

While the full range of measures to be adopted remains a crucial area of negotiation among the Cambodian parties, their supporters, the Perm Five group, and other interested members of the international community, it is clear that discredited Khmer Rouge leaders, including Pol Pot, must not be allowed to play any role in a future Cambodian government. In this regard, we regularly press all those involved to cut back with a view to ending their aid to the Khmer Rouge and otherwise join in a commitment to control the KR in the context of a comprehensive Cambodian solution. We recognize that this will be the most difficult and crucial aspect of a settlement and the key to its success or failure. The Khmer Rouge must never be permitted to subject the Cambodian people to the horrors of the past.

At the same time, it should be remembered that many of the leaders of the present Phnom Penh regime are former Khmer Rouge and therefore share responsibility for the crimes of that murderous group. Their regime, imposed as a result of a foreign invasion and sustained by a 10-year occupation, is not legitimate. Nor, in our view, is it strong. The recent reports of a Vietnamese troop presence, if true, underscore its fragility. Thus, even if it were worthy of the support of the international community, which it is not, the PRK would be an uncertain bulwark against a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. This reinforces our conviction that only a negotiated political settlement with a substantial U.N. peacekeeping force can provide the assurances which the Cambodian people and the international community demand. Efforts to bring about such a settlement, however assiduously pursued, will fail unless the Phnom Penh regime, and its Soviet and Vietnamese backers, accept the necessity for an extensive and intrusive United Nations presence during the transition period preceding elections. The objective of such a presence is not to disadvantage the PRK, only to level the playing field so that a fair election can be held. If the Hun Sen regime is as popular among the Cambodian people as its proponents claim, it need not fear such a solution.

We continue to believe that Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communists must play a vital role as an alternative to the two Communist groups. Prince Sihanouk remains the individual best able to unite his country and his people, in our view. In the absence of a significant role for Sihanouk and the non-Communist factions, continued warfare is probably inevitable. This is a widely recognized reality, which even the PRK and its backers do not dispute. We therefore intend to continue strongly to support Prince Sihanouk and both non-Communist factions.

We remain satisfied that our assistance program for the Cambodian Non-Communist Resistance (NCR) is vital, for if the NCR is unable to sustain itself as a viable and independent force, it will be unable to play the political role which a settlement will demand. In that case, prospects for a negotiated peace will recede dramatically. As you know, the non-Communists receive assistance in a variety of forms from a number of countries, efforts which we support. U.S. Government assistance to the NCR has been and continues to be nonlethal.

I would like to take this occasion to reiterate our longstanding position with respect to relations with Vietnam. Normalization of U.S.-SRV relations requires the genuine, verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in the context of a negotiated settlement of that conflict. We hope that Vietnam will contribute to a solution along the lines now emerging, in which the United Nations plays a central role in both the military and political aspects of a transition. It should recognize that such a solution is not designed either to punish Vietnam or to jeopardize its interests, but to establish an independent, peaceful, and neutral Cambodia, free of the threat of a Khmer Rouge resurgence. Accordingly, Vietnam should accept, and encourage Phnom Penh to accept, the need for an effective United Nations presence to ensure a credible election at the end of the transition period.

If Vietnam helps to bring about such a settlement, the political obstacle to normalization of relations will have been removed. As Vietnam's leaders understand, the pace and scope of the normalization process will be affected by their continued cooperation with us in our effort to achieve the fullest possible accounting of our men missing in Southeast Asia and on other issues of humanitarian concern.

The limited but important progress accomplished at the Paris Conference last August and continued through the Perm Five process—as detailed by Assistant Secretary Bolton toward defining the outline of an agreement has helped bring much closer to reality a comprehensive settlement: One that verifies Vietnam's withdrawal, prevents a Khmer Rouge return to power—or a monopoly of power by any faction during the transition—and allows genuine self-determination for the Cambodi-

an people. We look forward to learning the results of the informal meeting on Cambodia which concluded today in Jakarta. The strong role played by ASEAN, through the earlier Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) process, at the U.N., and at the Paris Conference has helped bridge the differences between the Cambodian parties and their supporters. We hope that the momentum of this negotiating process can be sustained and will culminate, soon, in a settlement which serves the best interests of all of the Cambodian people.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you both very much for your statements and for abbreviating the longer ones that will appear in the record.

Let me put this to whichever of you chooses to respond. How does the administration justify not even talking to the strongest bulwark against the Khmer Rouge, which is the Hun Sen government?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. If I may start, Mr. Chairman, we are in a negotiating process. We are supporters of the non-Communist resistance in a process in which they are one of the players. We do not regard as legitimate the Phnom Penh government. It was installed by Vietnamese invasion; it was sustained for 10 years by Vietnamese occupation.

We believe that were we to tilt in that direction, as Secretary Muskie put it, the result would be not to hasten the prospects for negotiation in which the PRK is going to have to make some concessions but, instead, to make less likely concessions from that quarter. So, we do not plan at this stage to have such contact.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Could I just observe, I did not understand Senator Muskie to perceive that talking to the Hun Sen government was tilting in that direction. I understood it only as straightening out a tilt which now exists, a very pronounced tilt, in the other direction.

Did you not hear it that way?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I accept the fact that we tilt in the direction of our friends, the non-Communist resistance and Prince Sihanouk.

Senator SARBANES. Talking to that government does not necessarily constitute tilting in their direction.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. No, I understand that.

Senator SARBANES. It may mean remedying or putting upright a tilt which is now proving to be counterproductive.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I would simply note that we believe, and indeed it undoubtedly would be true, that contact between ourselves and the Hun Sen government at this point would carry a very heavy political signal which could, and I believe would, adversely affect prospects for progress in these negotiations.

I do not think that we have any difficulty understanding PRK positions, nor they ours.

Senator CRANSTON. Is the Hun Sen government being the most flexible in the ongoing talks that various parties are engaging in?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I certainly agree that the Hun Sen government has shown some flexibility, and that is encouraging. I do not know what Hun Sen's statement in Jakarta will mean. In fact, the key element that I think is missing from it and which will be required is acceptance of the United Nations role of some kind in the actual administration of the country during the transition period.

But yes, I would say there has been flexibility. I think there have been signs of flexibility from various quarters over the past few months, Mr. Chairman, and we find that cautiously encouraging.

Senator CRANSTON. My next question starts with an "if." If it becomes apparent that no progress is going to be made with the Australian initiative, I think the question for the United States then will become what alternative policy should we follow to prevent a return to power of the Khmer Rouge?

So, what should our policy be toward the Hun Sen government if it is clear that the talks fail because of Chinese or Khmer Rouge refusal to make any compromise?

Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, could I start off the answer to that question by talking about the "if" part of it for a second?

We have had, as I mentioned, two meetings of the permanent five. We have a third which we hope will be held in the second week in March. I think the progress, at least in my view, that has been made so far is far more than I would have predicted at the outset. It may not be going as fast as some might like, but the fact is that as of now it is still moving further.

So, I recognize the importance of your question. I guess I would just say that I would hope that the "if" part does not get removed too quickly to give us some time to try and play this through.

Senator CRANSTON. What about the second part of my question?

Mr. BOLTON. I will leave that to Mr. Lamberton.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think that up to now the chief obstacle to a settlement has been inflexibility on the part of Phnom Penh supported by Hanoi, and I hope that is changing. I think if it does change, we will have a comprehensive settlement. So I, too, do not think that the hypothetical question you raise is going to be one that we are confronting.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you think the Khmer Rouge are being quite cooperative?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Based on our own conversations within the permanent five with China, based on China's evolving position over the past year—and it has changed—I remain of the view that China wants to help to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the kind we are talking about. That would mean that it would cooperate with the international community in addressing the problem of the Khmer Rouge and in helping to control it.

Senator CRANSTON. That sounds pretty optimistic to me. Let me go on to the next question.

Are the Sihanouk forces presently fighting in coordination with the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. There is no pattern of coordination. I would not rule out the possibility that coordination on the battlefield between units that are in adjacent locations takes place, but there has been no such pattern of cooperation.

Senator CRANSTON. Although they are fighting the same enemy.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. They are fighting the same adversary; yes, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Is it the view of the administration that sustained fighting will only diminish the chances for democracy in Cambodia?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. It is our view that sustained fighting is likely to benefit the Khmer Rouge more than any other party and that,

therefore, it behooves us to move this situation to a negotiated solution as quickly as possible. The specter of the Khmer Rouge return to power is raised by prolonged fighting.

Senator CRANSTON. The United States maintains diplomatic relations with Laos even though Vietnamese troops have not left that country. In January we concluded an agreement on cooperation in narcotics issues and, according to the National League of Families, for MIA/POW issues. Cooperation on those issues has apparently been quite excellent.

Do you think we should consider upgrading our diplomatic representation in Laos to ambassadorial level as a means of encouraging greater cooperation with them while demonstrating to Cambodia and Vietnam that productive actions on their part would meet commensurate actions on our part?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I tend to believe that we should do that. We are considering it. I fully agree that in our relations with Laos, particularly over the last year, we have made a great deal of progress in areas important to us, in particular on POW/MIA accounting and also in the area of narcotics cooperation.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. My time is up.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. On page 3, and I quote, "It is clear that discredited Khmer Rouge leaders, including Pol Pot, must not be allowed to play any role in a future Cambodian government."

Why do we want them to play a role in a transition toward a future Cambodian government?

Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Sarbanes, if I could perhaps—

Senator SARBANES. Well, let me, if I could—it is Mr. Lambertson's statement that I am going to, so maybe if I could get a response from him.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We would prefer that the Khmer Rouge have no role in any Cambodian government, transitional or permanent.

There is already a strong international consensus which will not be a dispute in any agreement that is eventually reached, I believe, that the top Khmer Rouge, the worst of the Khmer Rouge, should have no role whatsoever.

The question of Khmer Rouge participation in the political process is another matter, and that would be allowable under the sort of structure that the United Nations role envisages.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, you were positing a quadripartite transition arrangement, were you not, in which the Khmer Rouge would be included?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The Paris Conference in August, Senator, had as its mandate a comprehensive settlement based on a transition period during which there would be an interim coalition government, including participation of all four parties.

Senator SARBANES. Including the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We were not the advocates of that position. We were the only participant in Paris which objected to that idea. We did not—we are not advocates. We acquiesced in the consensus in Paris because we wanted to try to make progress toward this settlement, but it is not the United States which has ever been out in front in advocating a Khmer Rouge role in the process or in any government which results from it.

Senator SARBANES. Why did we accept it? Who advocated that role?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The entire conference, not excluding the PRK itself accepted that as the mandate of the conference, and the question that proved an insurmountable obstacle in Paris was how does one organize a quadripartite government.

Senator SARBANES. But if you feel so strongly about not having them in any future government, why are you putting them in the government ahead of the election? Why are you agreeing to that?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We are not putting them in any government ahead of the elections. We are working very hard to achieve a solution built around a United Nations presence in Cambodia which would not give administrative power or governmental power to any of these factions as factions and that would, we hope, serve to get Cambodia through this transitional process safely and securely to a fair and free election.

This is the approach that we and the international community generally are now pursuing, and we hope it succeeds.

Senator SARBANES. Let me ask you this question. This is a very hypothetical question, but it would help me to locate your position.

If given a choice between the PRK in power, perhaps even with support from Vietnamese troops, or the Khmer Rouge in power in Cambodia, which would you pick?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. There is no question but that any alternative to the Khmer Rouge that one can think of is preferable, and as I said in my statement, the prime objective of what we are doing and the prime objective of any negotiated settlement must be to ensure that that cannot happen again, that the Khmer Rouge cannot return to power.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, if you are pursuing—I mean obviously you do not want the PRK backed by Vietnamese forces to be the ruling element, and you are trying to get to something else. But I take it from your answer that if it could be shown to you that the way you are trying to get to something else may, in fact, put the Khmer Rouge in power, that you would not want to go down that path.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. That is very true.

Senator SARBANES. You would settle—if that is the choice, you would settle for the PRK even if supported by Vietnamese forces rather than have the Khmer Rouge in power; is that correct?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. That is correct.

The problem we have here is a conflict in which the Khmer Rouge exists. They are an unpleasant reality. That problem has to be addressed.

The best way to do that in our judgment is to negotiate a comprehensive settlement to which all of the players are a party, including China, and this does not mean that our policy is in China's pocket. It means that we want to achieve a settlement.

If you do not have a negotiated settlement in which all of the parties to the conflict participate, then inevitably you have continued warfare, and in a situation of continued warfare, the Khmer Rouge in our view might very well win.

As I noted in my statement, not only do we not accept the legitimacy of the PRK, but we do not think it is a very strong bulwark

against a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. I think we are on the right track.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, is it your position that the Khmer Rouge would win if all the other three Cambodian elements were united—were together in power and the Khmer Rouge was on the outside?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think that would be a very real and risky possibility.

Senator SARBANES. And would they win in that circumstance if the other three elements were backed by Vietnamese forces?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I suppose one could envisage a long period of stalemate just as we had when the Vietnamese were in Cambodia for 10 years, were unable to defeat the Khmer Rouge during that period. It is not a pleasant prospect.

The best prospect is a negotiated solution.

Senator SARBANES. Well, how are you going to keep the Khmer Rouge out of the future Cambodian government? How can you make that statement and then keep setting out a scenario that says "Well, if they are outside, we cannot control them"?

I mean, I am offering you these possibilities. They are outside. All the other elements are inside. Can they control the Khmer Rouge?

And I am offering you a second possibility. They are outside, all the other elements are inside, and the other elements are supported by Vietnam because you have already conceded the position that in order to keep the Khmer Rouge out, you would take ahead of that simply the PRK alone supported by Vietnam. Was that not your previous statement?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, indeed.

Senator SARBANES. Now, I am expanding that. I am getting all these other elements other than the Khmer Rouge. Why are we even putting them into the game in any way other than allowing them to participate in an election, a properly conducted election? But why draw them in in any way in the transition period in any formal way?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, the short answer is that we think a solution which stops the fighting and transforms the conflict from the battlefield to the political arena is one in which the Khmer Rouge inevitably are going to lose.

Senator SARBANES. And then they will stop fighting; is that right?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Not necessarily.

Senator SARBANES. We are right back where we were, and we have not run the risk that by bringing them in you have opened up the avenue to power.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Let me expand on that a bit if I may, sir.

Senator SARBANES. I wish you would.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The comprehensive solution would be an agreement in which all of the interested parties to this conflict would have a part and would be committed to support.

This would mean, then, that there would be no further flow of weapons from outside to any of the factions, notably to the Khmer Rouge.

We envisage a large and effective United Nations peacekeeping force and an extensive United Nations administrative apparatus to keep the peace, to monitor the disposition and disarmament of forces.

Senator SARBANES. How large are the Khmer Rouge forces in your estimation?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Perhaps 35,000.

Senator SARBANES. And how large a U.N. peacekeeping force are we talking about?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. It would be much less than that. And the cease-fire and the cantonment of forces that Assistant Secretary Bolton has talked about, would have to be steps agreed to by all of the parties and by their supporters.

We believe that this can happen, that there can be a cease-fire, there can be cantonment of forces, there can be disarmament, all of it under supervision of the United Nations. We know that it will not be perfect, that there will be violations.

Nevertheless, we think this structure could carry Cambodia through a transition period to an election that all of the parties would have to admit was fair and credible, and all of the parties to this agreement would pledge themselves to accept the outcome of such an election. That election would result in a legitimate government for Cambodia which the international community could support as it saw fit in dealing with any remaining problems it might have with insurgent groups within its borders.

That is the general idea, sir, and I think it is a better approach than to abandon the idea of a negotiated settlement and simply opt for one side or the other in continued warfare.

Senator SARBANES. Well, the PRK and the Vietnamese apparently are not prepared to enter into this arrangement because of their apprehension over the role being given to the Khmer Rouge; is that correct?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, that is correct.

Senator SARBANES. So, confronted with that problem, we in effect are siding with the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. No, we are not. We are trying to work out compromise solutions to these issues. We have on the one hand the position of the PRK that during the transitional regime their government must remain fully intact, fully in charge in Cambodia.

At the other extreme the Chinese position, as we have heard it in our own consultations among the permanent five and as they have stated publicly many times and the Khmer Rouge's view and Prince Sihanouk's view is that the PRK administration must be totally dismantled.

And as Secretary Bolton's prepared statement, I believe, noted, the objective that we seek is not—we do not have numerical standards that we are applying. We want a solution in which the United Nations has a sufficiently extensive and intrusive role to get the job done; that is, to ensure a fair election at the end of the transition.

Senator SARBANES. Well, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I just want to make this observation.

We just had an election in Nicaragua in which government which was there remained in control of the country, had an election, and lost.

We had an election in Namibia in which the existing government remained in control and, there was a full and fair and free election that is now going to lead to a transition of power.

In Namibia, of course, it was very much supported and in fact brought about through the U.N. role, but it seems to me it is probably worth giving some thought to that approach here.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, we have, sir, but I would just point out that there is one important distinction between those situations and the situation in Cambodia which is that in Cambodia you have to figure out how to address the problem of the Khmer Rouge for which there was no real analogy in any of those other places.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, but do not bring them in. You want them out. You are saying that your objective is to keep them out and yet you are bringing them and as soon as you bring them in, other elements that you need to put this thing together back out of it for obvious reasons, it seems to me.

Mr. BOLTON. Could I address that point?

When you say "bringing them in," let me be specific as to what we have in mind for the U.N. administrative role and what we have in mind of what we have called the Supreme National Council.

Under the terms of a final agreement in Paris or immediately after a final agreement in Paris, we would contemplate that the Supreme National Council of Cambodia would delegate all executive authority, all executive authority to the U.N. administration to be done in one of several different ways as a matter of handling the treaty.

But the Supreme National Council, however it is composed, would have no authority so that neither the Khmer Rouge would have executive authority nor the PRK would have executive authority, nor would the two non-Communist resistance factions have executive authority.

The only role that the PRK would have or the KR would have would be agreeing to a cease-fire, disengaging, moving into cantonments, surrendering their weapons and demobilizing, permitting the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in their camps back into Cambodia, helping to reintegrate them into society through the general U.N. presence, and then participating in an election.

We are not contemplating giving them any role at all other than demilitarizing themselves.

Senator SARBANES. Well, who would have authority, for instance, in the cities to maintain law and order under this arrangement, just the normal law and order?

Mr. BOLTON. What we contemplate as part of our estimate—

Senator SARBANES. The United Nations?

Mr. BOLTON [continuing]. As part of our estimate of the U.N. role would be that there would be a substantial—in addition to the military side, there would be a substantial civilian police presence as well perhaps working with existing civilian police in the countryside as in the case of Namibia where there were some 1,500 civilian

police advisors. We think the same sort of thing could be contemplated for Namibia.

Nobody doubts, Senator, that this is complex and potentially very expensive. But that, at this point——

Senator SARBANES. And very dangerous because it seems to me if you step down the law and order function of the existing authorities, you open up an opportunity to a Cambodian element that wants to move to power and that is apparently on the ground best situated to get there, and that is the Khmer Rouge.

Mr. BOLTON. And that is why, Senator, in our discussions among the permanent five our position has consistently been that after the sort of traditional cease-fire, disengagement that complete disarmament of all the forces of all the factions has to take place.

There are a variety of reasons why we think that is true, but as in the case of Namibia where the People's Liberation Army of Namibia had to turn in their weapons before they were permitted to return to Namibia, only by that kind of disarming process can we enhance the prospect that a peaceful civilian transition can be implemented.

Senator SARBANES. Fine. Well, I just make this point. In Namibia the government forces did not turn in their weapons. They stood down some of their security elements, but they did not abdicate entirely from the law and order role.

Mr. BOLTON. What happened there, Senator, was that the South African Government forces were withdrawn. The Southwest African territorial forces were disbanded and SWAPO, the South African police, were bracketed with 1,500 U.N. police monitors during the 1-year transition period.

And there were—you know, there were any number of complaints by numbers of the political parties competing in Namibia, SWAPO not the least among them, that there were problems with the SWAPO officers, and it was a source of constant problem for the United Nations to ensure that the SWAPOL units were simply enforcing law and order and not engaging in harassment or intimidation of political activity. It was not an easy course in Namibia.

Senator SARBANES. I thank my colleague.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Like Senator Sarbanes, as skillfully as he always does, put his finger right on the nub of the contradictions in our policy. For the life of me, even after your explanations, I still do not understand the rationale.

You said in your statement that if we do nothing, then the Khmer Rouge could sweep to power, but I could not agree more with Senator Sarbanes and others that the things we are doing, in effect, may result in their having greater ability to sweep to power than if we were to pursue other alternatives.

You suggested that the China policy is changing. Let me ask you about that. How has the China policy changed with respect to Cambodia and its support for the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The Chinese have become increasingly explicit publicly, and this is supported by what they say to us privately in

insisting that their objective in Cambodia is not a Khmer Rouge return to power.

Senator KERRY. If it is not that, what is it?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Their objective is to prevent what they would see as a Vietnamese military victory, I think.

Senator KERRY. Can you define that?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Their definition would be leaving in place fully intact the PRK.

Senator KERRY. Are the odds not great that if there is a free and fair election that that could take place anyway?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The odds, I presume, are considerable that that could take place.

Senator KERRY. And, therefore, you are asking them to share in a solution that could result in the electoral stamp of approval being put on what is currently just an occupational stamp of approval?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, that is true.

Senator KERRY. What is the difference?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The difference is the legitimization process would have been gone through. I think that is important.

Senator KERRY. If they are interested in that, then, why have we not put to them in Paris the prospect that all suppliers of weapons stopping simultaneously and imposing an electoral transition?

It seems to me they have every rationale to join in that if their bona fides are real.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We are working toward a solution that would incorporate all of these measures—an end to the supply of outside arms, a cease-fire, and the cantonment of forces——

Senator KERRY. I understand that. But in the current——

Mr. LAMBERTSON. It has to come together as a package. We do not think it would work otherwise.

For example, the cutting off of arms right now to the Khmer Rouge would not reduce the Khmer Rouge capacity to fight at a high level of intensity for a considerable period of time.

An arms cutoff is not going to be the solution. The solution has to be a political agreement in which that is one important element.

Senator KERRY. Do you think that the history of Cambodia permits Hun Sen to adopt a position that somehow lets the Khmer Rouge play within the process?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think that is possible, yes. I think it is conceivable within the Cambodian context that there can be a transition in which the Khmer Rouge are allowed to compete politically minus their worst leaders.

Senator KERRY. Well, I do not share that opinion, and I think that is the fundamental illusion of our policy, if you will, that it ignores the reality of what has happened there and the fear these people have for a return to power of Pol Potism, whether it is Pol Pot or whomsoever.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, we understand those fears and concerns.

Senator KERRY. But we do not seem to be sensitive to it in our policy. We mouth these words.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Senator, it is much more than words. We believe what we say.

Senator KERRY. Then why do we not——

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We believe that a comprehensive settlement is the best way to ensure against the Khmer Rouge coming back, and if you do not have that kind of negotiated solution, the only alternative you are going to have to contend with is warfare, continued, prolonged, perhaps low level at times, perhaps more intense at times, but with steady gains by the Khmer Rouge and—

Senator KERRY. Well, the Vietnamese did not have any trouble getting them out of the country, did they?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Pardon me?

Senator KERRY. The Vietnamese did not have any trouble getting them out of the country?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. They had tremendous difficulty getting them out of the country.

Senator KERRY. Not out. They had difficulty afterward in the low level conflict, but not out. It happened in a short span of time.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Until the conflict shifted from a conventional to a guerrilla.

Senator KERRY. Did we get anything out of President—have you been informed of any shift in our policy as a consequence of—I mean, it is beyond my comprehension that we can sit with the leaders of China a few weeks after Tian'anmen Square and we cannot sit with Hun Sen to discuss a resolution of this.

Now, is there any indication from what happened in the President Bush's initiative that you can move with China to pull back on the supply of weapons? Because it seems to me if that happens, you have a resolution in your hand.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. My impression, and Secretary Bolton can discuss this as well because it is in the permanent five meetings in New York and Paris where we have had the most intensive discussions with the Chinese of this issue recently, that the Chinese are continuing to cooperate. They want to play in that game.

I think, as I said earlier, it is my view that the Chinese will contribute to and uphold a comprehensive settlement if one can be put together.

Senator KERRY. Can you explain to me why we can talk to the leaders of China and we cannot talk to Hun Sen?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The explanation that I provided earlier is our explanation. We think that to have contact with the Hun Sen government right now would send the wrong signal with respect to the negotiations.

We support the non-Communist resistance. We do not believe that it is productive for governments to send delegations to Cambodia.

Senator KERRY. Why are we supporting the non-Communist resistance? What is this, sort of a let us win a victory that we could not win in Vietnam through this process or something? Why are we doing that?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We are supporting the non-Communist resistance and Prince Sihanouk because we think that without them a negotiated solution probably is not possible. We think that with Sihanouk playing a central role as he will and must, a negotiated solution is possible.

Senator KERRY. And you think that Sihanouk, given his history, having watched him maneuver his way through the greatest sur-

vival course in history, that this individual would not move fairly rapidly to negotiations if he saw the Khmer Rouge drying up—with the support for them drying? You do not think he would shift very rapidly into a posture of participating in an election?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think Sihanouk is serious when he says that he wants to see a substantial dismantling of the PRK regime, an election held under circumstances in which Hun Sen does not have an advantage. He goes very far in that direction.

He regards the PRK as a puppet government installed by Vietnamese invasion. He is very outspoken. I think he means it. And yet he is at the center of this issue.

Senator KERRY. But is that not irrelevant?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. He is at the center of this issue and the PRK and Hun Sen recognize that. The Soviets, I might add, recognize that, that Sihanouk is the core around which a negotiated settlement is going to have to be built, and he has that very important role to play and we support him for that reason.

Senator KERRY. Then I must say I disagree with that presumption about Sihanouk and his role. I think it is exaggerated under the circumstances, and it is probably unrealistic under the circumstances, but I am not saying he does not play a role. But the question of what role he plays is dependent on how he behaves and on how this process unfolds.

And for us to be a prisoner to him in that context is not to understand either the history or the opportunity, frankly.

I heard you say that verification of the Vietnamese withdrawal is an essential ingredient and yet we refuse the opportunity and have so far to actually verify.

How does that contribute to the process?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Verification of Vietnam's withdrawal will come as part of the comprehensive settlement which we seek.

Senator KERRY. It seems like catch-22.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, it is not, and I do not think the Vietnamese are confused by it. I think they understand it fully. They have for years.

Nguyen Co Thach may contend otherwise, but he understands what our policy is.

Senator KERRY. I am confused. Could you articulate for me precisely what our policy is toward the normalization of relations with Vietnam and what are the requirements for that to take place?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We are prepared to normalize relations with Vietnam in the context of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia which includes the verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. That is our position. It is simple and it is constructive.

Senator KERRY. That is all?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. That is our position.

The POW-MIA question has never been—at least in recent years—has not been linked to the question of political normalization. We have tried to keep it on a separate humanitarian track.

We have had extensive contacts and negotiations with the Vietnamese on this issue. We have made some progress.

Senator KERRY. It seems to me then that you wind up, as Senator Sarbanes mentioned, holding Vietnam hostage to other participants who have a whole set of different interests.

I mean, part of the reason Cambodia is a problem was the desire of China to have a buffer between Thailand and Vietnam, and the historical enmity between Vietnamese and Chinese is something that you are not taking into account here in trying to nudge this process forward, it seems to me.

I mean, you indeed have a catch-22 situation as long as you are saying the normalization process is tied to the settlement in Cambodia, but the settlement in Cambodia is tied to verification, but we cannot verify until we have a settlement and you keep going around in this circle.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, I do not see it as a circle. We want a comprehensive settlement. Part of that comprehensive settlement must be a verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces.

We think Vietnam can contribute to such a settlement by virtue of its influence with the PRK, and we hope very much that it will.

If it does, then the political obstacle to normalization of relations would have been removed; and I would add, because it is important to add this, that what we call the pace and scope of normalization, the development of the relationship after normalization is going to be affected by their continued cooperation with us on the POW-MIA issue.

Senator KERRY. My time is up, but I just make one last comment to you. It is truly astonishing to me for us to be so focused on Si-hanouk given the fact that he continues to be a puppet to the Khmer Rouge. He says one thing one day and the next day a totally different thing, to be allied with somebody here. We do not even know really where he is or who is or what he stands for, and I would respectfully—God, I hope we can change our thinking about this because I think a lot of folks are going to die, and the process is going to just continue to be extraordinarily difficult unless we begin to open our minds up a little bit about this policy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have had an occasion to discuss some of these matters directly, and I do have some questions that would be more appropriate for something other than an open forum, so I will pass so that we can get on to our next witnesses, if I may.

Senator CRANSTON. I have just a few more questions.

Senator Sarbanes asked if you had to choose between a government run by the Khmer Rouge and a government run by Hun Sen, you said anything would be preferable to the Khmer Rouge government.

What is the point of continuing to support a Cambodian seat in the U.N. that includes the Khmer Rouge but excludes Hun Sen?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The disposition of the Cambodian seat is going to be and should be one of the issues decided in the context of the negotiation. It is an important issue to the Cambodians. It is important politically, and it will be addressed in the settlement process.

Senator CRANSTON. It seems to me that with peace negotiations going on and on and on and never knowing when they are really going to get somewhere that it sends a confusing signal to have us backing the seat that is widely looked upon as a Khmer Rouge seat, although it is one that is shared by others. Should we not be encouraging the non-Communist resistance factions to break with the Khmer Rouge in the common seat in the U.N.?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think the issue is properly left to the negotiations surrounding the larger issue of the overall settlement.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, if that overall larger settlement does not bear fruit soon, I think we should take a look at that policy.

Looking ahead to Cambodia's postsettlement reconstruction needs, finally, would the administration raise an objection to the World Bank or some other international development agency sending a team to Cambodia to conduct a preliminary assessment of the country's economic situation and development needs?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We would not be enthusiastic about a team representing the World Bank going to Phnom Penh right now because we believe for the same reason that we are ourselves reluctant to go to Phnom Penh that such contacts bolster the political credibility of a regime whose legitimacy we do not accept in the context of an ongoing negotiation in which those kinds of things have considerable political importance.

Senator CRANSTON. In dealing directly with Phnom Penh, is the administration doing anything to encourage AID to work with other agencies, including NGO's to prepare for reconstruction and resettlement?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, sir, we are, and AID commissioned the study to which you referred earlier. There is planning going on as to what we might be able to contribute to a Cambodian reconstruction effort which we envisage starting after a comprehensive solution is reached.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Paul, do you have any other questions?

Senator SARBANES. I have just couple of humanitarian questions I want to put to Mr. Lambertson.

It is my understanding there is a very grave situation involving 300,000 or so Cambodians living along the border with Thailand, that there are shortages of funds and food and, most urgently, serious shortages of water which I understand has to be trucked into those camps.

Could you comment on that situation?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I am not familiar with the water shortage that you refer to. That is a problem from time to time. It is a seasonal question. Life in those camps is difficult, and I am sure no less so now than a few years ago.

Part of the problem is funding for UNBRO. It needs more money than it receives from the international community. We are the largest donor by a considerable margin. It could use more funds for those humanitarian purposes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I would like an answer from you promptly as to whether there is, in fact, a crisis existing there for these reasons.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. All right, sir. I will get you an answer.

[The information referred to follows:]

Question. I understand that there is a serious shortage of funds to support Cambodian refugees living in the camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. Are you aware that this is affecting refugee support, causing severe food and water shortages and even the complete cutoff of water to these people?

Answer. During 1989 UNBRO did experience a budgetary shortfall of U.S. \$7 million. Fortunately, UNBRO was able to cover this funding shortage with funds carried over from earlier years and essential, life-sustaining services were not cut. For 1990, UNBRO has appealed to the international community for \$32 million in cash. UNBRO will also require an as yet unspecified amount of in-kind contributions. The United States has already pledged \$5 million toward the cash appeal. To date, other donors have only pledged an additional \$5 million.

UNBRO officials are concerned that they will lack sufficient funds to carry on all of UNBRO's work this year. Contingency plans are being made to reduce all aspects of UNBRO's operations if sufficient pledges are not forthcoming. The United States is planning a further pledge later in the fiscal year; however, as instructed by Congress, \$1.5 million must be earmarked exclusively for security-related programs. We are urging other donors to provide UNBRO with funding as soon as possible.

We are not aware of UNBRO cutting essential services, including food and water, because of a lack of funding. We are aware of problems in the water delivery system at site 2 which has caused some disruption in service. However, we have been assured that steps have been taken to correct this situation.

Our Embassy in Bangkok will continue to monitor closely conditions at UNBRO-assisted camps. We will continue to provide UNBRO with financial and in-kind support to the extent our resources allow.

Senator SARBANES. I am somewhat taken aback because you do not know. I do not think it is adequate simply to say, "Well, it is tough out there." It is tough out there. We know that. Some of our colleagues have gone out there and seen it. If in fact it is so tough that it is an urgent crisis, then we ought to know about it.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. You should, indeed. It has not been brought to my attention; therefore, I can say no more than that.

Senator SARBANES. Could you get back to us promptly on that?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I will look into it and get back to you.

Senator SARBANES. There are also reports that Cambodians on the border are being used as part of a military effort by the three resistance factions, not only the Khmer Rouge but all of the resistance factions, with no opportunity for these people to achieve some protection in neutral zones where they can be shielded from, in effect, being pressed into military action.

What is being done to assure that they are not being forced in action against their will and have a chance to be protected under traditional humanitarian rules?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The UNHRC has access, of course, to the non-Communist camps. It has a considerable presence and knows what is going on there. There perhaps is a degree of coercion from time to time, but it is not, in my view, systematic. We do not know enough about what goes on, of course, in Khmer Rouge camps. Most of them are not open, and that is a continuing problem, a continuing concern which we address with the Thai government, with the United Nations and in every way that we can think of.

Senator SARBANES. Could you also report to us on that?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Question. What is our reaction to report that civilians in the camps are being impressed into carrying out military duties rather than being allowed to move into neutral zones. What is being done about this?

Answer. Reports persist that in some camps, particularly those controlled by the Khmer Rouge, civilians continue to be pressed into military service against their will. We deplore such actions.

We believe that all civilians should be permitted access to camps assisted by international agencies, such as UNBRO and ICRC, where their well-being can be closely monitored. On several occasions the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has acted to assist civilians to move from U.N.-monitored camps to internationally assisted ones. We welcome such initiatives on the part of the RTG, and have urged it to act decisively to prevent further military impressment of civilians.

Senator SARBANES. The final humanitarian question I want to put to you, are Cambodians on the Thai-Cambodia border who have family members in this country entitled to refugee status and the opportunity to be interviewed for resettlement with their relatives in the United States?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I would think so, but may I look into that and provide you with an answer for the record as well?

Senator SARBANES. I would like to know what steps are being taken to make sure those people who have relatives in the United States have a chance to be interviewed for our refugee or humanitarian parole immigration programs.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Question. Are Cambodian refugees on the Thai border, who have relatives in the United States, eligible for refugee status and do they have a chance to be interviewed for emigration purposes? What steps are being taken to carry this out?

Answer. At the end of 1982, Thai authorities began classifying Cambodians arriving in Thailand as "displaced Khmer." Although accorded temporary safehaven in Thailand, new arrivals were no longer considered to be refugees, and access to Cambodian camps for resettlement purposes was severely limited.

Responding to the unique circumstances surrounding the Cambodian populations in Thailand, the United States in 1986 initiated a limited special Cambodian humanitarian parole and immigrant visa (HP/IV) program. Cambodians eligible for HP/IV admission include beneficiaries of current and noncurrent immigrant visa petitions, other individuals who are of special interest to the United States, and dependent family members. Between 1986 and November 1989, almost 1,300 Cambodians were resettled in the United States under this program.

In November 1989, our Embassy in Bangkok received permission from the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to interview an additional 725 border Cambodians who were eligible for consideration under our HP/IV program.

To date, the majority of this group (238 cases/700 persons) have been interviewed. Of those interviewed, 148 cases/412 persons have been approved, 67 cases/209 persons are pending further documentation, and 23 cases/79 persons have been denied.

Our Embassy is currently preparing for submission to the RTG another list of approximately 800 persons who are eligible for HP/IV consideration.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Senator Helms has some questions he would like to submit to you for responses in writing. We will do that. If you could respond within a week, that would be fine.

[The information referred to follows:]

RESPONSES OF MR. LAMBERTSON TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS

Question 1. A U.N. peacekeeping force has been suggested for Cambodia. How much would that cost and what would be the U.S. share of the cost?

Answer. The exact cost of a U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cambodia is impossible to specify at this time. It would depend on the nature of the settlement and the role for the U.N. agreed by the parties. If the U.N. is to have an enhanced role in implementing a Cambodian settlement, which would include an adequate U.N. transitional administration, and would last for a period of 2 to 3 years, the cost will be

high, probably exceeding that of the operation in Namibia of \$450 million for 1 year. The U.S. share of peacekeeping costs is 30.6 percent.

Question 2. The 1989 State Department's human rights report accuses the Hun Sen government in Phnom Penh of "widespread and serious human rights violations." Would you care to comment on this?

Answer. As outlined in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989, ongoing human rights violations of the Phnom Penh regime include arbitrary detention of resistance sympathizers, a virtual absence of legal process for those detained, denial of fair public trials, the use by prison authorities of beating and deprivation of food and water of detainees, and forced induction into the armed forces of young men between the ages of 18 and 30. The Phnom Penh regime refuses to permit outside inspection of its prison facilities and continues to discourage efforts to monitor its human rights record.

Question 3. The State Department human rights report also talks about "reeducation camps" in Cambodia similar to the Communist Chinese slave labor camp system. Would you please describe these camps?

Answer. As outlined in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989, Phnom Penh regime regulations call for the "reeducation" of "any person carrying out propaganda campaigns to sabotage internal unity and Kampuchea-Laos-Vietnam solidarity." Such "reeducation" has meant indefinite detention to force a change in political thought. The PRK Ministry of Interior maintains at least three prisons in which suspected resistance supporters are held without formal charges. Provincial police and military internal security units maintain additional detention and interrogation centers. Detention in PRK prisons has at times included the use of torture; solitary confinement in completely dark, poorly ventilated, and unsanitary cells; deprivation of food and water, and lack of access to medication or medical attention.

With respect to labor reform and education camps in China, the committee may wish to refer to material already provided by the Department.

Question 4. Can you comment on the recent report of Vietnamese Army troops returning to Cambodia?

Answer. There are a number of Vietnamese military personnel in Cambodia assisting the forces of the Phnom Penh regime. Although at the end of September last year Vietnam apparently pulled the bulk of its combat units from Cambodia, some personnel were certainly left behind as advisers and in other support functions. In addition, we have seen the recent press reports which have raised questions about whether the September withdrawal was really complete or whether some Vietnamese troops have since returned to Cambodia. In the absence of a comprehensive political settlement, including the means for verifying the presence or absence of Vietnamese troops, it is impossible to be certain just how many Vietnamese military personnel are currently in Cambodia.

Question 5. Doesn't this show that the Hun Sen government can't survive without the support of the Vietnamese Army?

Answer. The Phnom Penh regime was established and maintained in power during its first decade by Vietnamese military might. Apparently, it still requires some Vietnamese military support to maintain its position.

Question 6. The Far Eastern Economic Review recently reported that Deng's son-in-law was in Bangkok last month arranging for new arms supplies to the Khmer Rouge. What can you tell the committee about this?

Answer. While we can offer no details about the involvement of any particular Chinese official in such arrangements, China has been a long-term supporter of the Khmer Rouge and its chief supplier of arms for more than a decade.

Question 7. Please describe the administration's efforts to persuade the Chinese Communists to stop arming the Khmer Rouge.

Answer. We have discussed with China on a regular basis for more than 2 years the assistance question as well as the need to control the Khmer Rouge in the context of a settlement in Cambodia. We have asked the Chinese to terminate their military aid to the KR, and have urged them at a minimum to reduce the level of such assistance. The provision of military assistance also has been discussed by the Chinese directly with both Vietnam and Soviet Union also during this same period. In late 1988, for the first time, China accepted in principle a reduction of military assistance simultaneous with a verified Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. Since the withdrawal was done outside of the context of an agreement, this was not pursued. The modalities of an actual cutoff of military aid are being discussed now as one critical element in a comprehensive settlement agreement.

Question 8. For the record, please provide a chronology of the administration's diplomatic efforts in the past 5 years to persuade the Chinese Communists to stop arming the Khmer Rouge and the response of the Chinese to these efforts.

Answer. For obvious reasons, we are unable to reveal the precise contents of diplomatic communications. We can say, however, that requests for restraint and ultimately the complete cessation of arms supplies to the Khmer Rouge have been a constant of practically every high-level U.S.-PRC official contact in recent years. These include the President's February 1989 visit as well as the two 1989 trips by National Security Adviser Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger.

In late 1988, for the first time, China publicly accepted in principle a reduction of military assistance to all factions simultaneous with a verified Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. Since the withdrawal occurred outside of the context of a comprehensive agreement, the PRC did not pursue this formula. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (China, France, UK, U.S.S.R. and United States) are considering the modalities of an actual cutoff of military aid as one critical element in a comprehensive settlement agreement based on an enhanced U.N. role in Cambodia in the interim period leading to a free and fair election.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you both very, very much for being with us. We appreciate it.

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. We now proceed to our third and final panel, consisting of: Michael J. Horowitz of Washington, DC; Prof. Helen Chauncey, Department of Government, Georgetown University; and Dr. Jeremy J. Stone, President of the Federation of American Scientists.

Thank you very much for being with us. If you would proceed in that order, starting with Mr. Horowitz.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. HOROWITZ, ESQ., WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HOROWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the invitation to share my views. I have, as well, a statement that I have submitted which I will telescope quite considerably. The statement is submitted for the record.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, it will appear.

Mr. HOROWITZ. I have been involved and interested in Cambodian policy for the last 10 years during, the course of most of which I have been an official in the Reagan administration. I served as general counsel of the Office of Management and Budget. I regard myself, proudly, as a political conservative.

Contrary to Senator Kerry, most of whose comments about Cambodia I thought to be trenchant, on the mark and quite extraordinarily right, I disagree with him with regard to our Nicaraguan policy. It is my view that the firm policy of the Reagan administration in support of the Contras is what led President Ortega to accept, quite reluctantly, the elections which now have unhorsed him. I know that this is within the realm of debate. As to Cambodian matters, however, I come in opposition to administration policy.

I say this as one who is a political conservative and who supports and who has supported strong steps against oppressive regimes when they have been indicated.

Together with Senator Muskie, I think the two of us probably have had a more extensive view of Cambodia than any American has had in the last 5 to 10 years. I spent 8 days in Cambodia at the end of December. My observations were, at least to me, quite surprising. Let me summarize them quickly.

First, the government, I thought, was increasingly made of non-Communists and is now critically influenced by the non-Communist elements in the government who had no—repeat, no—involvement with Khmer Rouge whatsoever. They were slaves who barely survived during the Pol Pot period and decided in many cases as patriots to stay in Cambodia rather than to go to Paris or the United States as they could have done. They are critical actors in the policies now made by this government.

Second, the former Khmer Rouge officials in the government largely came from the eastern zone during the Pol Pot years, and none of them are intellectuals in the Pol Pot sense. They are jungle fighters who joined, incidentally at Sihanouk's call, the fight against what they regarded not unreasonably, as a corrupt regime then in power, the Lon Nol government. They are largely practical people who have been playing with what works and what does not, and they have done an extraordinary job.

Their commitment to a market economy is stunning, Senator Cranston and Senator Robb. In fact, I could generally tell the historical non-Communists from the so-called Communists when I talked to them about what the economy ought to be. The Communists were the ones who sounded like Milton Friedman. They wanted little role for the government. They boasted, in fact, that 70 percent of the economy was in private hands and that they were looking for Western buyers of the other 30 percent.

I made the point based on an observation of the Sihanouk regime that Sihanouk was and is far and away a better socialist than any of the so-called Khmer Rouge Communists. When Sihanouk was in power we had Marcos cronyism kind of government, and that is what we would return to with any measure of power he would achieve. The current government has abolished cooperatives, farm cooperatives, and is restoring private property.

Let me add, that that is not the only thing being done. Before the Pol Pot period there had been some 50,000 to 60,000 Buddhist monks. There were fewer than 1,000 after that maniacal regime was displaced. One begins now to seek monks on the streets and restoration of pagodas. I in fact talked to Cambodian Muslims. They said that the commitment of the current regime to free religion, for themselves, much less for the Buddhists, was greater than it had ever been in the history of Cambodia.

Finally, I did not meet with Sihanouk but let me make a point at least in response to the comments of Mr. Lambertson who represents an administration which I campaigned for and care for very deeply. I worked with President Bush. I admire him enormously. But the notion that Sihanouk must play a central role, as Senator Kerry pointed out, is outrageous.

Sihanouk is a corrupt relic with diminishing support within the country. In my judgment he will never stand for election, and that is one key to his current policy positions, because he knows what the outcome would be if he submitted himself to the electorate. He has in fact participated in one election. In 1955 he stepped down as king, god, whatever combination he was then, called an election, jailed his opponents, and won 100 percent of the seats. That is his only experience with democracy.

More particularly, he has said on many occasions that the Soviet Union and the United States will come and go but China will be here forever. He is an arm of Chinese policy, and that is the only way to explain the alleged inconsistencies of his views. He supports China. Whatever they want, he is for.

I thus find it surprising and remarkable that an official of this administration talks of Sihanouk as America's friend, our central friend, a man who must play a central role. Do you know who Sihanouk's closest friends have been over the past 5 years, Mr. Chairman and Senator Robb? They have been Deng Xiaopeng, Kim Il Song, and, hold on to your hat, there are color photos of him and his pal Ceausescu all over Cambodia. Ceausescu was Sihanouk's closest Western friend over the past 5 to 10 years.

This is a man who will sell out American interests, who is downright hostile to the United States and has so proved, and his links are to China, China, China.

One other observation in this regard about my trip. American policy is in grave danger of being badly isolated. Japan, France, Great Britain, Canada, and Australia are moving away as quickly as they can from our policy.

I spoke with some of the most senior officials of the Thai government. They indicated that our policy of supporting the so-called non-Communist resistance, much of which goes to the Khmer Rouge with which it is in any event engaged in coordinated military activities, is proving enormously destabilizing to Thailand because the arms trade in the Cardoman Mountains is brokered by Thai generals. You, therefore, found the specter of when Prime Minister Chatchichai tried to move in the direction of elections and toward dealing with and negotiating with the Hun Sen regime, he was opposed by his foreign minister and his defense minister.

There is some real concern that Thailand, our very strongest friend in the region, an extraordinarily booming country whose economy is of enormous value and importance to us, which is looking to America rather than Japan for partnership in Southeast Asia, is being destabilized by our policy. How else to explain the fact that this administration has put off, put off, put off the visit of Chatchichai, who wants to come here? It is because he has broken away from our preoccupation isolating Hun Sen. But recently, 90 members of the Thai parliament sent a letter to the Prime Minister asking, demanding, that the arms trade in the Cardoman Mountains be closed.

Now let me say, Mr. Chairman, I think some of the things I have said honorable men may disagree with. There are, however, few matters about which there can be little debate.

The Hun Sen government is prepared for unsupervised U.N.-run, U.N.-administered, U.N.-conducted elections, plain and simple. This is a clear fact. Nobody, not even Mr. Lambertson, denies this. He just keeps talking of "comprehensive settlements" with elections set for the definite future.

I understand from Senator Robb's visit that there is at least some indication to the contrary, but I am convinced that as part of any negotiation to bring the Hun Sen government to an election run by the U.N., it would be prepared to have full-time, real-time monitoring of its human rights policies, of its prisons, and of its

POW camps. Senior officials of Cambodia told me that, and I have no doubt that if we came to them and said we want to support an election run by the U.N. but also with Western monitoring of its government's human rights policies, they would agree to that. We at least ought to demand it.

I have the following concluding points to make: First, Nicaragua. The comments of Mr. Lambertson may have made sense had the Sandanistas won the election. They now make no sense whatsoever. The Nicaraguan elections have cut the ground profoundly, from under the current American position. That notion that we need "level playing fields" and so forth before the Cambodian people can be trusted to vote their own needs is nonsense at this stage of the game.

We did not have free and fair elections in Nicaragua. We had unfair elections in Nicaragua, in my judgment, where the existing government controlled the mechanisms, controlled TV time, and did every unfair thing it could to win elections it nonetheless lost by a landslide. Why, short of racism, do we assume that the Cambodian people are not capable of voting their consciences in the polling booths and kicking the rascals out, if they are rascals, if they are permitted to be in an election which the government does not even run?

Let me say here that I think that there is a very important role that the conservatives must play in this regard. I think many of us are being gamed. There is this notion of muscular anticommunism, which for good reasons many of us support. We would support it in Ethiopia. We supported it in Nicaragua. We supported it in Afghanistan. We see it being offered on behalf of a Cambodian "non-Communist resistance," but what we do not see is that by not publicly pressuring the Chinese for its support of the Khmer Rouge, we appease China in the area in which it is looking most for Western appeasement.

I do not agree with Senator Muskie in one respect. I do not think the Chinese want the Khmer Rouge to take over. I think they want to destabilize the Hun Sen regime to the point where it cannot possibly be elected. That is why we talk about indeterminate periods for level playing fields, U.N. administrations, and so forth.

If the Chinese, on the battlefield or elsewhere, can ensure that the Hun Sen regime cannot come in through elections or otherwise, they will have achieved their policy objective. They will have averted rapid elections notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua has shown that if the Cambodian people think that a government serves their interests, whether it be the Hun Sen regime or Sihanouk or anyone, they will make it in the privacy of the polling booth.

I hope this committee begins to focus on China, China, China in connection with America's current policy in Cambodia. China is the party in the way of peace and elections, as the colloquy between Senator Sarbanes and Mr. Lambertson made clear, through its support of the Khmer Rouge of a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. Yet, curiously, as Senator Muskie said, we assume that Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge and arms support for the Khmer Rouge is the given in this equation and that it is our job to work around it.

I think what we need to do is tell China that you do not belong in the community of nations of this world as long as you provide arms to the Khmer Rouge.

Let me say, Senators, as much as I had read about the Pol Pot regime, nothing left me prepared for what I saw when I went there during the 8 days. It was not just the visit to the prison camps. It was stopping people on the streets at random and saying what happened during that period. They would say, "Well, everyone in my village who had gone to high school or could speak a word of English or, God help us, who wore glasses, got machinegunned by a 13-year-old who with an AK-47."

I would say, incidentally, that Sihanouk, our supposed ally, the center of our policy, Mr. Chairman, is a man who would in a day probably try to tear down and paint over the interrogation centers if he took power, whereas the current regime is looking to preserve the evidence of what the Pol Pot regime had done. We went through a whole debate over the use of a part of Auschwitz even for a convent, and yet America is supporting people who would destroy the evidence of what the Khmer Rouge had done if given the chance. That is an extraordinary position for us to be in.

But conservatives have got to look on what we are doing as not supporting an anti-Communist resistance because this is not who Sihanouk is. Our current policy merely supports China in its desire to destabilize Cambodia. That is the long and short of things, and I would hope this committee would begin focussing on China's role in Cambodia. Mr. Lambertson never mentioned China in his direct testimony except at the end to say that they are moving in all the right directions, and that he is happy with the comprehensive settlement that they want to bring about.

In my judgment the comprehensive settlement Mr. Lambertson is talking about is a U.N. presence and a dismantling of the current government long enough to destabilize it.

Let me say on Cambodia that I am pleased that some foundations are looking to provide support for bringing American conservatives to look at Cambodia, as I did.

I think that once the political profit is gone for the administration that comes from having conservatives think we are doing the right thing in fighting Communists, our policy will collapse as an internal political matter in the United States. We can then focus on China, hard on China, for its support of the Khmer Rouge and can begin insisting that China stop arming the Khmer Rouge and can then move to elections which would surely be fairer under anyone's analysis than what took place in Nicaragua and by this means allow Cambodians to determine their futures.

My final point involves the U.N., and here I plead with this committee, particularly those that care about the U.N. This notion—there is some notion of having the U.N. come in, take over police forces, take over the highways. Sihanouk has issued statements about how he wants to fire every person involved with the current government before there can be free and fair elections.

All the more incredible is the fact that probably two-thirds of the officials of the government are people who opposed the Khmer Rouge, as Sihanouk did not, and many were officials of the Lon Nol

and Sihanouk governments. We apparently want to dismiss them from office..

If you care about the U.N. do not impose on the U.N., as Mr. Lambertson would do, a responsibility greater than the U.N. can assume. We almost had the U.N. destroyed by its Congo operation, a much easier situation when it tried to take over the government than is the case with today's Cambodia. What are you going to do, fly in 500 U.N. officials, none of whom can speak a word of Khmer to run the postal system, to run the culture ministry? It cannot be done except if you don't care about destabilizing a fragile economy.

But I will tell you what will happen. Six months from now after such a U.N. counterpart comes in, a couple of U.N. observers will get shot, the U.N. will pull out, the United States will not want to spend \$1 billion, will not have the billion dollars to spend to keep this kind of process going. The fragile economy will then collapse, thus fulfilling the policy objectives of China—at Cambodia's tragic expense. China has always wanted the U.N. in as long as the U.N. presence makes it certain that Hun Sen can never return. That is always—there is no change in Chinese policy.

But you will also discredit the U.N. And I have had conversations with senior U.N. officials and they agree.

The kind of role envisaged by China which is giving the U.N., declaring peace and victory and then having the whole thing including the country fall apart 6 months from that date is the Chinese objective, and unhappily, we are joining in it.

Now, I think there may be differences within the State Department. I think the degree of U.N. participation will be the key matter.

If the U.N. comes in, we must have a date certain for elections, much easier to do now post-Nicaragua, post-Lithuania, post-Namibia. Let us have those elections and let the Cambodians decide.

And as I say again, the great responsibility is on my colleagues, in this debate in the conservative side of the aisle. We ought to see our policy as possibly being China appeasement. We ought to see the policy, at the least, as accommodation of China and not as it is pictured—fighting communism. We ought to be on the side of getting rid of the Khmer Rouge. We as much as anyone should be on the side of free elections and on the side of the Cambodian people deciding, and I hope that as more conservatives see our policy and go to Cambodia, we can begin to change the administration policy in this regard and move toward the rapid election I think Cambodians seek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Horowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL HOROWITZ

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am grateful for the invitation to share my views on the "prospects for peace in Cambodia."

I have attempted to follow issues involving Cambodia for more than 10 years, dating principally from the period when I first joined the Reagan administration, in 1981, as General Counsel of the Office of Management and Budget. Along with many of the people concerned with the fate of Cambodia, I have been haunted by the depredations which the Khmer Rouge visited on that country during the period of their depraved reign. I have felt—as I know do members of this subcommittee—that if the world is to be a decent place, it must make the phrase "never again" as applicable to the Cambodian people as to all other past victims of genocide and extreme political terror.

Thanks to a grant from the Bradley Foundation and to my long association with Chhang Song, President of Save Cambodia, Inc. (who has previously appeared before this subcommittee), I was able to visit Southeast Asia and Cambodia during the last 2 weeks of December 1989. The visit included an extraordinary 8-day stay in Cambodia.

As a proud political conservative—one who actively supported the Reagan Contra policy in Nicaragua—what I saw of Cambodia and its current, Hun Sen government were extremely surprising. Those observations were the product of long interviews with senior government officials, of random discussions with people on the streets, of meetings with Cambodian intellectuals and businessmen, of long sessions with foreign diplomatic officials and voluntary organization personnel. Those views may be summarized as follows:

- The Cambodian Government is increasingly comprised of and critically influenced by Western educated survivors of the Pol Pot years who had no links whatever with the Khmer Rouge.

- Government officials with past links to the Khmer Rouge are largely from its Eastern Region and are in many cases among the strongest proponents of private, Western investment and of free markets; significantly, and in distinction to Pol Pot and his crowd, they are nonintellectual fighters who joined the Khmer Rouge (in many instances at the call of Prince Sihanouk) in opposition to what they regarded, not unreasonably, as a corrupt and inefficient regime then in power.

- The government is powerfully committed to a market economy, to the privatization of property, to a significant measure of free press and to an unprecedented degree of freedom of religion, including for minority Moslems.

- Sihanouk, the principal instrument of American policy in Cambodia, is a corrupt relic with limited and diminishing support within Cambodia if only for his past and still continuing collaboration with and support of the Khmer Rouge; he has always been and continues to be responsive to the demands of China and is ultimately indifferent if not hostile to American interests. (Of note is the fact that over the past 5 years, Sihanouk's closest allies and warmest friends have been Deng Xiaoping, Kim Il Sung and, astonishingly if revealingly, Nicolai Ceausescu.)

- The governments of France, Great Britain, Japan, Canada, Australia, Thailand, among others, have increasingly moved in the direction of a relationship with the Hun Sen government, which they see as Western oriented even if still allied with Vietnam and the Soviet Union; in sum, current American policy toward Cambodia is at great risk of being badly isolated.

The above observations are debatable, and men and women of insight and honor can and do disagree with many of them.

But what is less debatable, and in my view profoundly unacceptable, is the failure of American policy to acknowledge, strengthen, and act upon the following realities:

- The Cambodian Government is prepared, or can be pressed in negotiations to accept the monitoring of its human rights practices by Western delegations given access to its prisons and POW camps; and, most critically,

- It is prepared to permit free elections, conducted on terms acceptable to the United States and under the full and total auspices of the United Nations or any other international body acceptable to the United States.

Recent events in Eastern Europe and the extraordinary events of the past few days in Nicaragua should make clear that it is the Cambodian people who can and are best able, through the medium of elections, to determine their future. The Sihanouk position has been that Cambodians cannot be trusted to vote their consciences in U.N. supervised elections until all members of the Hun Sen government have been displaced for an indeterminate number of years—presumably by armies of U.N. officials unable to speak Khmer. Never mind that such a development would halt and sharply reverse the real progress recently made by a still-fragile Cambodian economy. Never mind that the cost of such a U.N. administration would be in the billion dollar plus range—this in the face of compelling needs which now exist to provide assistance to newly freed peoples of Eastern Europe and Latin America, and to Cambodia itself. And perhaps most of all, never mind that such an assignment to the United Nations would saddle it with responsibilities greater than it has ever borne and surely greater than those it can possibly bear—even if it were given continued full financing by the Permanent Five. To Sihanouk, and to some degree to American policy, a U.N. trusteeship of indeterminate length is ostensibly in order, despite the certain risks and problems it could entail, because any lingering effect of the incumbency of the current government would preclude the Cambodian people from exercising a free choice about their future.

Nicaragua—where an unfair election conducted by an unpopular government still resulted in its landslide rejection utterly denudes our failure to support rapid U.N.-supervised elections of any vestige of credibility.

There is one remaining obstacle to a decent future for Cambodia—the Khmer Rouge, whose military operations could (but as El Salvador has shown, need not necessarily) stand in the way of rapid elections.

Accordingly, I believe that the singular issue relative to Cambodia—and it is one on which there has thus far been a curious lack of focus—is the flow of arms and financial support from China to Pol Pot.

It is my hope that this subcommittee will begin to reshape the debate over Cambodia by focusing on China's critical role in the current situation.

It is my hope that this subcommittee will begin asking sharp questions of American policymakers as to why we have not publicly condemned China, in the strongest terms, for its support of the Khmer Rouge.

Do we actually favor the continued arming of the Khmer Rouge—to be sure, of course, hoping it will not prevail—because we see the Khmer Rouge as the sole instrument by which the current Cambodian Government can be destabilized? But if we do how can we, when the Hun Sen government is prepared to risk its immediate, peaceful overthrow at the hands of the Cambodian people through U.N. supervised elections? Can it be that our policy of benign acceptance of China's support for the Khmer Rouge is based upon a desire, at the expense of the Cambodian people, to improve relations with the Deng Xiaoping regime?

I believe that the American conservative community in particular needs to ask tough questions about our current Cambodian policy. It would be ironic in the extreme if American conservatives who properly condemn China for its Tiananmen Square horrors nonetheless gave China a free pass for, if not actual support of, its at least equally horrid supply of arms to the Khmer Rouge. Silence in the face of China's support of the Khmer Rouge may well be act of appeasement which China wishes most from America and the West. And when the alternative to that silence is a policy of supporting wholly supervised Cambodian elections, there is little excuse for any failure to condemn China or to make it clear that China has place at the table of nations until it ceases its support of the Khmer Rouge.

Two additional points need to be made. First, I acknowledge my upset at the apparent return of Vietnamese troops to Cambodia, in whatever capacity. Having said this, the obvious point needs to be made that the Cambodians did not see other members of the world community waiting in line to protect them from the Khmer Rouge. Quite the contrary, for America's support of Sihanouk, whose forces are now engaged in openly acknowledged joint operations with the Khmer Rouge, has led many Cambodians to conclude, not unreasonably, that America is literally on the side of Pol Pot. It was the misfortune of Cambodia to have been rescued from the Khmer huge 11 years ago by the Vietnamese, but no one in their situation, no one, would have rejected Vietnamese assistance at a time when none other was forthcoming to overthrow the Pol Pot regime. (It is a mark of the literal insanity of the Pol Pot regime that it actually invaded and committed atrocities on Vietnamese territory, in 1978 and 1979, when the Vietnamese army was the bristlingly powerful and recently triumphant instrument it then was; but for the fact that Pol Pot was mad enough to have invaded Vietnam, Cambodia might still today be under Khmer Rouge rule.)

The above leads to the final point which I wish to make in this testimony. For all the reading I had done about the Khmer Rouge, I was totally unprepared for the evidence I actually found of the nature of their rule. People whom I randomly stopped on the street to ask of their experiences during the Khmer Rouge period would tell stories of 13-year-old boys armed with AK-47 rifles who had killed all of the people in their villages who spoke any English, or had gone to high school or had worn eyeglasses. Stories were told of "experimental" villages where all of the men were killed, to see how women would fare under the impossible work quotas imposed by the Pol Pot regime. (It is important to note that people who had been in Eastern Region villages often described themselves as "lucky" for their relative—although not complete—freedom from the horrors of the Pol Pot period.)

Two sights in Phnom Penh remain the most vivid for me. First was the visit to the Tuol Sleng interrogation center, at which the Khmer Rouge brutally murdered all but a handful of the 20,000 prisoners who were sent there. Evidence of the nature of Tuol Sleng still remains intact and well preserved, including torture instruments, jail cells, holding rooms, and thousands of pre- and post-torture photographs and confessions. Together, they document a record of inhumanity equalled for me by my visit to Dachau. This leads me to urge members of this subcommittee to ask American policymakers whether Sihanouk is committed, should he achieve

power, to preserving the record of Tuol Sleng. Last year, the world properly condemned the attempted conversion of a portion of Auschwitz even for so otherwise laudable a use as a convent. The need to preserve Auschwitz intact, it was said, had less to do with the needs of the Jewish community than those of the rest of the world—Auschwitz needed to stand as a reminder that there should “never again” be such a place. But Tuol Sleng is such a place, and the world needs it no less than Auschwitz, to remind it of its darkest capacities. Sihanouk would, in a second, destroy the evidence of Tuol Sleng if given the chance. How then do we support him? And how do we stand by while he engages in joint operations with the Khmer Rouge? Or stand by while China arms the Khmer Rouge, as if a strong Khmer Rouge in any way serves American policy interests? And, most of all, how can this be so when the Hun Sen government, whatever one may think of it, is prepared to accept U.N. run elections?

My second recollection of Phnom Penh is a happier one. I counted over 300 private English language schools in that city, and vividly remember the spontaneous bemusement of people who were asked why the city had no Russian or Vietnamese language schools. I strongly believe that Cambodia is looking to America and the West for its future. But I also strongly believe that the current situation in Cambodia is fragile—fragile enough for the Cambodian Government to possibly even cede its sovereignty to the U.N. for an indeterminate period if it believes that the United States is truly implacable in its support for Sihanouk, and through him, the Khmer Rouge. As noted I believe that such a development, especially if not accompanied by a date-certain commitment for rapid elections, will not only be an expensive failure for Cambodia, but may also irreparably jeopardize the credibility of the United Nations.

We are now looked upon as models by most of the world because of our championship of democratic processes and free elections. We should do no less for the people to whom we and the world now owes its deepest moral debt: the people of Cambodia.

As Nicaragua has dramatically shown, elections are the key to “prospects for peace in Cambodia.” In my view, this subcommittee can powerfully enhance those prospects by proposing for congressional enactment a resolution which:

- Calls unambiguously and without qualification, for rapid, U.N. supervised elections in Cambodia;
- Calls on the United Nations to do no more in the administration of Cambodian affairs than it is capable of doing, and no more than it needs to do, based on the recent record in Nicaragua, Lithuania, and elsewhere, to ensure that free elections will take place; and
- Condemns unambiguously and without qualification, China's present military support of the Khmer Rouge.

I again thank the subcommittee for providing me with this opportunity to appear before it and to share my views.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you for that heartfelt statement.
Dr. Chauncey.

STATEMENT OF HELEN CHAUNCEY, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. CHAUNCEY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the order of the presentation is going to make this begin to look a little bit like it is something of a setup. I am here to talk about China. I assure you this was not planned, and the three of us have not consulted on the order of events here.

I am here to speak to you as a specialist in contemporary Chinese affairs. My task was to call the attention of the panel to the close linkage between the People's Republic of China and events in Cambodia. That part of the task based on the testimony we have heard here already is going to be a relatively easy one.

I would like to open my comments by disagreeing particularly with the testimony which has been given by representatives of the administration as to where this item belongs on our agenda.

China, as we know, is the principal patron of the Khmer Rouge. Absolutely at the highest level of our negotiating agenda, before

anything else, must be the issue of cutting aid, bringing pressure to bear on China to cut aid to the Khmer Rouge.

Unless China's lifeline to the Khmer Rouge is cut, all other discussion is meaningless. It will not matter if Hun Sen is a snake in the grass or a born-again Republican, it will not matter if Norodom Sihanouk is a confused old man in his dotage or the absolute embodiment of popular sovereignty. It will not matter where U.N. troops are stationed or when they are stationed there. As long as the Chinese sustain the Khmer Rouge, it is absolutely clear what is going to happen in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge are going to take it.

In that regard and because time is short, what I would like to do is summarize the essence of a prepared statement which I submitted to the committee and focus my comments in particular on China, on the Khmer Rouge supporters. It is the Chinese who have been, in the process of the negotiations which have gone on for a number of years now, the least inclined to support a peaceful resolution of the situation in Southeast Asia and the most comfortable with endemic destabilization.

I would like to focus my comments in particular on two areas: First, why the United States has been reticent to address China on this issue and I will argue here that this reticence is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of our relations, the relations between the United States and China. Second, I would like to call into question the assertion that the Chinese have been relatively flexible recently, that we have reason for optimism.

Let me preface these comments by noting that I do not consider myself anti-Chinese and do not wish in any way, shape, or form to engage in China bashing. I think that deflects the issue from what really is in front of us, which is a very specific policy, China's policies toward the Khmer Rouge and the implication of those policies toward Cambodia.

There has been a widespread belief in American foreign policy circles that the United States is largely helpless when faced with Chinese preferences and one should note that marginally, at least, this view is not without some substance. For a number of years now the Americans have quietly expressed to the Chinese our disagreement with policy toward the Khmer Rouge.

But it should be noted that we have done so very quietly and we have done so without particular political urgency. The impact of those communications has been negligible and that has led many to argue that China is impervious to foreign opinion. It is going to do what it wants no matter what.

I would argue that we should assume—and I trust this argument does not take much by way of elaboration—that that assumption is unacceptable. No nation should be able to dictate its terms to the world beyond unchecked by international opinion.

Then—and in many ways this is the crux of my argument—there is a lingering and misplaced belief that whatever the cost to Cambodia, China is so sensitive, its ties to us so fragile and so important at one and the same time, that we cannot afford more than polite inconsequential gestures of disagreement.

Ten years ago when we normalized relations with the People's Republic that might have been true. When the United States first

normalized its relations with Beijing, ties with China were relatively fragile. At that time fundamentally the bond between Washington and Beijing was secured by one concern, a shared geopolitical animosity toward the Soviet Union, and in that sense we never normalized relations with China. Normal diplomatic relations are thicker, they are more multifaceted, and they are, therefore, more flexible than that.

In 1979 the geopolitical calculus rendered our ties with China tenuous and brittle. Ten years later, even in the wake of the horror of Tian'anmen, that is no longer true, nor should we want it to be true.

We continue, however, to approach China with excessive caution, and there was substantial evidence of this overly cautious approach at last month's Paris agreements on Cambodia. As has been indicated in the testimony here today, some measure of flexibility was shown in this regard by our Cambodian opponents who have agreed to consider U.N. facilitation, a position which Phnom Penh has previously rejected because of Khmer Rouge influence over the U.N. seat.

Press reports to the contrary, however, there was no flexibility on the part of the Chinese. The Chinese indeed warmly embraced the U.N. proposal but as has already been noted here, that was not a concession. The Chinese have been requesting a U.N. role in Cambodia since 1981 based on the assumption that the Khmer Rouge will hold the seat or at least influence whoever does hold the seat.

The initial Australian proposal called for vacating the U.N. seat. Agreement to vacate the seat would have indicated a concession on the part of the Chinese. There was no such agreement in the statement reached in Paris in January. There was also no agreement and apparently no discussion leading toward agreement to cut off arms to the Khmer Rouge even if everything else in the proposal goes as scheduled.

I have argued that the Khmer Rouge will triumph if its Chinese support is not severed. I have also argued that the United States appears reluctant to address China on this issue because of misplaced beliefs that our relations with China could not handle the strain.

Let me close my observations with observations about a degree to which America's own interests would be served if we assumed a more active stance with regard to China and, in addition, with regard to the current and ominous Khmer Rouge revival in Cambodia.

We have heard experts argue that the United States should not spend political assets in an area of the world such as Indochina. At a minimum that view fails to take into account America's security needs. We are not well served by instability in the Southeast Asian region of which, as our Secretary of Defense's recent visit to the Philippines indicates, there is measure enough among our own allies.

But beyond immediate security issues is America's stature as a global leader. We have seen political leadership and the power of democratic ideology exercised with thrilling significance in Eastern Europe, another region of the world that was once viewed as pe-

ripheral to the interests of Western and Soviet giants. It is precisely in such regions of the world, the allegedly peripheral ones, that the legitimacy and the respect of global leaders is now being defined.

If we assume the region is too peripheral to squander political capital, we will ourselves become peripheral, not only to Indochina but to Southeast Asia as a whole. That may be a grim option, but for the people of Cambodia the option is worse.

Tommy Koh, Singapore's talented Ambassador to the United States recently argued that the world should not stand by and allow the Khmer Rouge to seize Cambodia by force. If that looked like a possibility, Koh asserted, it would be necessary to welcome to Cambodia the return of Vietnamese troops. Neither possibility, Khmer Rouge victories nor the return of the Vietnamese, should be welcomed in Washington.

We have the power if we have the will to prevent that, but to do so we need to look not only at Cambodia, we need to look at, rethink and rethink with conviction our attitude toward Chinese policy. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Chauncey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CHAUNCEY

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you.

I speak to you in my capacity as a specialist in the contemporary affairs of the People's Republic of China. I wish to speak to you about the imminent danger of the return to power of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Regrettably, the linkage between that possibility and Chinese foreign policy is a close one, which, in my opinion, has received insufficient attention as we review American policy options toward Southeast Asia.

There is little dispute among us about the nature of the Khmer Rouge, both with regard to their sanguinary past and with regard to the desire we all share to ensure that they do not return to power. Much of the discussion designed to prevent a Khmer Rouge come back has focused internally, on the nature of negotiations among the warring Cambodian factions, for example, or on a transitional administrative exercise of power within Cambodia. Under normal circumstances, such discussions would be the epitome of enlightenment, confirmation that countries, no matter how small, should be the masters of their own fate regardless of the preferences of their superpower neighbors.

There are no normal circumstances in Cambodia, however. If we are sincere about our commitment to assist the people of Cambodia, we must locate an Asian superpower, the People's Republic of China, the principal patron of the Khmer Rouge, high on our political agenda. Unless China's lifeline to the Khmer Rouge is cut, all other discussion is meaningless. It will not matter if Hun Sen is a snake in the grass or a born-again Republican. It will not matter if Norodom Sihanouk is a confused old man in his dotage or the embodiment of popular sovereignty. It will not matter where U.N. troops are stationed or when they are stationed there. As long as the Chinese sustain the Khmer Rouge, there is no question what is going to happen in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge are going to take it.

Eleven years ago, driven from power after their bloody 4-year reign of terror, the Khmer Rouge were a spent force, exhausted, physically shattered, shunned by their people. Today, they are strong, healthy, armed to the teeth. They are still shunned by their people, but that is a trifling matter for a heavily armed, hardened fighting force which considers respect for popular opinion a poison from the West.

Let there be no mistake about the importance of the issue. Within the past month, we have seen the forced march of thousands of refugees under Khmer Rouge control from safe haven in Thailand back into Cambodia. We know from interviews with refugees who have escaped Khmer Rouge control what this means. These forced treks are not for the purpose of increasing the fighting ranks. The hardened core does the fighting. Rather, the terrorized refugees are being used as porters—arms are being transferred to stockpiles inside Cambodia. We have heard testimony

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Khmer Rouge now have sufficient arms to fight on for at least 2 years, even if the arms supply were cut off tomorrow. The Khmer Rouge tenure is lengthened every day the arms supply continues.

The revival of the Khmer Rouge has been the handiwork of the Chinese. The Chinese have not acted alone in this regard—they have had the active cooperation of the military in Thailand; for example, and the tacit approval of much of the Western world. Uncharacteristically for someone such as myself, who specializes in the study of history, let me argue that the issue before us now is not to point a finger of blame for past developments. The issue before us is preventing calamity in the future.

To do this, we must understand China's motivations. The calculus at work on China's part would appear to be an effort to mask domestic instability with unquestioned certainty in the realm of foreign policy. At issue is not threats to China's national security; at issue is virulent national pride. This does not mean that Chinese policy is set in concrete. Beijing has certainly altered the course of its policies toward the United States; for example, in the decades since the Communists came to power. Staying the course, however, sustaining support for the genocidal Khmer Rouge, will be the policy of choice until the Chinese can be convinced that their own self-perceptions will be better served by joining the Western community in its search for alternatives.

There has been considerable reluctance among Western nations to challenge the Chinese agenda for Cambodia. The Chinese have not felt bound to similar sensitivities. They have aggressively pursued their own policy goals in Southeast Asia. Those policy goals have shown little of the diplomatic perestroika affecting much of the world these days. Although the Chinese no longer support Communist insurgencies abroad, their support for the Khmer Rouge is foreign policy in much the same vein. Of all the players in the Cambodia embroglio, the Chinese have shown the least inclination to support a peaceful resolution. They have been more comfortable with endemic destabilization than constructive diplomacy. That is a bad sign for our Asian allies, and therefore for the United States.

Our own reticence toward the Chinese is based, I believe, on a fundamental misunderstanding of China's foreign relations with the United States. The misperceptions at work here would be little more than grist for the academic mills of a course in introductory diplomacy, were it not for the deadly implications of China's unchecked support for the Khmer Rouge. There is, to begin with, a widespread belief that the United States is helpless in the face of Chinese preferences. Marginally, at least, this view is not without substance. For a number of years now, the Americans have quietly communicated to the Chinese their distaste for Chinese support to the Khmer Rouge. The impact has been negligible, leading some to argue that China is impervious to foreign opinion and will do what it wants no matter what. That assumption is unacceptable. No nation should dictate its terms to the world beyond, unchecked by international opinion. It may also be worth noting that while we have expressed concern to the Chinese over the Khmer Rouge, we have not done so with any sense of urgency. Our communications have been largely uninnovative and without political priority. That will have to change if we expect the Chinese to listen and heed what they hear.

Then, there is a lingering, misplaced belief that whatever the cost to Cambodia, China is so sensitive, its ties to us so fragile, that we cannot afford more than polite, inconsequential gestures of disagreement. Ten years ago, such a supposition might have been true. When the United States first normalized relations with China in January 1979, ties with the Chinese were relatively fragile. Although Americans in large numbers came forward to explore new opportunities with the Chinese, fundamentally the bond between Washington and Beijing was secured by one concern—a shared geopolitical animosity toward the Soviet Union. In that sense, we did not normalize relations with China; normal diplomatic relations are thicker, more multifaceted, and therefore more flexible than that. The geopolitical calculus rendered our ties with China tenuous and brittle.

Ten years later, even in the wake of the horror of Tiananmen, that is no longer true, nor should we want it to be true. We now have thick, multifaceted relations with China, which are not determined by any one single issue and which are not in danger of collapse. Still, we approach China as one might approach a sick, irritable child, an approach which is complimentary to neither the United States or China and insulting to the diplomatic capabilities of both.

There was evidence of this overly cautious approach at work in last month's Paris agreements on Cambodia. Inspired by recent developments in Namibia, the U.N. Security Council's five permanent members adopted a resolution, put forward by Aus-

tralia, to use the good offices of the United Nations to break the Cambodian stalemate. Some measure of flexibility was shown by our Cambodian opponents, who agreed to consider U.N. facilitation—a position Phnom Penh has previously rejected because of the Khmer Rouge hold on the Cambodian seat to the U.N. Press reports to the contrary, there was no flexibility on the part of the Chinese. The Chinese warmly embraced the U.N. proposal, but that was not a concession. The Chinese have been requesting a U.N. role in Cambodia since 1981, a request based on Khmer Rouge control over the U.N. seat. The initial Australian proposal called for vacating the U.N. seat. Agreement to a vacated seat would have represented a concession on the part of the Chinese, but no such agreement is in the January statement. There is no agreement to cut off arms to the Khmer Rouge, even if everything else in the proposal goes as expected.

Equally ominous was Chinese insistence on hostile references to the presence of foreigners in Cambodia, in the face of an alternative proposal which would have specifically condemned foreign military forces. This bit of semantics is important because of what it signifies for the Khmer Rouge. When the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, their ideological battle cry was "purify the country of foreign influence." The first to go were ethnic minorities—notably local Vietnamese fishing communities, settled in Cambodia for generations. Then, as we now know, everything else went—the people with eyeglasses, the people who spoke foreign languages, the doctors who used Western medicine. With no apparent opposition, the Chinese have retained ominous code words, hostile to a foreign presence generally, which triggered the Cambodian holocaust.

I have argued that the Khmer Rouge will triumph if its Chinese support is not severed. I have also argued that the United States appears reluctant to address China directly on this issue because of misplaced beliefs that our relations with China could not handle the strain. Let me close with observations about the degree to which America's own interests would be served by a more active stance with regard to the current and ominous Khmer Rouge revival. We have heard experts argue that the United States should not sacrifice its political assets over issues in Indochina. At a minimum, that view fails to take into account America's security needs. We are not well served by instability in the Southeast Asian region, of which, as the Secretary of Defense's recent visit to the Philippines indicates, there is measure enough among our own allies.

Beyond immediate security issues is America's stature as a global leader. We have seen political leadership and the power of democratic ideology exercised with thrilling significance in Eastern Europe, another region of the world once viewed as peripheral to Western and Soviet giants. It is precisely in such regions of the world, the allegedly peripheral ones, that the legitimacy and respect of global leaders is now being defined. If we assume the region is too peripheral to squander our political capital, we will ourselves become peripheral to the region, not just Indochina but Southeast Asia as a whole.

For the people of Cambodia, the options are even worse. Tommy Koh, Singapore's Ambassador to the United States, recently argued that the world should not stand by and allow the Khmer Rouge to seize Cambodia by force. If that looked like a possibility, Koh asserted, he would welcome the return to Cambodia of Vietnamese troops. Neither possibility—Khmer Rouge victories or the return of the Vietnamese—should be welcomed in the United States. We have the power, if we have the will, to prevent that. To do so, we must look not only to Cambodia but to the Chinese as well.

Thank you.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very, very much.

Jeremy Stone.

STATEMENT OF JEREMY J. STONE, PRESIDENT, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have participated in the work of the committee for over 20 years, and I think this is a most unusual hearing. I cannot remember having heard, from my point of view, such brilliant testimony. Except for the administration witnesses, it seems to me that the testimony, and the questioning from the Senators, has been extraordinarily penetrating, and I would like to

associate myself with virtually every remark that was made by Secretary Muskie and the previous witnesses.

And I am glad to be—I feel it is an honor to be—the last witness on this panel because what I would like to see fits quite well with what has been said before.

I would like to explain what the Khmer Rouge strategy is. And then I would like to present a proposal which William Colby, the distinguished Director of Central Intelligence and myself have worked out to try to address that Khmer Rouge strategy.

You know, for the last 10 years we have been playing the Khmer Rouge game in many ways. We helped build them up in their sanctuaries after the Vietnamese defeat: We seated them in the U.N. We joined them together in a coalition with Sihanouk. We helped drive out the Vietnamese army. And now we are putting great stress and pressure on the Hun Sen government. So, from the Pol Pot point of view every one of the five major decisions made in the last 10 years about policy in Cambodia was a decision which, if Pol Pot were here today, he could warmly applaud.

And now what he wants is this. He has told his forces to delay the negotiations for as long as possible. He has said that after 2 years, he will be able to coerce enough villages, and enough people, in the traditional Khmer Rouge way of inducements and pressures to be sure that, in the election, Sihanouk will win without Hun Sen support. And then the Khmer Rouge will find it a simple matter to take over from Sihanouk. Sihanouk has been their patsy for 20 years. Sihanouk has been in league with them for 20 years.

Even during the period from 1970 to 1975, he said "the Khmer Rouge will spit me out like a cherry pit" as soon as they get back in power and, of course, they did and they held him captive for 3 years.

Pol Pot has also told his commanders that if the election were held now that the Khmer Rouge would be embarrassed. So, William Colby and I have put forward a position that does not oppose the Australian plan for this comprehensive settlement that so many are working for but which says that we have little confidence that every jot and tiddle of this proposal will be able to be resolved in the time required to prevent the Khmer Rouge from subverting the country.

The testimony of the CIA before the Armed Services Committee, and even the statement of David Lambertson today, concedes that the longer the fighting goes on, the stronger will be the Khmer Rouge position. And, therefore, what Colby and I are arguing is for elections—elections as soon as possible—and let us at the same time cut off the aid to the two military factions that we are supporting, not the political aid, not the humanitarian aid, not drive them out of the political ball game, but the "nonlethal" aid, so-called, that is military.

David Lambertson keeps telling you the only aid we are giving is "nonlethal." Nonlethal is a cover phrase for "no guns." The guns come from Singapore. But "nonlethal" it does not mean "nonmilitary." Military aid is being given. And America is participating in the secret Bangkok working group which is coordinating the military offensives of these two non-Communist factions.

Military reports show—the CIA admitted it before the Armed Services Committee—that these forces we are supporting are losing ground relative to the Khmer Rouge with every day we help put them in the field.

So what Mr. Colby and I have put forward is this. From a military point of view we do not need military support to support Prince Sihanouk. Even if the non-Communist resistance were threatened, they could live in the sanctuaries where they were for so many years and prepare for the coming political struggle in the coming election.

Above all, military support for these factions is counterproductive politically because it prevents us from putting pressure on the Chinese and the Thais. The key to this whole war is to tell the Thais to stop delivering the Chinese aid.

How can we do that when we are part of a coalition against Hun Sen giving nonlethal, but military, support and strategic intelligence, satellite photos, telephone listening in equipment? How can they expect to pressure the Thais to stop delivering Chinese aid?

What we have learned in the last few days is that this military support even draws the Vietnamese military back into Cambodia, if these recent reports are true. Thus, our goal of driving the Vietnamese out of Cambodia is undermined by the pressure we are putting on the Hun Sen government.

And I would like to insert for the record, Mr. Chairman, if I may, materials given at my press conference last week showing the degree of coordination and cooperation between the factions. This has reached a stage which, in my opinion, makes it unlawful for the United States to continue supporting Prince Sihanouk.

[The information referred to follows:]

February 13, 1990.

PRESS RELEASE—MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND KHMER ROUGE IS FORCING A CHANGE IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA

On return from a late January visit to Cambodia, FAS President Jeremy J. Stone released documents indicating (a) how close the military cooperation between Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge had become, (b) that the legislative history of aid to Prince Sihanouk required that this aid be terminated in the face of such close military cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, and (c) that the U.S. Government was itself perturbed about these new developments and was complaining to Prince Sihanouk about them.

Among the documents released was a document prepared by the Cambodian Defense Ministry, in Phnom Penh, on January 30. It revealed that Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge were cooperating strategically, tactically and in terms of logistics. This confirmed, and added to, a number of other relevant Western reports and admissions of Prince Sihanouk himself.

Released also was evidence that the Committee on Foreign Affairs had sought to get the President to secure assurances from Prince Sihanouk not to "use U.S. assistance in cooperation or coordination with the Khmer Rouge or to benefit the Khmer Rouge in any way" in its interpretation of legislation (now embodied in section 902b of the International Cooperation Act but passed each year since 1985) prohibiting even "indirect" help to the Khmer Rouge. Such assurances would not now be possible, Stone observed.

Further, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee had assured the House of Representatives that "joint military operations" with the Khmer Rouge were prohibited by this same law. (Congressional Record, H7019, October 12, 1989). Accordingly, the joint military operations which are now underway should lead, Stone said, to a prompt cutoff of all aid to Prince Sihanouk.

As evidence that the Department of State was finally becoming perturbed about such cooperation, the Federation released a little-noticed Agence France Press

report of February 1 indicating that United States ambassadors to China and Thailand had delivered identical expressions of concern to Prince Sihanouk and his son Prince Ranariddh about the "harmful consequences" which their alliance with the Khmer Rouge could have.

Stone called upon the Congress to cut off aid to Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communist resistance—and not only because of their alliance with the Khmer Rouge. "There was no need to continue to subsidize a civil war in Cambodia," he said, "when the Phnom Penh Government of Hun Sen had already agreed to all of the goals of U.N. supervised, free elections we sought. The time has come for the United States to turn all of its energies," Stone said, "toward preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge rather than helping them advance militarily, as we have, for almost a decade."

Stone pointed out that U.S. legislation concerning genocide, which prohibited "complicity" in genocide, made the U.S. Government guilty, under the genocide convention, for working in alliance with the Khmer Rouge. He called on Congress to cut off funding for the war, including the secret \$24 million being passed through the CIA, and to work to prevent the Thai government from continuing to pass along weapons from China to the Khmer Rouge.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEREMY J. STONE

— BACKGROUND ON PROHIBITION OF AID TO THE KHMER ROUGE

Beginning in 1985, the United States passed contradictory pieces of legislation with regard to the civil war in Cambodia. On the one hand, aid began to flow to the insurgent forces of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and those of Son Sann—these were called the "non-Communist" resistance. On the other hand, another piece of legislation asserted that none of the funds involved could be: "Obligated or expended for the purpose or with the effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina."

In fact, already in 1982, Prince Sihanouk had been forced by the ASEAN countries, with the active compliance of the United States, to join with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in a political alliance called the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). This turning of "white into red," as one Thai official boasted, many years later, was necessary to preempt a revolution in the U.N. against the seat being held by the Khmer Rouge alone.

Accordingly, when section 902b, the prohibition against direct or indirect aid to the Khmer Rouge, was originally passed, Prince Sihanouk was already in political alliance with the Khmer Rouge. Accordingly, direct aid to Prince Sihanouk was already indirect help to the Khmer Rouge.

All three armies of the resistance were, after all, aimed at a common enemy, that of the government of Hun Sen. If one resistance faction got stronger, then all benefited since, clearly, the Hun Sen government was stretched ever thinner by the added strength of any of the factions.

This basic contradiction was, however, ignored. Attention focused, instead, on whether the various factions actually cooperated with one another and/or coordinated their attacks.

Scattered newspaper reports suggested that they indeed did. The administration response, normally, was to argue that, quite the opposite, the factions sometimes fought with each other—and, on some occasions, this was probably true as well.

It remained a sensitive point.

On March 15, 1989, there was a campaign by the Sihanouk forces to have "lethal aid" sent to them and this campaign was championed, in the United States, by Congressman Stephen Solarz whose subcommittee was preparing the relevant "permissive" language. Until then, only "nonlethal" aid had been sent overtly. And covert aid had probably also been restricted to nonlethal, albeit military, aid.

In other words, until this time, the United States had sent military uniforms and equipment, paid for travels of officials (except in the United States where the CIA is not allowed to conduct activities), and salaries of soldiers. For political reasons, the United States took care that the lethal military aid was provided to the non-Communist resistance by Singapore (or China of course) and it buried whatever ways it reimbursed the Singaporeans, if any.

Congressman Stephen Solarz kicked off the campaign for lethal aid in March 1, 1989, hearings. He noted that the United States was already providing Prince Sihanouk with money for nonlethal aid and that this was, after all, something that

could be turned into weapons. He said: "My own view is that this distinction between lethal and nonlethal assistance is a distinction without any substantive difference. It may have some relevance in a domestic political context but I do not think it has any relevance in the theater."

By March 15, Prince Sihanouk's son, Prince Ranariddh, was in Washington enjoying an audience with the President and seeking lethal aid including ground-to-air Stingers. To support his request, Prince Sihanouk had a press conference in Beijing at which he announced "up to now we got from the United States of America non-lethal aid, but we want a few lethal aids."

SIHANOUK CALLS FOR 'HIGH COUNCIL' FOR COOPERATION WITH KR

But he went too far. At the press conference, he was joined by the Khmer Rouge's main spokesmen, Khieu Samphan which emphasized their alliance. Worst of all, as the L.A. Times reported (March 15, 1989) "A major purpose of the news conference was to announce the formation of a 'High Council for National Defense, headed by Sihanouk, to ensure cooperation between the three resistance forces." This, Sihanouk said, was a step toward merging the three forces into a single army.

The State Department announced that this should not be taken seriously and that the whole press conference should be treated as a public relations gimmick. Deputy Assistant Secretary David Lambertson advised a concerned Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the joint announcement:

"Had no significance whatsoever on the ground in Cambodia. It meant nothing. It was an effort by Prince Sihanouk at a time when Hun Sen's popularity and standing in the West seemed to be growing to effect something of a public relations coup and to give an impression of renewed unified effort on the part of all of the resistance factions."

At this time fighting in Cambodia was at a lower ebb than now. It was only when the Vietnamese withdrew their army from Cambodia on September 26 that fighting picked up.

We know now that the secret Cambodian working group in Bangkok, which coordinates the strategy of the two non-Communist armies was preparing a general offensive to be launched 4 days after the withdrawal. This working group is made up of high officials of the Thai, Singapore, and Malaysian Governments and CIA officials representing the United States and based at the U.S. Bangkok Embassy. (New York Times, November 16, 1989, "Secret War in Cambodia," Jeremy J. Stone; the New York Times would not print op-ed article until the Times could confirm the secret details itself which it did in an article printed, by prearrangement, on the same date by New York Times reporter Stephen Erlanger.)

CAMBODIA DEFENSE MINISTRY MEMO DOCUMENTS MILITARY ALLIANCE

The document we are releasing today prepared by the Defense Ministry of the State of Cambodia (viz, the Hun Sen government) reveals that all three resistance factions, including the third faction of Pol Pot, met and discussed a general three-way coordinated attack. And they even divided up the territory into three "zones of influence" described in this document. Thus they engaged in basic strategic coordination.

Furthermore, they decided on a common strategy of attack "advancing two-thirds of their strength deeper inside the country while one-third has to attack the defense line."

As this document shows, the parties also engaged in tactical coordination and cooperation. They "divide their forces into many groups to fight for one same stronghold or for many strongholds at the same time."

As evidence of the former, the document notes that both the Khmer Rouge and, for the Sihanouk forces, Prince Ranariddh, claimed they had successfully captured Varin—evidence that both were attacking this point at the same time. ("Ranariddh declared that his troops had seized the district. But the Khmer Rouge announced the same thing.")

The document also asserts that there was joint participation in the attacks on Pailin and on the attack on Banteay Meanchey province.

As for the document's charge that the parties try to fight for "many strongholds at the same time," we have evidence from none other than Prince Ranariddh himself in the Bangkok Post of October 28. The Prince concludes that the Khmer Rouge halted their attacks on Pailin when the non-Communist resistance started its attacks around Sisophon. "Only when Phnom Penh deployed troops from the 196th Division to assist in the defense of Sisophon, did the Khmer Rouge strike" (The 196th was one of two elite divisions defending Pailin.). The Prince said that resist-

ance was able to "monitor calls for reinforcements from Battambang to other battle fronts, through special equipment supplied by the U.S." (FBIS-EAS-89-208, October 30, 1989, Bangkok Post). See also this seemingly more disingenuous quote: "Desjardins: So, are you operating in close collaboration with the Khmer Rouges? Ranariddh: Not at all. There was a joint plan between the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and us to launch the October 1 offensive but with the Khmer Rouge we had simply reached an understanding without spelling things out."

The document also reveals that the Sihanouk forces may pay the Khmer Rouge to rescue them when they get into military difficulties or just need help—another form of cooperation. ("Sihanouk has paid \$3,000 U.S. dollars to Division 450 of Khmer Rouge while demanding them to do him this favor," i.e., of attacking the Nimit commune in Sereisophan District.)

CHARGES OF PHNOM PENH'S DEFENSE MINISTRY SUPPORTED IN PRESS

These charges of the Cambodian Defense Ministry are quite plausible. We have, to support them:

- The admission of Prince Sihanouk who, in an interview with New York Times staffer Steven Erlanger in Beijing, said that his forces were cooperating ever more closely with the Khmer Rouge. ("It is also true, he says, that the non-Communist forces are more and more coordinating their military activity in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge. * * * The diplomatic trend, he said, 'is more and more favorable to Hun Sen,' the Prime Minister of the Phnom Penh Government, 'so the resistance is obliged to strengthen its unity,' particularly when the non-Communist factions are weak." December 19, 1989)

- Reuters dispatch from the Thai-Cambodian border confirming that the forces were attacking together. ("U.S.-backed Cambodian guerrillas said Monday that they had combined forces with the Communist Khmer Rouge in fresh attacks on the Cambodian Government, overrunning five government positions." International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1989)

- New York Times interview with Prime Minister Hun Sen showing that the Cambodian defense forces were capturing Khmer Rouge with American weapons. (New York Times, January 1, 1990 "Cambodia Asserts U.S. Guerrilla Ties")

- And a recent Washington Post article (February 9, 1990; "Non-Communist Rebel Faction in Cambodia Relying on Khmer Rouge." by Keith B. Richburg). This article says that the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk's forces are "cooperating on tactical support, intelligence-sharing, and artillery support during battlefield operations". Richburg notes that, previously, the Sihanouk and Son Sann forces refused to "work in concert" with the Khmer Rouge.

Indeed, Sihanoukist references to cooperation are becoming ever more open. On January 22, Gen. Kruoch Yeum, commander of the National Sihanoukist Army (ANS) 3d region said: "Sisophon will become ours soon. I am very confident because our three forces will fight side by side to capture it." (FBIS-EAS-90-014; January 22 from Bangkok "The Nation".)

COOPERATION BECOMING HARDER FOR U.S. TO IGNORE

This cooperation is impossible to ignore today as it was ignored as late as last October. Thus, on October 11, Prince Sihanouk said, over a clandestine radio: "I would like particularly to commend the fact that our three armies know how to cordially cooperate with one another and respect one another as in the past. On the contrary, we assist one another in every circumstance and cooperate with one of the Cambodian motherland that we another on the battlefield love more than our lives." (FBIS-EAS-89-195; October 11, 1989; Clandestine voice of the Khmer in Cambodian)

The response of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, on October 16, was then simply to deny that it saw "any evidence" of such cooperation: "If that were the case, our efforts to assist the non-Communist resistance would be a lot harder to explain to the American public," one official said. (FBIS-FAS-89-198; October 16, 1989.)

But, today, the evidence is there and the diplomatic and legal problem for the U.S. Government is much more serious.

There are several problems. The first turns on the law cited above prohibiting even "indirect" support for the Khmer Rouge. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs urged, in a recent committee report containing this legislation, that the President secure assurances from Prince Sihanouk that he was not acting in "cooperation and coordination" with the Khmer Rouge. Obviously, no such assurances can now be forthcoming. Obviously, also, the intent of the prohibitive legislation was that such "cooperation and coordination" would be "indirect" support of the Khmer Rouge.

The second problem is one of public relations, rather than law, as noted in the statement just above from the Bangkok Embassy.

Sometime in January, reacting to this problem, U.S. Ambassadors in both Beijing and Bangkok were apparently instructed to warn Prince Sihanouk and Prince Ranariddh that they were going too far. As evidence of this, we have the February 1 report of Agence France Press that, sometime between January 15 and January 30:

"The U.S. Ambassador to China, James R. Lilley, has warned Prince Norodom Sihanouk that his alliance with the Khmer Rouge could have harmful consequences, a well-informed source said here Thursday."

On the same January 30, Prince Sihanouk released a letter to him from his son Prince Ranariddh in which the latter said:

"* * * he had been 'greatly discouraged' after being 'clearly warned' by an unidentified ambassador in Bangkok of the serious consequences of our 'cooperation and rapprochement' with the Khmer Rouge. The younger Prince added, without explanation that 'the message was doubtless the same' as the one Prince Sihanouk had received." (Hong Kong AFP in English; see FBIS-EAS-90-022, February 1)

It was this advice, evidently, that threw Prince Sihanouk into a deep depression, caused him to resign from his positions as head of the Sihanouk forces and as head of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, and induced him to announce that he was not going to receive any more diplomats except from China.

The Prince, now recovered from his depression, has announced that he will return to a "liberated zone" in Cambodia to counterbalance what he has asserted was the growing support to Hun Sen.

U.S. HAS A MORAL PROBLEM AS WELL AS A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ONE

In any case, the problem for the United States is not just legal and not just political. It is also moral. The United States cannot, in good conscience, assist Prince Sihanouk to fight in a civil war in which he is in alliance with the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

There is no clearer indication of this than in the Genocide Convention. The United States has ratified the Genocide Convention and made it part of U.S. domestic law on November 5, 1988.

The Convention does not only prohibit "genocide" but also "conspiracy to commit genocide" and "complicity in genocide."

Nowhere in the convention does it say that one may be allied with genocidal murderers, at increased risk that they will succeed in retaking Cambodia and repeating their genocide, if one is doing so with the goal of free elections.

On the contrary, those who have committed genocide, such as Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge must, according to the Genocide Convention be punished and, according to article I of the convention, the contracting parties confirm that genocide is a crime "which they undertake to prevent and to punish."

The United States has not done so. As late as last month, State Department representatives could not confirm that they even agreed that the Khmer Rouge had committed genocide. The legal department said that this was a factual matter and the East Asian Bureau was testifying that the determination was a legal matter. This is incredible. The entire world, with the exception of the Department of State, knows that the Khmer Rouge, under Pol Pot, did commit genocide.

As a consequence of this calculated indecision, the Department has been able to avoid any question of calling for an international tribunal to punish the Khmer Rouge. Nor has it been required to face the issue of having the Khmer Rouge outlawed as a legal party—as opposed to having it included in an interim government, or subsequent elections, of the State of Cambodia.

STATE DEPARTMENT COMPLICITOUS IN GENOCIDE

In response to charges of complicity in genocide, including in particular an article in the Los Angeles Times of December 3 ("Accomplices to a New Genocide," Jeremy J. Stone) which had earlier been hand delivered to Department offices, the Department argued that they were a "fact of life" that had to be dealt with "effectively" through a "carefully crafted comprehensive settlement which provides for a substantial U.N. presence including a peacekeeping force, strict international guarantees, and a process that will lead to free and fair elections for the Cambodian people." In short, the only responsible way to deal with the genocidal murders was, in particular, to avoid step-by-step peace processes.

Nowhere mentioned was the fact that the United States was, actually, weakening the Hun Sen government by arming two of its other enemies and, thus, making the Khmer Rouge job easier. Nor was there any mention of the cooperation between the

factions. Nothing was said about our failure to cut off such aid or our failure to put effective pressure on Thailand to stop the Chinese aid, or on China itself. In short, we continued the policy of helping the Khmer Rouge, indirectly, to put pressure on Hun Sen to achieve the goals of free elections which we sought all along. And no explanation is given of why these free elections would prevent the Khmer Rouge from continuing their effective struggle to regain control.

In a more recent letter of January 29, to a newly formed "Campaign to Protect Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge" the Department argued that the "nonlethal aid which we provide them (viz, the non-Communist groups) is important in supporting their participation and defending them against the two communist groups." But this disingenuous coupling of the "two Communist groups" and even more disingenuous explanation for the aid overlooks the fact that Hun Sen is not carrying the attack to Prince Sihanouk's forces which are based in Thai sanctuaries and that the Khmer Rouge have no incentive to attack Sihanouk either.

The fact is that, on its face, the United States is engaged in a secret war in Cambodia with two factions that are effectively allied with the genocidal Khmer Rouge and that no serious explanation has been given of how the Department of State can justify continuing this strategy at this point.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the United States is funding and directing forces, those of Prince Sihanouk, which are cooperating and coordinating their attacks on the Hun Sen government with a genocidal group—the Khmer Rouge. This group has committed genocide once before and has made it clear that it plans to commit genocide again, at least upon the Vietnamese community in Cambodia (to kill and drive them out of Cambodia) if not upon other ethnic minorities and, indeed, upon the Khmer people themselves, as they did before. And they are led by the exact same leadership: Pol Pot, Son Sen, Ta Mok, who committed the genocide before.

Our Government may, or may not, be in the process of changing its policy. But up until a few months ago, it was still providing Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann with \$24 million per year and high technology advice and help. Now that the Sihanouk forces, at least, are admittedly and clearly fighting in close coordination and cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, the contradiction in U.S. policy can no longer be ignored.

Accordingly, we ask the press and the Congress to inquire of the Government what its policy is and we ask the public to rise up and oppose the decade long decision of the U.S. Government to ally itself, indirectly, with the Khmer Rouge.

MEMOIR ON THE MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE THREE FACTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA AGAINST THE STATE OF CAMBODIA

I. THE OVERALL STRATEGY

In conformity with their get-together in August 1989 in Khao Larn village, Surin province of Thailand, close to the Cambodian border, the three factions of the so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea raised their strategy that after the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops they will cooperate with each other to "totally free" the country. But Pol Pot insisted that if any political settlement to the issue is reached or if they lose the election they will be carrying on their guerrilla war against the state of Cambodia under the slogan "using the countryside to encircle the city."

Toward this end, the three factions have divided their zones of influence as follow:

1. The Khmer Rouges are in charge of the western part of the country in particular Battambang province;
2. The Son Sann's faction is responsible for the northwestern part of the country in particular Sisophon;
3. The Sihanouk's faction is in charge of the region from Samrong to Sierreap.

The three factions were unanimous to advance two-thirds their strength deeper inside the country while one-third has to attack the defense line.

II. THE TACTICS

1. *Collaboration.*—While attacking on the important strongholds, they always divide their forces into many groups to fight for one same stronghold or for many strongholds at the same time. For example, the attack on Pailin: The main forces

were Pol Pot's. But there was participation of Sihanouk's and Son Sann's too, totaling 1,500 to 2,000 men.

During the attack on Banteay Meanchey province, the strength of the three factions was estimated to be 4,500 men including two Pol Pot divisions—Division 450 and Division 519—that means 7 regiments of 1,900 men; 4 regiments of Moulinaka of 500 men, and Sereika was composed of the zones of military operations belonging to the general headquarters, with 2,100 troops. During the fighting in Phnom Srok we have captured 272 Sihanouk men and 2 Pol Pot men of Division 519. These two men have informed us that Sihanouk was responsible for their food supplies.

With regards to the attack in Varin district on January 17, 1990, Sihanouk paid 2,000 bahts for each man of the Khmer Rouge, while requesting them for help. In the evening of January 16, 1990, Ranariddh declared that his troops had seized the district. But the Khmer Rouge announced the same thing. However a few days after, we have retaken our lost position.

Another case of attack was in Nimit commune of Sereisophoan district. Sihanouk has paid 3,000 U.S. dollars to Division 450 of Khmer Rouge while demanding them to do him this favor. Some Sereika troops also participated in the attack.

2. *Armaments.*—The armaments made in China were used by the Sihanouk and Son Sann troops such as H-12, artilleries of 130 mm. and 122 mm. mortars of 100 mm. and AK.

On the contrary, some modern arms made in Western countries and supplied to Sereika and Sihanouk factions are also falling into the Pol Potists' hands. As a matter of fact, during our mopping up on the 785 Pol Pot Division in the southern part of Kampong Thom province, we have seized one Gustav M84 antitank arms made in Sweden. (Wherever they arrived in, the enemies from all factions begun to burn houses, ill-treat villagers, rape girls and ladies, ill-treat the monks, and kill whoever refused to observe their orders.)

(Origin of this document—added by the Federation of American Scientists: On Tuesday, January 30, 1990, the State of Cambodia Defense Minister Tie Binh briefed FAS President Jeremy J. Stone on the defense situation. Stone then asked Gen. Tie Binh for a memorandum containing the points he had mentioned in the briefing bearing on cooperation between the resistance factions. The minister's staff worked that evening—with Ly Sorsane of the Foreign Ministry as translator—to prepared this memorandum which was then provided to Stone on Wednesday morning in time for his departure from Phnom Penh. Accordingly, it represents the views of the Cambodian Defense Ministry.)

LETTER FROM CHARLES H. TWINING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 29, 1990.

MS. ANNE GALLIVAN & MR. PAUL SHANNON,
Campaign to Protect Cambodia for the Khmer Rouge,
Cambridge, MA 02138

Dear MS. GALLIVAN and MR. SHANNON: I have been asked to reply to your message of January 14 to Secretary Baker concerning the Khmer Rouge. Let me first say that we share your distaste for that murderous group and advocate that it have no role in Cambodia's future.

Unfortunately, the Khmer Rouge is a potent military presence and that threat must be dealt with and cannot be wished away. We believe that a carefully crafted comprehensive settlement which provides concrete assurances against a Khmer Rouge return to power, including a substantial U.N. role and a process leading to free and fair elections provides the best assurance against a resurgence of this murderous group.

We are currently engaged in intensive consultations with the other four permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union and Great Britain) in an attempt to reach a consensus on settlement arrangements, including an enhanced role for the U.N. during the transitional period leading to elections. We are hopeful that these efforts will inject sufficient positive momentum into the diplomatic process to carry it through to a final settlement agreement.

If this process is to be successful, we believe that Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communist resistance must continue to play a key role since they provide the only alternative to the two Communist factions. We believe that the non-lethal aid which we provide them is important in supporting their participation and defending them against the two Communist groups.

I hope that the foregoing is helpful in clarifying U.S. policy on this critical issue.
Sincerely,

CHARLES H. TWINING,
Director, Office of Vietnam, Laos Cambodia Affairs.

[The New York Times, Dec. 19, 1989]

SIHANOUK EXPLAINS HIS HIGH-WIRE ROLE IN AWKWARD CAMBODIAN COALITION

(By Steven Erlanger)

BEIJING, Dec. 18—Now 67 years old, Prince Norodom Sihanouk still sits in a gilded exile in the old French legation here, pampered by the Chinese, monitored by the Khmer Rouge and haunted by the past and by the fear of making one final, disastrous error to the detriment of the independent Cambodia he has devoted his soul to achieving.

In conversation, over the fine French champagne he offers in his immense reception room, he admits he is a moody man, liable to drive the diplomats and journalists he meets to exasperation. They seek an impossible clarity, he says, when little is clear in Cambodia, which has for so long had so little say over its own affairs.

He has spent his life trying to keep his country and himself afloat, with few resources other than his wit and unpredictability. Given the devotion to him that still exists in the country he once ruled as a god-king, there is no end to the great powers and minor factions that try to use him, and which he tries to use in turn.

"The Romans had their Janus god, with two faces, for peace and war," he said. "But there are two or three or four Sihanouks."

NOT A 'CHANGELING PRINCE'

Still, he said, "I am not the changeling prince as the Western press calls me. I have to use my imagination and my intelligence to find any reasonable solution possible for Cambodia—but one based on fact and the realities on the ground."

That is why, he says, he has ended up in such an awkward coalition with both the rightists who overthrew him in 1970 and the Communist Khmer Rouge, who turned Cambodia into a charnel house when they overthrew the rightists in 1975.

Between the crocodile of Vietnam, which ended the slaughter in late 1878 when it expelled the Khmer Rouge and set up the current Phnom Penh government as a subservient instrument, and the tiger of the Khmer Rouge, he has had to choose the tiger, he said, "for while it, too, is man-eating, it is purely Cambodian."

He has also been forced to make this choice by China, which has always treated him with "friendship and dignity," he says, but which remains not only the prime ally of the Khmer Rouge, but also the main source of weapons and funds to the non-Communists.

"So we are obliged to be friendly to the Khmer Rouge," the Prince said, "otherwise China will send no more support to us."

SEES LACK OF WESTERN SUPPORT

It is also true, he says, that the non-Communist forces are more and more coordinating their military activity in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge. "The words may condemn us," he said, but this, too, is a result of the comparative lack of military support provided by the West and the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia.

"It is a terrible choice, he said, but the non-Communist forces must keep their legitimacy as actors in Cambodia, and that is only possible through success on the battlefield.

The diplomatic trend, he said, is "more and more favorable to Hun Sen," the Prime Minister of the Phnom Penh government, "so the resistance is obliged to strengthen its unity," particularly when the non-Communist factions are weak.

"You say if we continue to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield, the outside world may condemn us, and it's true," he said. "But while on the surface, the outside world condemns us morally, in reality it only gives importance to military strength. Despite their fine words about moral values, the outside world is not so moral, because in fact they are observing the developing military situation in Cambodia."

"And the ones who win will be embraced and recognized—it is very simple," he said. "So the most important thing is to show that Hun Sen will not win the war, so we can force the outside world not to go so quickly to Hun Sen."

A QUOTE FROM 'HAMLET'

The Prince toyed with his white French poodle, Miki, and then gave a sort of giggle that expanded to fill the room. "It is something very tragic, very Shakespearian," he said. "You know Hamlet: 'To be or not to be.' I don't want to give any justifications, but only to explain."

As he spoke, his personal secretary, Chhorn Hay, listened from a couch to the side of the Prince. Mr. Chhorn Hay was Prince Sihanouk's guardian during the years of house arrest in Phnom Penh under the Khmer Rouge. Friendly and at times even servile, he exists as a constant reminder of Khmer Rouge power and control. When he notices a reporter trying to maneuver him into the viewfinder of a camera, he moves away.

The Prince says he is hurt by charges in the West that he is an accomplice of the Khmer Rouge, which he detests. Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, he says, despite their claims to have retired, "are the real masters" of the Khmer Rouge. "I have no doubt that Pol Pot is heading the arms," he said. "If I were an accomplice of the Khmer Rouge I wouldn't say that."

Pressed, the Prince said that as more and more Western governments tell him he must drop the Chinese formula of Khmer Rouge participation in an interim government in Cambodia to oversee new elections, he has embraced the idea of a United Nations trusteeship over Cambodia for a year.

PEACEKEEPING FORCE URGED

That way, he says, there will be no interim Cambodian government and no Khmer Rouge participation in anything but free elections, which the United Nations would also organize and oversee. It just might work, he said, so long as there is also a United Nations-sponsored international control mechanism and armed peacekeeping force in Cambodia for at least 5 years, and preferably for 10.

China and the Khmer Rouge, opposed this second condition, he said, and he was sure that Mr. Hun Sen would also reject it, because it would mean the dismantling of his government, though not his party. In return, the Prince would disband his government in exile and allow the country's United Nations seat to be vacant until a new government could be elected.

But if Mr. Hun Sen should somehow accept his proposal, including mutual dismantling, the year-long United Nations trusteeship, the control mechanism and peacekeeping force, the Prince said, "then I will go home to Phnom Penh," regardless of any opposition from the Khmer Rouge or from China.

"The Khmer Rouge," he said, "will continue their war, but never mind, the whole world will condemn them." To defy China is a serious personal risk, he said, "but there must be some way out of this nightmare of stalemate and war."

Last week, an editor close to the Phnom Penh government said Mr. Hun Sen would be willing to disband his cabinet and accept a United Nations-controlled election in Cambodia under what is called the Namibia formula. But under this model, the Hun Sen government would continue to administer the country at the local level, a condition that Prince Sihanouk rejects.

NO ILLUSIONS ON KHMER ROUGE

For Khieu Samphan, the official head of the Khmer Rouge and the man with whom he often deals, the Prince has a sort of contempt. Khieu Samphan, he says, is probably on the the seventh-ranking official in the Khmer Rouge hierarchy, coming after Ieng Thirith, the wife of Ieng Sary.

He has no illusions about the Khmer Rouge, he says, or about the Thais. "Pol Pot is like Hitler," he said. "Unless you kill him, you cannot oblige him to stop fighting and killing people."

He shakes his head. "Pol Pot would not be with us in this world, he would not be alive without the Thais," he said. Pol Pot remains "terribly weak" with malaria, "yet each time he became very ill, the Thai army sent a helicopter to his headquarters in Trat province to take him to the best hospital in Bangkok, and gave him the best room, normally kept for the best of the Thai generals, and the best doctors took care of him."

With the introduction of gossip, the Prince brightens. It is true, he said, that Pol Pot's first wife, Khieu Ponnary, the sister of Ieng Thirith, is very ill and dying in a hospital here, perhaps dead. Ieng Sary, he said, has not been seen in 3 or 4 years, and the rumor is that he, too, is dead.

"Did you know," he asks, "that Pol Pot gave Khieu Samphan a wife?" A princely giggle. "She is a Khmer Rouge cadre, a pleasant girl and trusted by Pol Pot. She is

not ugly, she is rather pretty, with a dark skin. But I know Khieu Samphan, and it seems he is not so much interested in women."

ON 'VERY DANGEROUS' MEN

"Men who are not so interested in women are very dangerous," the Prince continued, "for they must concentrate on other things, which makes them very dangerous in wartime."

He giggled again. "But we nationalists, we are very interested in beautiful women. We are true Cambodians. We say the Cambodians are 'les chaud lapins et les chaudes lapines,' yes, yes, hot rabbits," he said, overcome with laughter.

But rather quickly, another mood takes hold, and the Prince grows somber. "I cherish my friendship with China. I don't want to lose it. It's the reason I'm hesitating," he said, acknowledging that it would be very easy now to make a tragic mistake.

And then he gave a sort of groan. "I have problems with conscience," he said. "I take sleeping pills each evening. I don't sleep without them. I have so many problems in my head. I suffer, I really suffer. It's not a comedy, I assure you."

[The International Herald Tribune, Dec. 26, 1989]

CAMBODIA GUERRILLAS MOUNT ATTACKS

BANGKOK (Reuters).—U.S.-backed Cambodian guerrillas said Monday that they had combined forces with the Communist Khmer Rouge in fresh attacks on the Cambodian Government, overrunning five government positions.

Western diplomats said the Khmer Rouge and the two non-Communist groups, which belong to a loose guerrilla alliance, were increasingly cooperative in northern and western Cambodia. This has moved the pro-Vietnamese government to cede sparsely populated areas.

The arms of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the exiled ruler, joined forces with another non-Communist group, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, and with the Khmer Rouge. Thirty-five Cambodian soldiers were killed and 50 wounded in attacks in western Battambang province last week, Prince Sihanouk's group said. It did not say how many of its own troops had been killed or wounded.

[The New York Times, Nov. 16, 1989]

SECRET U.S. WAR IN CAMBODIA

(By Jeremy J. Stone)

WASHINGTON.—The United States is waging a secret war in Cambodia against the Hun Sen government—knowing full well that none other than the genocidal Khmer Rouge are likely to be the ultimate beneficiaries.

Even as White House officials shed crocodile tears over signs of the growing military strength of the Khmer Rouge, they are continuing to use U.S. financial and intelligence resources to weaken the Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen government, the only faction capable of preventing a military takeover by the Khmer Rouge.

And the administration is pressuring Thailand to refrain from pulling the rug out from under the war itself, something that Thailand—as the main conduit of arms to all the resistance forces—is uniquely able to do.

According to well-informed sources, the non-Communist resistance—composed of forces loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk and to a former Prime Minister, Son Sann—has a joint military command that makes requests for weapons, materiel, and aid through Thai operatives and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency on the Thai border.

These requests are taken to the Cambodian Working Group, a highly secret unit in Bangkok that coordinates every move of the non-Communist resistance. Working the group are CIA operatives from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok and officials from the highest levels of the Thai, Malaysian, and Singaporean governments.

The Working Group is the conduit for all lethal, materiel, and financial aid to the non-Communist resistance, except for that coming from China. It reviews battle plans, approves specific weapons, disburses direct cash payments and reimburses resistance leaders. While Thailand and Malaysia train the resistance and Thailand provides, logistical support, Singapore provides the weapons through a quasi-private

weapons company in Singapore. And the United States pays for virtually everything.

For example, a "general offensive" launched last month by the non-Communist resistance was carefully planned and organized by the Working Group with highly secret "need to know" rules giving everyone plausible deniability. The United States pays \$24 million annually to support the resistance, and the Son Sann group is getting \$150,000 a month for operating expenses alone.

Newspaper reports even suggest that CIA operatives are providing intelligence information from U.S. reconnaissance satellites to the non-Communist resistance.

Now that these non-Communist resistance forces are beginning to fight, there can be no denying that U.S. support for them is helping the Khmer Rouge, albeit indirectly, by forcing the Hun Sen government to cope with three battle fronts rather than one.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Government is intervening in Thai politics by backing its hardline Foreign Minister, Siddhi Savetsila, against its Prime Minister, Chatchai Choonhavan, to keep the war going. Secret details on Thai involvement in the war shed new light on the importance of supporting the peaceful initiatives of the Thai Prime Minister, whose visit to the United States, originally planned for this week, has been deferred.

Through a large Thai intelligence entity called 838, the Cambodian guerrillas receive weapons, food, and other support. These officers are integrated into the daily life of the resistance bases. They provide weapons and materiel that are stored in secret warehouses well inside Thailand, and monitor everything.

Weapons for the Khmer Rouge are sent to Thailand by China, and Khmer Rouge leaders are given full freedom to travel from their jungle bases in Thailand to offices in Bangkok to deal with securing them.

Thus, Thailand has the ability to stop the war and, indeed, to determine the winner. Under these circumstances, Thailand could, by gradually reducing support, weaken the Khmer Rouge enough to prevent them from taking over Cambodia once again. This is exactly what the Thai Prime Minister wants to do.

And why doesn't he? One major reason is that Washington currently finds his initiatives unacceptable. He is, after all, arguing for a step-by-step settlement that would relieve pressure on the Hun Sen government.

The administration, which says it opposes Khmer Rouge involvement in a future Cambodian government, also says—startlingly—that it will go along with such involvement so long as Prince Sihanouk insists on it. The Prince, in turn, had already said he would insist on including the Khmer Rouge as long as the Chinese insist on it—leaving the United States, in effect, following the Chinese line.

In accordance with this convoluted policy, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok is happy about the recent success of the non-Communist resistance, which puts further pressure on Hun Sen to accept the unacceptable—a coalition with the Khmer Rouge. And it regularly protests any peace initiatives by the Thai Prime Minister.

So the irony is exquisite. We are redoubling our efforts to overthrow Hun Sen even while we announce that such a result would produce a Khmer Rouge takeover. Hun Sen is supposed to save us from this contradiction by organizing a wholly implausible, four-party coalition government with the Khmer Rouge.

From every objective point of view, we are allied with the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

[The New York Times, Jan. 1, 1990]

CAMBODIA ASSERTS U.S. GUERRILLA TIES

KHMER ROUGE IS SAID TO SHARE MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH NON-COMMUNIST FOES

(By Robert Pear)

PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA, Dec. 31.—Prime Minister Hun Sen expressed concern today that Khmer Rouge forces were coordinating military operations and strategy with non-Communist guerrilla armies supported by the United States, and he said the Khmer Rouge had obtained weapons from the non-Communist factions.

In an interview, the Prime Minister said Khmer Rouge guerrillas had got American-made antitank weapons from the non-Communist forces despite Washington's assertion that such arms transfers had not occurred.

The Cambodian government is fighting a three-party coalition made up of the Communist Khmer Rouge and two non-Communist guerrilla groups led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann, a former Prime Minister.

DISPLAYS M-16 RIFLES

Mr. Hun Sen displayed M-16 rifles and grenade launchers that he said had been seized in October from Khmer Rouge guerrillas; he said that the guerrillas had obtained them from Prince Sihanouk's army and that the weapons had been seized in fighting.

There was no way to verify the source of the weapons independently, and Mr. Hun Sen did not say how many weapons the Khmer Rouge had obtained from the Sihanouk army.

Cambodian officials and foreign diplomats said the war was confined mainly to three provinces along the Thai border and appeared to be at an impasse.

The 38-year-old Prime Minister said that Cambodia would hold national elections by early 1991 regardless of whether his government reaches a negotiated political settlement with the guerrilla forces.

The Prime Minister said he hoped to achieve a political settlement of the civil war so the United Nations could send experts to Cambodia to "organize the elections." Opposition candidates, including Prince Sihanouk, could then take part in the elections, he said.

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS INVITED

In the absence of a political solution, Mr. Hun Sen said, Cambodia plans to organize elections by itself and would invite international observers to monitor the vote. His comments were the most explicit statement by any Cambodian official of the government's intention to hold elections monitored by international observers.

Gen. Peng Path, a Vice Minister of Defense, said in an interview that the tactics of the Khmer Rouge were more clever and sophisticated than those of the non-Communist factions. The Khmer Rouge forces, led by Pol Pot, save their ammunition and quietly send infiltrators deep into Cambodia while allowing the non-Communist forces to assault the Cambodian government positions near the border, he said. If the guerrilla coalition starts to prevail, the Khmer Rouge would be the first to arrive in Phnom Penh and would be in a better position to seize power, he said.

Thus, he concluded: "The most dangerous enemy is Pol Pot. The Khmer Rouge is more patient, more persistent, and can endure more" than the non-Communist factions.

Mr. Hun Sen said, "U.S. arms that were provided to the other side could not fail to fall into the hands of the Khmer Rouge."

ARTILLERY SUPPORT CITED

Khieu Kanharith, editor of the weekly newspaper Kampuchea, said the Khmer Rouge had provided artillery support to the guerrillas.

Gen. Peng Path said that Phnom Penh had received most of its weapons from Moscow and that there had been no change in the level of arms shipments in the last 6 months.

Mr. Hun Sen said the date for elections would be set by the National Assembly. Several Cambodian officials said they were considering dates in the first half of 1990.

"If there is a political solution, we would organize elections within the framework of that solution," Mr. Hun Sen said. "If there is no political solution, we would have to organize elections on a unilateral basis. One way or the other, elections will be held."

GOVERNMENT CALLED ILLEGITIMATE

The United States and Western countries have refused to recognize the current Phnom Penh government, saying it is illegitimate because it was installed by Vietnamese invaders in January 1979.

The Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia from 1975 to January 1979. It presided over a brutal restructuring of society in which more than 1 million Cambodians were killed.

Mr. Hun Sen declared that elections were needed to satisfy demands of the Cambodian people as well as to attain legitimacy in the eyes of other countries. "We will organize elections not only to provide legitimacy, but also as a means to achieve national reconciliation and to put an end to the conflict," he said. "Not only the out-

side world, but our own people, would say our regime was illegal if we wait for 1, 2, 3, or 10 years to hold elections.

[The Washington Post, Feb. 9, 1990]

NON-COMMUNIST REBEL FACTION IN CAMBODIA RELYING ON KHMER ROUGE

(By Keith B. Richburg)

BANGKOK.—One of two Cambodian non-Communist guerrilla groups fighting the Phnom Penh government has turned to the Communist Khmer Rouge for supplies after an offensive it launched late last year stalled because of a shortage of ammunition, according to diplomatic and intelligence sources.

The diplomats said that in recent weeks, the army of Prince Norodom Sihanouk has increased military cooperation and supply sharing with the Khmer Rouge, despite objections from the United States and other Western backers of the non-Communists.

One diplomat said the Khmer Rouge is selling bullets to Sihanouk's army and the two groups are cooperating on tactical support, intelligence-sharing, and artillery support during battlefield operations.

The Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk's resistance group, and another guerrilla faction headed by former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann are joined in a U.N.-recognized coalition fighting the government in Phnom Penh, which is backed by Vietnam.

The Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge, which maintained a bloody 3½-year rule in Cambodia in the 1970's, has the largest and most powerful of the guerrilla armies and the international community has recently become alarmed at the prospect of the Khmer Rouge fighting its way back to power in Phnom Penh. In the past, the non-Communist groups have said they would not work in concert with the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield despite membership in the resistance coalition.

The United States and other Western countries have provided support to the two non-Communist factions, but have said the aid does not go to the Khmer Rouge, which was responsible for the deaths of between 1 and 2 million Cambodians when it held power in Phnom Penh.

Critics of the Western nations' policy have argued that support for the non-Communist resistance factions, which lack supplies, indirectly puts the West in the position of supporting the Khmer Rouge, which has stockpiled Chinese-supplied weapons in the Cambodian interior.

Diplomats here said the cooperation between the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk's faction will likely increase pressure on Washington and other Western governments to sever links with the resistance coalition and move toward recognizing the government in Phnom Penh.

That government was installed by Vietnam after its troops ousted the Khmer Rouge in early 1979. The Vietnamese maintained an occupation force in Cambodia until last September, when Hanoi said it had completed a troop withdrawal. Repeated efforts to end the long war diplomatically have so far failed, but a new initiative by the United States and other big powers is now underway.

The diplomats, from Western and Asian countries, said Sihanouk and his followers dislike relying on the Khmer Rouge, but feel forced into the arrangement because their own supplies were depleted during an offensive late last year and because Western countries have appeared reluctant to increase assistance. Sihanouk, a former ruler of Cambodia, has denounced the Khmer Rouge but has said the only way he could fight Phnom Penh was to join in a coalition with the group.

The non-Communists "need small arms, ammunition, mortars," said a diplomat from the non-Communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as ASEAN. "Nobody wants to help them. The Americans feel constrained. The French are not giving anything. The Europeans are not giving anything. . . . the whole international mood now is against any escalation of fighting."

A Western intelligence official said the commander of Sihanouk's forces, the former ruler's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, has expressed frustration that the United States, which has provided a small amount of humanitarian aid to the non-Communist resistance, has not supplied his forces with weapons.

All of the diplomats and intelligence officers interviewed said the other non-Communist faction, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, is also out of ammunition, but has so far refused supplies from the Khmer Rouge.

The Liberation Front surprised observers with an offensive last fall that followed the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. But after several small towns and outposts in northwestern Cambodia were seized, the offensive halted at the town of Svay Chek following a battle that diplomats said depleted the faction's ammunition stockpile. That offensive was followed by a similar one to the north by Sihanouk's forces, which seized less territory but also used a tremendous amount of ammunition, diplomats said.

The diplomats said the non-Communist resistance forces lack "fire discipline," meaning they waste large amounts of ammunition firing unnecessarily at uncertain targets.

Some diplomats in close contact with resistance military leaders said the non-Communists are angry because it was Western countries that persuaded them to launch their offensives and those countries are now refusing pleas for supplies.

CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(EXCERPTS)

The Contracting Parties, having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world;

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required;

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

ARTICLE II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

ARTICLE III

The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.

ARTICLE IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.

ARTICLE V

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

ARTICLE VI

Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act is committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
December 7, 1989.

Dr. JEREMY J. STONE,
*Federation of American Scientists, 307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.,
Washington, DC 20002*

DEAR DR. STONE: I am responding to your letter of November 19 regarding Cambodia. I have also been asked to reply on behalf of Secretary Baker and the other members of the Department of State who received letters from you on the same date, as well.

As you know, we share your abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge and the view that it is absolutely necessary to keep them from regaining power in Cambodia. This remains a central objective of our Cambodian policy.

Unfortunately, the Khmer Rouge are a fact of life in Cambodia and they must be dealt with effectively. Failure to do so would be irresponsible and could contribute to their return to dominance. We believe that the best assurance against a return to their murderous rule is a carefully crafted comprehensive settlement which provides for a substantial U.N. presence including a peacekeeping force, strict international guarantees, and a process that will lead to free and fair elections for the Cambodian people. You can be assured that we will continue to pursue all possible avenues to bring peace to Cambodia.

Sincerely,

CHARLES N. TWINING,
Director, Office of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Affairs.

U.S. ENVOY 'WARNED' SIHANOUK ABOUT KHMER ROUGE

BEIJING, Feb. 1 (AFP)—The U.S. Ambassador to China, James R. Lilley, has warned Prince Norodom Sihanouk that his alliance with the Khmer Rouge could have harmful consequences, a well-informed source said here Thursday.

A spokesman at the U.S. Embassy here confirmed that Mr. Lilley had spoken with the Prince "within the last 15 days" but would not give an exact date or details of the talks which he said were of a "private nature."

The spokesman was also unable to say if the meeting took place before Prince Sihanouk announced on January 24 his resignation as head of the Cambodian resistance coalition, which joins the former Cambodian monarch's supporters with those of former premier Son Sann and the Marxist Khmer Rouge.

Prince Sihanouk, who lives in exile in Beijing, said when he resigned 9 days ago that he was stepping down because of criticism from Western leaders and media that he was allying himself with the Khmer Rouge.

He also said the move was aimed at demonstrating he "would not shoulder the responsibility of what the Khmer Rouge (is) doing," and that he was in no way "an accomplice of the Khmer Rouge."

Also on Thursday, the Prince made available to the press here a letter from his son Prince Norodom Ranariddh sent from Bangkok and dated January 30.

In it Prince Ranariddh said he had been "greatly discouraged" after being "clearly warned" by an unidentified ambassador in Bangkok of the "serious consequences of our 'cooperation and rapprochement' with the Khmer Rouge." The younger Prince added, without explanation, that "the message was doubtless the same" as the one Prince Sihanouk had received.

The Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge is blamed for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians during its near 4-year rule before being ousted by Vietnamese troops in 1979.

Prince Sihanouk said January 24 that he would retain his position as president of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which holds Cambodia's seat in the United Nations, because he did not want Cambodia's "state legitimacy" to go to Phnom Penh's pro-Vietnamese regime.

Democratic Kampuchea was the formal name given to Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge when it overthrew the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh in April 1975, which in turn had overthrown Prince Sihanouk in 1970.

[The Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 1989]

ACCOMPLICES TO A NEW GENOCIDE

CAMBODIA: OUR DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHICH ACQUIESCED IN THE HOLOCAUST, HAS CULTIVATED ANOTHER MONSTROSITY IN BACKING THE KHMER ROUGE

(By Jeremy J. Stone)

Once upon a time, in Europe, Jews were being slaughtered.

The United States was at war with the murderers, the Government of Nazi Germany. As one might expect, the United States maintained that its policy was to work out programs to save those European Jews who could be saved.

History now records that this was not true. On the contrary, during half the war the Department of State actually used the machinery of government to sabotage the rescue of Jews. Only in 1944, when Treasury Secretary Henry J. Morgenthau, himself a Jew, went to President Franklin D. Roosevelt with a memo describing the Department of State's actions, was the situation reversed. The memo was titled "On the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews." By then, it was too late.

How come? It was an amalgam of racism, bureaucratic inertia, and geopolitics that produced this situation.

And it is happening again today. Not to Jews but to the Cambodians. The Cambodian Nazis, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, are coming back after one holocaust with a second in mind if they can overthrow the Hun Sen government. Pol Pot's Defense Minister, Son Sen, has a little list, which he has already read to some people. Those to be slaughtered include not just ethnic Vietnamese among the 6 million people living in Cambodia, but also Cambodian "fellow-travelers" of the Vietnamese. This would cover everyone who, now or later, is deemed to disagree with Pol Pot, who is still in command and who used this tactic in his earlier genocide, in the period 1975-78, when more than 2 million Cambodians died.

Today, the Department of State is not only acquiescing in the repeat of genocide but is helping to make it happen. Antisemitism has been replaced by anti-Vietnamese sentiment. Bureaucratic inertia is unchanged. And the geopolitics is one of support for the Government of China, currently the largest suppressor of freedom on Earth today.

Here is the indictment.

(1) Not only has the Department of State made no substantial effort to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge but it has worked actively and energetically to force the Vietnamese army out of Cambodia, thus removing the main bulwark of the Cambodian people against the return of the Khmer Rouge.

(2) Not only has the Department of State failed to oppose Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge but it has strengthened it politically by working to combine the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge in a so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Meanwhile, militarily, it has worked secretly, in conjunction with the CIA, to help the Khmer Rouge's two allies, Son Sann and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in their three-way combined effort to stretch Hun Sen's forces ever thinner in the ongoing fighting.

(3) Not only has the Department of State failed to support peaceful initiatives of the Thai government to end the conflict but it has actively tried to sabotage those initiatives by intervening in Thai politics against the Prime Minister.

(4) Not only has the Department of State failed to support Hun Sen's government against the Khmer Rouge but it is the main element in an economic embargo that denies Cambodia help from the West.

(5) Not only has the Department of State failed to prevent Pol Pot's government of Democratic Kampuchea from holding Cambodia's U.N. seat, it has—for 10 years and still today—supported the Khmer Rouge's retaining U.N. representation.

(6) Not only has the Department of State failed to protest China's support of the Khmer Rouge publicly, but it has worked closely with China's ally in Southeast Asia, Singapore, in advancing China's insidious campaign to insert the Khmer Rouge into a new government coalition in Cambodia.

(7) Not only has the Department of State failed to implement the U.S. signature on the genocide convention by moving to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice but it has used its vote at international conferences to prevent this charge from being leveled against them.

(8) The Department of State has hidden its knowledge that Sihanouk is far too unstable to be the "indispensable leader" of Cambodia that the Department represents him to be. And it has smeared, by action and inaction, the present government of Cambodia and, in particular, prevented its representatives from traveling here to make their case, even to private U.S. groups.

(9) Not least, Department of State representatives avoid exchanges of views with their critics so as to maintain a more defensible "low profile" than discussion would permit.

At a recent meeting on Capitol Hill, a senior Department representative had this to say to some who disagreed: "You only want a win for the Vietnamese." This statement reveals quite a bit. America's actions are caught up in a geopolitical hostility toward Vietnam that is every bit as tangible as the racism that embarrassed, for all time, the Department of State of Secretary Cordell Hull.

H.R. 2655

SECTION 902—CAMBODIA

(b) PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER ROUGE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available to carry out this section may be obligated or expended for the purpose or with the effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina.

[Congressional Record—House, Oct. 12, 1989, p. H7019]

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. RICHARDSON

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Richardson: at the end of the bill, add the following:

"RESTRICTION OF SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

"SEC. 705. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to support military or paramilitary operations by the Non-Communist Cambodian Resistance if, after the date of enactment of this Act, quantities of arms, ammunition or other military equipment are provided by the Non-Communist Cambodian Resistance to the military forces of Democratic Kampuchea (known as the Khmer Rouge) or if the Non-Communist Cambodian Resistance engages in joint military operations with military forces of Democratic Kampuchea."

Mr. RICHARDSON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?

There was no objection.

(Mr. Richardson asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, the reason that I have this concern is that in this legislation that we are debating today we are authorizing contingencies for the agency. Funds are not restricted. They are used at the discretion of the President, and basically, does not require congressional approval. Therefore, I am offering this amendment, or considering offering this amendment for the possibility that such funds may be used for this purpose. The amendment that I have is directed at the Khmer Rouge, and basically we have had, recently, a breakdown of the peace negotiations between the non-Communist forces, the Khmer Rouge, the various parties involved in the Cambodia dispute.

However, most importantly, the telling cruelty of the Khmer Rouge has been manifested once again. The failure of the peace conference, the Khmer Rouge proved to be once again, the bloc that, once again, disrupted negotiations. They re-

fused to accept language that condemned their past genocide. They refused to be linked to a process of peace.

I am concerned about our policy in that region, and the reason I am raising this matter is to, once again, hope that American policy somehow directly or indirectly does not link up with the Khmer Rouge.

Now, it is my understanding that in the Foreign Affairs authorization bill of last year, there is a provision that the gentleman from New York (Mr. Solomon) offered which reads as follows:

"Prohibition on certain assistance to the Khmer Rouge—*notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available to carry out this section may be obligated or expended for the purpose or with the effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina.*"

My amendment, basically, says that should there be this eventuality, there would be no military or paramilitary assistance that would go to the Khmer Rouge, through an error of joint military operation or through other factors by which American assistance might in some way be used by the Khmer Rouge, and in that event, link up the United States and those that we are backing with this dreaded community of not just traitors, but killers, that right now are threatening any kind of peace in Cambodia.

I would like, if I could, to ask the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Solarz), if in his judgment, the foreign assistance legislation that passed in 1987 covers the intelligence concern that I have raised in this amendment.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, my good friend and our valued colleague on the committee, this gentleman is not the gentleman from New York (Mr. Solarz), but he was originally from New York.

However, I appreciate and concur in the gentleman's concerns, as I am sure all Members, both on and off the committee do.

I would say to the gentleman, it is my understanding as well, that the gentleman's amendment is not necessary, that section 908 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985, I believe, already provides that no funds can be used to directly or indirectly promote, sustain, or augment the military or paramilitary capacity of the Khmer Rouge, a broader prohibition that the gentleman's amendment would impose, and accordingly, the amendment of the gentleman, it seems to this gentleman, is not necessary and need not be offered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, what the gentleman is saying is this amendment that he just read does cover intelligence activities?

Mr. BEILENSEN. If the gentleman will continue yielding, that is this gentleman's understanding.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we get the States confused and this gentleman gets the names confused, so now that all Members are thoroughly confused, I agree with the gentleman from California that the concern of the gentleman from New Mexico is covered by existing law.

No Member supports the Khmer Rouge directly or indirectly, and it is a matter of considerable concern for our committee and other relevant committees, to see that the Khmer Rouge does not receive any benefit from any programs whatsoever, in view of their record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, let me add that the reason I spoke of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Solarz) is that the gentleman very much wanted to speak on this provision, and regrettably I do not see him.

Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the failure of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, all parties involved in the Cambodian conflict appear increasingly entrenched. The possibility of civil war is greater than ever. The United States must assure that, should United States military assistance be made available to the non-Communist Cambodian resistance, none of this assistance would fall into the hands of the Khmer Rouge.

During its bloody 7-year reign, the Khmer Rouge presided over the murder of over 1 million Cambodians. This was genocide on the greatest scale.

Throughout the Paris conference the Khmer Rouge refused to accept language in the accord condemning their murderous rule. To this day, the Khmer Rouge continues to defend its actions in Cambodia. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the Khmer Rouge's genocidal agenda has been altered in the least.

In the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, passed on June 29 of this year, there was a recognition of the need to preclude any U.S. assistance from reaching the Khmer Rouge or from assisting its activities.

U.S. policy in the region must be clear. In the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal, the United States should do all it can to support the democratic aspirations of the Cambodian people and to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge—a return to the killing fields.

By precluding any assistance to the non-Communist resistance should the Khmer Rouge benefit the United States is stating firmly that the Khmer Rouge's return to power is unacceptable.

H.R. 2655, FOREIGN AID AUTHORIZATION, PASSED BY THE HOUSE, JUNE 29, 1989

(b) PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER ROUGE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available to carry out this section may be obligated or expended for the purpose or with the effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment, in light of the assurances of the chairman and the ranking member.

Dr. STONE. We have a law in this country saying no aid shall be given directly or "indirectly" to the Khmer Rouge. This has been interpreted by the Intelligence Committee in the House of Representatives to mean no cooperation and coordination and working together of our non-Communist factions with the Khmer Rouge, but they are doing it.

We have reports here, for example, of a Sihanouk general saying "Sisophan will become ours soon. I am confident, because our three forces will fight side by side to capture it." That is just such cooperation. That statement was in the Bangkok Post just this January quoting Gen. Kruoch Yeunb, commander of the 3d region of the National Sihanoukist Army.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have just returned from Cambodia. I was there for 9 days. I talked to Hun Sen, I talked to his economic minister who was trained in Georgia and who runs the free enterprise economy that Mr. Horowitz was referring to. I talked to his brain trust on the negotiations and I talked to In Tam. In Tam is the former Prime Minister of the Cambodian Government we put in place in 1970, the Lon Nol government.

I would like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, the interview I had with In Tam in which he gives a very good report on this Cambodian government of Hun Sen that we are putting so much pressure on. And I would like to submit for the record an interview with Kung San Ol the Georgia-trained economist who is Deputy Prime Minister and runs the economy. And I would like to submit my interview with Hun Sen. Would that be agreeable, Mr. Chairman?

[The information referred to follows:]

HUN SEN: U.S. SEEMS INTENT ON HELPING KHMER ROUGE BY WEAKENING PHNOM PENH

Excerpts from a January 25 interview with Hun Sen

"Our economic law has borne its fruit. Accordingly, our population is not encouraged to follow the ripples of change in Eastern Europe. I have often been asked about the effect of Eastern Europe on Cambodia. My answer is 'no' because the way things are going here is ahead of Eastern Europe.

"We have changed completely from communal kitchens. We just try what works. Our change did not come with Gorbachev's perestroika but earlier.

"The Cambodian people wanted such a change. Many think we are part of the Eastern bloc because we get assistance from that bloc. But here we make our own

hat. Shoes here are made according to our feet and not feet made according to the shoes.

"A reporter asked if we had not switched from a Vietnamese model to a Thai model. But this is not correct. From the beginning, we had no model. And, also, we are not following the model of Thailand.

"Many U.S. citizens, after they come here, have expressed their support. And, recently, Secretary Muskie came here. Once visitors arrive, they see a big difference from what they expected. It would be good if we could have more visits."

Question: What about the military cooperation of the resistance?

"On the Thai-Cambodian border, they have distinguished three different fronts. My Lai to Pailin is where the Khmer Rouge dominate but with participation from Sihanoukists and Son Sannists. From Poipet to Thmar Puok to Banteay Chmar, the region is under Son Sann but also has Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk forces. From Phnom Srok to Sisophon, Prince Sihanouk controls the region but here also there are Khmer Rouge and Son Sannists.

"So during the first offensive, they used Son Sann but with some assistance from Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge.

"When Pol Potists launched against Pailin, Son Sann launched his forces against Sisophon and Sihanouk against Phnom Srop. This was called the common offensive against Pailin.

"But at each battlefield, they have good coordination among themselves. Recently, they reached agreement to have a joint military command."

Do they have a tripartite military command? "Yes, especially where they have their forces all together. Where there are only two forces, these work together."

Do they share weapons? "On quite a few battlefields, they had to share the fighting, so they divide up the objective. This matter is no secret to the secret agents of the United States. Because the United States has satellites to watch and walkie-talkies to listen in.

"One of the battlefields, that of Phnom Srok, we had destroyed more than 300 of Sihanouk's army. When we had encircled them, at Phnom Srok, the commander of the Sihanouk division that was encircled called for help. The Sihanouk commander was cooperating with Din Del of the KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge commander in question to, whom he appealed was Ta Sou, the Khmer Rouge commander of Division 519.

"Just a few days ago, there were joint attacks in Siem Reap. Mostly the Pol Potists dominate but Sihanouk forces complained that they had liberated the Varin district. Then just a few days ago, the Khmer Rouge said they had liberated Varin. In fact, however, they did jointly attack Varin but they did not take it.

"On cooperation with weapons, where the Khmer Rouge help out Sihanouk, they have to use Sihanouk's weapons. In Siem Reap, my commander showed me two M-18 rifles that fire not only bullets but also grenades. Asked where these came from, my commanders said they were captured from Pol Pot's forces. Pol Pot also has M-84 antitank weapons made in West Germany. Right now, the sharing of weapons between the three factions has become a way of life.

"But because they divide up the battlefields, when they need to ask for help, they must pay for the help with ammunition. And the Pol Potists don't want the M-16 but rather want the M-18 or the M-84 in reward."

It looks like the government will survive the dry season

"From a general perspective, we have come to know our strength and the other side's strength. After the withdrawal, there was a clear shift on the battlefield. We have less support, obviously, since the withdrawal of the Vietnamese and they have more support.

"We have to examine the ambitions and the possibilities of the enemy. Their approach was to overthrow us in a short time. So, at the Paris Peace Conference, Sihanouk said we'd be blown away like a piece of paper.

"There was a round of meetings at Paris about how to defeat us. We have to look into the situation from the point of view of the general situation.

"Their offensive was close to the border—the best place for them. There it was easy to infiltrate, and easy to pass along commands.

"They started the offensive 4 days after the Vietnamese withdrawal. But we have to recall that the Vietnamese did little since July. And the rainy season gave us logistic problems. But, considering this, the situation is not bad at all. Stepped up fighting was inevitable and we knew where they would hit us.

"They do not represent a threat to us. No provincial towns along the border have been taken. We also have noticed that they have many problems.

"First, their numbers do not allow a general offensive along the entire length of the front. And they lack the popular support to send soldiers deep inside Cambodia.

"The cruelty of the Sihanouk and Son Sann forces is little different from that of Pol Pot. People are running away from Sihanouk and Son Sann forces as well as from Pol Pot. They kill all the animals and there are widespread rapes. Near the battlefields, the peasants send their daughters to Hun Sen authorities for protection.

"In the Phnom Prat district, the peasants killed a commander of the Sihanouk forces. We criticized the lynching but the population is on the spot and wanted to do it. Among the reasons, besides the rapes, was the fact that they take peasants hostage.

"With regard to the supplies of food and ammunition, they don't have enough for the general offensive. And the deeper they go, the harder it is for them. They do not have, yet, the support base. And they can't take provinces near Phnom Penh so as to dominate the scene.

"But we don't want to continue the war. We want a settlement.

"The United States should reexamine its position on Cambodia. The United States should reexamine its assistance to Sihanouk and Son Sann. The United States had three objectives:

"Vietnamese withdrawal of its forces.

"Prevention of the return of Pol Pot.

"The right of self-determination.

"But, in fact, the United States seems to be encouraging the return of Pol Pot by weakening Phnom Penh."

IN TAM: A CREDIBLE VOICE IN PHNOM PENH

For Americans, perhaps the most credible Khmer political figure alive today is former Prime Minister In Tam of the Lon Nol government of Cambodia. Indeed, In Tam actually ran for president in the early 1970's and was defeated, he believes only by election fraud. This Lon Nol government is the one that overthrew Prince Sihanouk and did so, it is widely believed, with the assistance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Under these political circumstances, anything which In Tam says that is good about the present Cambodian government of Hun Sen is hard to dismiss. On January 26, 1990, speaking in Phnom Penh after spending a total of 3 months in Cambodia, he provided this visitor with an interview that is remarkably sympathetic to that embattled regime.

Asked what he liked about this government, he began by saying, "I respect its politics of reconciliation and its standing against the return of the Khmer Rouge."

But what about its economic system? "It's very liberal." Was it better for the poor and for children than the Lon Nol government he knew? "Yes, it is. But Lon Nol controlled only the cities during those revolutionary times and could not do much."

What about corruption? "Here there is not corruption at the top, only at the middle and bottom because this regime is very young and the leadership is very young."

"If we compare with all factors, this government is better than Lon Nol because this government started with nothing and so had a 'fresh start,' albeit with no assets to start with."

Was there any way in which the Lon Nol government was better? "It had more highly qualified people and more technicians."

How did the Hun Sen government compare with Prince Sihanouk? "It is hard to compare because, at that time there was no war and the government had greater means. Sihanouk did, as this government does, concern himself with health and sanitation questions but not so much. So it depends upon what you like. I want freedom and there was more freedom in the Sihanouk period. But perhaps if the present war were stopped there would be more freedom here also. People's life here is very free but the government is like an umbrella because of the war. The government fears infiltration of the enemy and so they limit freedom. In the Sihanouk period there was very little control but now, due to fear of the enemy, there is more."

Was there democracy in the Sihanouk period? Was not the one free election Sihanouk held, in 1966, chaotic and corrupt as Sihanouk himself has written? "I stood for election in 1966. I never took money. And there were other good men elected such as Hu Nim, Hu Yuon, and Khieu Samphan."

[Editor's note.—Incredibly, In Tam has come up with exactly the three names mentioned by Sihanouk in his book "My War With the CIA." Sihanouk condemned the 1966 election, which he himself had organized, as an absurd result of his being forced to permit a real election. He reported that, of 96 men elected, only 3 had been "worth a damn." He went on to mention precisely these three men mentioned by In Tam. And all three of these men were forced, a year after the election, to run to the jungle lest Sihanouk's secret police kill them for their liberal critiques of him—so much for the greater freedom in the Sihanouk period. In the jungle they formed the Khmer Rouge—then much less radical. In the end, the Pol Pot faction caused the death of Hu Nim and Hu Yuon and turned Khieu Samphan into the "parrot" spokesmen of Pol Pot which he remains today.]

Well, in those days, Sihanouk preferred to appoint only one candidate rather than to hold elections. "Exactly."

What was the political structure of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970-75 period when they were preparing to take over? "There were three internal factions. A pro-Chinese faction led by Pol Pot, a faction leaning toward the Vietnamese, and the Soviets led by So Phim (chief of the Eastern Zone) and a Khmer Communist group led by Hun Nim. It is the second group, of Eastern Zone Communists, who are running the present government."

Do you know anything bad about them or their activities during this period? "No, Hun Sen was very young then, like my son, and came from my same native village. They love Hun Sen there, in Kompong Chong. But he was 17 when he joined and was in the lower ranks."

What about Chea Sim, who ranks above Hun Sen in the present government as president of the assembly? "The old people know him and they love him. He was Buddhist and raised and trained to do good things."

What about the president of the State Council, Heng Samrin, who ranks No. 1? "I never heard of him before. But now, he is very docile. He loves Buddhism."

Do you realize how important these remarks are in Washington? [Editor's note.—Where people like Congressman Solarz insist that these officials have hands "dripping in blood" for being former Khmer Rouge.] "You should understand that this regime is very new and very fresh and needs many things."

Do you love Prince Sihanouk? "I used to. But I quit his movement in 1984 after he had joined with the Khmer Rouge."

Are there any people of quality around Sihanouk today? "No."

So what would you like to see happen? "I would like to see Sihanouk playing the role played by a Thai king. Indeed, if Sihanouk had not abdicated as king to become prince, he would have played this role and it would have been better if he had."

"I want to write to President Bush, I like America but I see that the U.S. policy is going in the opposite direction. It has condemned a generation here. You have left a whole generation that don't speak English or French, for example, and this will eventually affect foreign relations."

"It is time for the Americans to abandon this policy. Listen to the Voice of America, for example. The United States has helped small resistance factions while condemning the larger part of the Cambodian people."

A U.S.-TRAINED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IS IN CHARGE OF THE ECONOMY

Deputy Prime Minister Kung Sam Ol attended the University of Georgia in the early 1960's as an agricultural economist. During the Pol Pot period of 1975-78, he pretended that he could not read or write and so survived. After the war was over, he found himself in the far northwest, near the Thai border, and could have escaped to the West and an easier life. Instead, he chose to return and is now working "heart and soul" to try to hold the country together.

He said the government's approach was to "try to use all our resources" and to run a "free market economy that will go by itself." The goal was to ensure that everyone had food to eat, to raise the standard of living, and to be like other countries.

Visitors could see that there was "no waiting in line whether for meat or cigarettes or anything else," proving that the market was free. Some handicrafts or cottage enterprises are government-run if they are security-related or need government inputs.

The economy, he said, was "based on agriculture and everything must be developed from agriculture." The goal was to be "self-sufficient" and the country was close to that now. Cambodia needed water, irrigation. It produced fruit, rubber,

some cash crops and cattle livestock. The cash crops included soybean and black pepper.

For the task of developing industry, more energy was needed. They had cement, glass, jute, and wood factories. They were planning joint ventures with Japan and the Soviet Union, with Singapore (a hotel), with Thailand and with Malaysia. France was investing also.

According to the investment law, money could be brought into the country and profits withdrawn or reinvested without tax. Taxation would begin once the enterprise shows profit.

Unlike the Sihanouk period, the parliament debated economic policy a great deal. Corruption was to 2 to 3 percent compared to 100 percent in the Sihanouk period. In the Sihanouk and Lon Nol period, the officials sent their money abroad—but not now.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, those will all go in the record.

Dr. STONE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. William Colby and myself have written three articles condemning comprehensive proposals for being unwieldy and supporting instead positions in which we would move more rapidly to elections, and I wonder if these could also be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

[The Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1989]

PLAYING INTO POL POT'S HANDS—THE WRONG PEACE PLAN COULD GIVE CAMBODIA TO THE KHMER ROUGE

(By William E. Colby and Jeremy J. Stone)

No one wants Pol Pot's genocidal Khmer Rouge to regain control of Cambodia. But unless something is done soon, it may.

The policy choice facing the Bush administration becomes clear when you look carefully at the two classes of proposals for preventing Pol Pot's return to power: the so-called comprehensive solutions and peace process solutions. The administration supports the comprehensive approach, and that's the problem. For it opens the door to the Khmer Rouge.

For the last few years, the "comprehensive" proposals have generally called for a "quadripartite" government containing each of the four contending Cambodian factions. These would include Khmer Rouge itself and two allies, Prince Sihanouk's forces and Son Sann's forces. The final party, of course, would be Hun Sen's regime, which now administers the vast majority of the country and has governed the 6 million Cambodians since the Vietnamese invasion of 1979 that overthrew Pol Pot and installed them instead.

The plan called for this quadripartite government to hold internationally supervised elections. It was presumed that the Khmer Rouge would receive relatively few votes and would, thereafter, give up its 30-year struggle for power.

A more recent version of the comprehensive approach calls for a U.N. trusteeship in Cambodia, rather than an interim government of four factions. The trusteeship would "consult" with the four factions and hold the elections while using a U.N. peacekeeping force to maintain order and disarm the various factions.

"Peace process" solutions, by contrast, try to unravel the knot of confrontation by addressing key "resolvable" issues. For example, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan has suggested that concerned parties should organize formal international verification of the Sept. 26, 1989, withdrawal of the Vietnamese army from Cambodia—with Western intelligence admits did take place. More direct partial measures might include withdrawal of the quantity of Chinese weapons transferred to the Khmer Rouge by the Thais.

If the Thais were willing to change their policy in these ways, the United States should be willing to cease funding its side of the war—support for the Sihanouk and Son Sann forces. The United States today is paying for virtually all of the expenses—except those for lethal weapons—of these two allies of the Khmer Rouge. In this way, the Thais and the United States, working together, could reduce the level of fighting in Cambodia substantially and lay the basis for a cease-fire.

The advantage of these partial measures is that they would avoid bringing the Khmer Rouge into a government in advance of elections. They would thus deny the Khmer Rouge a "Trojan Horse" that would open the way for assassinations, sabotage, and blackmail—all Khmer Rouge specialties.

Supporters of comprehensive measures respond that it is naive to think that the militarily powerful and disciplined Khmer Rouge force can be kept out of any preelection government. But we believe that under the approach we advocate—in which the United States stops funding the non-Communist resistance and the Thais curb military support for the Khmer Rouge—the Hun Sen forces would be able to prevail militarily, even if the Khmer Rouge refused to a general cease-fire.

Those who favor comprehensive measures respond that such a solution would leave the Hun Sen forces able to avoid both internationally supervised elections and serious negotiations with Prince Sihanouk. But the West's real leverage is political and economic—the promise of international recognition and economic aid for the Hun Sen regime and lifting economic embargo against it and its ally, Vietnam. Surely this nonviolent approach is more suitable than to permit—and indeed, to fund—continued violence among Cambodians who have known nothing but violence for two decades.

The comprehensive approach is also costly and complicated. For all such solutions would require the introduction of U.N. peacekeeping forces. The planned force of 6,000 to 8,000 troops could cost \$450 million a year, 30 percent of which would be paid by the United States. Such forces might be needed in Cambodia for many years. And in considering any U.N. role, we should remember that China—the main backer of the Khmer Rouge—has a veto in the Security Council, and that the Khmer Rouge hold the U.N. seat.

Comprehensive solutions are unnecessary, implausible, and, in their handling of the Khmer Rouge, dangerous. Serious observers learned long ago in dealing with other regional conflicts, such as the Middle East, it is wise to stress an incremental "peace process," rather than an all-or-nothing comprehensive solution. All too often, insistence on a comprehensive solution can itself become an obstacle to peace.

THAILAND CAN BECOME THE KEY TO RESTRAINING KHMER ROUGE

CAMBODIA: POWERSHARING IS IMPOSSIBLE. THERE'S NO CHOICE BUT TO BACK HUN SEN AND HELP THE THAIS DISENGAGE FROM THE FORCES OF POL POT

(By William E. Colby and Jeremy J. Stone)

In the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, civil war is moving from simmer to boil between the genocidal Khmer Rouge, still led by Pol Pot, and the government of Hun Sen, who has administered the country for 10 years.

But all that the outside powers can bring themselves to say is that the "best solution" would be negotiation and powersharing. Especially after the failure of the Paris negotiations, this is a wholly irrelevant observation, akin to asking Mikhail S. Gorbachev to negotiate with Josef Stalin over the future of Russia and to work with him for free elections.

These two groups of Cambodians hate each other. From the point of view of Hun Sen and his colleagues, the Pol Potists behaved like monsters while, from the point of view of Pol Pot, the Hun Sen group is a traitor to his movement.

There is proof that these former Khmer Rouge of Hun Sen do have a different ideology. No visitor to Cambodia today can mistake the present government of Hun Sen for the concentration-camp government of Pol Pot. It may be a one-party state, as are many others we deal with, but it is a normal government with money, music, religion, time off for relaxation, family life, and, indeed, a considerable amount of free enterprise. None of this could be said about Pol Pot's government.

While the Hun Sen government was certainly established by the Vietnamese, the Cambodian population is clearly more concerned over the reappearance of the Khmer Rouge. And the willingness of Hun Sen to arm a popular militia is evidence of his confidence in the population's attitude.

There is no other choice, today, except that between Hun Sen and Pol Pot. The two other aspirants, represented by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, are by all estimates too weak to determine the outcome, much less to prevail. At most, they can provide legitimacy to whoever wins.

In this regard, history may be repeating itself. Just as Prince Sihanouk is fronting for the Khmer Rouge today, as leader of their so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, so also was he their putative leader from 1970 to 1975.

Many young Khmer joined the Khmer Rouge in 1970 precisely because their prince, Sihanouk, issued a call for them to join with the Khmer Rouge to overthrow Lon Nol, with a view to putting Sihanouk back in power. Among these patriotic young Khmer who rallied to the prince's call was an 18-year-old schoolboy named

Hun Sen. According to credible reports, he defected from the Khmer Rouge 7 years later to avoid an order from Pol Pot to destroy a Vietnamese village. Sihanouk's and Son Sann's factions are also filled with former Khmer Rouge who defected in either fear or revulsion.

What can be done? The key may lie with the Thais. Not long ago, Hun Sen's defense minister said: "If the Thais gradually reduce their support to the Khmer Rouge, we can prevail easily. If they continue the support, it will be difficult for us though we still think we can win."

This is a plausible assessment. It is no secret that the Thais have, for the last 10 years, helped the Khmer Rouge. They have provided them with sanctuaries on Thai territory, funneled weapons supplied by China, given the Khmer Rouge information and advice and permitted them to maintain unsupervised refugee camps.

In sum, in the Thai effort to persuade the Vietnamese to leave Cambodia, they have worked with the devil.

But new ideas are arising in Thailand. Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan now has friendly relations with Hun Sen, whom he has brought to Bangkok several times in his laudable effort to turn Indochina into a marketplace rather than a battlefield. He is trying to slow the pace of the civil war and to substitute commercial forces for military ones. He is trying, in the wake of Vietnam's withdrawal, to move the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from policies opposing Vietnam's invasion to policies opposing a Khmer Rouge return to power.

Prime Minister Chatichai needs and deserves help. In particular the Thais should not be required to confront alone the hard-line Chinese determination to keep supporting their proxy, Pol Pot. We should be standing with our ally, Thailand, and urging China to cease and desist.

For Americans who detest Pol Pot, the alternatives are few. If we are currently too mired in past policies to support Hun Sen and if we cannot help the Thais to restrain the Khmer Rouge, will we not be morally obliged, in the end, to encourage the Vietnamese to return?

[The Washington Post, Apr. 28, 1989]

BLOCK THE KHMER ROUGE

(By Jeremy J. Stone and William E. Colby)

Cambodia suffered one of history's ultimate horrors when the Khmer Rouge, under Pol Pot's leadership, killed between 1 and 2 million of its population. Incredibly, it now faces a repeat performance. With the impending September withdrawal from Cambodia of the Vietnamese army, the Pol Pot faction of the Khmer Rouge, still run by Pol Pot and his senior lieutenants, is poised to seize power again from the sanctuaries it runs with unchanged Draconian discipline along the Thai border.

Its major asset is the dispute among the other Cambodian political factions. The Khmer Rouge's strongest Cambodian opponent is the incumbent government established by the Vietnamese, and now being left behind, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). This government is dominated by former Khmer Rouge who defected, in fear or disgust, from Pol Pot to the Vietnamese.

The PRK was a puppet of the Vietnamese, and it does not run a multiparty state with human rights and free speech. But one thing is incontestable. It is not running a Khmer Rouge state with its emptied cities, suppression of every vestige of human rights, separation of families, and widespread concentration camp conditions. It is clearly preferable, from everyone's point of view, to another Khmer Rouge government. And with the departure of the Vietnamese, this Cambodian government can be expected to take that nationalist course vis-a-vis the Vietnamese that Cambodians traditionally take.

The second strongest potential opponent of the Khmer Rouge, a distant second, are the forces of Prince Sihanouk and his ally, Son Sann. Serious voices now advocate American "lethal" aid (overt or "covert") to these forces. But as long as these forces maintain their now anachronistic coalition with the Khmer Rouge—a coalition designed by the West in 1982 when all efforts were concentrated on forcing out the Vietnamese—any such aid would have to be expected to be used, in the first instance, against the PRK.

This could only help, militarily and politically, to open the door to the Khmer Rouge. After all, with full recognition of the errors of U.S. policy toward Sihanouk since the Eisenhower period, it is clear to all that he cannot now, by himself, re-

place the PRK while holding off the Khmer Rouge and thus return Cambodia to the peaceful rural kingdom of yesteryear.

Accordingly, any aid to Sihanouk (and Son Sann) should be subject to two conditions: That they withdraw from the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, which the Khmer Rouge dominates, and that the aid not be used in a civil war against the PRK.

Indeed, the United States should support an alliance between Prince Sihanouk and the PRK, the terms of which they must work out themselves beginning, hopefully, at the meeting between Prince Sihanouk and the PRK's Prime Minister Hun Sen on May 2 in Jakarta.

In fact, the United States could usefully seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union to bring these two contenders together by using the separate influence of each on Prince Sihanouk and the PRK respectively. In addition, the two superpowers should urge the Peoples Republic of China to cut off the support it has long given the Khmer Rouge out of its antipathy to the Vietnamese. With the Secretary of State in Moscow just before the Sino-Soviet summit of May 15, this is an opportunity for the United States to play just such a constructive role.

Tentative agreement already exists at the international level to cut off military aid to all factions in September when the Vietnamese withdraw. Especially in such promising circumstances, the United States should put much greater emphasis on cutting off the lethal aid given to the other factions than in providing it to Prince Sihanouk, to jeopardize that cutoff for a few million dollars of lethal aid to Prince Sihanouk—aid which many observers consider of more political than military significance anyway—would be a colossal error.

U.S. policy in Cambodia has too many goals. Its single immediate goal should be to block the return of the Khmer Rouge. Then, in the fullness of time, we shall be able to press Phnom Penh, whoever is running it and in whatever period, to follow democratic practices.

But if we try to achieve all of the goals we might wish at once and in specified and controversial ways—installing Prince Sihanouk as the leader of an interim government with four parties (including the Khmer Rouge) and holding free elections with U.S. inspection of the Vietnamese withdrawal—we might well play into the hands of Pol Pot's lunatic but ruthless group.

In sum, in our opinion, to do other than to focus all our immediate efforts on preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge would be to make what is best the enemy of what is absolutely essential.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Dr. STONE. Now, Mr. Chairman, on the political side of our proposal, I would like to speak about it for a few minutes, but Mr. Colby is in the audience here today.

He was testifying this morning before the House Committee.

Through my own mistake, I did not notify the staff in time that I wished to testify in conjunction with Mr. Colby. If there is no objection from Senator Robb and the chairman, I wonder if Mr. Colby could help me answer questions on the political side of our joint proposal?

Senator CRANSTON. Certainly. We would welcome it, yes. If Bill Colby, former Director of the CIA, would come to the table, we would be delighted to have you with us.

Thank you.

Dr. STONE. In this collaborative effort that we worked out, Mr. Colby urged points that were unusual to me but well known to him, which is why I think he is the best person to explain to the committee that we could have these elections without having a cease fire and that we could have these elections with supervision other than the U.N. These are points which I think Mr. Colby has the credentials to explain.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM COLBY, FORMER DIRECTOR, CIA

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, all four factions are self-appointed representatives of the Cambodian people. There is no legitimate representative of the Cambodian people. That can only come through an election.

It seems to me, therefore, that rather than trying to get a comprehensive settlement among the four factions and then constructing an administration to run the country and then have elections, why not call the elections as soon as possible. This is the spring of elections. We are having them in Eastern Europe, Nicaragua, and almost everywhere in the world.

It is not very complicated. If the U.N. will sponsor it, fine. Then the U.N. can sponsor it. If China will not go along with that idea of a rapid election under U.N. sponsorship or if there is a complication because of the Cambodian seat in the U.N., fine. Let us have elections sponsored by one, two, three, or four of the main powers. Let us fill it with unofficial observers exactly the way the Nicaraguan elections were filled.

You can have an election with a government in power if you have enough observers to keep it clean. It seems to me that this is a way to get out of this terrible box we have been in waiting for the comprehensive settlement among peoples who will not settle.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Stone and Mr. Colby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. STONE AND MR. COLBY

It seems ever clearer that a comprehensive approach to settling the Cambodian civil war—in which all matters must be settled to the satisfaction of all four contending factions before elections can be held—is not viable. Indeed, since the Khmer Rouge could hardly win an election in Cambodia after committing so many acts of genocide, it is hard to see why so many believed, for so long, that they could be persuaded to accept a process ending in such an election.

At the same time, the present approach taken by the non-Communist resistance factions and their supporters (including the United States), to have "tests of strength" on the battlefield, is increasingly counterproductive. The longer the fighting goes on, the stronger the Khmer Rouge are likely to become, not only absolutely but also relative to the non-Communist resistance.

The time has come for a new approach both in the political arena and on the battlefield.

We believe the U.S. policy should advocate:

(a) prompt internationally supervised free elections in Cambodia for a constituent assembly that would, subsequently, draft a constitution and organize a government; and

(b) an immediate halt to U.S. military aid to the non-Communist resistance, combined with major efforts by the State Department to discourage all other governments from supporting the Khmer Rouge war effort.

With regard to (a), our reasoning is as follows. The important thing about the elections is that they be held and that they be fair. Questions of who holds power in the interim period are less important than that the elections be fair.

If it is too complicated to get the United Nations to supervise or administer the elections—because it has given the U.N. seat to the Khmer Rouge already, or because China has a veto in the Security Council, or for other reasons—then the elections should be observed, supervised, or administered by whatever states or collection of states (or credible unofficial bodies and/or prestigious individuals) are winning to this role.

If one or more Cambodian factions and/or personalities do not wish to participate in the elections, for example, the Khmer Rouge might not, then the elections should be held without them. The important thing is the reverse: that all parties who wish to participate in the elections should be permitted to do so and that the voters be enabled to vote for whomever they wish.

If the civil war cannot be stopped entirely before the elections are held, then the elections should be held in all areas where the situation permits. In other words, here also the Khmer Rouge should not be given a veto over the election. We should not await a cease-fire or a U.N. peacekeeping force before moving forward with a political solution.

With regard to point (b), up until now, the United States has, under the guise of "nonlethal" support, been providing approximately \$30 million per year to Prince Sihanouk's forces and those of Son Sann, much of it covert support for military purposes. According to the New York Times report of November 16, 1989, by Steven Erlanger, the covert aid of \$20 to \$24 million per year pays for uniforms, vehicles, reimbursement of Thais and Malaysians for their training of Cambodian soldiers, and so on.

Consistent with this military support, the United States has not objected to others providing military support—such as Singapore providing "lethal" aid (i.e., actual weapons) to these same forces—but has, on the contrary, cooperated with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in working out military strategy for the non-Communist resistance.

We reason as follows:

- *Military Support Is Unnecessary.*—Political support and humanitarian support (i.e., refugee assistance, food, etc.) can keep Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann in the negotiating and preelection game. They need not hold territory in Cambodia to be accorded the role in future elections they seek. Phnom Penh is ready for free, U.N.-supervised—or internationally supervised—elections, and the United States has the political and economic influence to see that Phnom Penh is held to such a standard.

Why, then, should America continue to support the killing of more Cambodians to achieve a goal already achieved? Holding territory being irrelevant, these factions can, if necessary, await the elections in their Thai sanctuaries while they prepare for the political struggle involved.

- *Military Support Is Counterproductive Politically.*—Military support to these factions makes it impossible for us to argue credibly and effectively that other Nations stop fueling the civil war. This is particularly true with regard to Chinese support of the Khmer Rouge and Thai delivery of Chinese weapons to the Khmer Rouge.

- *Military Support Is Counterproductive Militarily.*—All military observers recognize, and have long recognized, that the Khmer Rouge are the dominant military faction among the three resistance factions and, as a result, that any military victories against the Hun Sen regime will redound to Khmer Rouge advantage. The Khmer Rouge will be the ones to pick up the spoils, in the end, that result from our military support.

- *Military Support Is Increasingly Against the Letter and the Spirit of the Law Against "Indirect" Aid to the Khmer Rouge.*—An accumulation of reports and data now shows that "cooperation and coordination" do exist between the military factions and, accordingly, that military aid to the non-Communist resistance factions does help the Khmer Rouge "indirectly."

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs has asked the President to secure reliable assurances against such "cooperation and coordination" as a condition on overt U.S. aid, and clearly such assurances cannot now be supplied.

- *Military Support Is Inconsistent With Our Goal of Keeping the Vietnamese Army Out of Cambodia.*—It is clear that the Vietnamese tried to withdraw their army from Cambodia. If, indeed, as recent reports suggest, they reinserted some troops to help safeguard major northwestern cities in Cambodia, it only shows how inconsistent it is for United States policy to urge the Vietnamese army to leave while adding to the military threats that bring them back.

- *Military Support Is, Therefore, From All Points of View, Completely at Odds With the Fundamental Need To Keep the Khmer Rouge Out of Power in Cambodia.*—Recent administration statements that withdrawal of military support from the non-Communist resistance factions would not end the war but could only turn it into a war between "two Communist factions" is true but irrelevant—the main contest is already between the Hun Sen government and the Khmer Rouge.

Our stopping our military support not only would be a major step toward ending the war but would permit all concerned to focus on the problem of stopping the Khmer Rouge. In particular, it would enhance our standing to call upon the Chinese to stop supporting the Khmer Rouge and to call upon the Thais to stop delivering to the Khmer Rouge weapons that the Chinese supply.

Further administration statements that military aid is necessary to permit the non-Communist forces to "defend themselves" against the two Communist factions are wildly misleading. These two factions can rest quietly in their Thai sanctuaries

and will be attacked by no one while the elections are organized and/or the negotiations continue. Their presence on the battlefield is not helping the negotiations or the elections but is making them more difficult.

Conclusion.—In our opinion, the negotiating talks have gone on too long and are tending to prolong the civil war. It is time for the United States to provide leadership in championing a new approach: "elections now" and a cutoff of funding for military activities.

It is not necessary to continue fighting a civil war in search of an election process that is agreeable to the Khmer Rouge. Nor is it necessary to satisfy all factions at once with every jot and tittle of a comprehensive agreement to secure basic U.S. goals in the area.

On the contrary, the United States should be urging all Khmer factions, and all Khmer individuals, interested in the future of Cambodia to return to Phnom Penh to participate in the elections that we, and our allies, will help supervise.

And, in the meantime, we should do our best to reduce the level of fighting in Cambodia not just by calling for an end to the fighting but also through example—by eliminating our own military support to the civil war.

William E. Colby

Jeremy J. Stone

Senator CRANSTON. Does that complete your statement?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

Dr. STONE. I just wanted to emphasize, in closing, this. If we cut out the aid to our factions but keep them in business politically and humanitarily, I think we have a chance to plug the Thai loophole.

Now, one thing that has not been tried so far is tremendous publicity on one actor, Thailand, distributing this aid to the Khmer Rouge. The Thais up until now have never even admitted participating in the transference of these weapons, and 90 of their legislators, as was mentioned earlier, have petitioned against it, and their Prime Minister is against it. It is hard for them to pull themselves together to stop it. We are their main ally.

The easy, simple solution to this is to tell the Thais we are cutting it out, you cut it out. I think that might work. If that will not work, if Thailand is going to continue to deliver the aid and China is going to continue to supply, then the jig is up, as has been indicated before.

Senator CRANSTON. If the objective is to get elections as soon as possible, as you suggest, would it be possible for the Hun Sen government to call and hold elections under circumstances where it would be safe for enough international observers to go in so that there could be some validation of the outcome?

Dr. STONE. I talked to Prime Minister Nguyen Tho Vihach in Hanoi about what they expected when they withdrew. He said we expected the Cambodians to lose 30 percent of the country, but in fact they have lost only 10 percent of the country.

I believe order could be maintained. You know, it is possible in order to help keep order it might require forces of different factions, and conceivably the Vietnamese might be one of the factions. I do not think U.N. peacekeeping factions will maintain order.

In any case, when I was in Phnom Penh it is very serene there. In large parts of the country there is no active fighting. The Khmer Rouge would try to disrupt the election, but in those parts of the election, I think it is Mr. Colby's view where they were disrupting it we could—

Senator CRANSTON. Could the Hun Sen government proceed to hold an election?

Mr. COLBY. I think they could, yes. Yes, sir. I think they should get the international support for doing it from the United States.

Senator CRANSTON. Why does it not just proceed?

Mr. COLBY. If the United States supported it, then we would be indicating that our assistance to the non-Communist resistance would be used to urge them to participate. Sihanouk might win. Hun Sen might win. The Khmer Rouge might win. But if it is a fair election, then they have a legitimate government.

Mr. HOROWITZ. May I comment, Mr. Chairman, because I raised this directly with Hun Sen. It is a fascinating question.

The reason why the Hun Sen government has not held its own elections is because Hun Sen has opposed doing so and in the process has faced substantial internal pressures from an increasingly independent National Assembly of Cambodia.

The mechanism has been this. In what is a historic tradition of legislatures dealing with executive branches, which all the members of this committee are surely familiar with, dating from Magna Carta times, you have a National Assembly of legislators who have been taking on the administration, the executive branch more and more so.

Senator CRANSTON. Why does Hun Sen oppose that?

Mr. HOROWITZ. He has opposed it shrewdly because he knows that if the Cambodians ran an election on their own it would not gain any international credibility for the government. It would be written off as a phony staged election; therefore, he has sought against all these internal pressures to hold off elections, the domestic pressures for National Assembly elections, hoping to come up with a formula which would give his government some international recognition and ending the isolation of his country particularly and by the international community of his government. That is the bind that he is in.

It was quite remarkable. One of the members of the National Assembly said to me, "Why in the world do people think that Cambodians are any less anxious than Hungarians to have their own free elections for their own National Assembly?" They made it clear to me that it was Hun Sen who was standing in the way. These were people who had no sense of the overall international context. They wanted to gain power at the expense of the executive branch and thought that an election would institutionalize that kind of power.

I think they are right. I do not think Hun Sen ought to hold it now, although what Bill Colby suggests is something that we may need to go to. We need to get the Alan Weinstens. We need to get the Ed Muskies. We need to get the Jimmy Carters if we can to go on down there, and maybe we will have to if the U.N. does not come along or if Mr. Lambertson waits forever for an international settlement. I think that will have to be our next step, precisely as Bill Colby suggests.

Now let me say one other thing in terms of the security for those elections. I think there has been, I am told, a demoralization in the country. There has been an inflation even since I left. Do not, however, overstate the military, strictly military power of the Khmer Rouge. This is a political game that is going on, a propaganda game that is going on, not a strictly military battle. If it were otherwise, we would have won in Vietnam.

Let me say something about the regime in Cambodia. I find this as instructive as anything. Do you know, Mr. Chairman, who the Information Minister of the Government of Cambodia is? He is a great man. His name is Chang Pon. Chang Pon was director of the School of Fine Arts in Phnom Penh through the last days of the Lon Nol regime and then survived during the Pol Pot regime.

He is probably the man more responsible for the restoration of the culture of his country than any man in the world. Chang Pon has restored pagodas, the architecture of Cambodia, the dance of Cambodia. He is Culture and Information Minister.

Do you know what he has said? He said he does not care about the information side of his job. There is one fax machine that accesses the whole country, to the rest of the world. It takes 3 hours to get a phone call through.

On the other hand, when the Khmer Rouge blow up a gas station, they have press releases issued in Bangkok and elsewhere which enormously elevate the significance of their military "achievement." They issued press releases that Battambang was on fire and that the Phnom Penh leadership was fleeing. It took the government 3 days to find out about the charges and 2 days after that to even respond to those charges. They are not very good at that.

Short of the capacity to conduct random violence, short of the ability of the Khmer Rouge to blow up bridges which can sharply dislocate the economy and demoralize the people, as a military matter I believe that there is a marked, marked overrating of the capacity of the Khmer Rouge.

To find that the Khmer Rouge can take over the country for reasons other than the collapse and which effects the West's isolation of its government is to underrate the courage of Cambodians. They know what the Khmer Rouge are about, and they are prepared to fight them if given half a chance.

So, I think there is real security there for an election, if need be by others than the U.N., and I think it would go well.

Senator CRANSTON. Even though it is widely asserted now or claimed that we are the only superpower, the power of superpowers, any of them, ourselves included, to control world events is obviously reduced, and I do not think we need to necessarily be involved in authenticating an election in another country in any official way. That is their business, and if they could proceed and the Hun Sen government is willing to proceed to hold an election and international observers went in on their own like Jimmy Carter and Ed Muskie and others that would do so, it seems to me that would be a way to shortcut this process as you in effect are suggesting.

Let me put a general question to you. What within reason can we expect the present administration to do to move this process generally forward toward a peaceful resolution in Cambodia?

Second, what could this subcommittee specifically do to move the process forward?

Let me start at this end of the table and go down.

Mr. COLBY. I think if the President took the position that there should be early elections there and that the United States would

look favorably upon it, I think that would be an enormous initiative.

I think if this subcommittee reported that it was its recommendation that this be the case, that would stir up a whole new issue.

Senator CRANSTON. Jerry.

Dr. STONE. In addition, I think it is terribly important that the administration be required to talk to the Hun Sen government.

I wrote in the Washington Post that the Hun Sen government agreed to U.N.-supervised elections. The chairman of the House subcommittee immediately called the Assistant Secretary of State to a hearing and said "Is it true that the Hun Sen government has agreed to U.N.-supervised elections?"

Well, since I had been there I knew they had agreed not only to that but a lot more. But here the chairman of a House subcommittee has to ask the Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary did not give a clear answer because he does not really know either, because they are not talking to the Hun Sen government—so they do not know what their positions are except as these are filtered through the Jakarta meeting or the press.

As many of the Senators have pointed out, it is absolutely absurd at this stage not to be talking to Phnom Penh about what they are agreeing to. That should be done at once.

Second, I think the spirit of what Mr. Colby and I have said today is that this international negotiating game could go on for a very long time. During that time the Khmer Rouge could get so strong that they could not be stopped. Some time limit, therefore, has to be put on this negotiation.

I saw with alarm this morning, although I appreciate the Hun Sen government making concessions, that when they made the concessions at Jakarta they had already told me about, it was received as new impetus to the negotiating process. So, even though the Khmer Rouge had come in saying we are still for a quadripartite interim government and even though Prince Sihanouk said last week he was still for the quadripartite solution but he agreed to call it a supreme national council as an honorable compromise. So, even though the other side is so retrogressive, Hun Sen's concessions are keeping the whole process alive.

So, somebody has to say that if they cannot negotiate something within about 6 months, then we should have international inspection and international involvement in the election if not U.N. involvement; in other words, states, or collections of states. It means more than just President Jimmy Carter. Everybody who wants to come in and help the election, help monitor it, aid and support it, should be allowed to come in and help. All come.

What we have to get away from, though, is an effort unlimited in time to get a comprehensive proposal.

Senator CRANSTON. If I could complete with the two of you, Dr. Chauncey, what within reason could the administration be expected to do or urged to do, and what could this subcommittee do to be constructive?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. I think the subcommittee can urge the administration to do the following three things: One, end the conundrum—

Senator CRANSTON. That is not necessarily the way we are most effective.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. I know.

End the conundrum which Senator Sarbanes so clearly put his finger on in earlier questioning, wherein we are supporting negotiations which bring in and call for the bringing in of Khmer Rouge for a solution for which we hope the Khmer Rouge will not be present. That particular puzzle should be taken off the board once and for all.

Two, change our negotiating strategy toward China. In this regard, I think there are two things we can do. We need to bring higher up on the agenda the importance of military aid to the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, it should be made clear to the Chinese that we expect that stopped and stopped immediately. We need to do that bilaterally. We also need to explore a multilateral approach in that regard in the context of China.

Three, I think there is absolutely nothing to be lost in terms of talking to the Hun Sen government.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

Mr. Horowitz, your passion and knowledge on this leads you to give rather long answers, so please be succinct.

Mr. HOROWITZ. I do apologize.

First, I think it is to end the political profit for the administration so far as my friends in the conservative community are concerned. That will move this administration most of all.

Senator CRANSTON. Can you say that again?

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think the administration will be moved most of all when there is no political credit to be gained domestically with American conservatives such as myself for a so-called muscular anti-Communist position. When this policy is seen by conservatives for what it is, an accommodation to China and support of the Khmer Rouge, conservatives who are outraged at the administration for the Scowcroft mission will understand that if there is a real basis for outrage in terms of the administration's China policy to China, it is our quiescence in the face of China's support of the Khmer Rouge.

So, a focus on China and experience by conservatives in seeing and going down there is of great importance. I am now trying to persuade Elliott Abrams to chair a delegation of distinguished conservatives to go down to Cambodia, and I think I have him pretty much persuaded to go on down there in fairly short order, and there may be others who will go with him. I think that will help with the administration.

Second, I see Bill Triplett back there. We need to work, and I think this committee needs to work, with conservatives. In that regard, one of the things that will not help with the administration, Mr. Chairman, is tying Cambodian policy to Vietnam, to rapprochement with Vietnam.

That may or may not be in order, but there are many people in the conservative community and the administration who believe that if they accommodate Cambodia they will be under pressure to give reparations to Vietnam and do all the kinds of things they may not be prepared to do. Now maybe they are right, and maybe they are wrong, but I think if we care about Cambodia we ought to

focus on Cambodia and the need to have elections there and leave aside whatever will happen in Vietnam. If we do that, the administration will, I think, move a lot more rapidly than it has.

Finally, I would like this committee, again in the name of putting pressure on the administration for elections and focusing on China, to pass a three-part simple resolution: One, without qualification calling for rapid elections under U.N. supervision; two, calling on the U.N. to perform no more than it needs to to supervise elections along the lines of what has happened in Nicaragua, Lithuania, Namibia, and elsewhere; and three, finally, unambiguously condemning Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge. This position would differ sharply from that of Congressman Solarz' and would force change for the better.

I think that if the Senate moves in the direction of focussing on China, focussing on the need for rapid elections, the administration will move a lot more quickly than is commonly supposed.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Paul.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a very helpful panel, and we appreciate the obvious work and effort that has gone into the presentations.

Dr. Chauncey, I would like to ask you how important is it to the Chinese to get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. It is the publicly stated reason why the Chinese are supporting the Khmer Rouge, but I would argue that, in fact, what is stated publicly and what amounts to the private agenda are two very different things. Even with all Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia, whether or not there are troops that have gone back in, Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge will continue. It is going to continue for a range of reasons not the least of which is that China tends to look at Indochina much the way that the Soviet Union until very recently looked at Eastern Europe. It is something of a sphere of influence.

There is also a degree to which China's domestic instability at the moment has factored into a need to exercise foreign policy in which there is no apparent concession, in which China, in effect, can appear to be strong and steady in the foreign realm because it is not in the domestic realm. There is a virulent national pride at work on the part of China. And so for all of that, while it is important to them that there are not Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, that is not the only issue. The fact that it is not the only issue means that even with all forces out, the problem of China's support for the Khmer Rouge will not be solved.

Senator SARBANES. Does that mean that a willingness on the part of others in the world community to tolerate the presence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia to support the regime against the possibility of Khmer Rouge takeover will not work in any way to get the Chinese to drop their support for the Khmer Rouge?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. If I understand your question directly, are we sending a signal to the Chinese that they no longer have support in this regard? Is that the question?

Senator SARBANES. Part of this deal is that the Vietnamese get out and you stop supporting the Khmer Rouge. You are supporting the Khmer Rouge. Even the administration states, although I do

not think their policy is getting there, that given the choice, anything comes ahead of the Khmer Rouge, including Hun Sen supported by Vietnam. So, you say to the Chinese will you hunt the Vietnamese out, but you are still supporting the Khmer Rouge. We cannot have this situation, and we may start shifting the position here. First of all, you have got to talk to Hun Sen, obviously, and you may even entertain the notion that if he needs to, he can draw on Vietnamese forces to contain the Khmer Rouge.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. That message should certainly be communicated to the Chinese, but it is worth noting that one of the Chinese policy goals here has been general destabilization which has weakened the Vietnamese. So confronted with the possibility that there might be an ongoing hemorrhage in Cambodia, the Chinese are not going to lose sleep over it.

Mr. COLBY. The Chinese hate the Vietnamese.

Senator SARBANES. What?

Mr. COLBY. The Chinese just plain hate the Vietnamese. However, if you had a legitimized government of Cambodia through elections, that legitimized government could invite Vietnamese assistance against a continuing Khmer Rouge threat, and I do not think anybody could really argue with it.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think the Khmer Rouge could be controlled in that situation?

Mr. COLBY. I think with the promise of the Vietnamese backing Phnom Penh, yes, they could. That is what has happened the last few years.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. Let me add to that that I think that should not be our policy goal. It is the case that the Vietnamese may well either be forced to go back in, may want to although I think that is probably not the case, but much of everything we have done for the last 10 years has been designed to get the Vietnamese out.

Senator SARBANES. I am not suggesting it as a policy goal, but we have got two policy goals here and we do not seem to be able to get to the one perhaps without exploiting the other.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. There may be some real irony in the fact that we may have to depend on the Vietnamese to keep the Khmer Rouge from coming back to power.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I again want to state my view that the military power of the Khmer Rouge is overstated. What is really going on here is a people in Cambodia who from their perspective are seeing not only American isolation of their government, but literal American support for Pol Pot.

They see this going on, they think of our policy as being implacable, and there is a kind of demoralization. I have to say, Senator Sarbanes, if the U.S. Senate were to pass a resolution calling for immediate elections, condemning China for its support of the Khmer Rouge and calling for a U.N. presence that is sufficient to guarantee elections, there would be a signal, a sign really the first one from an authoritative body of the United States that someone is on their side.

And let me tell you, their spines would be stiffened, Senator Sarbanes. What we have seen thus far, the most we have seen is what has come out of Congressman Solarz and what that calls for an indeterminate U.N. substitution for the current government. The

Solarz' approach is a little fuzzy, but between the lines it really is the Lambertson, administration policy.

If we move beyond that, I think you would find people in Cambodia willing to hold on and prepared to hold on an awful lot more. But we have not sent them any signal that we do not want to isolate them, of that we are backing away from the Khmer Rouge and that is where they think we are.

Senator SARBANES. I would like to ask the other members of the panel other than Mr. Horowitz about a point he made which seemed to be to be just evident commonsense, but perhaps I am—both he and I are missing something—and that is this notion that somehow you can stand down existing authorities and somehow substitute some—a U.N. crew not to sort of observe an election or maybe even to run an election, but to run the country in a transition period.

I mean Lambertson says "Well, we are going to have this council that is going to have all four people in it, all four elements in it, but then the council is going to immediately absolve itself of any executive authority and then that executive authority is somehow going to be carried out by this U.N. crew that is going to come into the country." I thought it was a fairly reasonable point. I mean, how many of them will speak the language. Where is that skill going to come from?

Do any of you see how that could possibly work?

Dr. STONE. Well, let me explain what this looks like from the point of view of the Hun Sen negotiators with whom I spoke. The Australian plan has three versions. There is a Namibia formula in which the government stays in place. There is a decapitation approach where 300 of the bureaucrats in the government are replaced by U.N. officials, and then there is a dismantlement version which is what Sihanouk wants where the entire Cambodian government is eliminated.

The complete dismantlement program is obviously just a red herring raised by Sihanouk when he does not want to agree because clearly the whole administration could not be dismantled.

The decapitation approach is supported by the administration. It has in mind, I believe, deputizing Khmer who are outside the country and calling them U.N. bureaucrats. Giving them passports as U.N. bureaucrats and putting them back into the country to run Cambodia in the interim. This would be viewed by the Hun Sen government as a kind of a fifth column because most of the Khmer have been out of the country for 10 years and are mostly Sihanoukists, people that do not know what has been going on inside the country and are opposed to the Hun Sen government.

So, they, of course, prefer the Namibia formula, but are prepared to discuss the Australian formula in the Jakarta talks.

Now, the Supreme National Council is a different thing, Senator Sarbanes, which was invented actually by the Hun Sen administrators. They said, "We are eager to get the United Nations into the act." It will help us make sure the negotiations are verifiable, and we want the U.N. inspectors there so that the Khmer Rouge cannot say we cheated and also so people will be not afraid to vote their conscience.

So, they are eager to have the U.N. in. And so they decided to try to solve the problem of having the Khmer Rouge having the seat. They invented a Supreme National Council, of which they have two versions they could agree with, and proposed to give the supreme authority of the country to that—let that hold the authority momentarily—so as to hand it over to the U.N.

So, the Supreme National Council is a body of a few people which was invented to try to solve the U.N.'s problem with credentials, and is something that the Hun Sen government can support.

Senator SARBANES. What is it they would hand over to the U.N.?

Dr. STONE. Well, the U.N. lawyers cannot figure out how to deal with the problem that the U.N. cannot administer a country over the dead body of the Khmer Rouge because they hold the U.N. credentials for the country. That is very much against the U.N.'s legalistic approach. Once you give the credentials to the country, you cannot do something over their dead body.

So, the problem is how can the United Nations have an administrative role in a country without having a credentials vote?

Senator SARBANES. But assuming you solve that credentials vote, what is the administrative role that is envisioned?

Dr. STONE. Well, of course, the Hun Sen government prefer what they call a standing aside of the two governments. Their government would stand aside in the sense that it would say we are letting the U.N. at the very top run it in principle, but they do not anticipate throwing out all their bureaucrats.

They have in mind a formula which they call standing aside by both the CGDK and their government, but not a dismantling of governments. They would just as soon have a cease-fire in place, and have everything stand still and then run the election.

And as far as Mr. Colby and I are concerned, the only issue is whether the election be fair, not who was running the government during the election. We can tell whether the election is fair notwithstanding whose bureaucrats are running the government in between.

Quite frankly, Mr. Sarbanes, in these elections which the United States is requiring of Nicaragua and of Cambodia all the people know that if they vote for the U.S. candidate aid will flow in and if they do not vote for the U.S. candidate, trouble will ensue. As a consequence we can always get fair elections. We get more than fair elections. The playing field, from my point of view, is always quite fair.

They know that in Cambodia if you vote for Sihanouk things will go great. You continue to vote for Hun Sen, there may be trouble. In fact, Hun Sen knows this so well—this will amaze the members of the committee, I think—the Hun Sen government knows this so well that they are already planning that, if they win the election, they will invite Sihanouk to run in a coalition government with them. They know that without Sihanouk they really cannot get the international support they need and he can always go back to China and wage war against them again.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Mr. Sarbanes, could I just say one quick thing on the question of administration?

If the "modest" plan of the Australians or for a mere 300 replacement of a mere 300, 300 is an interesting number in this regard.

The most vivid memory I have of Phnom Penh was by my personal count, over 300 English language schools, private English language schools, to which people were paying tuition despite not having a lot of money, because they are looking to the West for their own future.

However, it is still pretty primitive. The professors are not that much far ahead of the students. There are not 300 decent translators in the whole country, Senator Sarbanes. They do not have people who can translate dispatches in the Western newspapers. In one or two cases if the luck of the draw is good, you get a good translator, but chances are that even with senior government officials you get a very primitive translator.

A U.N. administration is unthinkable just in terms of communication. What are you going to have—300 U.N. satraps who cannot speak a word of the language of the country taking over the culture ministry? It is just—it cannot work, and there are—I am confident people within this administration who know it as well and who may be hoping that the idea of a U.N. administration will fall of its own weight.

But it is Nicaragua that really helps us get to the point that we do not need to wait a long time if what we want are free and fair elections. We can have them without the U.N. being in there to "level the playing field" for an extended period of time.

Senator SARBANES. Well, actually we could go to U.N.-supervised elections or even sort of supervised elections without the U.N. if that is an extremely difficult problem and leaving the existing Cambodian administration in place, could we not, as long as we—

Dr. CHAUNCEY. As long as we jettison the Khmer Rouge.

Senator SARBANES. What?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. As long as we jettison the Khmer Rouge, we can do that. As long as we remain in a position where we feel compelled to keep the Khmer Rouge at the negotiating table, we have got a problem. But when we jettison the Khmer Rouge, the answer is "Yes. We can do that."

Mr. COLBY. If the Khmer Rouge wants to put up a candidate, be my guest.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Listen, I am willing for Sihanouk to get all \$26 million of aid for campaign finance. He can go on television. I am sure—

Senator SARBANES. We are about to pass a reform bill.

Mr. HOROWITZ. He still will not win, Senator Sarbanes. I think the people of—he really is a relic without substantial support, but he has got name recognition, and he fills roles in terms of our relation with China and so forth, but I think the Cambodian government, the Hun Sen government is ready to have a Cambodian FEC if we want it and to give Sihanouk equal time on television and we can give him all the money, double the money we gave Mrs. Chamorro. He still is not going to win, but if he does, all will accept that, and I think so will the Cambodian people.

Senator SARBANES. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the panel, too, very much.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, you have been very helpful and I have some more questions. I do not know if you have or not, Paul.

Mr. Horowitz, you have expressed your thoughts several times about what conservatives can help do to straighten out our policies in Cambodia. You obviously are playing a very important role there.

There are problems with the fact that some very important conservatives focus more of their wrath and their suspicions on Hun Sen in connection with what is going on in Cambodia than they do with the PRC and its aid to the Khmer Rouge.

How do we shift their attention to the proper target, which is the PRC?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, the first, Senator Cranston, is to have people actually see Cambodia. My visit was extraordinarily eye opening. If I can persuade Elliot Abrams to go, if we can persuade Richard Perle, Charles Murray, the whole group of conservatives that I hope we will be able to persuade to go down there, they are going to see that this is a regime far more committed to free markets and to freedom of religion than Sihanouk had ever been. That will help change the situation.

But beyond that I think conservatives are committed to the notion of self-determination and free elections and once they get the message, they do not have to agree with me as to the nature of the Cambodian Government. Once the message really gets out that the Hun Sen government is committed to free elections and that it is China standing in the way of free elections both politically and militarily through support of the Khmer Rouge, I think we turn it around.

But I think you and the Senate have got to focus on China, China, China because you know how the conservative community feels about the administration's dealing with China. Well, they have to see our Cambodian policy is one of a piece. I hope we can facilitate visits by conservatives rapidly and extensively.

Senator CRANSTON. I guess one thing new that we have going for us is that the traditional wisdom that a Communist regime would never willingly relinquish power with an election and instead would resort to bloodshed has now been exploded so that we have a new opportunity to convince people.

Mr. HOROWITZ. This is what Nicaragua does. I am not sure that the Ortega government would have consented to the election had they not thought that by stacking it and making it unfair they could not win it. We have exposed that now. That is why Nicaragua is so important.

Mr. Chairman, if Ortega had won in Nicaragua, I think Dr. Lambertson's policy would have been safe for the next 3 years—he could stand against elections on the theory that it would be stacked, and while we could try to make distinctions between U.N.-run elections and Ortega-run elections, but it wouldn't help. Ortega not only lost, but lost in a landslide, and that being the case, I think the confidence by which we all can trust moving to free elections on a rapid basis is enormously enhanced.

Senator CRANSTON. Dr. Chauncey, can you explain why the Chinese are so deeply dedicated to their support of the Khmer Rouge despite the obvious difficulties it creates for them?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. Yes. I think in this regard particularly now, given everything that has happened in Eastern Europe and beyond which sets aside the issue are they threatened by the Soviet Union—that was their initial justification—I think there is an issue of extraordinary national pride here for the Chinese.

This is the area of the world in which they have taken a public foreign policy stand. Virtually everything else beyond onto and including the Middle East is a much more flexible area, it is a fuzzier area for Chinese foreign policy. Here they need to look as if they know what they are doing, as if they are the experts and as if no one else can call them into question. So, I think there is a fundamental and important issue of national pride.

I do not think that means that we cannot convince them to change their policy, but I do think that there is an extraordinary issue of national pride involved here.

Senator CRANSTON. You said that our communications with China have been largely uninnovative and without political priority. How do we get innovative in our relationships to China?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. I think we do several things. I think first of all the location of the item on the talking order has got to go up. It has got to be absolutely clear to the Chinese that this is a high priority. To do that the communications cannot be as private and quiet as they have been. I do not mean by that that we need to make this profoundly confrontational at the outset, although it could come to that, but virtually all of the communications with which I am personally aware have been by and large back channel communications, which has allowed the Chinese more or less to save face. This has never been a public talking issue. So, I think first the issue has got to go up on the priorities list, it must become public, and we need to invest foreign policy assets, as it were, in a multilateral as well as bilateral approach to this.

Senator CRANSTON. I am going to have to go vote and stay there for a second vote. I would like to ask staff to carry on and ask a couple more questions that I had intended to ask.

I would also like, if you would volunteer anything more that you wish in commenting on the administration's testimony, that will go in the record. Then I am coming back. I hope to get back before you are done. I have to come back for a nomination that we are going to deal with for an ambassadorship.

I want to thank you very much for the very effective testimony you have given. We have had a rather unusual session this afternoon in the fact that we imposed no time limit on what you said in your opening statements because of the importance of all this.

I take very seriously our responsibility here. I am very impressed with these proposals for trying to expedite the elections, and I am going to do what I can in that direction.

I will try to get back before you are done. If not, we will reconvene after I get back for the nomination.

Thank you very much.

Would you please come forward now, Richard.

Mr. KESSLER [presiding]. Dr. Stone and Mr. Colby, you suggest that the negotiating talks have "gone on too long and are tending to prolong the civil war." I would agree that we cannot allow negotiations to drag out endlessly while the battle rages in Cambodia, but we are in the midst of the third JIM meeting, just scheduling the third Permanent Five meeting in the middle of a dry season offensive in Cambodia.

Senator Muskie in his testimony mentioned that some progress had been made in these talks. My question is should we not wait a little longer before declaring negotiations of failure, especially after Hun Sen and Sihanouk agreed just last week to forming a national supreme council?

Mr. COLBY. I do not think you have to declare them a failure. I think you can just go ahead with the election and continue any negotiations that you want to. I think you will be able to have your election within 3 to 6 months whether you have had your agreements on your deals or not, and I rather suspect you will be no closer to agreement, comprehensive settlement, than you are now.

Dr. STONE. I would answer it in a similar, but slightly different way. We are putting forward two prongs of a policy. The first prong of trying to undermine the military struggle could be done immediately. We could stop two fronts of the war tomorrow by cutting off this so-called nonlethal aid and withdrawing publicly our cooperation with the Bangkok working group, and at that point we could put pressure on the Thais not to pass the aid through to the Chinese.

While I agree with Mr. Horowitz that, in domestic terms, it is important to focus on the Chinese, in military terms it is obviously much easier to stop the Thais from passing the aid along than it is to stop the Chinese from wanting to provide it.

So, first of all, I would propose that we should do the first prong of this Stone-Colby approach and try to undermine the fighting while the negotiations are going on. As far as the other part of it, I think we should create support for the possibility of an internationally supervised election and suggest this possibility as something to be done, if the negotiations drag on too much longer. By raising the specter of quicker elections and explaining how it would be done we could try to put a deadline on the comprehensive negotiations and be prepared for a substitute for it.

Mr. KESSLER. Any other comments from the witnesses on that question?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. The major concern that I would have about prolonging negotiations is what appears to be a fairly significant transferral of Khmer Rouge military arms by forced treks from refugee camps into Cambodia. What in effect we have done is given the Khmer Rouge notice that they have a certain amount of time, but we are not going to cut it off. There is no end point in this for them to stockpile their military arms inside Cambodia and get set for a long and bloody conflict. I would like to see that process stop as soon as possible.

Mr. KESSLER. Mr. Horowitz.

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think the comments cover the waterfront, Mr. Kessler.

Mr. KESSLER. The Senator has one other question for the panel.

I agree with you, Mr. Stone, that we must do all in our power to prevent the genocidal Khmer Rouge from returning to power, but they appear to have a two-part strategy: First, to gain political legitimacy through negotiations and participation in elections; and second, to increase their military stranglehold.

Is there any danger that your proposal for early elections will actually play into the hands of the Khmer Rouge strategy by giving them an opportunity to put their people into legitimate political positions?

Mr. COLBY. If they win an open, fair, clear election, they can have it. If the Cambodian people elect them, then they are elected. That is what the whole debate is about. Who is the legitimate representative of the Cambodian people in a fair and free election?

Dr. STONE. You are really asking the question whether an early election would have more Khmer Rouge participation and chances of success than a later election. What I explained earlier was that the Khmer Rouge strategy is to drag out the negotiations until they are in a stronger position to suborn voters. So, from our point of view, the longer one waits the better the Khmer Rouge will do in either getting support for themselves, or more likely throwing their support to surrogates like Prince Sihanouk.

I am not against electing Prince Sihanouk in this, but if he is not elected with a certain amount of Hun Sen supporters, then the country will fall to the Khmer Rouge.

So what Mr. Colby and I have proposed is from all points of view better than waiting. The only difference, I think, between what Mr. Colby and I have proposed and what the Hun Sen government has said about this is the following. The Hun Sen government has said that the Khmer Rouge should not run as an organized Pol Pot party, and that only a party that denounces Pol Pot and that is perhaps composed of other Khmer Rouges, but ones that denounce the past, could run.

We are saying, although it is not really up to us, that in the general global stakes of this, since the Khmer Rouge are very unpopular, let them run under Pol Pot's flag. We are not sure it will make that much difference.

Mr. COLBY. Every recent visitor to Cambodia says that the Khmer Rouge would lose a free election.

Mr. KESSLER. I take your point. Mr. Horowitz mentioned in his testimony, I believe, that the last Cambodian experience in election was in the 1950's.

The question is, do the Cambodian people in a sense, given their history, need more time in order to understand the process of an election, let alone set up an election.

Would the whole panel comment on that?

Mr. COLBY. If Namibia ran one, Cambodia can run one.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Let us add Lithuania to that list as well, Mr. Kessler.

Dr. STONE. I want to emphasize that the question here is compared to what. We are suggesting that you try to start the elections before you sign every jot and tittle of a comprehensive agreement. If it takes longer to arrange the elections in people's mind, then it would take longer under the comprehensive approach. But the comprehensive approach has all kinds of other front-loaded delays.

So, we are for starting it once, however long it takes, not starting it once 2 years from now, however long it takes.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Can I, Mr. Kessler, just note at least what may be a moderate disagreement with Mr. Stone and Mr. Colby? I do not want us to jump too quickly to a non-U.N.-supervised selection, to an independent election. I agree that we may need to go there to symbolize in part the frustration of the world community with China's hold on the U.N. processes and with the United States quiet support for anything China does.

I do believe, however, that pressure brought directly on China to stop supporting the Khmer Rouge, as Dr. Chauncey says, moving up the issue of China's support for the Khmer Rouge to No. 1 on our agenda with China and focussing on China's support for these demented clones of Idi Amin, if not Hitler surely Idi Amin. The idea that there is a government that purports to have respectability in this world and wants to sit at the table of the great powers of the world that is out there supporting Idi Amin is beyond comprehension once we begin to focus directly on it, China may rapidly change its policy, I'm for trying this approach.

Now the notion, as Dr. Chauncey says, that China is impervious to criticism is, in my judgment, not true. I am told by reporter friends, for example, that when there is a dispatch in the American papers, however obscure, that is unfavorable to China, the sensitivity, the defensiveness that comes into play on China's play is greater than that of any other country. They are enormously sensitive to what we do.

I think that if we can get our act together, through the leadership of this committee to focus on China's support of first the Khmer Rouge, China's opposition to an election will not be permanent.

The real problem is we are not pushing the Chinese in that regard. What China is doing with the Khmer Rouge is down at the bottom of our list, if anyplace at all. That is what we need to change. If we do that, I do not think we are going to need to have now U.N.-supervised elections whose outcomes can be politically undermined.

If we can get a Jimmy Carter and an Ed Muskie and an Alan Weinstein together to do it, and get the financing to do it, if the Chinese do not move off a dime and if this Government does not push them, we will have to move to Mr. Colby's and Mr. Stone's plan, but I would move there a little more slowly and a little more reluctantly than them.

Dr. STONE. I want to emphasize, Mr. Horowitz, we are not talking about inspection just by leading personalities or even by leading personalities in groups. We are talking about international inspection by states and collections of states.

Mr. HOROWITZ. If France would be willing to do it, that would be great. I think France is a natural, and some of the other governments would be naturals in that regard.

I hear from all reports that Mitterand may be fed up and may have told Prime Minister Kaifu and others that he is fed up with Sihanouk. If we can move France to the position of sponsoring elections, we would really make some substantial progress. I agree with that.

Mr. KESSLER. Let me ask you one question, following up on what Mr. Horowitz said on behalf of Senator Helms. What leverage could we use to make the Chinese Communists stop arming the Khmer Rouge?

Dr. CHAUNCEY. I think the strongest leverage that we have includes public opinion, to which the Chinese are very sensitive, and a range of multilateral advantages, which include access to the World Bank and other institutions, financially in particular, upon which the Chinese depend very heavily.

I would also like to add that any form of election which does not have international sanction will provide legitimacy for the Chinese to continue to aid the Khmer Rouge.

It seems to me I find the election proposal that has been put forward here an interesting one, but if it stands on its own the Chinese will feel justified to continue their aid to the Khmer Rouge, and they can do that for a long time.

Dr. STONE. I would like to point out that no matter what happens in the election, there is no question whatsoever that the Khmer Rouge will denounce the election as having been illegitimate. They will say that millions of Vietnamese were still in Cambodia voting, and many other unrealistic charges of a typically Khmer Rouge kind will be made in any case.

It is inevitable that the Khmer Rouge will denounce the elections. I do not believe the Chinese will use the same excuses to continue arming the Khmer Rouge because I believe their policy will be based on geopolitical conclusions.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Mr. Kessler, I want to add one other thing to this, though, if I may.

Mr. KESSLER. Just a minute, Mr. Horowitz. We are going to stand in recess briefly, and Senator Cranston asks if you could all stay. When he returns, he has some more questions for you, and I believe he may be bringing another Senator.

So, we will stand in recess. Thank you.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator CRANSTON [presiding]. We will now resume.

The reason I asked that the four of you stay, which I appreciate your doing very much, is that Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska, who is not a member of this committee, nonetheless has a very great personal interest in Southeast Asia and in Cambodia. We have discussed the unfolding events there together. I told him of the hearing, that you were here and some of the recommendations that have evolved out of this. I asked him if he would like to come over and participate, and he said he would. So, I now yield to him for whatever questions he would like to put to you.

Senator KERREY. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I will make the questions open-ended enough that any one of the four of you can answer it because I know that in the interest of time, I should not go down the line and direct them.

For your information, I am not interested in winning an argument. I am interested very much in the people of Indochina. I am very much interested in the United States of America developing a policy that permits their culture to survive and permits their people to survive in peace and which permits their people to make choices for themselves.

I emphasize that I am not interested in winning an argument because of all the things that we Americans sometimes do with foreign policy and I think particularly true with Indochina is that we like to sort of choose up a horse and get on the horse and then argue that our horse is better than the other person's horse and reduce the argument down to a level that really, for me, becomes tragic in the end because we end up forgetting the people for whom the argument itself is generated.

So, I do not have a position. I do not begin with a position that says that I am trying to prove that the administration's policy is incorrect. I have some questions about the administration's policy. I have some questions about the seating of the coalition in the United Nations. I have some questions about backing a coalition in the field that essentially requires us to be in a position where we hope that the group that we are backing does not win and puts us in a rather desperate situation where those of us who are trying to assess the policy are unable to get information about what is going on on the ground.

So, for example, we are reduced to discovering through Eastern European sources that several thousand Vietnamese stood in between Battambang and the government soldiers of Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge sometime late in October for however long. We learned that through Eastern European envoys, not through our own intelligence sources, not through our own people who are supposed to be telling us what is going on so that we can make good policy judgments.

I have criticism and I have questions about our policy, but I want to emphasize that my object in this is not to show that President Bush is mistaken or that Under Secretary Solomon is making a mistake or anything like that. It is very important, I think, particularly in Indochina that, No. 1, we declare our interest to be the interest of the people of Indochina, and our desire first and foremost to stay the course, that we are not going to argue it for 60 days and then forget, that we are willing to stand with the people of Indochina and stand for their freedom, and that we are willing to stay for as long as it takes through several elections if need be to make sure that that in fact occurs.

So, with that I am simply interested to hear from all of you that assessment of the people of Cambodia and their capacity to sustain a government, to form a government, to conduct an election, to select their leaders, to operate the government, I know that you all have either been there or spent a lot of time on it, and I am just interested in hearing your objective analysis of what is going on in Cambodia.

Dr. STONE. I am the most recent returnee from Cambodia. I was there last month, but I want to emphasize, Senator, something that is even more important than the freedom of the Cambodians. That is their safety. I think you will understand better than many other people in this building that if the fighting there is unnecessary and if people are losing limbs to mines especially and to artillery bombardment and if there is going to be an election anyway, is there any need to continue the fighting until every last comma and period has been put on the agreement for the elections?

So, what William Colby and I were proposing before you came was a two-pronged proposal. In the first part we would do everything to undermine the ferocity of the war. We would stop our support to the two factions we support, thus preventing them from getting more Western support because there is enough U.S. support to the Sun San and Sihanouk factions that we could stop their fighting in safety to them. They could sit on the Thai border where they were for many years. We could safely stop the fighting of our factions and then throw the full spotlight of world publicity on the last faction, the Khmer Rouge and the Thai providing of those arms to the Khmer Rouge.

So, the first thing we are trying to do is stop the war, and if there is going to be elections it does not matter who owns more territory or who owns less territory. The Senators can check on it, but the CIA unveiled this openly before the Armed Services Committee. All the intelligence estimates show that the longer the fighting is going on, the stronger the Khmer Rouge is getting; and indeed, not just stronger absolutely but stronger relative to the factions we support.

So, the first thing that I think Mr. Colby and I would like your support on is a campaign to lower the level of fighting to the absolute minimum we can, and the second part is to have the elections you want U.N. supervised if possible; if not, internationally supervised.

Mr. COLBY. I say the sooner the better on those. We are engaged in a long complicated negotiation to try to achieve a comprehensive settlement among the four parties. Now there is no legitimate representative of the Cambodian people today. Each one of the four has been self-appointed.

The first order of business needs to be to achieve a legitimization of somebody representing the Cambodian people. That can only come through elections.

Now there is a great debate as to whether you can have an election while the Hun Sen government is there. We just had a very successful election in Nicaragua while the Sandinista government was there. The election was a landslide against that government. The fact is you can have an election if you get enough supervision from the outside.

Do you have to do it through the U.N. if the Chinese would veto it? No, you do not have to do it through the U.N. You can do it by an informal group of powers. The French, Mr. Horowitz suggested, might be interested in participating in view of their historical relations there; and some of the unofficial representatives such as flooded Nicaragua last week. You could have the election within 3 to 6 months, in my view.

Continue the effort to achieve a comprehensive solution, but get somebody speaking for the Cambodian people. I do not know whether that would end up as Sihanouk or Hun Sen. I am almost certain it would not be the Khmer Rouge so long as we have these reasonably soon before the Khmer Rouge can build up their additional strength by their continued operations.

I think that would give you, then, a vehicle for uniting the country against a continued effort by the Khmer Rouge. In the extreme, it would give you a legitimate government which could invite the

Vietnamese back to help them resist the Khmer Rouge. That is not a very attractive idea, but the administration's position is we would be better off with a Hun Sen government supported by the Vietnamese than by Khmer Rouge, and I agree.

So that in the extreme you would have a legitimate government inviting a neighbor and ally to support them against chaos.

Senator KERREY. Assuming a voting age of 16, how many voting age Khmer are there?

Mr. COLBY. There would be about 3 million, I would guess, of about 7 million total. There is a high percentage of young people.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. I think your emphasis on the well-being of the Cambodians is right on the mark. In the best of all possible worlds, all we would need to do is look at Cambodia and answer the questions that you have posed.

This is not the best of all possible worlds. And it is essential in answering the questions that you have asked about Cambodia that we also focus our attention on the principal patron of the Khmer Rouge, which has been China.

So, in whatever calculus we lay out, it is absolutely essential that one recognize the fact that the Chinese have breathed life back into the Khmer Rouge, they sustain the Khmer Rouge. There have been no indications of flexibility on the part of the Chinese for cutting military aid to the Khmer Rouge.

Elections which did not in some way or another delegitimize that process are bound to guarantee there will continue to be military aid to the Khmer Rouge. China and its military policy are going to have to be on the list as we think about Cambodia.

Dr. STONE. Your original question was, What is the mood in Phnom Penh about this? Could they carry out these elections? And I want to explain something about the Khmer approach to elections, which is very different from what everyone expects.

We think of free elections as the way to determine the government. But they go beyond that, in their desire to forgive and forget, and to get Sihanouk back. They are prepared to give him a place in the government—an important place, even if he loses. Because he is the Prince. Because they will not get international support without him. Because they want to be all together.

They just do not want the Khmer Rouge back.

So, their approach to this is more than electoral. They would do anything, I think, to get Sihanouk back. And they have been begging him. Hun Sen meets with him, even though the Prince calls him a one-eyed Vietnamese lackey. And Hun Sen says, "Oh, Prince, cannot we reach a deal? What is it that you really want? And, cannot we get you back in some way?"

So, they are prepared to have more than a fair election, because even a fair election in which they won would not fulfill their requirements. The only thing they do not want is sufficient dismantlement and chaos so that the Khmer Rouge will take over.

These former Khmer Rouge, although it has not been established that they are guilty of great crimes during the Khmer Rouge period, in my opinion, they are very conscious of what the Khmer Rouge did. And they are very vigilant about it happening again.

If it were not for them, if only Sihanouk opposed the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer Rouge would be back in power today, already.

Senator KERREY. What is going on in the villages, Mr. Horowitz? Did you get out in the villages?

Mr. HOROWITZ. We saw some. When I was there, it was not on the Thai border. We traveled up Highway 1 from Ho Chi Minh City to Phnom Penh, a 6- or 7-hour drive. We spent some time in the villages. We traveled some beyond Phnom Penh. It is hard for me to know or to say about the villages.

I have no benchmark against which to compare. Most of our time was spent in Phnom Penh.

Senator KERREY. Do you agree with Dr. Stone's analysis of the people's attitude toward Sihanouk?

Mr. HOROWITZ. No, not entirely. I think that there is a circularity involved here. I think the Cambodian Government, though, is still mystified in some ways about their continued isolation at the hands of the United States, whom they see because literally—and from their perspective you cannot blame them—supporting the Khmer Rouge through Sihanouk and through efforts to isolate them as the sole barrier to the Khmer Rouge return.

To the extent that Sihanouk is—and Dr. Lambertson, in his testimony this afternoon kept talking about Sihanouk is our instrument, is our friend, is our ally, and so forth—to the extent that the Hun Sen government sees Sihanouk as a means of reassuring the American Government, and therefore, a means of obtaining Western or American aid, sure, they will find a place for Sihanouk.

I think he is universally regarded with contempt, frankly, by the Khmer Rouge. They called him the water buffalo they use to get across the mud in Cambodia during the entire period of their rule, and prior to that, when he was their chief recruiting agent, and the fellow they trotted out whenever they wanted to get international respectability.

They have used him and have had contempt for him, I think.

Senator KERREY. I am not sure that is a contemptible analogy to compare him to a water buffalo.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, all right. I am not sure—I am quite confident it was not intended with great respect. This is the fellow who purports not only to be king, but God on Earth. And to compare him in that context to a water buffalo, is to give some sense of what Pol Pot thought of him. But he was a very usable instrument on their part.

Everybody wants to use him as an instrument, so long as he is the guy with name recognition, and is the fellow that the West thinks of and deals with when they have to deal with Cambodian matters.

I think of him as a largely corrupt relic. And I think that his influence and support in Cambodia is not as great as one would imagine, and is clearly diminishing by the day.

So, I do not find him quite that necessary, nor do I find the notion that they would invite him back after an election as particularly reassuring. He is a wild card, but there is one strain of consistency I think that I have noted throughout, or that in my sense is present. He will follow the Chinese line, come what may.

I said in earlier testimony, he has been quoted as saying that the Soviet Union and America come and go, but China will be there forever. His base is in Beijing.

That is where he has found his support. His wife and many members of his family are very, very much a part of Chinese military and intelligence operations.

He is a fellow that has been around for a long time. And he has served, in my judgment, as cover, while Americans who have looked to build relations with Chinese, and satisfy some of China's needs vis-a-vis Cambodia, they have used him as an alleged anti-Communist. The fact is, he is not that. He is allied with China. I think people know that. But, you know, you do not want to cross him off entirely, because, in the United States, he has got some support within the higher reaches of the American Government.

So, presumably, the Hun Sen government is as willing to use him as the Khmer Rouge were. And my guess is, as long as his palace is lush enough, he will be willing to be used, to the extent that China is not unduly alienated.

I have a different view, as well, of the Hun Sen government. I was quite struck, Senator, when I was there, at the extent to which—there were a number of factors that were true about that government. And I hope you will have the chance to explore and find, as I did, not only in 3-hour meetings with government bigshots, but in chances to walk through the streets and talk to people at random, businessmen, intellectuals, journalists, private volunteer organizations, diplomats.

And here, I particularly commend to you the Chargé from India, an extraordinarily sophisticated fellow who has been in Cambodia for as long as any one. He can give you a feel for Cambodia.

Here is the feel that I had when I came back.

First, the government is significantly peopled, and critically, at this point, its policies are critically determined by people who had no relationship whatsoever to the Khmer Rouge government. They were in Cambodia during the entire Pol Pot period, survived, and decided to stay. People who were Western educated, who are looking to move Cambodia to the West as quickly as they can.

Second, the Communists, the former Khmer Rouge factions, were not Western educated intellectuals, but were jungle fighters, practical people, and they tend to be on the side of free markets to a remarkable degree.

There is a great measure of freedom of religion in the country.

There is a fragile economy. But Cambodians wonder whether American policy will change. In their dark moments, they think that America will always be against them, come what may. And they need to be reassured on that score.

But the government which enjoys broad support, is looking to the West, and does not need or especially want Sihanouk, but will take him if they win an election, to the extent America views Sihanouk's presence as a necessary condition for further American support.

Senator KERREY. Is not the underpinning of our unwillingness to recognize the Hun Sen government the fact that the Vietnamese invaded and set the Hun Sen regime in power? That is the underpinning?

Mr. COLBY. Both ours and the ASEAN powers. They took a very strong line against the cross-border invasion during that period.

You could on the other hand make an argument for its being a just act, in view of its ending the Khmer Rouge murders.

Senator KERREY. Is there any apparent hypocrisy in our laying claim to a successful election on Sunday in Nicaragua, although we did not invade Nicaragua, we certainly connected the Contra effort with that election, and were grateful for it? Is there hypocrisy in that?

Dr. STONE. Well, the analogy is with Panama, really. I mean we felt there that a sufficient evil had occurred when some soldiers were attacked, and because the situation was corrupt that we overthrew the government.

In this situation in Cambodia, it was a genocidal murderous regime that had not just attacked a few servicemen in the Vietnamese, but had destroyed whole villages. Whole villages, 9 miles into Vietnam. And had announced on their radio that they were going to kill very Vietnamese alive by having the Khmer kill 30 Vietnamese for each Khmer. They said we could do it and have some Khmer left over.

So, this was a regime that was a mad dog, destroying Vietnamese villages.

And when I came back after my first trip to Cambodia a year ago. I called up an international lawyer. And I said what are the conditions that are required to justify the overthrow of a government? And he said, there are three. You have to of course be attacked. You have to have tried mediation. You have to have tried retaliatory measures proportionate. You see?

So, I looked into the record. I discovered, by happenstance, the Vietnamese had done all that. They first suppressed the news that the villages had been destroyed, and asked the Chinese to mediate. And when that failed, they tried retaliatory attacks in secret. And when the Khmer just said, "Oh, we have been attacked" and made it public. They then went to the U.N. and said we want to demilitarize a zone between the two countries.

They were not fools. They knew they could overthrow Cambodia easily, but they knew China would come on them like a ton of bricks.

So, they did try all the things that international lawyers require before you are justified in overthrowing a government. They did more than we did when Japan attacked us. We did not try mediation or retaliatory attacks. We just overthrew the government.

It took us 5 years to reconstruct the Japanese Government and sign a peace treaty with them. It took them 10 years. But that is because they had guerrilla wars on the borders.

So, I feel it is a tremendous injustice to have the U.N. saying this was an illegal invasion.

Mr. COLBY. I think in direct answer to your question, though, sure, there is probably some hypocrisy, but clearly elections are the way to go now. They are occurring all over the world. And the only problem is making them open, fair elections.

Why the people vote the way they do is another subject. And sometimes they vote because of appetite, some out of fear, envy, or whatever. But, so long as they vote, they make the decision. And I think that is the only way out of this Cambodian box.

Senator KERREY. Why do you suggest an election as quick as 3 or 6 months?

Mr. COLBY. Because the Khmer Rouge are getting stronger all the time.

Senator KERREY. Stronger in an electoral way?

Mr. COLBY. No.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. Militarily.

Mr. COLBY. Stronger in a military way, with the continued Chinese aid. I mean we heard about this. And, you know, they will go on and build it up some more.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Senator, I just want to note a modest disagreement. I do not think they are getting stronger militarily. I think what is happening is there is a dispiriting effect to the Cambodian Government here. This is not a military battle. It is a battle of press releases, propaganda. It is a battle of morale and so forth.

And to the extent that the Khmer Rouge continue to be supported, as they see it, directly by the United States and the West, and we continue to isolate them, even after the Vietnamese go out, and even after they look for elections, there is a real demoralization that takes place.

So that is the sense in which I think the Khmer Rouge are getting stronger. Militarily, I do not think that they are an overwhelming power or are likely to be.

Dr. STONE. Well, you know, that is completely at odds with the U.S. Government estimates. And they were presented here today, Senator.

For example, David Lambertson's testimony today said, "in the absence of a negotiated settlement, fighting is likely to continue to escalate—a situation most likely to benefit the Khmer Rouge."

Senator KERREY. Well, with all due respect to U.S. estimates, the U.S. estimates 2 weeks ago made no mention of the Vietnamese presence at Battambang, none at all. And it is tough to hide 6,000 people.

Dr. STONE. But all the estimates for years have been that the Khmer Rouge were the strongest military power among the resistance. And when the CIA spoke to the Armed Services Committee this week, this is what they said: "Without a diplomatic settlement that constrains the Khmer Rouge and strengthens the non-Communists," which would be a really nice diplomatic settlement if you could get it, "the prospect is for sustained fighting that will likely diminish the chances for the installation of a transitional regime that could lead to a democratically elected Cambodian government."

That is a polite CIA way of saying, the longer the fighting goes on, the stronger the Khmer Rouge are going to be.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. One of the questions at issue is, where is the military strength? One of the things we have seen over the course of the last month or so is a reallocation by the Khmer Rouge of their military stockpiles from the area along the Thai/Cambodia border into Cambodia itself.

So, to a certain extent, we may be splitting hairs trying to argue about whether they have got more bullets or not, and whether they are getting more on a day-by-day basis. They are getting stronger militarily inside Cambodia.

Senator KERREY. Let me add a little detail on my question concerning the invasion and the comparison to the Contra war. Because I want to make it clear that the world may judge actions that I take as being hypocritical.

I mean I do not want to suggest to you that I am either personally or, at times with my own votes, completely free of hypocrisy. Some may judge things that I say and do that way, as well.

I am trying simply to open up the principle that seems to underlie the policy. And that seems to dominate a lot of the consideration, which is the invasion itself and the legitimacy of the invasion which took place over 10 years ago.

And it does seem, at times, to get in the way of the policy and create conditions of complexity. I hear quadripartite and tripartite. We are trying to work this thing out so that everybody has—at home, so that domestically in America we have our political needs satisfied.

And what you seem to be suggesting is something that is certainly far simpler than what our current policy is. And I am asking whether or not it is possible for the policy to be even simpler and connected with that.

Something that I think is awfully important as well is what price do you think Americans are prepared to pay here? We know the price that the Vietnamese are willing to pay. We know the price that the People's Republic of China is willing to pay.

We even are beginning to get some pretty good indications of what the Thai are prepared to pay. They are prepared to extract a bit more than they would like to pay, I think, but they have a price as well. They have a strategic and a national interest. And they are putting things on the line.

Whereas the United States does not appear to me at the moment to have made that step, where we say, "OK, we are going to put something on the line here as well."

Because it seems to me that one of the things that has to happen in order for us not only to get good information, but also to be able to say we are more than just an intellectual player here, is some sort of American presence on the ground.

Mr. COLBY. If I may answer that. I think that we start from the basic point that you started this discussion with. Which is the Cambodian people. And in that respect, the No. 1 problem is to keep the Khmer Rouge from coming back. Everything else pales into insignificance next to that. Just keep them from coming back. Because if they come back, they will conduct another genocide. There is no question about that, now that they have been thrown out.

Senator KERREY. But, Bill, are not we in a position right now that the only people that are really prepared with their lives now—not with their words, not by coming to a foreign relations committee like I have just done, but with their lives—are not the only people that are prepared to pay with their lives the Vietnamese?

Mr. COLBY. That is right.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. COLBY. And that is what I said. That is less of a negative development, having the Vietnamese back there in support.

Now the Khmer do not like it. Because the history of the last 300 or 400 years is that the Vietnamese ate up the Cambodians. And Sihanouk's longstanding position is that he is afraid that the Vietnamese are just going to eliminate Cambodia.

Senator KERREY. I do know the attitude of the Khmer people.

Mr. COLBY. They are concerned about that. But it is less of a concern than killing off Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge.

Mr. HOROWITZ. You know, this is an unfortunate people, not the least owing to the fact that the Cambodians had the bad fortune to have been rescued from Pol Pot by the Vietnamese. Of course, nobody else was standing in line to do it. And the Cambodians are now saddled with the fact of their rescuer.

But I think it quite remarkable that after 10 years of presence, and very active presence in Cambodia, after a long history of trying to take over, swallow up Cambodia, you do not have to visit Cambodia for long to know that if it was the Vietnamese intention, they failed.

You will find lots of people in Cambodia grateful to the Vietnamese, surely, wanting to maintain friendly or, at a minimum, non-hostile relations with them. After all, Vietnam is Cambodia's insurance policy. Nobody else has been ready to protect them against the Khmer Rouge but the Vietnamese.

The remarkable thing is how culturally independent Vietnam and Cambodia are. One drives down Highway 1 and the difference culturally between the two is so striking. You cross that border, you just see all kinds of different ways of life, different cultural styles and so forth, and this is right on the Vietnamese border. And those differences have been maintained, notwithstanding the Vietnamese presence over the 10 years.

So, whatever the Vietnamese intentions were, and I view them with a lot more of a jaundiced eye than many of my friends on the issue of Cambodia, they did not succeed. This is really quite an independent government, made up of non-Communists, increasingly now. And people who, in private conversation, will express a cultural hostility and many other sorts of hostility to Vietnam. And pride that Cambodians are doing it by themselves, as indeed they are.

Senator, there is just one other thing on this. It comes from Elizabeth Becker's remarkable book about the Vietnamese invasion.

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, this was at a point in time where America's fortunes, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were never at a lower ebb. Brezhnevski was then the National Security Advisor to President Carter. And his view was that, rather than playing China off against Russia, as Nixon had done, we just had to ally ourselves with China to stop Russian advance.

Russia was walking all over the world at that point at the end of the Carter Administration.

And so part of our reaction, our negative reaction to the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam, came because we saw Vietnam as the Russian surrogate, and the Khmer Rouge as the Chinese surrogate. And our large geopolitical need, as Brezhnevski saw it, was to side with the Chinese and let the Russians know we and the Chinese were going to stand against them come what may.

So, one can even defend what we did back in 1979 in isolating Cambodia, because of the Vietnamese presence. We were in trouble with the Russians and we needed to do everything we could to stand against Russian allies and with the Chinese.

But one of the things we ought to do, Senator, is simply declare victory. Maybe Brezhnevski can say, "OK, we sided with China in the late 1970's." That helped stop the Russian Bear. Now the Russians are crumbling. We succeeded. We triumphed. Now we can take a hard look at China and tell China what not to do, and take them on hard, as we should in Cambodia.

So, I think there is honor on everybody's part here, if we just stop old policies and look at them afresh, in terms of what is going on right now.

Senator KERREY. Let me open up another old policy that, to me, seems to be connected. And that is our relations with Vietnam. I know this subject is Cambodia, but it seems to me that the two are very much connected. And I must confess at the outset that I have got rather harsh feelings toward the Vietnamese Government. I am not generous toward them, Dr. Stone, as you might be.

And yet, part of me says maybe I ought to be. But I am not. I do not want to connect normalization, by the way, with the POW/MIA issue. I think that should be left independent. And in fact, I believe that General Vessey has made a lot of progress in that regard.

I do not like even connecting it to the invasion, though I know that was done. Historically that has been done. And people have negotiated and feel very strongly about that. I mean I do not like connecting it to a historical event that occurred 11 years ago, that history now shows at least had some very positive secondary benefits.

I believe the Vietnamese went in there because they have territorial interests in Cambodia. But the secondary benefit was in fact they did drive the Khmer Rouge out, and they are the only one prepared today to put, as I said, their lives on the line to do it.

And yet I still have not been able to get myself to say under what circumstances do I think the United States of America should normalize relations with Vietnam.

And I was curious and would be very much interested in hearing all you comment on that. If you have reached a conclusion about whether or not we should, and if so, under what conditions.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. The first thing to be said along those lines is that the two should not be coupled. There is a tendency in current administration policy to, in effect, hold Vietnam hostage to the situation in Cambodia. That does not help us think clearly about our relations with Vietnam. But it also does not help the situation in Cambodia, as well.

So, it is a fair question. But it is important that it be asked in a separate arena from anything that is asked about Cambodia.

Senator KERREY. OK. So, we have got it in a separate arena now. Tell me what you think.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, go ahead and answer it as a separate arena.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. OK. In its own right, we have set out for the Vietnamese a series of preconditions which we expect them to meet

before we will move toward normalization. They have met those preconditions. So, it would appear at this point that, to a large degree, the issue is American prestige in terms of the policies we state and the degree to which it appears that we follow through on those policies.

If, in fact, we set a set of preconditions, the country with which we are negotiating meets them, and we pop up with new preconditions, sooner or later someone is going to start saying there is not any point in following through on outlines you have laid out, because the outlines will not hold over time.

Mr. COLBY. I think we made a mistake last year when we said that practically our only condition was withdrawal from Cambodia. Because I think there is one other way of expressing a conditionality which is a reasonable one. And I am no more enthusiastic about the Vietnamese Government than you. And I have been involved in struggling against it for quite a while.

I think that the new generation of Vietnamese are going to try to get out of the box of isolation that they put themselves in these last few years. But I think a condition of normalization should be some real movement on human rights. Human rights among the Vietnamese. Free rights of speech, free rights of association, free rights of exile, travel, and so forth.

We have 980,000 Vietnamese in this country. They are very successful people here. I think we ought to be considering some of them. We are just beginning to get some of the people who have been in the reeducation camps for 10 years or more out of the camps.

Now, are they free to travel?

We hung up our policies on the Soviet Union for a number of years on the right of free emigration. I think that is a legitimate question to demand of the Vietnamese. And I think they will be pretty ready to do it, because they are going to want to move very rapidly, as soon as you get a few of the older fellows who fought the war out of the way, by the ravages of time. They are going to want to join that other successful group of East Asian countries and become the fifth tiger of the area.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. The only problem with that is if it appears that we are adding yet a new precondition for which there has been no background laid, as far as the Vietnamese think they are supposed to do a, b, and c, and we come up with d. We have got a problem in terms of our credibility in foreign policy making in the area.

Senator KERREY. Well, I am not so sure we have been terribly concerned about our credibility in the foreign policy in Indochina for the last 20 years at all. So, I mean I do not—

Dr. CHAUNCEY. Perhaps we should be.

Senator KERREY. Well, I would agree with you that perhaps we should be. I am less concerned about shattering an impeccable record of credibility than I am in just trying to conclude what a credible presentation is.

Dr. STONE. Well, Senator, my answer would also be based on human rights, like Bill Colby's. But I reach a somewhat different conclusion. The major human rights problem in Southeast Asia now is whether there will be another genocide in Cambodia. This is the major question.

The State Department feels that it can best avoid that by not recognizing Vietnam, and putting pressure on Vietnam to put pressure on Hun Sen to do one thing or another.

I have the opposite conclusion. I think the best way to prevent this genocide is to get into a closer dialog with the Vietnamese. They are, as you have pointed out, the only actor willing to put bodies on the line to stop the Khmer Rouge.

If we had some of these elements of normalization with Vietnam, it would help the Cambodians with their human rights problem enormously.

For example, there is an embargo on Vietnam. But the same embargo is on Cambodia. The same embargo is on the alleged puppet as the alleged puppeteer. If one goes there, for example, one can pay only for your own hotel and pay for things in the shops. But one cannot do any business with Cambodia.

So, if we start changing the embargo with Vietnam, it would help the Cambodians. If we talk to the Vietnamese, it would help the Cambodians. I do not think you can really solve this problem without working with the Vietnamese.

So, I would base recognition of Vietnam on one's sympathy for the Cambodians. And this one would not have to have any sympathy for the Vietnamese to start the normalization now.

Mr. HOROWITZ. I could not disagree more with my friend Jeremy Stone's point here. I think American policy toward Cambodia can be changed if we focus on the extent to which it really is accommodating to China, if we focus on the extent to which the Cambodian Government is prepared for elections, and make clear Nicaragua has shown that elections can be held, even under unfair conditions.

And we should keep on pushing on that point. I think isolating China makes it possible to move China away from the Khmer Rouge.

I think it terribly important, and here I agree with Professor Chauncey that we separate Cambodia and Vietnamese issues.

One of the problems with the conservative community, and I am a former official of the Reagan administration, is this: One of the ways in which the administration sells its Cambodia policy to conservatives is by saying that if we take a step in the direction of Cambodia, the next step will be all that the people guilt-ridden about our involvement with Vietnam will want to pay reparations and give full recognition to the Vietnamese.

The fact of the matter is that if the formula for recognizing and normalizing relations with Cambodia is free elections in Cambodia, the administration can if it wants to create a difficult human rights test for Cambodia of the sort that Bill Colby just talked about. We will recognize you, Vietnam, and will normalize all relations with you if you agree to free elections.

I am not sure we need to do that. Perhaps we should normalize with Vietnam without elections there. But I think it clear that we ought to separate our policies to the two countries.

But I will say one thing about Vietnam, and this from my brief stay in Ho Chi Minh City. I was there around Christmastime. Senator, there were more Santa Claus posters and reindeer topiary there than you would see in most American cities. And there were not a lot of tourists there.

On Sunday, there were lots of people in the churches. This was South Vietnam. There were lots of motorbikes. There was a seeming openness to markets. I would run across people, and this was common, people would come up to me, they would find out I was American, I would ask if they were men, how many years had they been in reeducation camps? And one would say 5, and one would say 7, and others would tell you that 2 years ago they would have been afraid to talk to you. And now they feel free to do it.

I think you have got a hardcore regime confronting the realities of the fact that their economy is sour, and that the battle in Asia now is not a military one, it is an economic one.

One of the principal guys in Thailand told me, he said "We used to be afraid of the Vietnamese." He said "Now it is a little different. We are afraid of the Vietnamese only to the extent to which Hanoi can produce a better business school than Bangkok." "We do not think they can," he said, "and we are less concerned about what they can do these days."

Vietnam is confronting the need to move toward markets, to liberalize, but doing so very reluctantly I think. I think the 980,000 American Vietnamese are beginning to visit Vietnam, and they are going to effect real change. I think the capital that those 980,000 will bring in as tourists and investors will be too attractive for the Vietnamese Government to turn down.

I think things will develop at their own pace. But I want to start with the proposition that Professor Chauncey made, let us keep Cambodia and Vietnam separate. This will even help in the normalization of relations with Vietnam. I do not think we need to move toward Vietnam to get good policies and elections in Cambodia.

And I think, to the extent the two are linked, it makes it harder for American conservatives, who are essential, I think, to this solution, to move toward change in our Cambodia policy.

Senator KERREY. Let us assume that we have got an election in Cambodia. Let us assume that we are successful and the administration, 60 days from now, is successful, either under the Australian plan or some other solution, and you have got an election scheduled, and 6 months from now an election occurs. And let us say Hun Sen/Sihanouk are selected, and we now recognize the government of Hun Sen/Sihanouk, and they are recognized and seated in the United Nations, and the Khmer Rouge do not lay down their arms.

And you now have a guerrilla war on the part of the Khmer Rouge against the Khmer people, the new government of Cambodia. And they say we are in trouble. And again, I put it to you. Now we have recognized Cambodia. They are seated in the United Nations. And who are they going to turn to for help?

Mr. COLBY. The Vietnamese.

Senator KERREY. The Vietnamese.

I mean I do understand intellectually why the two need to be separate. But the trails keep leading back to the Vietnamese.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. The trail in this one may lead back to China. Let us say this is 2 months down the line, or it is 2 years down the line, pick your timeframe. The degree to which the Khmer Rouge can sustain such a guerrilla war against whatever this government

looked like, whether it is Hun Sen, Sihanouk or somebody we do not know about yet, will depend heavily on whether or not its arms supply from China continues.

Senator KERREY. I understand that. We are saying to Vietnam, improve your human rights, but thanks a lot for fighting Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, who was a practitioner of genocide. I mean we are going to say to the Vietnamese, thanks for being a bit more than just involved in the argument here. But you still have got to improve your human rights conditions in your own country before normalization occurs.

Mr. COLBY. I think if you open up the possibility of normalization with the Vietnamese Government, you will see them improve their human rights pretty quickly.

Senator KERREY. Which I would like to see. Again, I am not trying to make this more complicated than necessary, but it just seems to me that policymakers like myself—and believe me, I think there are strong disincentives to even approach the subject in American political life, particularly the normalization of Vietnam issue.

But it seems to me that we American politicians have to force ourselves to that consideration and answer under what circumstances, independent of the Cambodian question, we are prepared to normalize relations with Vietnam. And answer that in our own minds and begin a debate and discuss it publicly, so the American people are prepared for it, if and when it occurs.

Mr. HOROWITZ. If you do not solve Cambodia first, you will make it harder. My judgment is let us focus on where American policy is vulnerable for its silence in the face of Chinese support of the Khmer Rouge, our support of the Chinese.

In the end, the Vietnamese will get their due measure of credit for fighting against the Khmer Rouge. If the Cambodian struggle is solved, they stood in there and kicked out Pol Pot and made it possible for Cambodia to be free.

As I say, Senator, I think the 980,000 Vietnamese in the United States will both change the country and be very significant players, as all immigrants are, in our Cambodian policy. And I think it will work out okay, without policymakers' direct leadership, a lot more easily than people think. Because Vietnam may have no place else to go.

And the other thing, Vietnam's is a very hardcore regime. It may well be that what the Vietnamese want most of all is to go with the few remaining hardcore friends they have got left in this world, China, Castro, North Korea.

It may well be that, if the Vietnamese to get their troops out of Cambodia, it will, strangely, make it easier for them to link up with the Chinese with whom they are in a sense natural allies given their hardcore view of the world.

Dr. CHAUNCEY. I do not know of a single China specialist who would support that scenario. That is just not a likely scenario that Vietnam is withdrawing its troops from Cambodia to make it more possible to leverage a close conservative relationship with China. It is not in the cards.

Mr. HOROWITZ. I will tell you. I saw an interview—and the reason I mention it is when I was in Ho Chi Minh City, and I can

supply it for the committee—an interview with, I think it was the Foreign Minister of Vietnam, where he said exactly that.

Here he was just trying in this difficult way to explain what was going on in Eastern Europe and with the Soviet Union. And you could tell he was just having the hardest time. Trying to explain it all as a defeat for America, what was going on in Russia and Eastern Europe.

And at one point, he explicitly said, "Now that we have pulled out our troops from Cambodia, it may well be that we can reestablish relations with China." At least he said it.

Now I thought it was interesting that he did.

I think it is difficult to speculate on where Vietnam will go. I think they probably have to go to the West, as all governments will. Because we offer markets and economic hope. And Vietnam will come to us on our terms eventually. But, as I say, I would like for us to defer that and let it take its course. And let us move toward rapid elections in Cambodia first.

Dr. STONE. Senator, there is one missing link that I think you should know about. And that is that it is generally assumed—

Senator KERREY. It feels like a lot more than just one.

Dr. STONE. Well, it is generally assumed that if Phnom Penh has these elections, then countries will recognize the government that results, embargoes will be lifted, and the whole economy will be strengthened. And this will be, in and of itself, a defense against the Khmer Rouge.

Hun Sen's government is trying to defend against the Khmer Rouge now without any Western trade and without any Western recognition and this is in a very fragile state.

So, if we could get the election soon, and get Western recognition, one might not need to call the Vietnamese back, or to have as long a struggle with the Khmer Rouge as one otherwise would if one keeps strangling this main bulwark against the return of the Khmer Rouge.

That is what we want. I think that is what Mr. Horowitz wants, too, relaxation of pressure against the Hun Sen government, simply and solely because it represents the main bulwark against the Khmer Rouge. You can love it or not love it. But it is the main bulwark against the Khmer Rouge. And we have got to stop strangling it.

Senator KERREY. I appreciate your answers and your time. I must tell you that I have learned an awful lot, though I must also confess I have not reached an awful lot of absolute conclusions either.

But I do believe American policy is on a course that could be interrupted by the people of Cambodia themselves, and a satisfactory outcome could occur. But the current course that we are on, it seems to me, is a disastrous course, one that permits in-country, things that are reprehensible, that could be stopped. And one that, if it continues, I think puts the United States of America in a position, again, of another foreign policy disaster.

Senator CRANSTON. Bob, thank you very much for joining with us. It was very, very constructive to have you join with us.

I have two quick questions I would like to ask, and then we will wrap things up.

This goes to Bill or Jerry. How soon do you think elections should and could be held?

Mr. COLBY. I think they could be held within about 6 months, I would say, 6 months to nine months. By the end of this year, perhaps. That would be a very fast track. But I think it is not a totally unreasonable one.

Dr. STONE. Mr. Chairman, the record should show that—in order to make the election as simple as possible—we are proposing elections for a constituent assembly. In other words, we are proposing that they elect people who then design a constitution. This will save at least a year or two.

Because under the present system, no one knows what elections we are talking about—whether presidential or prime ministerial—or what kind of government would result. So, we are calling for the simplest election, the constituent assembly, that will then design the constitution.

Senator CRANSTON. Second, I am going to ask for the record whether half of one of Jesse Helm's statements submitted for the record, which would be, the State Department's 1989 Human Rights Report has accused the Hun Sen regime of "widespread and serious human rights violations."

Would any one of you comment on that?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Senator, without unduly revealing some private discussions, I can say that the State Department report in 1989 was not the product, and Senator Kerrey has made that point, of any real intelligence. It was a kind of boilerplate repetition of previous repairs. And it was initially intended as such.

I think, though, if you look very closely at the 1989 report, you will find evidence of some infighting within the State Department, for the report is a somewhat softer and more sympathetic depiction of the Hun Sen regime than is seen in prior reports.

Prior reports, in my judgment, bore darn near no relation to reality. Calling the government the Hang Som Rin Vietnam puppet regime and so forth. Again, there was no intelligence, and no one was there. I was there. When we went we were accompanied by Robert Pear of the New York Times, a very distinguished New York Times correspondent, whose dispatch on Cambodia in the New York Times some few months ago was a very striking report.

I think that the government got banged up by an Amnesty report. Many people in the volunteer community thought that the Amnesty report was excessive and unfair. Oxfam, for example, regarded the Amnesty report as just wildly overstated.

They do not have much of a justice system in Cambodia. Just about every lawyer got killed by the Khmer Rouge. There were very few left. And compared to what had gone on under Lon Nol and Sihanouk, many believe that the current government was not worse in its human rights record than prior regimes.

But I know that the Government of Cambodia, at least when I was there, was negotiating for the return of Amnesty to take a second look at what was going on. Every observer believes that in the last two years the human rights record has markedly improved.

There is a very real free press that exists there. Kieu Kenneret, who is trying to get into the United States at the invitation of some

Senators, and there is a lawsuit on the subject which the State Department is opposing, is a non-Communist editor of the largest paper in the country.

He has been exposing human rights violations and corruption in his newspaper. Ministers have told me that they now get called before the National Assembly and get grilled about human rights policies.

It is far from perfect. But I said also in my testimony, I think that if the United States really wanted to bargain for free elections, we could send a delegation down, and as part of the deal, we could insist on full access by Western delegations to all the prisons and POW camps of Cambodia. And I have already been told by Cambodian officials that they would agree to that.

So, it is an improving situation. It was never as bad as was pictured. And I think even the State Department report for 1989 is better than it was in 1988.

Senator CRANSTON. Any other comment, briefly?

Dr. STONE. I would just say that whatever government is running Phnom Penh could vastly improve its human rights record if the war were stopped. But so long as the war is on, there is sort of a martial law atmosphere, and there is a limit to what can be done. They presumably have prisons full of people they think might be saboteurs and so on.

So, I think that is the major problem in their human rights record—the war.

Senator CRANSTON. I want to thank the four of you for staying as long as you have, for your patience, and all the others who have stayed throughout this session.

Frankly, I have been trying to figure out a policy that I can help push through the subcommittee in my role on the committee for a long time. And I think you have helped distill finally what we should do.

So, between running back and forth to votes, and listening to you, I have been conferring with my staff, we have put together a summary of my views after listening to your very helpful testimony, and that of Ed Muskie, and frankly, also that of the administration, which helped shape some of my thoughts, and our thinking generally, I think.

So, this will be the basis of an effort that I will now make with the other members of the committee to see if we can come up with a resolution on this. And I hope this can have some impact, perhaps now, in thinking in Southeast Asia, and hopefully here in Washington.

So, this is a statement that summarizes, from my point of view, what we have learned today.

Today the Senate subcommittee of East Asia and Pacific Affairs held a hearing on United States policy toward Cambodia. In the course of this extraordinary hearing, it became clear to me that our administration's policy is not only ineffective, but potentially destructive.

The Bush administration continues to support a policy which includes the Khmer Rouge in a solution, and sidesteps the issue of the Chinese role as principal supplier and supporter of the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

This policy must be changed immediately if more bloodshed is to be avoided. I suggest the following measures be taken to shape a policy that is both viable and constructive.

First, elections must be held this year. Any delay in holding elections merely benefits the Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot has indicated that if he had two years with which to intimidate the countryside, he could dominate an election. The earlier the elections are held, the less likely the chance for the Khmer Rouge to play any role whatsoever in the governing of Cambodia.

Second, the United States must support the United Nations role in organizing and supervising elections. If the direct participation of the U.N. is not possible, for example, because of a veto by China, we should call for private citizens or organizations, like the Carter Center, to play that role as they did in Nicaragua.

I would like to emphasize that a comprehensive and expensive U.N. role was not necessary to ensure free and fair elections in Nicaragua.

I believe that the Hun Sen government is willing and capable of holding such elections and will cooperate with international monitoring groups. We should fully explore this option.

Finally, we must condemn the Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge, and I urge the administration to forcefully press the Chinese to withdraw their support for the Khmer Rouge.

The United States has tiptoed around Chinese policy objectives for far too long. If we ever hope to achieve a solution to this tragic Cambodian conflict, we must pursue the course outlined above.

Our objectives must be to achieve a freely elected Cambodian government that can lead Cambodia toward a peaceful and prosperous future.

For too long our policies have been at odds with these objectives. It is high time they changed.

That concludes our hearing. And I thank you for your very, very constructive help today.

Thank you very much.

We are going to reconvene in about 2 minutes for a brief nomination hearing.

[Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

[Chicago Tribune, Feb. 18, 1990]

A U.N. ROLE IN CAMBODIA MUST BE LIMITED

(BY CHHANG SONG)

I am deeply troubled by the idea of an enhanced United Nations role in Cambodia, particularly as the idea moves in the direction of a United Nations trusteeship. The U.N. role in Cambodian affairs in the past 10 years has resulted mainly in the resuscitation of the Khmer Rouge, who are held responsible for the deaths of more than 2 million Cambodians during their 3½-year rule of Cambodia.

Now, a new proposal for a U.N. trusteeship would, for an indeterminate period, replace hundreds of senior officials of the current government with U.N. officials who are not Cambodians. Moreover, they are unable to speak or read Khmer and generally are unfamiliar with Cambodia's economy or culture.

Such a "solution"—particularly without a date set for elections—has been described by many, and even by senior U.N. officials, as unworkable and beyond the U.N.'s competence. The international body has broad experience in supervising and administering elections; however, it has almost never tried and has never succeeded in administering the affairs of a country.

But there is more. U.N. trusteeship, displacing a current, operating government, would be an act of divesting the Cambodians of their sovereignty and independence. By this time, those of us who prefer to deal with exile politics should have enough sensitivity to appreciate why people in Southeast Asia—and everywhere else in the world—picked up arms and fought against their colonial masters. Wouldn't many now fight others shipped in from the outside to tell them what to do? The people of Cambodia deserve the right to determine their own future without being subject once again to an external power, much less the U.N., a group of over 150 external powers.

If the goal of the international community is to have the Cambodians choose a government on their own, what then is the purpose of flying in a Chilean or a Finnish civil servant? Why replace Western-educated Cambodian senior officials with foreigners? Well over one-half of the current government's senior officials can be described in that manner, as my colleagues and I have assessed during recent trips to Cambodia. These Cambodian survivors, some of whom were students during Sihanouk or Lon Nol times, had no link with the Communists. They chose to remain in Cambodia and rebuild the land with their bare hands. They succeeded in reviving the country to the point that now everyone else who had accused them of being "Vietnamese puppets" wants to administer it.

Cambodia is neither a territory nor a colony. Since 1953, it has been an independent state. Placing U.N. officials in such a role in Cambodia would be illegal. It would be an irresponsible act that would destabilize Cambodian society and most likely fuel another "war of independence."

The overwhelming concern of everyone should be to have a fair election in Cambodia, not to administer the country. For only a fair election can result in the formation of a democratic government which, in turn, will have a chance to be acceptable by outside powers. We know that this goal could be reached through an internationally supervised election, conducted by the U.N. or by any other international body of the world's choosing.

Such a body could establish rules for the election, including rules guaranteeing access to the media by all candidates, and would be required to certify that the elections had been free and fair. It also could and should monitor and have full and free access to all jails, POW camps, and police facilities in Cambodia. America and the world at large would then have a basis for supporting early, supervised elections, for

it could be secure in the knowledge that only if democratic processes were honored—and recognized as having been honored—would the election have legitimacy.

I ask, and plead that all Americans ask, in the name of a people who have suffered so much: What more needs to be done? The world community must more openly condemn those who support the Khmer Rouge, and must be prepared to permit and support Cambodian elections at the earliest possible date. Events in Eastern Europe have proven that unpopular governments have been overwhelmingly rejected even when the governments in power have conducted elections.

On what grounds, except perhaps racism, can anyone assume that Cambodians, in the secrecy of their polling booths, in an election run and supervised by an outside international body required to certify its fairness, will not take care of their best interests and needs?

What is important, in the end, is for America to negotiate a tough-minded plan for Cambodian elections, and to allow the Cambodian people to decide their fate, of their own free choice.

CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY PRESS RELEASE—FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE SAYS UNITED STATES MUST CHANGE CAMBODIA POLICY

WASHINGTON, DC, Feb. 22, 1990—Edmund S. Muskie, former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Secretary of State in the Carter administration, today called on the Bush administration to change its policy on Cambodia.

Releasing a report on a trip he made in the fall of 1989 to Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, Muskie, currently chairman of the Washington, DC, think tank, the Center for National Policy, said that U.S. support for a resistance coalition that includes the genocidal Khmer Rouge has become counterproductive.

"Our present policy was laid down a decade ago," Muskie said at a briefing on Capitol Hill. "Just about everything there has changed, but U.S. policy has not changed. As long as we continue to support China's wish to bring back the Khmer Rouge, we are on the wrong side."

Muskie urged U.S. policymakers in Congress and in the administration to read his report, which includes an extensive interview with Cambodian head-of-state, Hun Sen. He called on the U.S. Government to establish contact with Hun Sen, who he described as "young, intense, capable, to all appearances a real nationalist; a negotiator. * * *" and said that the United States must make it clear to China that Americans cannot support destabilization of the current administrative structure of Cambodia.

Muskie was the first person who served in high levels of a United States administration to visit Cambodia in over a decade. Current U.S. policy strictly proscribes contacts.

CAMBODIA PEACE PROCESS

If the world is truly concerned about the survival of the Cambodian people and nation, the proposed United Nations administration plan initiated by Congressman Stephen Solarz and the Australian Government is the key to a solution. The important first step will be for a substantial U.N. peacekeeping force to (1) verify a total Vietnamese withdrawal, (2) reestablish Cambodia's rightful borders, and (3) disarm all factions as quickly as possible.

Like many Cambodians, I lost most of my relatives during the 1975-78 Pol Pot reign of terror. I barely survived an extermination camp, here I was to be executed for speaking English. I believe that the Khmer Rouge should have absolutely no role in Cambodia's future.

In November 1979 I fled to Thailand after seeing that our Vietnamese "liberators" intended to stay and impose their own brand of communism. During the past 6 months I have made two visits to Cambodia, interviewed competing political and military leaders, ordinary residents of cities and rural villages, and recent defectors from both the Pol Pot and Hun Sen Communist factions. I also believe that the Hun Sen government, with the Vietnamese always in control in the background, should have no role in Cambodia's future.

On my two trips representing Western human rights organizations, the first in August 1989 as a guest of the Hanoi-imposed regime and the second in January 1990 when I visited resistance controlled areas in northwest Cambodia, I found a very different situation than what Western media has been able to portray.

From interviews on my visits, I have come to understand ever more clearly that fundamental issues including Hanoi's claims of withdrawal, national sovereignty,

human rights, the balance of battlefield forces and the political appeal of various factions must be viewed in a political context in order to achieve an equitable and lasting reconciliation.

The Hun Sen regime is an improvement over that of Pol Pot and is supported by some intellectuals. Although some nonparty members have positions in government, Cambodians are still denied most rights of free people. The majority are impoverished and ignored, especially in the countryside where some 85 percent of the population resides. The military and security apparatus are dominated by former Khmer Rouge and Khmer Viet Minh. Corruption among authorities is rampant. (North Vietnamese trained Cambodians during late 1940's to early 1950's.)

Party leaders own the finest mansions, black markets thrive, and new autos are seen on the boulevards of Phnom Penh. But profits earned from exploiting Cambodia's abundant natural resources are seldom used to rebuild desperately impoverished rural areas. Instead, villagers speak of unfair taxation or "forced donations." Critics of party leadership continue to disappear. Prisons are reportedly full of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. Systematic torture is similar to prisons of the Pol Pot period.

Most damaging to the regime is that Chief of State Beng Samrin and Prime Minister Bun Sen (both former Khmer Rouge officers) are seen as proxies of Hanoi. A number of intellectuals inside and outside of government told me, "We have no voice of our own. All decisions come from Vietnamese advisers." They point to the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh as the ultimate authority. In addition, the unrestricted influx of Vietnamese merchants, farmers, and fishermen has created widespread resentment.

Many Cambodians fear that they may one day become a minority in their own land. Recent gains by the Khmer Rouge are partly due to material support from China. But they have increasingly won passive acceptance in some places, recruit and maintain the morale of their fighters based on nationalism. Until Hanoi's influence on Cambodian affairs and the Vietnamese presence is resolved the fighting will not end.

I spoke with a number of Vietnamese merchants and traders and learned that they had not previously lived in Cambodia. In the capitol's market areas, O-Reous-Sey and Chbar Ampoeu, Vietnamese language is common. In the important Mekong River port of Neak Luong, the majority of shopkeepers—even beggars—speak no Cambodian. En route to my hometown, along the Tonle Sap River I saw continuous clusters of Vietnamese families. Cambodians I spoke with north of the capitol and near the temples of Angkor Wat lamented that new Vietnamese settlers have become "the kings" of river fisheries. Hun Sen regime soldiers who come from eastern provinces along the Vietnam border speak bitterly of large concentrations of Vietnamese farmers moving into areas well within Cambodian territory. And they tell of border demarcations being physically relocated.

In August I witnessed preparations for the ceremonial withdrawal of Hanoi's troops in Phnom Penh. However, in January a number of sources in Cambodia told me that some Vietnamese forces remain or have returned. Refugees and defectors from Phnom Penh and Battambang City report aircraft have unloaded Vietnamese troops dressed in Hun Sen army uniforms. Refugees and traders report disguised Vietnamese troops on Highway 10 moving toward Pailin. A regime army officer told me that two divisions of disguised Vietnamese troops returned under the same commanders as before the withdrawal. Officials in Phnom Penh claim that Hun Sen has hired Vietnamese "mercenaries."

Historically, Vietcong/North Vietnamese troops disguised as Khmer Rouge initiated large scale attacks in Cambodia against the American-backed Lon Nol government from 1970 through 1973. Throughout much of the Vietnam war Hanoi denied its forces were staging in Cambodia. It is likely that in Hanoi's "talk/fight" tradition that heavy fighting will take place during upcoming peace negotiations on Cambodia. Both China and the Soviets have provided enough weapons to keep Pol Pot and Hanoi/Hun Sen forces supplied for at least 3 years. The Khmer Rouge now have a lot more weapons than manpower.

The greatest danger is that the non-Communist parties, which themselves have problems with corruption and human rights abuses, will be targeted for elimination by the two rival Communist forces. Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann's organizations have expanded their control to some 4,500 square kilometers in northern Cambodia. However, these non-Communists are seriously lacking supplies to defend and provide aid to growing civilian populations under their administration. The West must not abandon them in this critical stage of the struggle.

If the West chooses to ignore or disbelieve Vietnam's continued involvement and exclusively supports the Hun Sen regime for a quick solution, the Khmer Rouge will

gain support as nationalist "heroes" among an unwilling population, and likely will be able to regain power. The Khmer Rouge cannot easily be wished away by just advocating recognition of the current regime. Meanwhile, the non-Communist parties who strive for the restoration of true independence and democratic freedom will be caught between the Khmer Rouge tiger and Vietnamese crocodile.

Proper ways of support for the non-Communist parties, and full backing of the U.N. administration plan are necessary if my dream, for freedom, independence, and democracy in my homeland, is to come true.

LETTER FROM VANN M. YANN, CO-LEADER OF CAMBODIAN NETWORK COUNCIL PEACE TASK FORCE, TO SENATOR PELL

February 27, 1990.

The Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

DEAR SENATORS: As Americans, we all believe in the system of democratic process of the public hearing on any subject. We understand that, on February 28, 1990, a hearing on Cambodia's issue is going to be held at the Dirksen Senate Building. According to the invitation letter, four private individuals will testify, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will probably be hearing just one side of the story. However, we would like to submit herewith our documents attesting our opinions and views on Cambodia crisis.

We believe that the only hope for peace in Cambodia is the comprehensive political settlement under the enhanced role of the United Nations, as proposed by the Australian Government.

We respectfully urge you to support the House of Congress Resolution No. 254 in favor of the United Nations enhanced role in Cambodia.

Respectfully yours,

VANN M. YANN,
Co-Leader of CNC Peace Task Force.

PETITION OF CAMBODIAN-AMERICANS TO SECRETARY-GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE HONORABLE STEPHEN SOLARZ, CONGRESSMAN OF NEW YORK, AND THE HONORABLE CHARLES ROBB, SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Whereas, the destruction of Cambodia, the long-time sufferings and the killings of the Cambodian people continue; and

Whereas, the invasion by the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam of a sovereign country, Cambodia, and the installation of its client regime in Phnom Penh—led by former Khmer Rouge commanders Heng Samrin, Hun Sen—were in violation of the International Law and the Charter of the United Nations; and

Whereas, the imminent threat of the return to power of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime whose genocidal practice is condemned by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, must not be allowed to happen again in Cambodia; and

Whereas, the Cambodian people have been deprived of their sacred fundamental rights as a result of all the above-mentioned events.

Now, therefore, in consideration of the new modality of solving the Cambodian conflict through a comprehensive political solution under the auspices of the United Nations, We, Cambodian-Americans, do hereby:

1. Strongly support Secretary-General Javier Perez De Cuellar, the United Nations Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly for their enhanced role to end the war and suffering in Cambodia; and
2. Gratefully thank President George Bush, and his administration for their active involvement toward peace, independence, freedom, and genuine democracy for Cambodia, and self-determination of the Cambodian people; and
3. Gratefully thank Congressman Stephen Solarz, Senator Charles Robb, and the whole Congress for their unanimous vote in favor of the enhanced role of the United Nations to solve the conflict in Cambodia; and
4. Call upon all Cambodian factions in conflict, and also Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China to fully cooperate with the United Nations in achieving a comprehensive peace settlement; and
5. Strongly request and support U.N. administering authorities and a U.N. peace-keeping force in Cambodia.

Done in Washington, DC, on this 13th day of February, 1990.

CRY FOR PEACE

For more than two decades, Cambodia has been victimized by the geopolitical rivalry of China and Soviet Union. More than 3 million innocent Cambodians—men, women, and children—paid with their lives to guarantee the influence of either China or the Soviet Union in the Indochina region.

Under Vietnamese political manipulation, Moscow and Beijing hold Cambodia hostage. Cambodians die, sacrificed in the bloody struggle between the two Communist superpowers.

The recent ploy of withdrawing Vietnamese troops from Cambodia turns the diplomatic endgame in favor of Hanoi and the Soviet Union. The world sees them as good guys. But withdrawing from Cambodia without a real peace settlement only accelerates another era of killing field. Hanoi and Moscow expect their puppets to come out winners. The real losers and endangered species are the innocent Cambodian people. The new wave of killing has already restarted inside Cambodia.

The unilateral Vietnamese troop withdrawal without international supervision and control does not prove that it is genuine and complete, nor does it bring peace to Cambodia. Vietnam must be responsible for all violent consequences of its behavior. The current Phnom Penh regime, installed by the Vietnamese force of aggression, is not legitimate. In fact, some of their leaders, associates, and aides were in the Khmer Rouge.

3 MILLION LIVES ARE ENOUGH

With great pain, we, Cambodian Americans, respectfully urge the U.S. Government, the Congress, and the administration:

1. To actively initiate a new peace settlement negotiation toward the formation of an interim government ensuring self-determination of the Cambodian people.
2. To use all diplomatic pressures to stop the killing of Cambodians immediately. A solution by diplomatic negotiations toward an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations (i.e., U.N. Security Council) should guarantee peace, democracy, freedom, fraternity, national integrity, and independence, and future progress and prosperity of Cambodia. The international conference shall institute an International Peace Commission to monitor the interim government and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force activities.
3. Not to establish the diplomatic and economic relations with Vietnam until a complete Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia is verified by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, and the comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia is successfully completed.
4. To urge China and/or any other nation to stop supplying arms to the Khmer Rouge. This is the only solution which prevents the return of murderous Khmer Rouge to power.
5. To enforce human rights by opposing forced repatriation of Cambodian refugees (or displaced persons) from Thai-Cambodian border prior to a complete peace settlement in Cambodia.
6. To initiate the change in status of the Cambodians along the Thai-Cambodian border from displaced persons to that of refugees, so that they are free to resettle in a third country.
7. To provide strong support and encouragement to the Cambodian non-Communist resistance for achieving a genuine peace in Cambodia.
8. To call for a general election under an interim government allowing the Cambodian people to determine their own political future regime. Such a general election shall be conducted under a strict supervision of an International Peace Commission, after a complete pacification of the entire country, and a complete implementation of a United Nations sponsored educational program on democracy and human rights. The waiting period for such a general election shall require at least 3 to 5 years from the time in which a total disarmament by all parties in conflict can be verified, and a general census of population can be performed.

THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE

In the wake of the unsuccessful Paris Conference on Cambodia, Vietnam announced the unilateral withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia but without international control and verification. The four Cambodian factions in the conflict are

heading toward a devastating civil war. As of August 24, Vietnam has expressed its willingness to reenter Cambodia if Hun Sen requests Hanoi's help. The threat of the genocidal Khmer Rouge return to power is now the foremost issue of debate concerning Cambodia's future.

Followed the ASEAN's pursuit of three interrelated objectives in Cambodia: Restoring the country's national sovereignty through a verified Vietnamese withdrawal; preventing a return to power of the murderous Khmer Rouge; and facilitating self-determination for the long-suffering Cambodian people,¹ the United States remains ambiguous on how to solve the conflict. This position invites several rhetorical approaches. Due to the threat of a Khmer Rouge resurgence, some American observers, after short visits just in the cities of Hanoi and Phnom Penh, now argue that the United States should choose Hun Sen and normalize relationships with Vietnam rather than seek a comprehensive political settlement. Among this group, some of whom were rising against the Lon Nol's republic in 1970-75. During that time, these same observers failed to report to the American public the fact that North Vietnamese troops were fiercely fighting the Lon Nol troops instead of the Khmer Rouge who had only 3,000 men. Now again, this group ignores the current accounts of the following three recent defectors of the Phnom Penh regime about the hegemony and Vietnamization of Cambodia: Mr. Vandy Kaon, a senior congressman; Mr. Sieng Saran, a senior foreign service officer; and Mr. Chhin Sunan, a diplomat. They all say that the current regime under Hun Sen is still a puppet of Vietnam. A settlement supporting just one faction does not solve the problem but will only deepen the conflict. It is absolutely impossible to achieve peace by favoring just one side of the conflict. No matter what some individual scholars, journalists, or politicians may think about any particular Cambodian party, only the Cambodian people have the right to determine what the form of government should be for and who should have the chance to lead Cambodia. The popular vote will express the popularity of that party. Therefore, a global settlement must be addressed here to permit self-determination by the Cambodian people. Vietnam should show its good intentions through a political settlement. Its unilateral withdrawal without international control and verification does not prove that it is genuine and complete, nor does it bring peace to Cambodia. The People's Republic of China should also back up its good promises by constructively reducing the threat of the Khmer Rouge's return to power. Trusting just one faction will once again cause more Cambodians to die and produce more refugees.

Cambodia and her people have suffered tragically enough for many years. They must now be given the opportunity to take charge of their own destiny. They suffered a war imposed by the outsiders' conflicts of interest. China feared the surrounding by the Soviet Union and Vietnam feared the influence of China. In addition, Vietnam may have wanted to carry out the program of Ho Chi Minh to advance to the south and then to the west. This deep mistrust of these outside powers caused the failure of the Paris conference when the four Cambodian factions sat down to discuss powersharing. It is time now for the United States to step in and play a significant role to lead the international community to find a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem by using political, economic, and financial power as tools of negotiating.

To bring about lasting and genuine peace in Cambodia as well as in Southeast Asia and reduce the threat to international peace and security, the United Nations International Conference on Kampuchea instituted in 1981 should be reconvened as soon as possible. This conference is expected to:

1. help the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China to reach a consensus to cut their direct and indirect military aid to their Cambodian clients to such a level that each force can be balanced and cannot be offensively strong enough to attack one another, and cut aid to Vietnam to prevent Vietnam from occupying Cambodia, and reach an agreement to guarantee peace in Southeast Asia;
2. help Vietnam and ASEAN to cut military supplies and to stop channeling arms to all Cambodian factions in such a way that all forces can be balanced and none can be offensively capable to attack another;
3. help China and Vietnam reach an agreement to guarantee peace, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity for Cambodia and establish peace, security, and stability in Southeast Asia;
4. promote a national reconciliation through creation of a quadripartite Cambodian Provisional National Council. This PNC should have limited state power and be

¹ "The Future of U.S.-Indochina Relations, An International Symposium," September 8-9, 1989. By Timothy M. McCully, the Asia Society.

restricted to: (a) a cease-fire plan; (b) a disarmament plan; (c) an amnesty plan; (d) a troop reduction plan; (e) a cooperative effort with a refugee repatriation plan; (f) a cooperative effort with political and war prisoners release plan; (g) a cooperative effort with the U.N. administrating authority's general election plan;

5. create a United Nations administrating authority to assume the day-to-day operations of the civil administration including preparation for the general election. Other important state affairs shall be temporarily postponed until a legitimate government is elected;

6. install a United Nations peacekeeping force to enforce, control, and supervise the implementations of all protocols and agreements reached by the proposed conference and support the U.N. administrating authority.

The quadripartite PNC, although it will have no authority to run the country, which responsibility will rest with the U.N. administrating authority, will play an important role in managing its forces and followers toward participation in fair and peaceful elections of a representative government. During this period each of the four groups may independently conduct political campaigns in preparation for general elections but must operate in conformity and in support of the policies of the U.N. administrating authority. Once this transitional period ends with democratic elections, the PNC will be dissolved and those duly elected will become the new leaders of Cambodia.

LETTER FROM PHENG KOL, PH.D., PRESIDENT, CAMBODIAN NETWORK COUNCIL TO THE
LEADERS OF THE WORLD

November 21, 1989.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, The Presidents and Leaders of all Nations, the Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representatives of all Nations to the United Nations, The Peacemakers and Peace Lovers of the world,

YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES, AND GENTLEMEN: 1990 will be the most important year thus far in the quest for democracy around the world. Democracy seems to be growing and picking up strength in Eastern Europe, Central America, South America, Africa as well as in Asia because of your good will and intention as true Leaders of a New World. You have begun to try to understand each other and started to build a completely new world, a safe and peaceful place in which to live in harmony.

Faithful to the ideal of peace, we are grateful for your endeavor and are submitting herewith an outline of a Peace Plan Proposal on Cambodia for your esteemed consideration in order to stop the long suffering and agonizing war, killing, fratricide, and foreign interference and expansionism in Cambodia.

Very respectfully submitted,

PHENG KOL, PH.D.,
President, CNC

SUMMARY OF THE CAMBODIAN NETWORK COUNCIL PEACE PLAN PROPOSAL FOR
CAMBODIA

This peace plan proposal is presented as an alternative solution to the formation of a "Provisional Government" or a "Coalition Government" as suggested by some countries in seeking peace for Cambodia. Its fundamental principle is based on the concept of nonviolence and neutralization of powersharing among different Cambodian parties in conflict during the transitional period. Under the present circumstances, placing the Cambodian administration and her innocent people under a "Coalition Government" or a "Provisional Government" to be led by either a domineering political party or any other form of powersharing among the political party leaders in conflict will inevitably lead to a biased government where internal power struggles, mistrust, and anarchy will definitely be the outcome. Thus, the Cambodian common and supreme national interest could not be achieved.

In order to restore peace, independence, territorial integrity, to stop the killing, the suffering, and the long agonizing war, and to liberate Cambodia and her people from such an odious scourge as the annexation by Vietnam and the genocide regime of Khmer Rouge's Pol Pot, the Cambodian Network Council (CNC), a nongovernmental organization, is convinced that international cooperation and a national reconciliation are required. In view of the Cambodia's present conditions, a truly representative government cannot be selected in a democratic fashion. Thus, a full intervention of the United Nations in the Cambodia crisis appears to be a unique solu-

tion for saving the innocent Cambodian people trapped in the current geopolitical web.

To have just and lasting peace in Cambodia, the Cambodian people's fundamental right to self-determination must be sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all parties in conflict and all countries. The Cambodian people shall decide for themselves the political future of Cambodia through genuinely free and democratic elections under international supervision. Foreign countries and Cambodian parties in conflict shall not impose any political tendency or leadership on the Cambodian people. To prevent the Khmer Rouge and/or any foreign forces from regaining power in Cambodia, an international conference should work out an agreement among superpowers for a total and complete disarmament in Cambodia.

Faithful to the ideal of peace, the right to live freely, and to the international principle of nonaggression and noninterference, this CNC Peace Task Force believes that the United Nations, the civilized world community, especially the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Vietnam and ASEAN can bring the war and suffering to an end, and restore peace, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity to Cambodia.

The Cambodian Network Council pleads of those four Cambodian factions not to use force to obtain power which will only result in longer civil war and endless fratricide, and ultimately the division of the country or extinction of the Cambodian race. The continued civil war effort and foreign war sponsorship will make Cambodia more vulnerable to her powerful neighbors and interfere with her future reconstruction. To have genuine and longlasting peace, the citizen's rights must be recognized and respected. It is the right and responsibility of the Cambodian people to choose their own leader or leaders and form of government.

As the United States of America is the world leader in democracy and freedom, and as a new wave of killings has returned once again in Cambodia, the Cambodian Network Council urges the U.S. Government and the Congress to engage actively and promptly in bringing about the right of self-determination for the Cambodian people. We are confident that the United States can help to make peace possible for Cambodia by reactivating the existing U.N. framework called the "International Conference on Kampuchea," its "Ad-hoc Committee on Kampuchea," and the U.N. Security Council to take immediate actions for a comprehensive peace settlement. To prevent a possible collapse of the settlement effort, each party should be treated equally and fairly and no party should be humiliated. A compromise among the superpowers and the involved countries must be reached to stop this long and agonizing proxy war.

To achieve the preliminary diplomatic negotiations and work out a comprehensive peace plan, the Cambodian Network Council wishes to propose the following steps as indicated in the attached flowchart.

STEP 1.—RECONVENING THE U.N. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA

The U.N. International Conference on Kampuchea instituted in 1981 should be reconvened as soon as possible to avoid a prolonged civil war. This conference is expected to form several working committees. One of which shall be responsible in working out a plan for an effective international mechanism of control and supervision, and subdivide into two subcommittees: External Party Subcommittee (EPS) and Internal Party Subcommittee (PS).

1. EXTERNAL PARTY SUBCOMMITTEE-PEACE SPONSORSHIP

This subcommittee should turn "war sponsorship" into "peace sponsorship." It should be divided into three groups:

a. *Group one*, composed of United States, Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, should reach a consensus to work out a plan to cut their direct and indirect military aid to Cambodian clients to such a level that the forces can be balanced and any one force cannot be offensively strong enough to attack one another. This includes cutting aid to Vietnam for occupying Cambodia.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and France shall be invited as members of this group to mediate among the three original superpowers to break any deadlock in reaching a consensus. As the five proposed subcommittee members are all U.N. Security Council members, the agreement reached by this group would become the decision of the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, it will be effective, durable, and respected.

b. *Group two*, composed of Vietnam and ASEAN, should work out a plan to cut military supplies and stop channeling arms to all Cambodian factions in conflict in such a way that all forces would be balanced and none would be capable to attack

another. Australia, Sweden, and Japan shall be invited to be mediators of this group.

c. *Group three*, composed of China and Vietnam, should reach an agreement to guarantee peace, independence, and territorial integrity for Cambodia, and thus establish stability in the region.

Singapore and Canada shall be invited to be mediators of this group. These countries will be able to work with this group to achieve its goals.

2. INTERNAL PARTY SUBCOMMITTEE-NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

In cooperation with EPS-Group (a) and the U.N. peacekeeping force, this subcommittee should turn the national hatred and destruction into national concord, reconciliation, and healing.

This group must work out a plan to form a provisional national council (PNC). All four Cambodian factions should recognize the existence of the others. The PNC shall also include representatives of all four factions but must exclude Pol Pot and his close associates.

The provisional national council should have limited state power and be restricted to: a. A cease-fire plan; b. a total disarmament plan: tanks, artillery, war planes, war ships, and other armaments not mentioned herein must be placed under surveillance and control of the U.N. peacekeeping force; c. a demilitarization plan of all Cambodian forces. If a national security force is needed, it would be recruited and trained under the commandment of the U.N. peacekeeping force; d. a national amnesty plan, including release of political prisoners; e. an amnesty plan for the moderate Khmer Rouge troops, military personnel and civilians living in the Khmer Rouge camps who are willing to give up their armed struggle and incorporate into the Cambodian society; f. a cooperative effort with the refugee repatriation plan which shall be established by a special committee mandated by the international conference or by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.); g. a cooperative effort with the U.N. administering authority to work out a plan toward general election; h. a cooperative effort with the U.N. administering authority for training, orientation, and placement of civilian and military personnel from each political faction. Those who seek for nonpolitical affiliation in the first general election shall receive training, orientation, and placement by the United Nations administering authority; i. a cooperative effort with the U.N. administering authority for seeking alternative funding sources as election enhancement funds for each political group to ensure fairness in the preparation for the national election.

The PNC should also have a consultative role in the state civil affairs. The PNC, although having no authority to administratively run the country, will play an important role by managing its followers toward participation in fair and peaceful election of a real representative government. During this period, each of the four groups and/or any other political groups may independently conduct political campaigns in conformity and in support of the policies of the U.N. administering authority. Once this transitional period ends with democratic elections, the PNC shall be dissolved and those duly elected shall become the new leaders of Cambodia.

The PNC shall work out an amnesty plan to achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, and prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other. The PNC shall also support the UNPKF and the U.N. administering authority to ensure the human rights according to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The release of political prisoners must be also included in the national amnesty plan.

STEP 2.—INSTALLING A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND A U.N. ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

The main outcome of the U.N. International Conference on Kampuchea is to reach a general and total agreement to guarantee real and genuine peace to Cambodia and to work out a plan for an effective international mechanism of control and supervision. Furthermore, the provision of clauses emphasizing the international principles of noninterference and nonaggression, and guaranteeing the actual borders of Cambodia before April 17, 1975, recognized by the world community shall be included in the protocol and peace agreement. In addition, all treaties and agreements with Cambodia after April 17, 1975, shall be voided. The conference should recommend to the U.N. Security Council to establish an International Peace Commission, or alternatively to give mandate to the U.N. Secretary-General to appoint his Special Representative to oversee the peace settlement implementation process until a free and fair general election can be performed.

The emplacement of a United Nations peacekeeping force is an imperative condition for peace, security, and stability in Cambodia before any other administrative process for the general election can take place. The U.N. peacekeeping force shall be established with a military component and a civilian component.

The civilian component functions as the administering authority of the country. It shall assume full responsibility of the day-to-day operations of the civil administration including preparation for the general election. Other important state affairs may be temporarily postponed until a legitimate government is elected.

The UNPKF military component shall monitor foreign troop withdrawal, enforce the cease-fire and the disarmament, maintain security and order, and carry out any other missions as assigned by the International Peace Commission or the Secretary-General and/or his Special Representative.

STEP 3.—IMPLEMENTING TROOP WITHDRAWAL-CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

A cease-fire shall be permanent and observed at a specific starting time and date throughout Cambodia. At the same time, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shall stop all its military activities against the territory of Cambodia by land, air, and/or waterways forces, wherever they may be based, and remove, permanently deactivate, or destroy all lethal equipment and materials as soon as peace agreement goes into effect. The four Cambodian parties in conflict shall stop all their military action against each other as well as against the Vietnamese troops, settlers or any other illegal aliens now stationing or residing in Cambodia.

All parties in conflict shall strive to maintain a permanent cease-fire and to ensure a stable and lasting peace. The Vietnamese troops and their like shall remain in place pending the implementation of the plan of the troop withdrawal under the UNPKF control. The armed forces of the four Cambodian parties shall remain in place pending the implementation of the plan of disarmament under the supervision of the UNPKF. The return of prisoners of war and repatriation of Cambodian refugees from foreign countries as well as Vietnamese colonists and/or any illegal aliens must be discussed and included in the peace agreement.

STEP 4.—IMPLEMENTING DISARMAMENT-NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

The disarmament of all military bases in Cambodia shall be discussed and specified in the peace agreement. All chemical, bacteriological, and other lethal armaments shall be destroyed under UNPKF supervision. All forces, arms, and ammunitions shall be relocated to some specific locations decided by UNPKF. During this transitional period, all the military troops, arms and ammunitions shall be placed under the strict supervision of the UNPKF.

STEP 5.—CAMBODIA'S REPRESENTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Once the peace settlement agreement is fully enforced, the Cambodia's seat at the United Nations currently held by the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea shall be transferred to a special representative assigned by the U.N. administering authority upon recommendation of the PNC to represent Cambodia's sovereignty.

STEP 6.—ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL CONSTITUTION TASK FORCE

Once a total cease-fire and complete disarmament take place, the Provisional National Council in cooperation with the U.N. administering authority shall form a National Constitution Task Force to draft the Constitution for the country. To prevent a dominant influence of any political party, the National Constitution Task Force shall also include experts and members who are not affiliated with any political party. The organizational structure, system and powers of all levels of government shall be determined by the National Constitution.

STEP 7.—INSTITUTING A NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY


The PNC shall faithfully cooperate with the U.N. administering authority to work out an election system for a National Constituent Assembly. Once elected, the National Constituent Assembly shall review the Constitution drafted by the National Constitution Task Force and adopt a National Constitution after public hearing with all members of the National Constitution Task Force. Once the National Constitution is adopted, a general election can be held. The election of the National Constituent Assembly shall be conducted under strict supervision of the UNPKF, and only after a complete and total pacification of the country. A United Nations-

sponsored educational program on democracy, human rights and citizen's rights shall precede such elections.

Due to its prominent experiences in Namibia and Central America, we believe that the United Nations should play the primary role in bringing peace to Cambodia. It should be noted that due to the extreme opposition, negative attitude, and mistrust of each party in conflict, the Paris international conference was found to be ineffective in solving Cambodia crisis.

The Cambodian Network Council is very grateful for the U.N. continued effort and is willing to provide technical support for the United Nations' involvement in the peace settlement in Cambodia and any subsequent programs such as humane resource development, leadership training, engineering, education, social, economic, and community development.

FLOWCHART FOR CAMBODIA PEACE PROCESS



Remark: This chart does not represent line of authority, it rather shows the steps of peace process.

STAFF ANALYSIS OF CAMBODIAN PEACE TALKS

BACKGROUND

Overview

Since the collapse of peace talks that began in Paris on July 30, 1989, and ended on August 30, 1989, the Vietnamese have claimed to have withdrawn their army from Cambodia (although some special force units may have returned). Civil war has recommenced as four groups struggle for Cambodia's future.

These four groups—the Vietnamese installed government in Phnom Penh known as the State of Cambodia (SOC) under Prime Minister Hun Sen; the Khmer Rouge (also known as Democratic Kampuchea—DK) under Pol Pot; Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS); and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under Son Sann—have yet to achieve any major military breakthrough during the current dry season which ends in May. The three resistance forces—the DK, KPNLF, and ANS—have been able to make some inroads in the western part of the country. The Khmer Rouge capturing the small border town of Pailin and the KPNLF taking the equally small district town of Svey Chek have inflicted some defeats on the SOC although in late February the SOC counterattacked, retaking Svey Chek.

However, fearing that reliance on a battlefield solution will only further tear apart Cambodia, benefiting the most-seasoned of the factions, the Khmer Rouge, the international community led by Australia but working through the Permanent Five Members of the United Nations Security Council has begun searching for alternative solutions to the conflict.

The Australian Peace Plan

In November 1989 the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, called for a new round of peace talks following the collapse of the Cambodian peace talks in Paris last August. In a round of bilateral talks with ASEAN members, China, the four Cambodian factions, the United States, French, British, and Japanese, the Australians sought an alternative approach.

The genesis of the Evans approach, according to him, was the concept of a United Nations trusteeship, initially proposed by Prince Sihanouk during the August talks in Paris. A similar idea was broached by Congressman Stephen Solarz later in the fall using as a model the United Nations involvement in a Namibia peace settlement (see box on Namibia solution).

The "Australian Initiative" as it came to be known was conceived as a means of evading the key stumbling block to the Paris talks in August of how to create a four-party coalition government to rule Cambodia in a transitional administration prior to free elections without providing even a minority role for the Khmer Rouge.

Failure of the August 1989 Paris Talks.—Although the Paris talks had stumbled earlier on the insistence by the Chinese, Prince Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge that the Khmer Rouge be included in a transitional administration, agreement on a strategy for a comprehensive settlement under the supervision of an international control mechanism had been achieved involving:

- (1) a monitored withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops
- (2) a cease-fire by all sides
- (3) a cessation of external arms support
- (4) creation of a transitional administration
- (5) the need to hold free and fair elections

Evans' Proposal.—Senator Evans proposed the creation of a transitional administration "directly around the authority of the United Nations" pending free and fair elections organized by the United Nations in lieu of a comprehensive settlement in advance by all four factions. This United Nations initiative is distinctly different from previous proposals for an International Control Mechanism (ICM) earlier proposed for Cambodia as it involves the actual civilian administration of the country, including peacekeeping military functions, and gives the United Nations a direct role across all governmental functions rather than a more limited, monitoring functions.

To date, the Australians have proposed three options for this interim arrangement:

- (1) Option 1 involves the replacement of approximately 200,000 Cambodian officials by United Nations personnel
- (2) Option 2 replaces 300 to 500 senior Cambodian officials with United Nations personnel, preserving two rival governments but giving the United Nations authority either above or alongside the current administration of Cambodia

(3) Option 3 replaces only the top 10 or so officials from each faction with United Nations staff.

Congressman Solarz's Proposal for a U.N. Interim Authority

Congressman Solarz's approach is similar to the Australian initiative. The United Nations Secretary General is asked to appoint a special representative as head of an interim authority in Cambodia prior to the formation of a new government, working through the existing bureaucracy in consultation with representatives of the four factions.

The four factions continue to exist separately but as political parties rather than coalition partners in an interim government as envisioned in the earlier Paris talks.

A large United Nations peacekeeping force responsible for implementing a cease-fire in-place, disarming the various forces, destroying military stockpiles, and monitoring the cease-fire is also called for.

An international program of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Cambodia would begin under United Nations' supervision. This would be followed, at an appropriate time, by United Nations' supervised elections to select a constituent assembly for Cambodia.

Under international supervision, refugees would be returned to Cambodia with full freedom of movement.

The Solarz approach also insists that the top leadership of the Khmer Rouge would be removed from Cambodia and will no longer have control over the Khmer Rouge. Human rights monitors would be fielded to deter abuses.

NAMIBIA FORMULA

The Namibia formula, was a U.N.-sponsored initiative adopted by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in December 1988 as a blueprint for granting that southwest African territory its independence from South Africa, providing for a transitional period under U.N. supervision. Total cost of the U.N. initiative was estimated at over \$425 million. The supervisory responsibilities are carried out by a U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTASG) led by a "special representative" of the U.N. secretary general. Its mandate included:

- Administering elections for a constituent assembly.
- Monitoring a cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the demobilization of all armed forces.
- Overseeing the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles.

International Meetings on Cambodia

Three separate sets of meetings have taken place in an effort to achieve a peace settlement. The first, begun under Indonesian sponsorship in July 1988, called the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM), will have completed their third such session by the end of February. The second includes a round of bilateral meetings principally between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen. The third is a continuation of the international meetings begun in Paris last summer.

The Jakarta Informal Meetings have involved the direct participation of ASEAN states and at times Vietnam and Laos. Following the July 1988 meeting in Jakarta, a followup meeting was held in Paris in November with the SOC and the two factions of the resistance making up the non-Communist resistance (NCR), the KPNLF and the ANS; the Khmer Rouge did not attend. In February 1989, JIM II talks were again held in Jakarta. While no agreement was reached, significant compromises were made, suggesting that a negotiated settlement might be possible. During February 26-28, 1990, JIM III will take place in Jakarta, involving the four factions with Australia and France as observers. Initially, as during the Paris 1988 meeting, the Khmer Rouge indicated that they would not attend. However, their position has altered although the level of participation is still to be determined.

Bilateral Meetings have taken place periodically during this process at the instigation of outside powers or the Thais. In December 1987 Hun Sen and Sihanouk held 3 days of talks in Paris. In May 1989 they met once again after which time Sihanouk declared that "tremendous progress" had been made, predicting that he would join in a coalition government with Hun Sen whom he referred to as "my son." In late July, they met once again just prior to the Paris Conference on Cambodia although this time the meeting was more acrimonious. Most recently, in late February 1990 Hun Sen and Sihanouk met under Thai Prime Minister Chatichai's auspices just prior to the JIM III meetings.

International Conferences as with other meetings among Cambodian participants have yet to achieve concrete results. The 19-nation Paris talks last August fell apart

amongst mutual recrimination as all sides accused the others of being intransigent. Prior to the Paris meeting, concern was expressed by American participants that insufficient groundwork had been laid to achieve concrete results and that clearly may have been one difficulty. However, it may be equally true that at that time none of the sides had a vested interest in achieving a settlement. While the Vietnamese had announced their troop withdrawal in May 1988, substantial numbers of troops still remained in Cambodia at that time. None of the sides had as yet tested each other on the battlefield in a significant way. Nor had any of the sides tested each other significantly at the negotiating table. The outcome on the negotiating front was mixed. According to news reports in Paris, the Khmer Rouge and the SOC were significantly better prepared than either Prince Sihanouk or the KPNLF's Son Sann who refused to permit his key military commander, Gen. Sak Sutsakhan, to come to Paris, suggesting additional breaches in the non-Communist united front. Thus, with the two strongest antagonists, the DK and the SOC, the best prepared, a draw in negotiations was perhaps a foregone conclusion, particularly because from the outset the Vietnamese and the Phnom Penh government had made clear that they would not accept any participation by the Khmer Rouge in an interim-government, fearing as they did for their lives.

The second set of international meetings, sponsored by the Australians under the auspices of the United Nations Perm-5 (the five permanent members of the Security Council—United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, France, and China), as they have come to be known, suggest the possibilities of a different outcome to the failure in Paris:

First, they are occurring after changes in the actual battlefield with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and some, although limited, battlefield successes by the opposition.

Second, unlike at the earlier Paris meeting, an implicit agreement has been reached that Khmer Rouge participation must be constrained if not avoided all together in a settlement, limiting in essence some of the Khmer Rouge's diplomatic negotiating room despite their continued military menace.

Third, the Khmer Rouge's main backer, China has come under increasing international pressure in part as a result of the general decline in China's image after the massacre in Tiananmen Square to end its support although to date no decline has yet been observed.

Fourth, the mix of support for the SOC has changed. On the one hand it has gained some additional international support as various governments, including the English, British, French, Canadians, and Japanese, have sent representatives to investigate current conditions while losing some support from its principal backers, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Vietnamese who are under domestic political pressures for greater democratization. Thus, it is possible that the current set of international meetings with fewer participants, which have included a meeting in Paris January 15-16, 1990, and one in New York on February 11-12, may result in some progress. An effort to schedule the third meeting in Paris for March 12-13 is now underway.

Positions on the Australian Initiative

Both the limited progress that has occurred as well as the impediments that remain are clearly evident in the positions taken by various sides since the Australian initiative was first proposed with the SOC demonstrating the greatest flexibility, the Khmer Rouge the least, and Prince Sihanouk apparently hedging his bets, as always.

The State of Cambodia has demonstrated new flexibility on the role of the United Nations in a settlement with Hun Sen welcoming on December 9 the suggestion that the country be placed under U.N. trusteeship until elections for a new government and proposing a new formulation on the question of an internal settlement that allows for a role for the Khmer Rouge during a transitional period.

On December 15, Hun Sen stated that he was willing to maintain the current political and military status quo in Cambodia rather than demanding as in the past that the Khmer Rouge be disbanded prior to general elections. Although denying the "legitimacy" of the Khmer Rouge, he did not oppose its participation as a political force within the coalition opposition government-in-exile, the CGDK.

In January Hun Sen said he was willing to accept U.N. participation and was "prepared to leave in place two governments which control two regions of the country" while relinquishing authority to the United Nations. In addition he proposed setting up a National Council with the participation of the two "governments" that would occupy Cambodia's seat in the United Nations.

Prince Sihanouk has given guarded support to the proposal. In a statement on January 17, the Prince said "I declare that we accept the U.N. Trusteeship in Cambodia" but demanded that the SOC administrative apparatus in the country "be completely dismantled." He claimed that the problem is not an "inter-Cambodian problem" but is "only a problem between free Cambodia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," in effect continuing to insist that the SOC is a Vietnamese-puppet regime. He said he would refuse to meet with the four Cambodian factions but only as "Cambodian-Vietnamese meetings or conferences." He has called for the dissolution of the SOC at all levels. On January 18, 1990, the Prince refused to participate in a "National Supreme Council" with Hun Sen although agreement on this participation appears to have taken place in their February meeting.

However, on February 3, 1990, Prince Sihanouk announced a change in name of the opposition in the United Nations from Democratic Kampuchea to Kampuchea, changing the flag from the Khmer Rouge's red flag to the traditional Cambodian flag depicting Angkor Wat, and changing the CGDK to the National Government of Cambodia (NGC).

With the weakest military forces and still dependent on support from China and North Korea, Prince Sihanouk must walk a delicate diplomatic line. Indeed, he appears to be under increasing pressure to hone to the Khmer Rouge line as the Khmer Rouge come under more international pressure. When Sihanouk expressed his willingness to accept an interim U.N. administration, the Khmer Rouge excised all references to it in its December 12 report on his December 11 statement. According to an AFP wire story on February 1, the U.S. Ambassador to China, James Lilley, has warned Prince Sihanouk that he must break with the Khmer Rouge and Prince Ranariddh, commander of Sihanouk's army, has been given similar warnings in Bangkok. These reports suggest that Sihanouk is being pressed by China to stick with the Khmer Rouge and pressed by the West to break with them.

The Khmer Rouge have been the least supportive of the initiative. As Senator Evans mentioned in a press conference on January 29, "I wouldn't go so far as to say they've encouraged us but nor have they discouraged us." They initially refused to send representatives to the JIM III meetings and have refused to mention the idea of an interim administration in their statements, portraying instead the resistance as united in its continued backing for the CGDK's previous proposals for a quadripartite coalition government.

The KPNLF also appear to mirror the Khmer Rouge's stance, restating on December 27 the importance of a four-party coalition. This may be reflection on the KPNLF's military vulnerability and increasing tactical military cooperation with the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield as suggested by recent news reports. According to a Washington Post article of February 9, the NCR has "turned to the Communist Khmer Rouge for supplies after an offensive it launched late last year stalled because of a shortage of ammunition" although the article mentioned that to date the KPNLF has refused supplies from the Khmer Rouge. A New York Times article of February 4, citing Western diplomats, stated that "the front coordinates strategy with the Khmer Rouge on battlefield objectives and shares military intelligence." Even if true, however, neither Sihanouk nor General Sak the KPNLF commander have yet taken positions as intransigent as that so far shown by the Khmer Rouge and their Chinese backers.

China's position, despite meeting with the Australians and participation in the two Perm-5 meetings, has not yet demonstrated any major shift. Chinese officials have taken the position according to accounts published in Xinhua that, while China "favors" a larger role for the United Nations in Cambodia, any proposal must have the "unanimous agreement" of all four Cambodian factions. A Foreign Ministry spokesman on December 21 declared that "the best formula" for a settlement is the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces "under effective international supervision" and the formation of a four-party coalition government. Xu Dunxin, the Chinese representative at the Perm-5 meetings insisted on January 14 that a quadripartite coalition government headed by Prince Sihanouk should be set up. Following the January Perm-5 meeting Xu again reiterated China's insistence on a "provisional four-party coalition government."

Key Problems with United Nations Involvement

Several major stumbling blocks impede progress on the Australian initiative to create a U.N. trusteeship for Cambodia: (1) success is dependent on the Khmer Rouge conceding defeat; and (2) United Nations involvement entails significant operational difficulties.

The Khmer Rouge must concede defeat to make United Nations involvement feasible. A U.N. trusteeship can only occur with a complete and verifiable cease-fire, dis-

closure of arms caches, troop disarmament, and the insertion of a significant international peacekeeping force that can receive reasonable assurances that it will not get involved in a civil war.

This was the major stumbling block in last August's Paris conference when Hun Sen and the Vietnamese refused to include the Khmer Rouge in a four-party settlement. Given the Khmer Rouge's significant military and political presence throughout the country and their military experience, they pose the most serious threat to any effort to achieve a political settlement unless they are at the least disarmed in advance.

Recognizing this, the Khmer Rouge have been the least forthcoming in negotiations. Their strategy has been to keep up some minimal military pressure on the Phnom Penh government in order to encourage a compromise which would give them political legitimacy, allowing them to burrow from within to gain power in the event of a settlement. However, as the conflict has dragged on and the Hun Sen government appears to be gaining greater international credibility, the Khmer Rouge must decide whether or not to intensify their military attacks, risking international opprobrium.

Problems in United Nations involvement are almost insurmountable. First, the cost of the operation is initially estimated at \$1 to \$3 billion. The Australians have suggested that the cost will be borne on the same percentage basis as U.N. dues with hopefully some donors; i.e. the Japanese, contributing more. Second, the duration of the operation is anticipated to require at least 2 years from the period that the United Nations first moves in to the holding of elections. Third, operational problems are equally daunting.

The Paris Conference on Cambodia last August sent a United Nations military factfinding team to Cambodia to assess operational problems that would be encountered by a peacekeeping force. They visited crossing points, ports, access routes, roads, and military bases; they assessed supply availability, vehicles, personnel, accommodation, utilities, and banking facilities. They concluded that "the existing infrastructure, sources of supply and services in Cambodia are not sufficient to support the deployment and operation of an ICM."

United Nations officials have indicated that in order to ensure disarmament actions would be necessary to prevent any resupply by land or sea. This would require essentially a naval blockade of the Cambodian coast.

Replacing or supplanting Cambodian administrative personnel with United Nations personnel to be effective would be dependent on, first, being able to attract civilian as well as military personnel to the region for an extended period of time and, second, on finding individuals with some Khmer language capability.

The significant problems facing both achievement of an agreement on a United Nations trusteeship and then on carrying out the operation suggest that the current talks will be at best prolonged, especially since no signs of flexibility on the part of the Khmer Rouge or the Chinese are yet apparent.

Post Settlement Reconstruction

Cambodia today is substantially in worse condition than it was 21 years ago. The population estimated at 7.5 to 8 million is greatly below what it would have been based on a 1969 population estimate of 7.3 million. A disproportionate number of the population appear to be female, perhaps as many as 64 percent above the age of 15. The loss of life is estimated at least 1.4 million. The economy is two-thirds of what it was in 1969 in absolute terms with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$550 million (\$70 per capita) compared to a GDP of \$890 million in 1966 (\$130 per capita). Rice production, the basic crop, is at the margin of self-sufficiency.

The toll of the Khmer Rouge days is most telling on the educated elite. The destruction of the education sector is typical: 60 percent of all primary school teachers murdered, 70 percent of all secondary teachers, 70 percent of university teachers. Of the total student population of 827,000 about 50 percent were killed. In the medical profession, of 500 doctors, only 40 remained after 1980. Among 70,000 Buddhist monks, 14,000 died. An estimated 189,000 public officials were killed.

The destruction of the country's economic infrastructure was equally complete. Schools were destroyed. Phnom Penh's cathedral leveled to the ground. More than two-thirds of the nation's roads were damaged, including bridges and construction equipment. Airports, the main port of Kompong Som, water systems, postal and telecommunications, public buildings all heavily damaged.

Despite 10 years of Vietnamese occupation, the recovery has been slow. A Faculty of Medicine reopened in 1980 but there is still only 1 doctor for every 30,000 people. Infant mortality is extremely high due mainly to diarrhea and acute respiratory infection—20 percent of all children die before the age of 5.

UNICEF reports that the adult literacy rate is now at 70 percent (compared to a 1960 level of 31 percent) after two major literacy campaigns by the government but, lacking reading material, these "neoliterates" may be losing their newly required skill. Teachers have had little training; the Ministry of Education's textbook printing capacity is only 600,000 per year compared to a demand of over 2 million. There are also some indications of severe posttraumatic stress syndrome among adults being transferred to children with an increase in learning disabilities and other problems that augur poorly for the country's long-term recovery.

The country's natural resources have deteriorated, continuing a process already noticeable in 1969. Rice production is down and continues to be dependent on natural floods. The Tonle Sap system, one of the world's most fertile areas, is in decline with fish production down. Rubber production which used to be one of the world's most efficient, located primarily in state-owned plantations in Kompong Cham and Kratie using mainly Vietnamese-immigrant labor, has also seriously deteriorated. No comprehensive survey of Cambodia's mineral resources exists although they are believed to be limited. The main ruby mining area of Pailin is now under Khmer Rouge control.

While showing strong signs of vibrancy given the government's laissez-faire economic policies the economy is still in serious trouble with an inflation rate of over 50 percent in 1989. Major work on economic recovery has yet to begun both because of the continued warfare and the international aid boycott.

Information on Cambodia is extremely limited. Because of the international boycott, aid programs in Cambodia are restricted, limited to the activities of independent nongovernmental agencies and relief workers. There has been no accurate census conducted and given the destruction of the educated elite by the Khmer Rouge, there are few qualified government officials in Cambodia capable of organizing the administrative apparatus needed to make an accurate assessment of the situation.

Planning for Post-Settlement Reconstruction has not begun in a serious fashion although it was the subject of a special committee in the failed Paris talks last August.

The United States objected last year to a mission of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) visiting Cambodia to conduct a preliminary assessment of Cambodia's development needs. Instead the team went to Thailand. The results of their research, a two volume, Kampuchea Needs Assessment Study, was published in August 1989.

Also, in August USAID commissioned a report, entitled "Cambodia, Post-Settlement Reconstruction and Development" by Columbia University Prof. Robert J. Muscat. As with the UNDP team, Muscat was not permitted to visit Cambodia to research his report.

However both reports underscore (1) the seriousness of Cambodia's development needs, (2) the lack of basic information on the country's problems, and (3) the need to work through existing nongovernment organizations (NGO's) in Cambodia for the most productive impact.

A key issue is whether or not additional assessments need to be carried out at this time, including granting permission to a World Bank survey team to visit Cambodia, in order to prepare for and to encourage a negotiated settlement.

EXPLORING CAMBODIA

(By Edmund S. Muskie)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

EXPLORING CAMBODIA is the report of a trip to Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia undertaken by Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman of the Center for National Policy, to explore options for U.S. policy in dealing with the issue of Cambodia.

Senator Muskie was accompanied on the trip by Andrea Panaritis, Associate Executive Director, Christopher Reynolds Foundation; Maureen S. Steinbruner, Executive Vice President, Center for National Policy; and, Thomas Jo Vallely, Coordinator for Indochina Programs, Harvard Institute for International Development.

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FOREWORD

(by Edmund S. Muskie)

For 15 years, from 1975 to 1989, Cambodia was a nation largely outside of American consciousness.

The history of American involvement in Cambodia prior to 1975, the story of what happened in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge reign of terror from 1975 through 1978, and the facts of the 1979 Vietnamese invasion and 10-year occupation, were largely unknown to the American public.

As a result, U.S. Government policy toward this small nation in the center of Southeast Asia evolved quietly, essentially unnoticed, the subject of little public discussion and almost no public concern.

All of this began to change in 1989. Over the summer, 19 nations gathered in Paris to debate the future of Cambodia. Four Cambodian factions, including the notorious Khmer Rouge, were represented, as were the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China.

Vietnam had announced plans to complete the withdrawal of its troops by the end of September. It appeared that Prince Norodom Sihanouk, once ruler of Cambodia, might return to participate in some fashion in a government coalition with the native Cambodian regime that Vietnam had installed in power there.

The United States and other international media were giving increased attention to events related to Cambodia and the world began to hope for a resolution of the 10-year-old guerrilla war. But Sihanouk insisted on a role for the Khmer Rouge, and a replacement of the current Cambodian government, prior to elections. China, where Sihanouk was in residence, would not weaken its commitment to the Khmer Rouge without this. U.S. policy sided with Sihanouk, and with China. Phnom Penh and Vietnam said "no." Hopes for a settlement dimmed as the conference broke up. With the Vietnamese pullout that U.S. policy had long demanded on the horizon, it had seemed to me that the time might be approaching when the United States might be able to take on a new posture toward Indochina—constructive, not destructive—and begin to play a more active and leading role in the development of Southeast Asia.

The failure of the Paris conference was not a hopeful sign, however. It seemed that U.S. policy had only two choices at that point: to go along with Sihanouk's demand that the Khmer Rouge be imposed on Cambodia as the price of a political settlement, on the one hand, or to continue to support Sihanouk and his forces in a guerrilla war in coalition with Khmer Rouge, on the other.

For the public, the press, Members of Congress and for U.S. Government officials, the most difficult problem in knowing what to think or do about Cambodia remained: a lack of concrete, firsthand information.

Throughout the global communications expansion of the 1980's, Cambodia continued to be remote, isolated, unreachable, the subject of a broad embargo on international aid.

No U.S. executive branch policymaker went there during the decade; members of Congress made only sporadic contact. Even Prince Sihanouk stayed away.

Clearly, it was necessary to consider a new approach, if any progress were to be made. I therefore agreed to travel to Cambodia in my capacity as Chairman of the Center for National Policy. It was my intention to observe firsthand the conditions there, and to develop a direct assessment of the effects, the consequences of present U.S. policy.

My questions were these: What is the reality of the situation in Cambodia today? What are Vietnam's objectives, and are they consistent or inconsistent with U.S. interests? What about Cambodia's neighbor, Thailand, an important U.S. ally? Is China right or wrong in its commitment to the Khmer Rouge? Can peace be brought to Cambodia? Is genuine self-determination a possibility?

From the conversations I had with heads of state, with foreign ministers, with officials and soldiers and citizens during my 2½-week trip to Southeast Asia, and from my own observations, I concluded that a fundamental redirection of U.S. policy should take place.

This report describes the development of the trip and provides both direct excerpts and overall summaries of key meetings. The material speaks for itself, generally, but a few points should also be stressed.

First: The government of Cambodia in the fall of 1989 was a Communist government in form, but it also included many non-Communists, from earlier regimes. It did not appear monolithic; it did demonstrate pragmatism.

This government was by all evidence a genuinely nationalist government; it had taken measures to liberalize the economy and, although the country remained poor as a result of extreme international isolation, these measures nonetheless were having a positive effect.

Second, from my observations not only of the government and its administration of Cambodian society, but also from what I saw of the searing evidence of the devastation of the Khmer Rouge period, and what I learned about the dominance of the Khmer Rouge in the resistance coalition, it became clear that the central question for U.S. policy was, simply, this: Why should we insist on dismantling the existing government prior to elections, and thereby risk the return of chaos?

Would it not be better for Cambodia to let the existing government administer this fragile nation, pending the selection of a new one, under international supervision?

Under the circumstances, this appeared to be the critical choice, if we really hoped to move Cambodia toward a better future, in which the stability required for genuine and lasting self-determination could be sustained.

If support for maintenance of the existing administrative structure until elections should mean a direct disagreement with China, then so be it. If it should mean accepting, finally, some common ground with Vietnam, then so be it.

I have prepared this report in the hope that its readers will find it a source of useful information. It is meant to elicit not sentiment but, rather, understanding. Cambodia and its people have been punished enough by history; their situation deserves a fair and honest assessment—no more, no less.

EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
Washington, DC, February 1990.

INTRODUCTION

During the decade after Saigon and Phnom Penh fell to Communist insurgents in April 1975, the fate of the Vietnamese and Cambodian people was largely ignored by Americans. By the mid-1980's, however, several forces were at work to bring Indochina back into political focus in the United States.

International concern over Cambodians in refugee camps along the border with Thailand; a renewed flow of Vietnamese boat people to Hong Kong; activity on the issue of missing servicemen (MIA/POW's); and release of the movie about Khmer Rouge terror in Cambodia, "The Killing Fields," followed by a series of movies centered on the American experience in Vietnam, all contributed to creation of a public presence for issues that had been dealt with primarily out of public view by policymakers.

The picture of what had occurred in Cambodia was a shocking one. In 1975, while the United States was preoccupied with disengaging from Vietnam, a genocidal Cambodian Communist organization, known as the "red" Khmers, or Khmer Rouge, had defeated the U.S.-supported military government of Cambodia, Gen. Lon Nol. A few years earlier, Lon Nol had ousted the mercurial Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whom the Khmer Rouge now brought back to Phnom Penh, to serve as a figurehead, effectively under house arrest.

For 4 years, the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge systematically terrorized, brutally collectivized, tortured, and killed millions of Cambodians, and fundamentally destroyed large segments of the country's social and economic fabric, until in early 1979, they fell to a Vietnamese invasion.

Vietnamese Communists once had been allied with the Cambodian Communists, as part of an Indochina Communist Party. The Khmer Rouge faction was anti-Vietnamese, however, and the longstanding enmity had resulted in bloody incursions by the Khmer Rouge into western Vietnam in 1977 and 1978. Late in 1978, Vietnam attacked in retaliation. The Khmer Rouge forces were quickly routed, abandoning the capital, Phnom Penh, in January 1979.

The Vietnamese brought with them and installed in power an indigenous Cambodian administration made up of Khmer Rouge, Lon Nol and Sihanouk period survivors. There then began a process of securing the military, economic, and social stability of the devastated country a process that was to maintain a Vietnamese presence in Cambodia for many years.¹

To policymakers in the outside world, particularly in China, in neighboring Thailand, and in the United States, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and its establishment of a military presence there, constituted a security threat. In response, a decision was made to grant the Khmer Rouge remnant force, sheltering along the Thai-Cambodian border, continued recognition at the United Nations.

Shortly thereafter, Prince Sihanouk, who had been a collaborator, but also a prisoner, of the Khmer Rouge during the 1975-79 period when they were in power, was brought in to head an expanded U.N. delegation, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The group making up the new entity holding the U.N. seat² also included a third faction, associated with segments of the former Lon Nol administration.

These three became established as an anti-Vietnamese guerrilla resistance, operating out of camps along the Thai-Cambodia border, armed and financed primarily by China, but with additional support from the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Each of the factions maintained control over a series of individual refugee camps, some of which were opened to U.N. contact and assistance. It was estimated that about 300,000 Cambodians were held in these camps without official refugee status and no hope of migration or repatriation.

The Vietnamese presence eventually helped stabilize life in Cambodia, as well as the military situation there, but the effort to do so added to the burdens of Hanoi's economic and political challenges in Vietnam itself. In Cambodia, with the exception of the Soviet bloc countries and India, the nations of the world closed ranks to isolate the Phnom Penh government, effectively preventing it from receiving any significant international aid.

The economy of Vietnam stagnated over the first half of the 1980's. The economy of Cambodia was in even worse shape; it had been essentially destroyed, and the effort to begin to reconstruct it was hampered by the lack of outside help. Both nations suffered from disease and inadequate nutrition.

By 1985, Vietnam was engaged in a series of diplomatic probes with the United States over the issue of normalization. Economic liberalization in China and economic growth in the free-market economies of Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular were providing a stark and unpleasant contrast to conditions in Vietnam and Cambodia. Steps were taken in Vietnam to decentralize the economy. In Cambodia, where except under the Khmer Rouge collectivization and state ownership had never been comprehensively implemented, efforts to improve economic performance continued.

The changes brought about inside the Soviet Union with the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev also began to affect the situation in Indochina. The historic antagonism between China and Vietnam continued to find expression in China's strong support for the Khmer Rouge. As the Soviets began to seek a rapprochement with China, they had to confront China's wish to sever Cambodia from the influence of the Soviets' ally, Vietnam.

The possibility of a complete pullout of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia came under consideration in Vietnam.

By the spring of 1989, a great deal of movement had occurred. Two sets of talks had taken place in Jakarta between former Cambodian head of state Sihanouk, resident in Beijing, and the current head of state in Phnom Penh, Hun Sen. Thailand's first elected prime minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, had invited Hun Sen to Bangkok. The possibility that a negotiated settlement might be on the horizon, and that the Vietnamese might actually withdraw their troops, persuaded the Bush administration to resurrect the concept of giving U.S. "lethal aid" to the non-Communist factions as a bargaining chip, a move that Congress resisted.³

STRUGGLE OVER U.S. POLICE

As early as 1979, the decision to support the resistance Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea had been one that posed difficulties for U.S. policymakers.

On the one hand, China, Thailand, and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) saw this support as necessary. And, to the extent that it was consistent with opposition to Vietnam's Communist government, the policy also was a straightforward extension of U.S. purposes in the Vietnam war: to stop the spread of communism in Asia. But, in spite of these arguments in its favor, the policy also entailed a commitment to help the Khmer Rouge, however indirect that commitment might be.

There were continuing differences of opinion among U.S. administration officials and Members of Congress about the extent to which this policy course was the cor-

rect one in terms of U.S. interests, but over time it came to be generally accepted as the least undesirable option.

U.S. financial aid flowed to the two non-Communist factions, and recognition of Vietnam and the Phnom Penh government were withheld. The United States maintained a strong stance against the granting of developmental help to either country and placed restrictions on the activities of humanitarian organizations.

A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

A number of nongovernmental groups based in Europe and the United States had been active in Indochina over the years, providing personnel and supplies for health care and other small-scale humanitarian projects. The Christopher Reynolds Foundation of New York had been a major contributor to these projects.

In the spring of 1989, responding to an interest in Indochina Policy demonstrated by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for National Policy, the Foundation approached the Center with a suggestion.

It was thought that the time had come to take a fresh look at the situation in Cambodia, to make an objective assessment of U.S. interests, at the effects of the planned withdrawal of the last of the Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, and at the implications for U.S. policy.

The Center agreed, and decided that its chairman, former Secretary of State and U.S. Senator Edmund S. Muskie, should visit Cambodia. The Center already had been following political and economic developments in the Pacific Basin region, and had begun to focus on the question of U.S. policy toward Vietnam as the key to redirecting U.S. objectives in that area of the world.

PREPARATION FOR THE MUSKIE TRIP

As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and as a Vice Presidential nominee and Presidential candidate, Edmund Muskie had had a career-long involvement with Vietnam policy. He had visited Vietnam twice, as a member of the Mansfield Mission in 1965, on a trip that included Cambodia on its itinerary, and later as an official observer of the 1967 South Vietnamese elections. In addition, as Secretary of State he had participated in the internal disputes over Cambodia policy after the Vietnamese invasion and had taken part in a key 1980 meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur at which the topic of what to do about Cambodia was a major focus.

As part of the process of preparing for the trip over the spring and into the summer of 1989, Muskie met with U.S. Government officials and participated in a series of briefings with Indochina experts. Members of Congress of both parties were engaged along with the administration at that point in the debate over the wisdom of lethal aid to the non-Communist resistance, and an international conference was being organized in Paris to try to bring about a negotiated settlement in advance of the Vietnamese withdrawal.

In the background of all discussion, the question of what to do about the Khmer Rouge loomed large. So long as China remained committed to supporting them, it was felt, the guerrilla war would continue. A proposal was made in Paris to create an interim four-party government, one in which the Phnom Penh government of Hun Sen would have a share equal to the share held by each of the three resistance factions.

The theory behind this proposal was that China would be satisfied with an interim role for the Khmer Rouge. Elections would be held; the Khmer Rouge would lose; China would concede. Even in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, this logic seemed to appeal to many of the nations assembled in Paris, but the Vietnamese government and the administration in Phnom Penh refused to yield power to the Khmer Rouge and the Paris conference ended inconclusively.

With the Vietnamese withdrawal scheduled for the end of September, Muskie made plans to arrive in Southeast Asia immediately following the pullout. Arrangements were made for a series of preparatory conversations in Washington and New York with officials representing the Thai and Vietnamese governments and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

TO CAMBODIA

The trip itself took 2½ weeks, and included time in Bangkok at the beginning and at the end, as well as a stay in Hanoi and overland travel between Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) and Phnom Penh.

Muskie met during the course of the trip with the Prime Minister of Thailand, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, and the Prime Minister of Cambodia. He spoke with other officials of the three governments as well. He visited the Ho Chi Minh residence in Hanoi, saw the sites of Khmer Rouge genocidal brutalization preserved by the Cambodian government in and near Phnom Penh, and spent a day touring the temples at Angkor Wat after a helicopter ride to the site in the company of Cambodia's Minister of Defense.

Muskie saw a country that had been shattered, but had survived. He saw the effects of isolation, war, and disease, and he saw the results of efforts to reconstruct. He heard descriptions of steps taken to liberalize an economy and open it to trade; he saw the modest but concrete effects of those efforts.

He spoke with the young Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, and was impressed by his determination and his sophistication.

What he heard from Vietnamese, Cambodian, and international observers indicated that the Vietnamese withdrawal was real. What he saw in Cambodia indicated that the Cambodian government had de facto acceptance, and that the country itself was functioning adequately.

Muskie was persuaded by his experiences and observations that there was a need for change in U.S. policy.

First, he felt very strongly that the United States should no longer be a party to any proposal that would forcibly return the Khmer Rouge to power in Cambodia—on an interim or any other basis.

Second, he saw no reason for the United States to continue to refuse to talk with the Phnom Penh government. Its leaders, by virtue of their relatively stable and constructive administration of the country, were demonstrating a level of political legitimacy as least as great as that of the two former non-Communist regimes active in the resistance coalition which the United States had long maintained contact.

On the basis of personal observation and the many conversations that had taken place on the trip, it was apparent that the Hun Sen regime was not posing a threat to other nations in the region, nor did its relations with Vietnam appear to threaten China's interests. On the contrary, both the Phnom Penh and the Hanoi governments gave evidence of wishing to normalize relations with China, as well as with other countries.

Trade and economic development—and the political and military stability necessary to facilitate them—were the subjects that had, overall, been the focus of much of the concern Muskie had heard expressed in Cambodia and in Vietnam.

Finally, Muskie had come to believe that carrying out small, concrete steps toward resolution of the problem—beginning with international verification of the Vietnamese withdrawal—would be much more productive than trying to achieve a "comprehensive political settlement" all at once.

It also had become apparent to him that changing the United States approach to China would be the key to a more appropriate United States policy on Cambodia.

Rather than conceding China's commitment to the Khmer Rouge, Muskie felt, United States policy should be oriented toward firmly opposing that commitment, and bringing China to accept the need and the reason for change.

The key details of the conversations that took place in conjunction with Muskie's trip are presented here as a documentary report, along with a description of Muskie's itinerary, and a description of his findings, conclusions and recommendations.

WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK

As Senator Muskie prepared to depart for Southeast Asia, press reports out of Cambodia were documenting the movement of Vietnamese troops along Route 1 eastward, across the Mekong and toward Vietnam.

The Paris conference had ended without a political settlement a month earlier, over the issue of "powersharing" in an interim government, and on the question of whether Khmer Rouge atrocities during the 1975-79 period should be termed "genocide."

Thailand's Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, had announced plans to try to reconvene the parties for an informal conference.

It was widely anticipated that intensified warfare would shortly break out in western Cambodia along the Thai border, and would continue for some months.

In the United States, national media attention was being given to the Vietnamese withdrawal, and to the recent return of "Killing Fields" protagonist Dith Pran, a New York Times photographer, and the doctor who played him in the movie, Haing Ngor, for a visit to Cambodia.

As part of the preparation for Muskie's trip, staff conversations with State Department officials, a meeting between Muskie and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, and a discussion with State Department Under Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Robert M. Kimmitt, provided a dynamic overview of current U.S. policy.

A strong commitment to the resistance coalition was expressed by U.S. Government officials, and the Vietnamese were condemned for their unwillingness to impose a political settlement that would allow the two non-Communist resistance factions and the Khmer Rouge to participate in an interim government in Cambodia.

In Washington, Muskie met at the Thai Ambassador's residence with Thailand's Foreign Minister, Siddhi Sivetsila, a proponent of the decade-old ASEAN and U.S. policy, Thai Lt. Gen. Charon Kullavanijaya, and Ambassador Vitthya Vejajiva.

Siddhi argued in favor of keeping pressure on the Vietnamese to admit the Khmer Rouge into an interim government, primarily through the tactic of refusing to acknowledge the Vietnamese withdrawal. This, he indicated, would keep recognition and aid from Vietnam and continue support for Chinese objectives.

FOREIGN MINISTER SIDDHI

We have to keep the pressure on Vietnam. If Vietnam sees no U.S. normalization, no Chinese normalization, and no assistance from Japan and Europe, they will tell Hun Sen to be more flexible and they will call for a comprehensive political solution.

In New York, Muskie met on September 7, 1989, with Khieu Samphan, Foreign Minister and Vice President of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), and a leader of the Khmer Rouge. Khieu Samphan was accompanied by CGDK Ambassador to the U.N., Thiounn Prasith, and by Kor Bun Heng and Chhuon Sikhorn.

Khieu Samphan spoke of a triangle between the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and India, designed to make Vietnam master of Indochina. He related this to Soviet ambitions in Afghanistan which, he suggested further, could threaten the Middle East.

He presented the conflict between the resistance and the Phnom Penh government as a "war to liberate Cambodia from Vietnamese forces who are still in Cambodia."

In response to a question from Muskie, Khieu Samphan described Khmer Rouge objectives as follows: "In the interior of the country, we will try to dismantle, as much as possible, the Vietnamese administration. At the border, we will try to liberate more area." He indicated a lack of sufficient strength to achieve a complete military victory, but said that it nonetheless would serve the political objective: to get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia.

He strongly supported the concept of a four-party interim government as the focal point of a political settlement, and said, "We know we cannot go back to socialism or communism. We have to have a policy acceptable by all Cambodians, one that could be supported by ASEAN and the West. * * * Our ultimate objective is to have Cambodia an independent neutral country."

* * *

KHIEU SAMPHAN

Vietnam is not read to withdraw from Cambodia. * * * there are many disguised forces * * * regular troops, militia men, settlers, paramilitary forces * * * 149,000 organized troops in all * * * if there is a cease-fire now the Vietnamese will never withdraw.

* * *

Also on September 7, Muskie met with the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations, Trinn Xuan Lang.

Lang said that "the main problem now is how to deal with the Khmer Rouge."

Saying that "not a single" Vietnamese soldier is left in Cambodia, he indicated willingness on the part of Vietnam and the Phnom Penh government to reconvene, at the instigation of Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, to consider two steps preliminary to a full-scale political settlement: establishment of an "international control mechanism" to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal and enactment of a cease-fire. He noted, however, that the Khmer Rouge opposed a cease-fire.

Ambassador Lang discussed a proposal to hold multiparty elections, under the supervision of an international organization, but with the Phnom Penh government continuing to administer the country. He talked of the Paris conference, hopes that Prince Sihanouk was ready to cooperate with Hun Sen and abandon the Khmer Rouge, and what he called the "ambiguous" position of the U.S. delegation.

TRINH XUAN LANG

Sihanouk is not independent. (At Paris) he spoke with a Khmer Rouge voice and he represented the Khmer Rouge. * * * If the United States had a more clearcut policy toward the Khmer Rouge, it would help.

BANGKOK I

On his arrival in Bangkok on Sunday, September 30, Muskie was met at the airport by U.S. Embassy personnel. Press accounts were indicating that the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia had been completed. Thailand's Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, was in Europe for discussions that he hoped would lead to another round of talks on the Cambodia issue, following the inconclusive outcome of the August Paris conference.

Over the next 3 days, Muskie talked informally with U.S. Embassy officials, representatives of the Thai government, other experts, and members of Western non-governmental organizations active in the refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border and in Phnom Penh.

Two formal meetings also took place during this time. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of former Cambodian head of state and King, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and commander-in-chief of the Sihanouk resistance forces, received Muskie in his home, for an hour's discussion.

Muskie also met with Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, Commander of the Thai Army, in the presence of a number of aides and Thai officers.

In these discussions, Muskie was seeking in particular an assessment of the military situation. In the absence of Vietnamese troops, how would the three resistance factions do on the battlefield against the forces of the Phnom Penh government?

Muskie also asked about prospects for a political settlement. Would renewed fighting be more or less likely to lead the combatants to compromise?

Muskie also wanted to know more about the proposal for an interim government, one that would replace the Hun Sen regime with a four-part coalition, prior to elections. Could elections be held if the population saw the Khmer Rouge returning to power? Given the history of Khmer Rouge brutality and atrocities, could they actually be expected to share power responsibly?

The picture that emerged was one of uncertainty. Most observers indicated that they expected a military stalemate, with the resistance winning some victories in the border regions, and the Phnom Penh government remaining essentially in control. Few of those with whom Muskie spoke in background briefings expressed the view that the Khmer Rouge leadership as a whole had changed its objectives or behavior in any significant way.

Several said that they hoped the most discredited could be "removed from the political equation." Most indicated some uncertainty about how elections might be conducted freely with Khmer Rouge involvement.

When the question of a political settlement was discussed, key elements of the official ASEAN and U.S. view were stressed:

- that admitting the Khmer Rouge to power on at least an interim basis would be key to getting China to agree to cease its support for Khmer Rouge military activity; and,

- that Vietnam's refusal to admit the Khmer Rouge to interim power was the major stumbling block in the way of a settlement.

An important factor in all of the discussions in Bangkok was the concept of involvement by the United Nations as an international force in Cambodia. At the Paris conference, there had been debate over an "international control mechanism" that would verify the Vietnamese withdrawal, monitor a cease-fire and the cessation of foreign military aid, and administer elections.

The Vietnamese and the Phnom Penh government had resisted the use of the United Nations for these purposes, citing the fact that Cambodia's seat at the U.N. is held by the resistance coalition, and saying that it could not be impartial. The possibility of vacating the U.N. seat pending new elections in Cambodia, or of adding the Phnom Penh government to the coalition, had been raised in diplomatic circles over the summer. Most of those with whom Muskie spoke at this point in the trip did not recommend pursuing either of these options.

Verification of the withdrawal appeared to be emerging as a critical question; it was linked procedurally to the issue of U.N. involvement in Cambodia, and substantively to Khmer Rouge rhetoric, to the anti-Vietnamese rationale for the existence of the resistance, and to China's backing for the resistance.

The following notes are from the meetings with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Commander-in-Chief of the ANS (Sihanouk) forces, and with Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, Commander of the Thai Army. Both Ranariddh and Chaovalit spoke in English.

MEETING WITH PRINCE NORODOM RANARIDDH

RANARIDDH. Your Excellency was Secretary of State when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. I remember the statement you made.

MUSKIE. What is happening now?

RANARIDDH. Since Paris, the press and the U.S. Government have said the failure was because of the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk, but, last week * * * Dumas⁵ met with Baker.⁶

The French—Dumas—acknowledged the failure was because of the Vietnamese and Hun Sen. The majority of nations at Paris agreed that there must be a comprehensive solution. Only Vietnam, Laos, and Phnom Penh objected to two elements: one, a withdrawal controlled and well-monitored by the United Nations. Two, a provisional "quadripartite" government.

Should we or not associate killers with government? We should try, but without the Pol Pot clique. They should be free to go reinforce the Chinese government at Tiananmen Square.

It was the Vietnamese who put Pol Pot in power in Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese Communists are responsible for the victories of Pol Pot. Heng Samrin, Ieng Sary, and Hun Sen were Khmer Rouge, themselves.

The main question is the United States. Chet Atkins and Jim Leach and Solarz⁷ are friends of mine, but they now say to Solarz, please drop the Khmer Rouge. But is the United States ready to take 40,000 refugees, or is France or China ready? If not how do we handle the Khmer Rouge? How?

There are two approaches. No. 1: Sihanouk and Hun Sen could fight the Khmer Rouge. This means we accept the civil war. Two: take the Khmer Rouge into a very temporary government, with strong measures to prevent the return of power. These measures would be: No. 1, an international control mechanism; No. 2, an international peacekeeping force; No. 3, to strengthen the non-Communists as the only force capable of fighting the Khmer Rouge; and No. 4, self determination and disarmament of all and, then, free elections.

My friend, Jim Leach, said there should be a trial for Pol Pot. But, who will be able to bring Pol Pot to trial? It would be a moral condemnation. This is not enough for my people. They need real measures. An international court is not enough. Pol Pot must be condemned by the Cambodian people. They will definitely condemn him. Only then will we fight.

Now, there is military fighting because of the failure of Paris. The Vietnamese do not want a settlement. They are fighting to go back to Paris in 3 to 4 months. Vietnam needs the World Bank, the IMF, the United States and Japanese aid. Vietnam must go back to Paris to solve the problem. The United States is very concerned about the Khmer Rouge, but the Khmer Rouge is more concerned.

The Sihanouk forces have 20,000 people. Do you believe they would follow us they thought we would bring Pol Pot back to power? They know the regime in Phnom Penh is not a liberal regime. This regime changed the flag and the anthem, but look what has happened in China. Deng tried for 10 years to implement a liberal regime; but, when the state power was challenged, they went back. To liberalize some sectors is not to liberalize all.

We must have a quadripartite government. If this is rejected, China will never accept it. A government between Sihanouk and Hun Sen would mean recognition of a Vietnamese fait accompli. China can never accept this.

MUSKIE. Have the Khmer Rouge changed?

RANARIDDH. You mean, can I trust the Khmer Rouge? If I'm stronger than them, yes. If not, no. If I'm stronger, they changed. If I'm not, they didn't.

MUSKIE. Are you stronger?

RANARIDDH. Not now, but in Battambang⁸ and Siem Reap⁹ there was a stronghold of Ta Mok.¹⁰ Now the Khmer Rouge are not there and those areas are our areas. We provide 100 percent security to our people there.

MUSKIE. A quadripartite government would include Hun Sen?

RANARIDDH. Yes, we must accept Hun Sen and Hun Sen must accept Pol Pot. No, not at all. He must accept Khieu Samphan and one or two—I don't know. The Khmer Rouge promised my father this. We will be Hun Sen, Sihanouk, Son Sann, and Khieu Samphan.

The French wanted Sihanouk to marry Hun Sen. Sihanouk said no. This would accept a Vietnamese fait accompli. It would mean like in 1941 asking De Gaulle to marry Laval. Hun Sen's place is better than Laval. You know what happened to Laval in 1945. We do not agree with the French proposal because it accepts the quadripartite as a principle, but bipartite as the most important.

MUSKIE. I'm curious about whether the Cambodian people would truly vote freely. With a quadripartite interim government, the dominant force would be the Khmer Rouge. This is how it would be perceived. Would they, indeed, vote freely if they understood that the Khmer Rouge were in a position to share power?

RANARIDDH. No. 1: If they could form a quadripartite government, the Khmer Rouge will be in the minority already. No. 2: The Khmer Rouge is not a dominant force in the quadripartite solution politically or in terms of strength. No. 3: Sihanouk is asking for an international control mechanism and international peacekeeping force to supervise and control the withdrawal and provide free elections so no one would use arms to force voting.

MUSKIE. Would people who were exposed to the Khmer Rouge believe that an international commission would protect them from people who come in the middle of the night?

RANARIDDH. Please write this down. We have, No. 1: disarmament; No. 2—like in Lebanon, to keep the peace, we need a peacekeeping force; No. 3: we need an international control mechanism; No. 4: we need an interim quadripartite government.

This would mean a simple calculation. If the Khmer Rouge have 40,000 men, Sihanouk forces have 20,000, Son Sann has 16,000 and the PRK¹¹ has 40,000. Of the 49,000 of the Khmer Rouge, if there is an acceptable solution, three-fourths would leave Pol Pot. They now are fighting the Vietnamese.

The only obstacle for Pol Pot is a political settlement. The Khmer Rouge accept disarmament, the international control mechanism, the international peacekeeping force. Take it. But, the Vietnamese and Hun Sen said, "no," so, all that's left is fighting. We have no guarantee we can win.

MUSKIE. You are fighting now with the Khmer Rouge?

RANARIDDH. No.

MUSKIE. Are you fighting against them?

RANARIDDH. Yes, if we need to.

MUSKIE. But the three forces are working against each other?

RANARIDDH. We fight together but not under a common structure. I never fight with the Khmer Rouge. In the latest operation with the KPNLF,¹² there was no Khmer Rouge with us, but we cannot fight each other.

But, if Cambodia is free of Vietnamese colonialism, we will be no more with the Khmer Rouge. For many years we got arms from China. Not one arm of ours has fallen into Khmer Rouge hands. Why? They are much richer than we are. We are poor. Why give them a knife to kill us? We are fighting them if they are threatening us.

Why not join Hun Sen? No, I cannot, because it will mean that after 10 years of sacrifice we have accepted a Vietnamese fait accompli. It is against any principle cherished by your country. Hun Sen is a Communist state. In Paris he did not talk about a multiparty system. He talked of a prominent role for the Communist party. If he wants an alliance with us and the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann and to have elections, this is OK.

MUSKIE. Do you expect a military victory?

RANARIDDH. We don't search for it.

MUSKIE. Does Hun Sen?

RANARIDDH. Absolutely. The Soviet Union is providing Hun Sen with tons and tons of material. We have the names of the ships and a list of their cargo. Hun Sen is forcing recruits into his army. They want an army of 100,000. This is a violation of human rights. The Soviet Union wants Cambodia to be another Najibullah.¹³

In Paris, the Soviet Union was not at all flexible. They did not pressure Vietnam.

MUSKIE. Hun Sen and the Soviets are pushing for victory?

RANARIDDH. Yes. It is the natural thing.

MUSKIE. Is it natural for you to seek victory?

RANARIDDH. Hun Sen will not have a military victory and the resistance won't have one, but with enough successes from our side, both Vietnam and Hun Sen will realize the need for a political solution. Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments. I don't remember who said that.

STAFF QUESTION. What about Thai Prime Minister Chatichai's initiative?

RANARIDDH. Nobody is against a cease-fire, but we didn't agree how and when to do it. We say it must come with a comprehensive solution. They say it must come now.

Under Le Duc Tho and Kissinger,¹⁴ there was a cease-fire without a comprehensive solution. Laos 1962¹⁵ and Paris 1973 could happen again. We refuse it because it would protect Hun Sen. There are no guarantees about the Vietnamese withdrawal and Hun Sen would remain.

Chatichai must do it because of his country. He must do his best to try to achieve something. But, he had no doubt that he could do this. Sihanouk will go to Jakarta for a third time, but we must do something to strengthen our hands first.

STAFF QUESTION. Khieu Samphan said there were 80,000 Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia and about 1 million settlers.

RANARIDDH. I quote the Time's military (column). They say about 50,000 Vietnamese are disguised in one way or another. Hor Nam Hong¹⁶ said publicly that Cambodia is open to observers and two journalists said they thought there were 500,000 to 1 million settlers.

MUSKIE. What about an open seat at the United Nations?

RANARIDDH. We definitely do not accept a vacant seat now. There is no precedent on an open seat.

STAFF QUESTION. Will the Khmer Rouge seek a military victory?

RANARIDDH. I think the Khmer Rouge can achieve a quick military victory, but they will exercise restraint because it is better to have a political solution.

MUSKIE. I have real doubts that the Khmer Rouge would exercise restraint to deny themselves a victory if they thought they could get it.

RANARIDDH. In refusing the Khmer Rouge a political option, you may have the Khmer Rouge back by force. There is a 50-percent chance of war. If they are not in a political solution, there is a 100-percent chance of war. We should invite them in so the Khmer Rouge have no pretext for fighting. If they fight after that, we can take other measures. A free election will give us a chance to say no to the Khmer Rouge.

In free elections, I will definitely be a candidate.

MEETING WITH GEN. CHAOVALIT YONGCHAIYUT

MUSKIE. Can you tell me about the military situation in Cambodia now and in the next 6 months?

CHAOVALIT. No one will win in the next 6 months. It will go on for a while, then stop. In 1 or 2 years they will sit down and talk. Our Prime Minister is trying to get them to talk. * * * Vietnam says it is out, but nobody knows if it is true. * * * They have a lot of Vietnamese settlers there. Hun Sen said they have about 600,000.

MUSKIE. Is the Indochina Federation still something to talk about?

CHAOVALIT. Yes. It still is, the way ASEAN thinks about the solidarity of ASEAN. We have hostility, but we have friendship to some degree. More than 50 percent of the Cambodian Politburo is ethnic Thai.

MUSKIE. Are arms moving through Thailand to both sides of the conflict?

CHAOVALIT. No sir. Beforehand maybe the answer was "yes," but now there is very little. We have to be careful on this. We are asking every country to stop supporting every faction.

MUSKIE. Are there any problems with the U.S. position?

CHAOVALIT. Never, sir.

MUSKIE. Would a political settlement that includes the Khmer Rouge work?

CHAOVALIT. We must define the word "Khmer Rouge" first. All Khmer Rouge have the right to choose. The Khmer Rouge have about 50,000 people, judged by the number of tons of rice they consume. There are about 100 leaders. Half of them have learned from their mistakes.

MUSKIE. Are free and fair elections possible?

CHAOVALIT. They are very difficult.

MUSKIE. What is your view of Hun Sen?

CHAOVALIT. Hun Sen has not consulted with Vietnam's Foreign Minister before doing everything. We can't tell the degree of his independence. But, he depends on his sponsor more or less.

From the meeting with General Chaovalit, the Muskies went directly to the airport for a Thai Air flight to Hanoi.

VIETNAM

The flight from Bangkok emerged out of the mist of a drizzling afternoon rain, to land at the Hanoi airport in a landscape of mountains and rice paddies. Two Vietnamese Foreign Ministry staff met the Muskie party on the tarmac.

Passing along rural roads lined with small dwellings and stalls, the Muskie group was taken into the heart of Hanoi, to the government guesthouse.

After a preliminary meeting with Dang Nghiem Bai, director of the North America Department of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, Muskie was escorted to the Presidential Palace for a formal discussion with Do Muoi, the Chairman of Vietnam's Council of Ministers—like Muskie, a man in his seventies.

Television and still cameras were present to record the event. It was the first time that Do Muoi had held such a meeting with an American.¹⁷ It was the first time that Muskie had met a ranking Vietnamese official.

A long working session with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, for years Vietnam's most senior and active diplomat, took place the following day.

At the time of the Muskie visit in the autumn of 1989, Vietnam was in the early stages of its first successful effort since the end of the war with the United States to modernize its economy and open diplomatic and economic relations with free-market countries.

Vietnam's forced diplomatic isolation from the wealthier economies of the world retarded its development over the 1970's and much of the 1980's, while the inadequacy of functioning internal markets restricted the level of growth that could be achieved on a year-to-year basis. In spite of U.S. trade and aid embargoes, the involvement of Western humanitarian, development, and commercial groups in Vietnam grew over the late 1980's. Business interests became more active after the Vietnamese began taking steps to loosen central control over their economy in 1986. In particular, the Singaporeans, Japanese, and the Thai began the process of engaging with the Vietnamese economy following the implementation of liberalization measures.

With its large and rapidly growing population—about 65 million at the end of the 1980's—and limited arable land area, the Vietnamese agricultural sector was pressed after the war. With reforms, however, and new technology, rice production increased to the point where it met and even exceeded the requirements of self-sufficiency in 1988 and 1989. Progress in other food product areas was weaker, and industrial growth remained slow.

The United States Government maintained a formal policy of nonrecognition of the Vietnamese government after the fall of Saigon in 1975, along with an embargo on trade and aid, and restrictions on humanitarian assistance. A number of official contacts were made nonetheless. Starting in 1987, the assignment of John W. "Jack" Vessey, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the role of special envoy for MIA/POW discussions resulted in considerable progress on the issue of finding, identifying, and returning the remains of U.S. servicemen killed during the war. Nonetheless, in spite of this progress and the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, at the time of the Muskie trip, the United States was still withholding recognition and maintaining a strong policy against trade and assistance.

This trip to Hanoi was Muskie's first to the northern Vietnamese capital. On earlier trips, to South Vietnam, he had traveled as a representative of the United States. On this occasion, he was traveling as a private citizen, but he and his party were given a formal welcome by officials of the Vietnamese government.

Muskie's meeting with the Chairman of Vietnam's Council of Ministers, Do Muoi, was one of the central events of the trip, both as symbol and as substance.

The session with the 73-year-old head of state took place in the presence of a number of aides, at an evening session in the Presidential Palace, a formal building erected by the French to house its chief colonial administrator.

In an atmosphere of cordial formality, the two leaders began by sharing observations on their age, their grandchildren, and their perspectives. Do Muoi indicated that he welcomed Muskie's visit as a hopeful sign of progress on the issue of normalization. He spoke at length about Cambodia, saying that Vietnam needed to extricate itself from involvement there in order to concentrate on its own development problems. He expressed a strong interest in improving relations with the United States, and with China as well.

Referring to the issue of nonrecognition, Do Muoi said, "I don't understand the policy of the U.S. Government." He questioned why progress on the issue of missing servicemen and the withdrawal of troops from Cambodia had not led to normalization, since U.S. policy statements in the 1980's had implied that such actions would.

Muskie told Do Muoi that he came as a private citizen, but intended to share his observations and judgments with leaders in the United States and with the public. He spoke of the Vietnam war, of U.S. perceptions at the time, and of the evolution of his own understanding of the issue.

He said that he believed that the United States had made a mistake in its judgments about Ho Chi Minh and had misread the history of Vietnam. He expressed a hope that there could soon be progress toward a resolution of differences between the two nations. He said also that he believed that solving the problem of Cambodia could help "close the door on the wars of the past and open the door to the economic relations of the future."

With respect to Cambodia, Do Muoi said that Cambodians should settle their internal affairs by themselves, and that the United States, the Soviet Union, and China should discuss the issue, and persuade Thailand not to give sanctuary to the Khmer Rouge.

After an hour of exchange, Do Muoi and Muskie parted, expressing the hope that they might meet again in the future.

The following are notes from the meeting with Do Muoi. A Vietnamese Foreign Ministry staff member translated.

MEETING WITH DO MUOI

DO MUOI. We welcome you to visit Vietnam.

MUSKIE. I came here with great curiosity. * * * How is your country doing at the present time?

DO MUOI. We were unlucky under French domination. The economic level of Vietnam is low due to the destruction of the war. Vietnam is the poorest country in the world.

We are trying to end the war in Kampuchea to concentrate our efforts on rebuilding the country. If we didn't carry out the struggle, we would not have independence and freedom. Now, we have everything. We want to live in peace. * * *

We are encouraging the private sector. Our policy is to broaden relationships with other countries—with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and with other countries.

We want normalized relations with the United States. We wish normal relations with China, too.

MUSKIE. What about relations with the United States?

DO MUOI. There have been some U.S. businessmen here. We understand many want to have relations, but the U.S. Government doesn't permit it.

MUSKIE. The challenge is to straighten out the relationship between the two governments.

DO MUOI. The Vietnamese and the American people both want relations. * * *

Up to now, I don't understand the policy of the U.S. Government.

MUSKIE. The history of the war is not yet behind us. There is a growing perception that the Pacific Rim has an important part to play in the economic future of the United States. Americans who have a long view understand that the best way to go is economic and political relations, to put behind us the idea that the Pacific is a place of conflict and war.

The Cambodia issue gives us an opportunity. If we can resolve the issue of Cambodia, we can close the door on the wars of the past and open the door to the economic relations of the future.

I've been here only 1 week and I've heard all points of view discussed. It seems there is a way to sort out the issues and to bring peace. If I can learn anything about how to do it, I will communicate this back home.

You've taken an important step in withdrawing your troops from Cambodia; you mentioned that as a positive development, so what is the next step that we should take?

DO MUOI. I don't understand U.S. policy toward Vietnam. The history was caused by the United States and not by Vietnam.

MUSKIE. We do have the responsibility.

DO MUOI. Regarding Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge were helped by China and there was genocide. We went in to help at the request of the Cambodian people. * * *

Now that the Cambodians are stronger, we withdraw. It would be better if we could withdraw with a political settlement, but I don't think the U.S. Government should cling to its statements about a settlement before normal relations can be established. The internal affairs of the Cambodian people should be settled by themselves. The big powers should not get involved. If they con-

tinue arming the Cambodians, the situation will be worse. If China and the United States stop and Vietnam leaves Cambodia alone and the Thais stop providing sanctuary, everything will go well.

MUSKIE. What about the Soviet Union?

Do MUOI. The same thing. They must not interfere. Big countries should be held responsible for the present situation. The United States, the Soviet Union, and China should discuss this matter. They should persuade Thailand not to give sanctuary to the Khmer Rouge. Internal affairs should be settled by Cambodia.

The United States says that until there is a comprehensive solution, there will be no normal relations. I hope the U.S. Government would reconsider its policy. Why is the U.S. Government so cool?

MUSKIE. We made a mistake. We misread history 25 years ago. I'm persuaded that what is said here now about Ho Chi Minh is historically true. We didn't see it that way at that point. It is now up to us to correct that. The American people see we made a mistake. If we can find a way to communicate, we can find a way to correct it.

Do MUOI. We should look to the future.

MUSKIE. Yes, indeed.

Do MUOI. Because history moves forever.

MUSKIE. We should look back to keep the wisdom of the past but not the mistakes.

Do MUOI. We must move fast to avoid mistakes.

MUSKIE. And we must do it while you and I are still here.

Do MUOI. I'd like to return to economics. There is no food shortage this year. We can export about 1 million tons of rice. There is no shortage because of new technology, the contract system and the changed system of distribution of food.

There are no American goods in the market, but there are a lot of Chinese goods. Politically, it is very tense, but economically, it is OK.

MUSKIE. In the long run, economics will control.

Do MUOI. We wish to see American goods in Vietnam and Vietnamese goods in the United States. Our shrimp are very good. We have tropical fruits * * *

MUSKIE. Japan and Germany were our enemies in World War II, yet today our relations with them are very important. Once we put our differences behind us, our future has no limit.

Do MUOI. Without the help of the United States, Japan would not be in the position it is in today. * * * I hope we will meet many times in the future.

MUSKIE. You have made me very comfortable. Thank you.

On the morning following his meeting with Do Muoi, Muskie joined Vietnam's Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier, Nguyen Co Thach, and several other aides and officials, for a working session.

In his presentations, Thach expanded on the themes that Do Muoi had introduced, developing each in some detail. He talked about Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, describing the stages by which he said a transfer of responsibility to the Phnom Penh forces had taken place over a period of a couple of years.

He discussed the issue of powersharing in an interim Cambodian government, citing three alternative approaches to this question: the imposition of a four-party arrangement by the international community; leaving the issue entirely to the four Khmer factions; or, negotiating a neutral interim government, modelled on the government of Austria. He argued for the latter approach, with a "step-by-step" process to achieving such a result, starting with a cease-fire—following the logic recommended by Thai Prime Minister Chatichai.

Thach, like Do Muoi, spent a good deal of his time with Muskie on the topic of China, saying that "it is a great mistake of U.S. policy to focus so much on China" generally, in addition to concerning itself specifically with China's interests in supporting the Khmer Rouge.

He also talked about Vietnam's relations with the United States and with the Soviet Union.

Muskie asked Thach in particular for his judgment about the strength of the Phnom Penh government, and what he thought the prospects were for a Khmer Rouge victory. Thach dismissed this as unlikely, but also said that, should such an outcome occur, Vietnam would turn to the international community for a response before considering any return of their own forces.

The following are notes from the meeting with Nguyen Co Thach. A Vietnamese government official translated.

MEETING WITH NGUYEN CO THACH

THACH. Some have blamed Vietnam for the failure of Paris. Why would we cause it to fail? We want to have peace.

After withdrawal, the people of Cambodia cannot accept the return of Pol Pot. It is very different from Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the concern of Afghanistan is peace. In Afghanistan they have one evil, war, and they have Allah. In Cambodia, they have two evils—war and Pol Pot, and they do not have Allah.

We must judge the Cambodian situation by [triangulation], like looking for oil. You must go for three points: political, economic, and military. These three points are not in the same line.

Regarding the military aspect—since 1982, we have been withdrawing from Cambodia. First, we said we would leave by the end of 1990, within the context of a political settlement. By the end of 1987, we had withdrawn half our troops—100,000. There were 100,000 left. By 1987, we realized we could take them out by the end of 1990 without any political settlement. We took out 74 outposts of the Khmer Rouge and 70 were given to the Cambodian army.

By 1988, we realized that the PRK army could stand. At that time Pol Pot would take up to 10 outposts back, but would keep them, at the longest, 1 month. It has been up and down, but we know that they can stand. So, we took out 50,000 more, and we said we would get out by the end of 1990 without a political settlement or by the end of 1989 or the beginning of 1990 with a political settlement.

MUSKIE. Will it remain stable? Are there disguised forces in Cambodia?

THACH. If we still wanted our forces there, we would have them there. Nobody forced us to withdraw unilaterally. If the Vietnamese are not out, the Vietnamese people would be asking, "where is my family, where is my son, where is my husband?" The Cambodians would not trust their government if the Vietnamese were still there.

MUSKIE. Would it be valuable to have an outside force verify withdrawal?

THACH. Yes, but it must be impartial. The United Nations recognizes Pol Pot, who does everything to destabilize Phnom Penh. We could accept the U.N. if they didn't recognize either government.

The United Nations condemns Vietnam, but it doesn't say anything about genocide. The United Nations is not impartial.

The second situation is the political situation. The Cambodian people cannot accept the return of the Khmer Rouge.

MUSKIE. Does getting rid of Pol Pot mean him as an individual?

THACH. If the supplies from China and Thailand stop, Pol Pot could fade away. They are like the Mafia. You can't accept the Mafia. The world is still hunting for former SS. This is a question of morality. We must have a clemency policy. We would not accept those who carry out the genocide. We would accept the followers, but not under the label of the Khmer Rouge. This clemency policy could erode the reign of Pol Pot. But, this is up to the Cambodians to decide.

MUSKIE. What kind of political settlement do you see?

THACH. The external aspect has been solved. Now there are two questions. The first is the question of genocide. The second is the question of the interim government.

Regarding the first question, we must not legitimize the genocide of Pol Pot or give them a legal right in the government.

For the sharing of power, in a transition period, this is not easy. Right now Hun Sen has the whole cake in his pocket, but he is being asked to give away three-fourths of it for nothing. It is an internal problem, but concerned countries do have questions.

There are three options. One is to intervene and impose an interim government. The second is a *laissez faire* or hands-off attitude and the third would be to neutralize an interim government like Austria. If you neutralize the conflicts and the government is not the enemy of any outside power, then no one will intervene.

If you do the first option, intervention, you will have endless conflicts. If Pol Pot is included, the Cambodian people will not be happy. If you do the second, hands-off option, it will make trouble for foreigners, too. If you do the third neutralizing option, it is like electing the Pope. If the Thai and Cambodians can be friendly and if the Cambodians and the Vietnamese can be friendly, then we don't care what they are cooking there.

MUSKIE. How do you get to that point?

THACH. Foreign powers say the Cambodians must be friendly to all countries. Then, you lock the door and let them elect the Pope. You wait for the smoke to rise. If it can't be done now, it should be done in the future.

MISKIE. What will happen in the next 6 months?

THACH. There will be a test on the battlefield; but, the other side cannot succeed. If Pol Pot does succeed, the responsibility will be on the United States, China, and so on. If the Khmer Rouge capture anything, there will be panic in the world. Southeast Asia will see the Chinese hand become too long and they are very hairy hands.

MUSKIE. Could the Khmer Rouge succeed enough to make the Vietnamese return?

THACH. If we go back, it will be a great failure for us. We must put this burden on the world community. Those who condemned Vietnam must decide if they want to save the Cambodian people or not. Let the moralists in the U.S. State Department decide what to do, and those who have supported the CGDK.

We asked the United States and China not to allow the return of Pol Pot and to stop giving arms to them. A zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, that is what we need. The United States will not come back, but the Chinese are omnipresent.

Sooner or later the Soviet Union will move out of Cam Ranh Bay.¹⁸ We will then have double neutrality—the neutrality of Cambodia and the neutrality of Southeast Asia. Regarding the United States bases in the Philippines, we are not against them as long as they are not used against Vietnam.

The third situation is the economic situation. In 1979, Cambodia was near starvation. In 1988 and 1989, Cambodia has become self-sufficient in rice. They produce 400 kilos of rice per capita in Cambodia. In Vietnam we have only 300 kilos per capita.

This means the peasants have confidence in the regime and political and military economic stability. Hun Sen is very independent, intelligent, and capable. If they can build Angkor Wat, they can lose faith in Pol Pot.

THACH. I would now like to talk about United States-Vietnamese relations. The war was a mistake, but the bigger mistake is not the war. It is the United States reaction to the omnipresence of China in United States policy decisions. The shadow of China is very dark on the State Department. After normalization, everything is linked to the situation of China.

The Vietnamese are only one pawn on the chessboard between China and the United States. We are no more. We are no less. In 1978 and 1979, the China card was played in relation to Vietnamese normalization with the United States, and to Pol Pot in Cambodia. It is immoral, but the China card now comes again. We are always tools of somebody. The Vietnam war is only a by-product—it is not the main mistake.

Now, China's ambition is great, but its means are limited. So, how do they work this? No. 1, they aid fights against colonialism in the world; No. 2, they aid the Communist Party in Southeast Asia; No. 3, they play the Southeast Asian countries off among themselves. The Chinese did not want the Vietnamese to win the war.

Thai Prime Minister Chatichai and others in Southeast Asia are becoming more and more independent. If the United States wants to please China and to support Pol Pot, it will not be accepted by the world.

THACH. A French company is negotiating with the Chinese to work with the Vietnamese in order to get access to the sea, and to open the railways from China through the Vietnamese-Chinese border to the sea. The Chinese have sent two experts to Cambodia and they met with officials in Phnom Penh. An article was printed in China about the resuscitation of Phnom Penh. They will send a Foreign Ministry representative to Phnom Penh under the label of a businessman. The United States will be a late-comer.

Regarding the United States and Vietnamese relations, we are not beggars; if you beg, they don't give you what you want anyway. So, we don't beg. In the United States, the moral wounds are still bleeding. In Vietnam, we have the material wounds of war, but not the moral wounds of war.

Regarding the 25-mile travel restriction on Vietnam officials in your country—when U.S. Special Envoy General Vessey is here, he can go anywhere. He invited me to his home in Idaho (sic), but I was not able to get permission to travel there.

One-way traffic cannot work. It may work in New York City, but it doesn't work in bilateral relations.

The general impression of both the Do Muoi meeting and the working session with Thach was that the Vietnamese leaders were quite concerned with the situation in Cambodia, but as a political rather than a military matter. It appeared that they appreciated the opportunity to share their views with a senior American and that they were especially eager to convey their interest in establishing relations with the United States.

The Muskie party's time in Hanoi included two special visitor events. One was an evening of ethnic Vietnamese music, performed by a family of musician-ethnographers, who were supported by government funds. They played a series of string and wind instruments gathered from the numerous ethnic subgroups located throughout Vietnam.

The second occasion was a visit to the Ho Chi Minh residence, maintained as a museum.

CAMBODIA

When the Muskie party was still in Bangkok, about to depart for Hanoi, the only Air Vietnam flight scheduled to Phnom Penh for the coming week was canceled. A decision was made to fly instead to Ho Chi Minh City—Saigon—to remain there overnight, and then to proceed to Phnom Penh via car along Route 1, a trip of about 7 hours.

Out of Ho Chi Minh City, the group traveled westward to the Cambodia-Vietnam border, where they were met by officials from the Phnom Penh government's Foreign Ministry. Changing cars, they then continued into Cambodia, on the same road taken a week earlier by Vietnamese troops and vehicles pulling out of Cambodia. The entire trip was completed without incident or difficulty.

The road crosses the Mekong via a small ferry, at a settlement called Neak Luong, in the area that was portrayed in the film, "The Killing Fields." The Muskie party stopped here for lunch, and an hour-and-one-half wait with trucks, bicycles, and a few cars waiting for a turn to load for the trip across the Mekong.

It is approximately 50 kilometers from Neak Luong to the capital. Laid out to accommodate wide boulevards and gracious villas, Phnom Penh offered the approaching visitor an appealing first view. Its main streets were intact, and a noticeable effort had been made to restore buildings that deteriorated during the Khmer Rouge period. At the same time, side streets remained unpaved, there was little street lighting and much of even the central area's housing appeared primitive.

There was busy traffic of bicycles and bicycle rickshaws (cyclos), the primary mode of transportation; cars and trucks were rare. A tour of the city took in the elaborate Royal Palace complex; a river basin park; the temple monument, Penh hill, or phnom, that gave the city its name; and the street vendors, government buildings, covered markets, and occasional new international construction project that constituted ongoing daily life at the end of 1989.

Western goods were in evidence and trading was brisk in the markets, where state controls had been lifted. Blue signs, the mark of private entrepreneur-licenses, dominated the run of shops lining main avenues; red state-only signs were scarce.

Muskie was housed at Chamcar Mon, a stark but imposing residential complex built during the regime of Prince Norodom Sihanouk on the northwestern area of the city. Its accommodations were spare. Ten years after the wreckage left by the Khmer Rouge, the government was able to provide a window air conditioner and small refrigerator for each room in the official guesthouse. The water, sewer, and electrical systems in Phnom Penh were old, and subject to frequent failure, a fact that affected Chamcar Mon as well as the city at large. The official events of Muskie's first full day in Cambodia were oriented around visits to two monuments to the devastation of the Khmer Rouge period.

A former secondary school building in the middle of the city, Tuol Sleng, was used as a torture center by the Khmer Rouge. There, Khmer Rouge cadres whose acts or associations had marked them for retribution, intellectuals, and other enemies of the regime were held and abused until they died. Preserved as a museum, Tuol Sleng provided photographs, paintings, chains, and other restraints, and individual cells, to inform the visitor about the grim realities of Pol Pot Time.

A short distance outside of Phnom Penh, at the site of a former Chinese burial ground, situated at the edge of a vast expanse of open, partially flooded ground, were the mass graves of Cheung Ek. For some years, the bones and skulls of Khmer Rouge victims unearthed at this site after the Vietnamese invasion in 1979 were stored on wooden racks, open to public view. During the period just prior to the Muskie trip, the racks were removed. A group of skulls was moved to a new memorial tower, or stupa, at the edge of the gravesites, and a board of photographs was placed nearby, to provide a constant reminder of the full grimness of the original scene.

Muskie was shown around the torture center at Tuol Sleng, and was driven to the burial ground at Cheung Ek. He spoke briefly at the latter site with a young man visiting there with his family. On the return trip into Phnom Penh, the Muskie party stopped to question a group of soldiers resting at their post at the side of the road. Consciousness both of the events of the Khmer Rouge period itself, and of the shadow of the war, were readily elicited.

A separate trip, to a rehabilitation facility set up by the American Friends Service Committee and run by Cambodians provided an additional picture of the effects of the continuing civil war and isolation. Amputees—casualties primarily of mines—were being fitted with locally constructed prostheses in a facility that also cared for infants affected by polio. American and Cambodian workers both stressed the difficulty of providing care with outside assistance restricted. They also indicated that the facility could accommodate only a fraction of those who needed rehabilitation services to be able to function.

On Monday, October 9, 1989, almost 25 years after coming to Phnom Penh as a guest of Prince Norodom Sihanouk during the Vietnam war, Muskie was again meeting with the head of a Cambodian government. During most of the intervening years, U.S. relations with Cambodia—linked closely to U.S. objectives in Vietnam—had been either difficult or nonexistent. As Secretary of State in 1980, Muskie was involved in internal U.S. Government debates over how to respond to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. It was that occupation that brought to power the government administered by Prime Minister Hun Sen, with whom Muskie was to meet.

The 3-hour session with the young government leader was serious and intense.

A major focus of the meeting was the question of prospects for a political settlement, and the related issue of how the military conflict between the resistance forces and the government would evolve in the absence of significant numbers of Vietnamese troops supporting the government.

Prior to the Paris conference, it had appeared to many observers that Hun Sen and Sihanouk had agreed at least in principle on a process for working together. At Paris, that apparent agreement had dissolved, primarily over the issue of Khmer Rouge participation in a proposed interim government. Would the battlefield now determine the outcome for Cambodia, or was there still room for negotiation? What was Hun Sen's position on powersharing? What was his judgment of the military situation? Would he ultimately accept a role for the Khmer Rouge?

Muskie began by referring to Hun Sen's published comments on the Paris conference, in which he stressed the fact that there had been a number of points of agreement, but also cited several areas of disagreement as serious obstacles to a settlement. In response, Hun Sen said that there was a failure to reach agreement in Paris because the other side rejected all offers except the so-called quadripartite, or four-party powersharing arrangement, and because there was an unwillingness to acknowledge the Vietnamese withdrawal.

He indicated that the failure of Paris to achieve a political agreement, and therefore a cease-fire, would inevitably mean a continuation of the war. He also said, however, that he expected the conflict to continue at a low level. He said that he did not expect the resistance to be able to take full control of any areas of significance.

Muskie then raised the question of how much room there might be among the different positions for pursuing a political solution. In particular, he asked whether Hun Sen would consider it acceptable to distinguish rank and file Khmer Rouge adherents from Pol Pot and other leaders, as the Vietnamese had indicated in Hanoi the previous week.

Hun Sen vigorously rejected the idea of reintroducing the Khmer Rouge as a coherent political and military force into the structure of the Cambodian government. "If we allow them to have military and political power here, could we control the civil war which would explode inside this city?" He asked, making an analogy with the situation in Lebanon.

He also said, however, that "people or groups" who dissociated themselves from the Khmer Rouge and renounced the genocidal behavior of the Khmer Rouge regime would be "welcomed back to the community." He made it clear that this amnesty was not intended to extend to the Khmer Rouge leadership.

Hun Sen emphasized that his objective was to "discard the Khmer Rouge" as a force in Cambodia, and that he was only interested in a political settlement that would do that. He rejected the idea of giving power to the Khmer Rouge to satisfy China, saying that this was "not in the best interest of the Cambodian people."

He proposed instead maintaining the political status quo until elections, with overall supervision of the process undertaken by a "supreme council," to be composed jointly of his administration, and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, headed by Sihanouk. Under this arrangement, he said, "my government will be only a caretaker government, managing daily life, to avoid chaos."

In response to Muskie's questions, he described the functions of the supreme council as arranging for elections, and monitoring and supervising a cease-fire.

Muskie pressed Hun Sen on the question of elections, and on a possible role for an international force in Cambodia. Hun Sen indicated such a force would be necessary, to help the supreme council carry out its tasks, but also to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal and monitor the cessation of foreign military aid.

The question of an appropriate international entity was discussed, with Hun Sen arguing for an arrangement that would involve the authority of the Paris conference—where he was a party—in addition to the United Nations, where he was not. He said that, in the absence of a political settlement and a process for getting to multiparty elections, Cambodia would nonetheless plan to hold its own National Assembly elections in 1990.

"I want to stress my respect for the right of assured self-determination," Hun Sen said, indicating that he believed a negotiated political settlement would be key to establishing the conditions for this in Cambodia.

During the meeting, Hun Sen spent some time discussing the non-Communist resistance forces in general, and the role of Sihanouk in particular, emphasizing his continuing interest in the involvement of Sihanouk. He returned frequently to the subject of the Khmer Rouge, speaking at one point at some length about Sihanouk's relationship to them. Referring to his own past participation in the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen said, "from 1975 to now, Sihanouk has been with the Khmer Rouge, and I have not."

Hun Sen also called attention to the issue of verifying the Vietnamese withdrawal as a first step in the process of moving toward a full-scale political settlement.

Muskie concluded the session by noting that, although he was in Cambodia as a private citizen, he nonetheless intended to communicate to the U.S. Government his findings and observations. "I will consider long and thoughtfully what I've heard in this meeting," he said. "There is no magic. But, I'm willing to try."

Following are notes from the meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen. In this session, Khmer-English translation was provided by a Cambodian official.

MEETING WITH HUN SEN

HUN SEN. I must apologize for the rough road from Ho Chi Minh city to Phnom Penh.

MUSKIE. It's no problem. Maine's country roads are very rough too. The important road I'm traveling now is that of the problems of Southeast Asia. I hope to have some sense of how rough that road may be.

It's been 25 years since I last visited Phnom Penh. I'm very pleased that the Prime Minister has given me time to discuss the situation. I have read the transcript of your statement after the Paris conference. The points made are grounds for considerable discussion.

HUN SEN. Where should we start? I'm ready to discuss every issue.

MUSKIE. The Prime Minister said that there are seven points of agreement, and four points of disagreement, which he described as obstacles. Those four points are particularly difficult issues, as I see them. But, before we get to them, I would appreciate the Prime Minister's description of the present military situation here in Cambodia.

HUN SEN. You are aware of the situation after Paris: It will be unavoidable continued war. After the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, there will be continued war. The other side has rejected all offers if there is no quadripartite government that includes the Khmer Rouge.

The issue of the last 10 years was to get the Vietnamese out. Now they are out, and people don't recognize the withdrawal. They refuse to send anyone to see the withdrawal. They have created a new pretext with regard to the existence of more than 1 million Vietnamese settlers, or the issue of Vietnamese soldiers supposed to be disguised in our army.

They have refused the cease-fire which is proposed by Thai Prime Minister Chatichai. They have also refused to stop supplying arms to other Cambodian parties. As a result, we know once the Vietnamese are out, the war would continue. For us, it is not surprising, because when the Vietnamese stay here, there is no fighting.

We don't want fighting. It is not good for the people of Cambodia. That's why we have agreed with Chatichai on a cease-fire. After the completion of the withdrawal, with no cease-fire, it is unavoidable that the war will continue. The problem is, can we allow the war to increase or can we contain it? There are a lot of countries that say they want to avoid a civil war after the Vietnamese withdrawal.

In order to contain the war, you must stop providing military assistance to all Cambodian parties. If you continue to provide military assistance, you can't find an agreement among the parties and you will not reach an agreement on a cease-fire. So, we appeal to all countries to stop providing military assistance after the Vietnamese withdrawal. They should agree to a cease-fire. This is one way of avoiding civil war. The countries involved have not answered our appeal or carried out their pledge to stop military assistance.

Now, about the military situation after the Vietnamese withdrawal: If you look at our 10-year conflict, you see no signs of serious flaring up. We knew beforehand our enemies would launch an attack after the withdrawal. They wouldn't negotiate, therefore, they would attack. They knew the Vietnamese had withdrawn, so during the international conference, they pulled up their strength. On the September 30, the day of the traditional Cambodian festival, the enemy started to launch attacks along the Thai-Cambodian border. Their objective was to attack and to take control of Pailin and Sisophon, about 30 kilometers from the border. Apart from that, they also launched an attack on some points along the border.

When they launched the attack from inside Thailand, it was no surprise to us, because they are in Thailand, this is their stronghold. We don't want to counterattack against these sanctuaries inside Thailand, so the bulk of their strength has been behind them. Well, just like rubber, if you don't stretch it, it is bulky, but when you stretch it, it gets thinner.

They have had a lot of casualties in Sisophon. The Voice of America broadcasts resistance propaganda—that they walked right into the marketplace. They did not walk in, brother, we brought them in. We captured them. Military activities were only active on the September 30. From then on they have very much decreased. There are border spots, though, where the military activities still go on.

Lately the other side has changed strategy, one that we regard as most odious. I just received this information before coming here. They gathered 12,000 refugees from site II and pushed them ahead of the army. They did this once before, in March 1989. Then, we were forced to abandon some of our positions along the border to avoid killing the refugees who were forced to march in front of the army. Since they had no military successes, they forced the refugees to walk in front.

I don't know how our armed forces will react because I just received the information. I must appeal to the international community not to let those refugees be used for military ends. They must be far away from the military activity and far away from the conflict zone.

Regarding Pailin, whether the Pol Pot army is active, whether they intend to control the Pailin area—even before the withdrawal, they fought there. Although there is sporadic fighting, we are still in control of that area. Last week we allowed about 20 foreign reporters to see the place. We have done a lot of things that we are not able to show the outside world. So, if anybody wants to see this, we will show them.

Another spot is in Siem Reap province. This is given within the resistance coalition to the ANS, Sihanouk's forces. They intended to use this as a seat for Sihanouk's forces. So far, there has been no fighting in that place.

Inside the country, after the withdrawal, a lot of our enemies have come to submit themselves. Some of their soldiers seem to have recognized the sincerity of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, so they surrendered in order to come back into the community.

In the next few days we expect the situation will remain at the same level. This is the situation after withdrawal.

MUSKIE. Will the military situation change significantly in the next 6 months?

HUN SEN. Well, we expect the conflict will continue and the situation might change, but there is no expectation of the loss of any town along the border—maybe

the increased activities of subversive destruction of district towns, but there is no possibility the enemy will occupy a district town.

Like I said earlier, a rubberband stretched gets thinner, so if they want to attack provincial capitals far from the border, they won't be able to do so. Military acts along the Thai-Cambodian border where there is no population will not be very significant.

I'd like to talk about the situation in Pailin. Pailin, before 1970, was a nice little town. After 1970, it had very little population. After 1975, when Pol Pot took control of the country, there was no population in Pailin. In the last 10 years, it has not had much population. It is rich in gemstones. There are some of our population who went there for the mining.

The Pol Potists have sold some pieces of land to Thai businessmen for mining gemstones. In 1989, we have captured more than 400 Thai businessmen and miners, but we have released them all. Pol Pot is trying to grab this area to sell these stones. If they can't control it, they won't control any population.

MUSKIE. If the military situation remains as is, attention must be focused on a nonmilitary solution. It would seem to me that the Prime Minister would agree.

In which area is the greatest promise for developing agreements? For example, in your statement, the Prime Minister made clear that you were opposed to participation by Pol Pot's group in an interim government. But, you indicated you were not opposed to some representation for the Khmer Rouge people who supported the Pol Pot regime. It is interesting that I also heard this point of view in Vietnam.

HUN SEN. Right now, the greatest obstacle is how to deal with the Pol Pot issue.

In the past, China had three major obstacles against better relations with the Soviet Union. These three have been settled. Now, they have put up a fourth obstacle. This fourth obstacle is that China tried to force us to accept the settlement with Pol Pot, so that he can share politically and militarily in the government.

The problem is whether to reward or condemn the Pol Potists. I don't understand why the crimes and killings should be rewarded by giving them shared power. Yes, opinions have been expressed that we should give some power to the Khmer Rouge to satisfy China. This is using Cambodia to satisfy China; it is not in the best interests of the Cambodian people.

Some countries dislike Pol Pot but agree that he must share politically and militarily. We can extrapolate that they are taking into consideration their relationship with China. I've talked extensively with Sihanouk. He says he dislikes Pol Pot, but he must support Pol Pot to maintain relations between Sihanouk and China. I asked him if he will solve the problem for the benefit of the Cambodian people or the benefit of the Chinese.

We cannot allow Cambodian people to be taken hostage. They can't be a bargaining chip in order for Pol Pot to maintain his civil war.

There are attempts at making a distinction between the Pol Potists and the Khmer Rouge party. For 10 years, the Khmer Rouge have had refugee camps; the United Nations and Thailand could not prevent the violations of human rights in these camps.

We believe it is better not to allow them to return at all as a party. Could we control the civil war which would explode inside this city? In Beirut, a number of countries can't solve the problem. We can control Pol Pot along the border. If we allow a quadripartite army, can we control the Khmer Rouge armed forces?

This is one aspect of it. But, also morally, is it right to give a share of power to the Pol Pot forces? Sihanouk has other interests. Now he is more or less a hostage to the Khmer Rouge. He has lost 19 children and grandchildren; but, at Paris, in official protocols, he demanded the omission of the word genocide.

The Cambodian people cannot allow that. Should we respect the United Nations Genocide Convention, or should we reward those criminals?

If we provide political and military legitimacy, it would be a dangerous precedent. If we accept a quadripartite government, maybe in Cambodia more than four parties will spring up, because they do not want to work with the Khmer Rouge. If we, the government, join hands with Son Sann or Sihanouk's forces, maybe our people can understand this. They are not opposed to Sihanouk or Son Sann.

During the U.S. intervention in support of Lon Nol, all were opposed to Sihanouk in the city. In the rural areas, they opposed Lon Nol, because Lon Nol represented the Son Sann group. But, even so, when we started to produce a national reconciliation policy with Son Sann and Sihanouk, our population understood this. If we go a step farther to share power with the Khmer Rouge, our population will not understand us at all.

A number of countries have put too much stock in Sihanouk. He is not the father of national unity. He can't even have unity in the coalition or in his own party. He

can't even control his own sons. He can get unity among the United States, China, and the Western countries in supporting him, but he can't get the Cambodians to support him. Sihanouk lost all credibility by trying to unite the factions, and aligning himself with the Khmer Rouge.

Our government started from scratch. The most important thing is that we had a policy of opposing the Khmer Rouge. Outsiders said we survived as a government only because of Vietnam's presence. But, what about the Lon Nol government? He couldn't have stayed in power without the United States and Saigon's Republic of South Vietnam support.

If you allow the Khmer Rouge Pol Potists inside the government, there will be more than four factions inside Cambodia. I want to stress that we do not demand the elimination of the rank and file. We welcome people or groups who dissociate themselves from Pol Pot back to the community.

If we don't require that they deny Pol Pot or oppose genocide, then we give legitimacy to a genocidal regime. In the whole world, there is no other place that criminals could run for presidential office. Tuol Sleng is only a small part of the skulls of the Cambodian people.

The main obstacle to a political solution is how to settle a deal with the Pol Potists. At Paris, Sihanouk demanded deleting of the word "genocide." At the time, there was a hard struggle to maintaining that word. The cochairs told me that they would maintain it, and asked me to make further concessions.

Let me clarify that I don't just want a single word, I need to know about how to discard the Khmer Rouge themselves. I need to know concrete measures; only then can I think of making further concessions on the Pol Pot issue. Then, we can talk of setting up an interim government.

The other side had two demands that went together. One was to provide Pol Pot with a role and two was to dismantle my government and set up a new coalition government. We cannot accept that.

There are three reasons why. No. 1: to include Pol Pot and dissolve my government is an invitation to the return of Pol Pot. Everyone knows that apart from us, who else can oppose the Khmer Rouge? Son Sann and Sihanouk are Khmer Rouge allies. We can't allow the Khmer Rouge to return that easily.

No. 2: it is a violation of the rights of self-determination of the Cambodian people. The right to dissolve a government belongs to the Cambodian people. Only the people can elect or dissolve. We propose to maintain the political and military status quo until the completion of elections.

We have to set up a supreme council to organize elections. It would have a mandate to control the cease-fire and to organize and control elections under international auspices. They would have the same responsibilities in regard to military matters, except that Pol Pot must dissolve his army before allowing any former Khmer Rouge stand for elections. Other armies must cease-fire and remain in place until after the elections.

It will be the mandate of the newly elected assembly to create a new army. It can organize a new army or merge them all together.

I would like to make a small comparison. Sihanouk and Son Sann have said that elections under these circumstances are not free elections because the whole country is under our control. So, I asked Sihanouk if his election in 1955 was free.

In 1955 Sihanouk asked all political parties to lay down their arms in exchange for the ability to run for election under the authority of Prince Sihanouk. Now, our election would not be conducted under our authority, but under the authority of the supreme council.

My government would be only a caretaker government (for the functions of daily life) to avoid chaos. We won't influence the elections. We also say they keep their arms. But, in 1955 all had to abandon their arms.

No. 3: there is injustice in the proposal for a political solution. If there is a political solution, all parties must make mutual concessions to reach a common goal. But, the other side hasn't made concessions.

They try to force us to make all the concessions. They want one-fourth of the power to be given to the Khmer Rouge. We are not afraid of losing power, but if we do, please allow the Cambodian people to have security for their lives. The right to establish the future of power in Cambodia is not that of foreigners, but of the Cambodian people.

We don't understand why the outside world wants to bring the Khmer Rouge in, when Cambodians are so afraid of the Khmer Rouge. We don't understand countries that have expressed compassion for Cambodia, but don't dare to conduct their policies that way because they are afraid of China. We are alone against the Khmer Rouge.

If China rejected our solution, Thailand could stop providing sanctuaries and stop arms transit. We could force the Pol Potists to respect these conditions for the sake of Cambodian people.

Regarding U.S. Secretary of State Jim Baker's statement. In Paris, he stated opposition to the return of the Khmer Rouge, but he said he will respect Sihanouk's opinion if Sihanouk wants the Khmer Rouge included. But, he said, the degree of U.S. Government participation will depend on the degree of the Khmer Rouge participation. So, he gave a warning.

But, at the end Baker put the blame on Hun Sen and Vietnam, saying we are stubborn. With regard to this, I told Sihanouk, 'you can talk about sharing power in Paris, but not in Cambodia.'

MUSKIE. You put a lot of importance on elections. How will you organize elections in a way that is credible from the point of view of those who wish nothing but good for the Cambodian people? I am interested in the supreme council.

HUN SEN. The supreme council will be made up of two main parties. In addition, we can invite other Cambodian personalities. This supreme council would not be under the authority of any government. It would be above any government.

MUSKIE. Would it be international in any way?

HUN SEN. No; it's a national council, with Khmer Rouge personalities from abroad. It would be seated in Phnom Penh here and assisted and protected by an international control mechanism.

It would be independent and not under the influence of authorities. The supreme council could set up a number of committees. It could have political, military, and control committees. The political committee could have electoral roles and elections as a mandate. The military committee could discuss the cease-fire and how to control and maintain armed forces in place. The control committee would discuss the control of cease-fire and the control of elections with the international control mechanism.

The supreme council and elections would not be under the authority of the two current governments.

In the past, we proposed to organize elections in 3 months after the withdrawal; now, we say it will be 6 months after the withdrawal. Some say that 6 months is too short, but I think it is just enough to organize elections.

If there is too long a delay, there will be a temptation for a violation of the agreement, because you have to conduct elections under a cease-fire. Because of these conditions, maybe the parties can't sustain more than 6 months. If they move, it will be a violation of the cease-fire and the fighting will resume. I believe that 6 months is enough to organize a campaign and election.

MUSKIE. If there is no political settlement, will you still move forward with elections?

HUN SEN. Yes, because we cannot go against the provisions of our constitution. If there is a negotiated political solution, our elections will be with a number of political parties. If there is no solution, elections will be within a framework of our unique parties. Now the National Assembly is coming to the end of its terms, so we need elections for the first quarter of next year.

MUSKIE. Do you see Sihanouk as an important element in moving forward, as he suggested?

HUN SEN. We consider him as an important person. But, he may also not be very important. If he really wants to find a solution, he is important. If he places himself as an obstacle, he can also be important. The failure of Paris was because of the Khmer Rouge, but Sihanouk also played this role.

We must remind ourselves, why did Paris convene? All countries noted the importance of the Sihanouk-Hun Sen talks in May in Jakarta. In Paris, Sihanouk rejected our agreement and allied himself more closely with the Khmer Rouge.

Sihanouk no longer is the key to the solution but is the counterweight to a settlement. Put another way, he is just a part of the solution of national reconciliation. Now, the Khmer Rouge are using Sihanouk and Sihanouk is using the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge are using Sihanouk as a counterweight. Sihanouk's current strategy is to use the Pol Potists as a counterweight.

If we continue this way, Sihanouk will not be very important for national reconciliation. In the past, our population opposed the return of Pol Pot, but now some oppose the return of Sihanouk.

In 1970, when Sihanouk appealed from Beijing, tens of thousands went into the guerrilla movement in response. I was 18 and among that group.

In Jakarta, I asked Sihanouk what he would say now about the 1970 to 1975 movement against the United States. He said it was a patriotic liberation movement. Well Sihanouk was its king. I said to him, then you were the king of the

Khmer Rouge and I was only a small Khmer Rouge. But more than that, from 1975 to now, Sihanouk has still been with the Khmer Rouge and I have not. Why am I then considered Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk has escaped so easily?

Now, where is Sihanouk? How many of the Cambodian people would answer his call now? Everyone recognizes that Sihanouk's forces are the weakest of the three. Most important is his association of himself with the Khmer Rouge. No one can trust him, and he changes all the time. But, that is not important.

What is important is his association with the Khmer Rouge. If he wants to come back, he must break with the Khmer Rouge. If he breaks with the Khmer Rouge, he is important. If he stays with the Khmer Rouge, he is not important.

Many countries give him importance, but it is personal—not a reality for the Cambodian people. I have been very disappointed with the reaction of some countries. They support Sihanouk only for the sake of their political strategy, vis-a-vis China. They opposed Sihanouk from 1970 to 1975.

We have the judgment of the Lon Nol military court condemning Sihanouk to a loss of nationality. I want to ask those countries how they now regard their 1970 to 1975 policy? If they were correct then, on the Lon Nol judgment, this should matter now.

MUSKIE. Paris has been suspended for 6 months but you want to have elections in February. Is there a contradiction there?

HUN SEN. No, because there will be unilateral elections if there is no political solution. If there is a political solution, a new election can still be organized with the participation of other political parties. So, unilateral elections are not in any way intended to destroy a political settlement, but to search for it.

MUSKIE. Would the Prime Minister be interested in a continuation of negotiations during this 6-month period?

HUN SEN. Yes. We discussed this with Chatichai. Our intention is not to allow the period to go idle. In Paris, we sent a message to the cochairs asking them to help appeal for the continuation of negotiations. The proposal was rejected.

I was surprised at the postponement for 6 months. This was proposed by Khieu Samphan and Sihanouk, to test their strength. It is not good at all.

In Bangkok, I asked Chatichai to play a bridge between Sihanouk and me, to resume the talks, and to reconvene JIM III¹⁹ or reconvene Paris before the 6 months are up. We shouldn't allow a military test while arms supplies are coming in.

It is a pity my talks with Sihanouk can't be reconvened. He rejected the meeting already. Everyone knows the meeting and agreements between Hun Sen and Sihanouk are the most important. But, the Khmer Rouge don't want Sihanouk to negotiate with me.

MUSKIE. What about the cutting off of arms supplies?

HUN SEN. You understand the source of our arms supplies. From whatever source, we are ready to stop accepting them and these countries are ready to stop sending them.

Supplies to the other side are coming from China, Singapore, France, and the United States. France has denied giving arms to Sihanouk; but, they can't hide it because we have all the papers. I don't remember the whole list, but I remember 60 mortars and 50 tubes. Also, there are other weapons. It is not very much; but, it is not a contribution to a search for settlement.

Regarding U.S. assistance, I know the debate in the United States. The money provided was to buy arms.

MUSKIE. Is the Prime Minister confident in his outcome in the election?

HUN SEN. I want to stress my respect for the right of assured self-determination. Whether I win or lose, the most important is assuring the right of self-determination and safeguarding security.

If I were in this for the sake of my party or myself, why would I propose elections? If the other side wanted to continue to fight, they could not topple us and I would continue to be Prime Minister and my party would continue in power. That's not good, so that's why I'm proposing elections.

The confidence you are referring to is because the Cambodian people know very well who we are, and who have been their killers. But, I don't want to predict whether I will win or lose.

MUSKIE. Like many politicians in the United States, the Prime Minister is confident of his record. From what I've seen, my sympathies are with the Cambodian people. On Sunday, I saw people relaxed, taking their families on drives with their children. I wouldn't mind running for election myself.

Now, how do we go forward to create an international presence? What about the Secretary-General going through the Paris conference to set up an international control mechanism?

Your reluctance to accept the United Nations, I understand; but, might the resources be useful?

HUN SEN. Yes. We have already agreed on the formula you just sketched. I would like to express our view with regard to the United Nations' role. The United Nations is still seating the Khmer Rouge and has adopted resolutions that are biased.

On the other hand, we are participants at Paris, so any international control should be an "offspring" of that conference. The other side wants to give prominence to the United Nations; we, to Paris. So, we should find a compromise formula.

Our proposal is that the United Nations Secretary-General send a team to be under the Paris conference. This team would be the offspring of Paris. Paris is the father and the Secretary-General is the grandfather. We could have a mission sent to Cambodia with a compromise agreement between the role of the U.N. and the role of the Paris conference.

The important jobs of the mission would be: No. 1, to investigate and verify the withdrawal. We don't want lies used as a pretext to war. Every suspicion must be investigated, not used as a pretext for the continuation of the war. No. 2: to stop the arms supplies coming into Cambodia. If there is an agreement for a cease-fire or elections, this control mechanism could fulfill that mandate. The other side said that if there is no interim quadripartite government, they won't allow the sending of the team.

At Paris, we talked about more than 1 million Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. So, I proposed an immediate team to investigate to resolve this question. They said they can't do it because there is not yet a quadripartite government. They try to maintain the lies to continue the war.

They accuse me of being a robber; but, yet, I have asked the police to come to investigate.

MUSKIE. Are there any circumstances that the Vietnamese might be asked to come back in?

HUN SEN. If the situation is like now, there is no need for the Vietnamese to return.

While in Phnom Penh, Muskie also met with several government officials, to talk about details of the military and economic situation in the country. Efforts at development and economic liberalization were discussed, and comparisons were drawn between the devastation wrought by the Khmer Rouge, and the recovery accomplished by the present regime. Emphasis was placed in particular on reforms instituted to give peasant farmers control over their land, and on the need for infrastructure improvements.

Information gained in conversations with Western representatives of private voluntary organizations resident in Cambodia for some time basically confirmed the government's claims of material progress, indicating that this has been achieved with difficulty, in spite of the Western embargo on trade and aid.

Mention was made of rumors of corruption in the government, coinciding with increased exchange of goods with the outside world, but the main theme stressed was the extent to which the country had achieved a significant degree of political stability, and the restoration of a basic economic structure, under the present regime.

VISIT TO ANGKOR WAT

The extraordinary complex of 13th century Buddhist monuments, known collectively outside Cambodia as Angkor Wat, or Angkor Temple, is situated near an isolated rural settlement in north-central Siem Reap province, about 250 kilometers north and west of Phnom Penh, just beyond the Tonle Sap lake. The area, reopened to visitors in 1989, consists of hundreds of individual structures, of vastly different sizes.

The Muskie party's program did not fit with the infrequently scheduled regular Air Kampuchea flights, but Muskie expressed strong interest in seeing the temples to the Prime Minister. Arrangements were therefore made for Muskie to join Cambodian Defense Minister, Tie Banh, and several of his officers and staff, on a military helicopter trip into Siem Reap province, where Angkor Wat is located.

The trip took about 1 hour and 15 minutes, and provided a broad look at the landscape north of the capital, and at the Tonle Sap lake, which is said to expand during

the rainy season to an area approximately twice its primary size. The region in which the temples are located is largely flat, covered by a semitropical forest. Both from the air and on the ground, population around Angkor Wat appeared to be sparse, and not much cultivation was visible. There were some villagers coming and on the roads, however, and children playing around the temple complexes.

Although all of the numerous individual monuments have suffered from weather and looting, the large main structure that is actually Angkor Wat, or Angkor Temple—it is more than a kilometer square, surrounded by a vast moat—is relatively intact. It is approached via a massive causeway, from which one can view easily only three of its five towers.

From the end of the causeway, one enters the first of a series of passages. Each leads to a courtyard, at the inside of which is a set of steep stone stairs leading up to another passage, and a higher courtyard, until the central shrine of the Buddha is reached, far above the surrounding countryside.

An elaborate, 10-foot-high frieze has been carved on the inside walls of the arcade that runs around the entire perimeter of the main structure. The highly elaborate relief details heroic scenes of march and battle, and portrays the various court attendants of the Khmer monarchs.

Muskie's Angkor Wat guide was informed and professional, as well as courteous. He offered the information that he was a native of the province, and the father of nine children (one of whom was studying out of the country, in Czechoslovakia). He said he had worked as a guide in the area over a period of 25 years, both before and after Khmer Rouge rule, during which Angkor Wat was essentially abandoned.

The Muskie party completed its visit to Angkor Wat with a luncheon hosted by the chairman of the Siem Reap People's Committee.

Muskie's time in Cambodia included an evening with a group of representatives of American nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, some of whom had spent almost a decade in Phnom Penh. As a group they were able to provide a practical, day-to-day perspective on the hardships, struggles, and progress associated with bringing life back to a city that had been virtually destroyed during the Khmer Rouge period. All stressed the extent to which the Hun Sen regime provided a constructive contrast with the past.

On the flight back to Ho Chi Minh City, Muskie was able to exchange observations with New York Newsday Associate Editor, Sidney Schanberg. Schanberg's story of his forced departure from Cambodia in 1975, as the Khmer Rouge invaded Phnom Penh and foreigners fled, formed the basis of the movie, "The Killing Fields."

BANGKOK II

Returning to Bangkok via Ho Chi Minh City, on Friday, October 14, Muskie arranged to meet with a group of foreign correspondents and representatives of the Bangkok English-language press, to talk about his observations and present the tentative findings of the trip.

He said in his presentation, "I was terribly impressed by the isolation of Cambodians . . . an economic and political isolation that imposes a terrible burden. . . . We are punishing the Cambodian people with our policy."

"It is inconceivable that the Cambodian people would accept the Khmer Rouge coming back to any degree. . . . The military situation is inconclusive; the most obvious impact of the fighting is the human impact and human toll. . . ."

"The United States need to review its policy. . . ."

"It is not too much to ask that we do what we can to prevent [the return of the Khmer Rouge]. . . ."

"We need to look realistically at the accomplishments of the Hun Sen government. . . . His position is not as simple as people think, not black and white. . . . there are faults [but] he does not need to justify his government to the United States or to China, but to the Cambodian people. He is being treated as an orphan outside the door. . . . shall we let him in? He has earned the right. . . ."

"These people are a nation of survivors; they need help, not slogans, and 6 months of war will not do it."

"Regarding the 'comprehensive political settlement'—this can be achieved step by step. To insist that every argument is met, every 'I' is dotted, and every 'T' is crossed. . . . why should verification be part of the comprehensive political settlement? It is clear that you cannot resolve the other issues until you have verification. . . . We ought to do it. . . . Who is it, who does not want it?"

"The State Department in recent [congressional] testimony said the goals of U.S. policy are (1) to verify the withdrawal; (2) to prevent the Khmer Rouge returning to power; and (3) genuine self-determination for the Cambodian people. I agree with all three."

Before departing southeast Asia to return to the United States, Muskie met informally with the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok, and had a formal 1-hour meeting with Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. He also spoke with Chatichai advisors.

The Prime Minister discussed at length the efforts he had been making to keep the parties talking with one another, beginning with his invitation to Hun Sen to come to Bangkok. He described his activities since the Paris conference, focused on the convening of an informal meeting of the four Khmer factions. He said that that he, too, believed very much in a step-by-step approach to resolving the Cambodia problem.

Muskie departed for the United States confirmed in the view that the United States was pursuing a policy course that, if not changed, would not contribute to the achievement of stated U.S. policy goals.

POSTSCRIPT: NAMIBIA

Shortly after Muskie returned to Washington from Southeast Asia, he received a call from the White House, asking if he would be willing to lead an official delegation of United States observers to the elections that were shortly to take place in Namibia.

This African nation was about to participate for the first time in its history in the exercise of a real election, for the members of a Constituent Assembly. Like Cambodia, Namibia had been subjected to a long period of resistance warfare, and to occupation by a foreign power—in this case, South Africa. Various other nations, including neighboring Angola, its ally Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet Union, had been involved over a period of many years in the tangled warfare in Southern Africa.

As part of an agreement concluded between the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the guerrilla group that had resisted South African control of the former League of Nations mandated territory, the government of South Africa, and Angola, the United Nations put a force of more than 4,000 military, police, and administrative personnel into Namibia to support the activities of the U.N. Special Representative in monitoring the transition to self-determination.

These activities included, principally, policing a cease-fire agreement and assuring the integrity of the electoral process as well as steps being taken to draw up a constitution.

The process of bringing peace to Namibia, along with the prospect of genuine self-determination, had effectively begun in the mid-1970's, with the passage of U.N. Resolution 385. That resolution had required the Pretoria government to withdraw, turning over its administrative apparatus to the United Nations. Ultimately, a different approach was required.

This was embodied in U.N. Resolution 435, providing a U.N. Special Representative and Transition Assistance Group to concentrate on peacekeeping and elections. Under this formula, the South African administrator in charge of Namibia would continue to carry out normal governmental duties—under scrutiny by the United Nations team—until a new government could be elected and a new constitution could be put into effect.

The potential parallels with Cambodia had occurred to a number of people, and the possibility that Namibia might provide a model was already under discussion.

Muskie decided to agree to the request, and so notified the White House.

He flew to Namibia on a U.S. Government transport plane outfitted for special passenger travel. He and the other designated observers were in Namibia for several days, traveling to observe polling underway and to be briefed on the process by officials.

Muskie was impressed with the patience of the voters, and with their orderliness. Many traveled for days to join lines to cast their votes.

Muskie returned to Washington persuaded that Namibia did, indeed, provide an example that should be explored for lessons in dealing with the problem of Cambodia. He found it most significant that the existing government remained in place throughout the transition process, and that this arrangement provided the stability necessary to permit the elections to go forward.

Equally significant, he believed, was the fact that the U.N. Special Representative was able to assure the integrity of the electoral process through a set of monitoring

and approval procedures, backed up by the presence of a large U.N. team, observing the steps being taken.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

During the last months of 1989, there was much background diplomatic activity related to Cambodia. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan traveled to China to consult with the leadership in Beijing about prospects for new informal talks; U.S. Congressman Stephen J. Solarz and Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans each proposed what they characterized as Namibia-like solutions for Cambodia; Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen asked the Cambodian National Assembly to authorize the United Nations to convene elections as part of a peace settlement.

At the same time, the guerrilla war on the Cambodian border became more active. There were reports of resistance attacks and also of territory taken, most of the latter disputed by the government and, to an extent, discounted by outside observers.

The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council convened in mid-January 1990, to discuss Cambodia. Their joint communique included 17 points, which they indicated were principles that would guide them in working for a resolution of the Cambodian problem.

- No acceptable solution can be achieved by force of arms.
- An enduring ace can only be achieved through a comprehensive political settlement including the verified withdrawal of foreign forces, a cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance.
- The goal should be self-determination for the Cambodian people through free, fair, and democratic elections.
- All accept an enhanced U.N. role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem.
- There is an urgent need to speed up diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement.
- The complete withdrawal of foreign forces must be verified by the United Nations.
- The five would welcome an early resumption of a constructive dialog among the Cambodian factions which is essential to facilitating the transition process and which should not be dominated by any one of them.
- An effective U.N. presence will be required during the transition period in order to assure internal security.
- A special representative of the U.N. Secretary General is needed in Cambodia to supervise U.N. activities during a transition period culminating in the inauguration of a democratically elected government.
- The scale of the U.N. operation should be consistent with the successful implementation of a Cambodian settlement and its planning and execution should take account of the heavy financial burden that may be placed on member states.
- Free and fair elections must be conducted under direct U.N. administration.
- The elections must be conducted in a neutral political environment in which no party would be advantaged.
- The five permanent members commit themselves to honoring the results of free and fair elections.
- All Cambodians should enjoy the same rights, freedom, and opportunities to participate in the election process.
- A supreme National Council might be the repository of Cambodian sovereignty during the transition process.
- Questions involving Cambodian sovereignty should be resolved with the agreement of the Cambodian parties.
- The five support all responsible efforts by regional parties to achieve a comprehensive political settlement and will remain in close touch with them, with the view to reconvening the Paris conference at an appropriate time.

Shortly following this, the Phnom Penh government announced a proposal under which it and the resistance coalition would each continue to administer territory under their respective control while the United Nations came in to monitor a cease-fire and conduct elections.

Through the evolution of proposal and counterproposal, Muskie's view remained what it had been upon seeing the reality in Cambodia firsthand. As he said in his address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on December 19, 1989:

- The United States should formally and explicitly acknowledge the significance of the Vietnamese withdrawal, and urge its verification;

- The United States must abandon any and all proposals designed to facilitate the return of Khmer Rouge leaders to Cambodia; and, as we work toward the ultimate objective of a process for free and fair elections;
- The United States should talk to the current government of Cambodia.

NOTES

1. Much of the history discussed in this and other sections of this report relies significantly on information presented in *Brother Enemy: The War After the War*, by Nayan Chanda. see Related Readings.
2. Technically, the Khmer Rouge still hold control over disposition of the seat to the Coalition, under the terms of their agreement with the other two parties. Were the negotiated arrangement to be abrogated, however, the United Nations itself would undoubtedly reconsider its grant of status.
3. U.S. covert and overt aid to the non-Communist factions in the CGDK coalition was a matter of some public debate from 1986 on. Published discussions based on nonclassified and other sources indicated that some covert lethal aid was being supported at least indirectly by the United States.
4. Not correct. Cyrus Vance was Secretary at the time of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Muskie had become Secretary by the time, a year and a half later, that Vietnam made a border incursion into Thailand, seeking Khmer Rouge forces.
5. French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas.
6. U.S. Secretary of State, James A. Baker III.
7. U.S. Representatives Chester Atkins, Jim Leach, and Stephen Solarz.
8. Provincial capital. It came under attack by the resistance during the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990.
9. Province in Central Cambodia where Angkor Wat is located. Muskie visited Angkor Wat, and the area appeared to be fully secured by government forces at that time, contrary to this statement.
10. Khmer Rouge military commander.
11. People's Republic of Cambodia—i.e., the current government. The official name of the country was changed at the end of 1989 to the State of Cambodia (SOC).
12. Khmer People's National Liberation Front. Headed by Son Sann. The third resistance coalition member, along with the ANS, or Sihanouk forces, and the Khmer Rouge.
13. That is, Afghanistan.
14. Senior Vietnamese Communist Party Politburo member, Le Duc Tho, and U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who negotiated the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, providing for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.
15. The Geneva Accords of 1962 provided for the neutralization of Laos, but the internationally orchestrated design for a three-part governmental structure fell apart shortly thereafter.
16. State of Cambodia official.
17. Former U.S. Senator Dick Clark of the Aspen Institute Policy Forum arrived in Hanoi shortly after Muskie and he, too, met with Do Muoi.
18. Vietnamese naval facility developed by the United States during the war and later taken over as a Soviet naval base.
19. The so-called Jakarta Informal Meetings, JIM I and JIM II, were sessions designed to bring Hun Sen and Sihanouk together.

CAMBODIA: TIME TO CHANGE POLICY

I recently visited Southeast Asia, on behalf of the Center for National Policy and the Christopher Reynolds Foundation. The Greeley Foundation provided support for this effort, as well.

A full report on my itinerary and conversations will be made available shortly. Let me just note briefly that I held a number of meetings in Washington and New York before leaving. I met with the senior representative of the Khmer Rouge at the United Nations. In Southeast Asia, I met with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and also spoke personally and at length with the Prime Ministers of Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. I was in Cambodia a little less than a week, including some time in the provinces as well as in the capital.

This was my first trip to the region since I participated as Secretary of State in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meetings held in Kuala Lumpur in 1980.

On both occasions, Cambodia was the focus of concern and discussion. In critically important respects, however, the situation, and the factors that led us onto our current policy course, have changed since 1980.

I conclude that it is time for a change in U.S. policy, as well. Indeed, I believe that change is inevitable, as well as right.

It appears from press reports over the past week that there may be some progress on the subject of a political settlement in Cambodia, resulting from an initiative taken by Australian Foreign Minister Evans. I hope that this is the case, and will return to this point shortly.

First, however, I would like to describe the four factors that led to the requirement for a new U.S. policy.

One: the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, that began in 1979 and occasioned our present policy, has now ended.

Two: Vietnam's decision to end its occupation of Cambodia has come about as a result of fundamental and constructive changes in Vietnam's objectives, and therefore its role in the region.

Three: relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union are changing, reducing the threat posed to United States security and to the security of other nations in the region.

Four: these three developments undercut the rationale and the purposes of China's policy toward Cambodia.

Today I would like to discuss each of these changes, raise what I believe to be their implications for U.S. policy toward and, finally, recommend a new course of action.

Let me begin with a brief description of the situation in Cambodia as I saw it in October.

Cambodia is poor and isolated, but appears neither grim nor defeatist. It is underdeveloped, but it is reaching out to change.

On the road to Phnom Penh from Vietnam—a long trip of about 7 hours that included a stop for lunch and a ferry ride over the Mekong—I saw thatched huts, rice paddies, and water buffaloes. I also saw trucks, newly constructed housing, and cans of Heineken.

In Phnom Penh, the effort to restore and rebuild was evident, as was a capacity to get on with the business of daily life in spite of the intrusions of war.

The Cambodian government officials I met appear young. The government, made up of non-Communists as well as Communists, has been called a "coalition of survivors."

Those I met seemed pretty confident of the future, though they acknowledge many difficulties in the present. The press has described the efforts to privatize land holdings, and to open Cambodia to trade.

So far as one is able to observe, the results of these recently instituted policies remain modest; they have only begun to offset the years of isolation, and the devastation of the Khmer Rouge period.

Evidence of Khmer Rouge torture and killings has been preserved. This evidence is highly credible, and serves as a politically useful reminder of the Pol Pot period and its brutality. The skulls and photographs provide a stark and hideous contrast, to the accomplishments of the present regime, as well as to accomplishments of earlier periods that either have escaped destruction or have been restored: the royal palace, the modern residence compound erected by Sihanouk, and the temples at Angkor Wat.

I met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen for about 3 hours. His statements and his responses to my questions were detailed and complex.

We discussed withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops, and the implications of that withdrawal for the military situation. He predicted, correctly as it turns out, where resistance forces would attempt to make inroads along the border areas. He said that he expected to retain control over most territory within Cambodia, including district and provincial capitals. Obviously, this claim is now being tested.

We also discussed the elements of a political settlement. Hun Sen said that he accepts the idea of multiparty elections. He said that he would welcome back people or groups who dissociate themselves from Pol Pot, the rank and file. He also said, however, that he would not accept a role for the Khmer Rouge leaders in the dissolution of his government prior to elections, since that would be an invitation to the return of Pol Pot.

I will be glad to talk more about my discussion with Hun Sen and my impression of him in the question period, but let me conclude on this point now with a general comment. Hun Sen appears to me to be a political figure of some capacity. His past, like that of other key Cambodian players, has been compromised by association with the Khmer Rouge, unlike some of the others, however, he has long since been in opposition to the Pol Potists. He has said repeatedly that they should not come back, and has acted to try to prevent their return.

For this reason, as well as because he is the head of an in-*place* government that has de facto responsibility for a nation of 6 million people, I conclude that U.S. policymakers are making a serious mistake by not giving him a direct and fair-minded look for our sake and for Cambodia's, not for his.

So, that is one fundamental change from 1980. The Vietnamese have withdrawn from Cambodia, leaving an indigenous government in place. That government is against readmitting the Khmer Rouge to power and is at present the one Cambodian force fully committed to preventing their return.

Changes in the region

A second major change has to do with the overall regional context, and with Vietnam's place within it. In the years preceding 1980, Thailand and other ASEAN countries were subject to the internal threat of Chinese-backed Communist insurgents.

The invasion and occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam compounded Thailand's security problems. An isolated Khmer Rouge, whose murderous record was poorly understood, had been routed by the militarily formidable Vietnamese, whose history was known to include efforts to dominate surrounding peoples.

As part of a deal with China, ASEAN agreed to support the Khmer Rouge remnant force against Vietnam, addressing at one and the same time both domestic and foreign dangers.

Today, both China and Vietnam are preoccupied with their own internal problems. Economic growth, not ideology, has become the main focus of national aspirations and international competition, in Southeast Asia as in most of the rest of the world.

The Thai say they want to change Indochina from a battleground into a marketplace. There is discussion of Thailand becoming the center of a new economic region, one that would include Indochina as well as Burma. There is a concern in Thailand about how best to balance Japanese investments, Soviet trade in the region, and American technology. And so on.

During my conversations with officials in Cambodia, the Phnom Penh government's interest in pursuing economic development through liberalization and through trade was constantly emphasized.

Most importantly, Vietnam's interest in reestablishing relations with the United States has a large economic motivation. Our current stance is crippling Vietnam's effort to attract development capital and development aid. Even the boat people are telling us this. Vietnam's Prime Minister, with whom I was invited to meet when I arrived in Hanoi, addressed the issue directly: "we are trying to end the war in Kampuchea," he said, "to concentrate our efforts in rebuilding the country." He went on to say, "we want to live in peace. We are encouraging the private sector. Our policy is to broaden relationships with other countries—with the Soviet Union and socialist countries and with other countries. We want normalized relations with the United States. We wish normal relations with China, too. We wish to see American goods in Vietnam and Vietnamese goods in the United States * * *"

He conceded that "politically it is very tense" in Vietnam, but he made a point of saying that in spite of this, the economy is functioning.

So a second element of change in Southeast Asia today is that Vietnam's current ambitions do not pose a security threat to the region. Its diplomatic and economic isolation continues, however, and the effects of this isolation are having a very harsh impact on its 6 million people, and on its economic reform efforts.

The Soviet Union and Indochina

A third element of change with respect to our Vietnam and Cambodia policy is the fact that the threat to United States security posed by the Soviet Union's relationships with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia has clearly become a matter for reduced concern.

The Soviet Union is supplying the Cambodian government with military equipment for its war against the resistance. It would be better if all foreign arms shipments to Cambodia would cease, but, for the present, this Soviet equipment is helping defend the country against the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam's Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, said in his meeting with me, "sooner or later the Soviet Union will move out of Cam Ranh Bay." He mentioned U.S. bases in the Philippines, discounting their relevance to Vietnam.

I take it not only from these comments, but also from the entire thrust of current Soviet policy, including its new relations with China, that we could soon see a Soviet military disengagement from Asia that is analogous to the trend, if not the scale, of events in Eastern Europe. I take it, further, that should such disengagement occur, in a context which includes cessation of all outside military aid to contesting parties

in Southeast Asia, Vietnam will not perceive its military security to be much affected.

So changes in Soviet objectives and relationships are another element that distinguishes the situation we face in Southeast Asia today from what we were facing in 1980.

The problem of China

Finally, there is China.

China's military and political support for the Khmer Rouge, before, during and after Pol Pot's reign of terror in the latter half of the 1970's, was based on China's longstanding antipathy toward Vietnam. It was reinforced by China's concern about the potential dangers of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.

Khmer Rouge national purification policies have always been justified as a means of cleansing Cambodia of Vietnamese influence, and this justification has remained the basis of Khmer Rouge rhetoric, in international forums and in the field.

Thus, with respect to Cambodia, China's real interests and China's public rationale for supporting the Khmer Rouge have both been affected by the Vietnamese withdrawal. The military aspect of China's Cambodia objectives has been achieved. It has continued to try to fulfill its political aims—a regime in Phnom Penh that can assert independence from Vietnam—via the negotiating table and the battlefield.

So the final element of change in the situation with respect to our policy in Southeast Asia is the fact that Vietnam's role in Cambodia no longer poses a direct security threat to the people's republic, and China's justification for supporting the Khmer Rouge has been undercut—whether China is yet ready to acknowledge this fact or not. There were in fact suggestions in a number of conversations I had while in the region that China might be exploring options for its current policies.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Let us go back now approximately 10 years, to when the United States decided to join in the vote to allow the defeated Pol Pot regime to retain Cambodia's seat at the United Nations. At that time, it seemed inevitable to many for the United States to be with China on this issue and against the Soviet Union.

It was not comfortable, even so, to condone the legitimizing of a genocidal band of terrorists as the representatives of the Cambodian people. So a decision was made to resurrect the remains of two ousted non-Communist Cambodian regimes, and to append them to the Khmer Rouge. This became the coalition government of democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations—not really a coalition, not really democratic, and not really a government. A coalition whose members frequently assert—incorrectly—that they never cooperate with each other.

As we have seen, the ASEAN countries, led by Thailand and supported by China, argued persuasively that this distasteful construct was needed to contain the Vietnamese.

Today, of course, the reality of that rationale has evaporated. U.S. support for a coalition that includes the Khmer Rouge is no longer tenable. Yet, in spite of this fact, new arguments are continually being marshalled to shore up the old policy. These new arguments have included the following:

- We must begin supplying lethal aid to the two non-Communist resistance factions, because China gives them less than it gives to the Khmer Rouge.

- We must force an interim government on Cambodia, and give the Khmer Rouge a share of power, in order to persuade China to stop helping the Khmer Rouge.

- We must refuse to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal, in order to compel the Vietnamese to force the Cambodians to admit the Khmer Rouge to power, in order to persuade China to stop sending arms to the Khmer Rouge.

And so on. We appear to be willing to do just about anything on this issue, other than work directly to compel the Chinese to meet their responsibilities, and stop supporting the Khmer Rouge.

But that is precisely and simply what we should do.

Since Tiananmen Square, Chinese actions have presented the United States with a significant dilemma. A 10-year record of improving relations has now been damaged. The administration is concerned; it wants to restore the balance. Members of Congress are equally concerned, about how that balance is to be restored.

Changing U.S. Cambodia policy makes extremely good sense, in this context as well as generally.

Our interests and China's interests in Cambodia are not the same. We do not need or want to put the Khmer Rouge back into the picture there—Cambodia needs help, not more chaos. We do want to bring about a cease-fire, to bring about an end to

foreign military involvement, to help set up the conditions under which Cambodians can vote in a free and fair election.

As some of you may know, I was asked by President Bush to lead the U.S. observer delegation to Namibia for the election that just took place there. After a decade of frustration in the effort to achieve a settlement, a couple of critical first steps have now been taken to set that nation on the road toward independence and full self-determination.

Under the plan developed by the United Nations, the existing government remained in place, working with a U.N. special representative to jointly administer a credible electoral process under which all of the various parties could compete fairly.

I felt when I was in Namibia that it provides a lesson for United States policy in Cambodia, and others clearly have had that perception as well. The recent proposal of the Australians to introduce the authority of the United Nations directly into Cambodia refers explicitly to Namibia.

This proposal seems to be attracting positive interest on the part of the Phnom Penh government, the Vietnamese and the Soviet Union—undoubtedly, in part at least, because it would imply the necessity of vacating Cambodia's seat at the United Nations, pending the outcome of elections.

Such an action would reduce the current international political legitimacy of the Khmer Rouge, an important step toward restoring long-term political stability in Cambodia. If Vietnam ends up agreeing to this proposal or a similar one, it will have met the United States insistence that it contribute to a political settlement in Cambodia as a condition of normalizing relations, without, as we now say they must, accepting the forced return of the Khmer Rouge.

It remains to be seen what China will do, and what we will do with respect to China.

The administration has indicated that it expects the Chinese to respond to President Bush's initiative. China might therefore agree to this new proposal, perhaps incorporating a step to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal.

Verification would ease, not hinder, a settlement. It would affirm the reason why China should alter course. Since I discussed this with him in Bangkok, Thailand's Prime Minister—who has been working diligently to keep diplomatic channels open on the issue of Cambodia—has come to emphasize this point, as well.

But, above all, on Cambodia I believe it is time for us to alter our course with respect to China.

As the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Vietnam reminded me in our recent conversations, the United States went to war in Vietnam in part because of our failure to see clearly when it comes to China. The experience of Korea was very much on our minds at the time, and in consequence we failed to weigh sufficiently the history of China's conflicts with Vietnam. We ended up driving them together, a result which was the opposite of what we wanted.

When we finally left Vietnam, we opened the way for the historic conflict between Vietnam and China to reemerge. Vietnam went on to invade Cambodia, and China invaded Vietnam. In these conflicts, we took the side of China.

Now, that phase of their history, and of ours, is over. Or, at any rate, it will be over once we are prepared to let it be over.

Our differences with Vietnam on the issue of Cambodia now are no greater, surely, than our differences with China. Perhaps it is inevitable that the bitterness of our experience in Vietnam would blind us to this fact. In his inaugural address last January, President Bush said of Vietnam, "that war cleaves us still." "But, friends," he went on to say, "the war began in earnest a quarter of a century ago, and surely the statute of limitations has been reached. This is a fact: the final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered by a memory."

It seems to be largely the memory of Vietnam that has sustained our Cambodia policy. We should turn instead to the reality, and take the following steps to face it:

- the United States should formally and explicitly acknowledge the significance of the Vietnamese withdrawal, and urge its verification;
- the United States must abandon any and all proposals designed to facilitate the return of Khmer Rouge leaders to Cambodia, and, as we work toward the ultimate objective of a process for free and fair elections,
- the United States should talk to the current government of Cambodia.

ADDRESS TO THE INDOCHINA POLICY FORUM OF THE ASPEN INSTITUTE ON THE NEED FOR
CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA

As you know, I recently returned from a trip to Southeast Asia and a later trip to Namibia.

I have decided on the basis of my observations and conversations that it is time to change our current policy toward Cambodia.

Three factors emerged most clearly from my 21/2-week stay in the region as critical to the argument for change. They are these: the actual situation in Cambodia as I saw it in person; what I learned about the effect of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal on prospects for a comprehensive political solution; and, what I heard from Vietnamese and Cambodian leaders in terms of their attitudes about powersharing.

These factors, along with the suggestion of some change in the Chinese position, lead me to conclude that separating out the issue of verification might prove to be the key that unlocks the door to a resolution.

Why not separate verification? As I understand it, one reason given is that the withholding of verification has been an integral part of the strategy of bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam to persuade the Hun Sen government to accept a quadripartite interim government. This quadripartite proposal in turn is said to be the means of getting China to remove active military support from the Khmer Rouge.

It is apparent that this strategy has not worked until now. For reasons I will outline, I think it is unlikely to work any better in the future. In addition, U.S. implicit support for the Khmer Rouge is no longer tenable. At a minimum this argues for an exploration of alternatives. It is in this spirit that I offer my suggestions.

Separating out verification could provide room for maneuver for all the parties with which we are concerned, including the Chinese. It would serve to undercut the Khmer Rouge politically. It might permit China to achieve a rapprochement with Vietnam. It would permit the United States to claim the credit for a policy achievement that our current stance now denies us. It would provide a new context in which to reassemble the parties for talks, either informally as Thai Prime Minister Chatichai has proposed, or formally under the auspices of the Paris conference.

The situation in Cambodia

The current political and economic situation in Cambodia seems neither to merit, nor to require, the level of isolation to which our present policy consigns the population and its present government.

In addition, a close look at the nature of the devastation wrought by the Khmer Rouge argues absolutely against any act that would legitimize them, however interim such act is intended to be.

I began my stay in Cambodia by driving overland from Ho Chi Minh city, taking the same road traveled by the departing Vietnamese troops some days earlier. There was a striking absence of any sign of military conflict during this trip. The people seemed to be coming and going freely along the road, concentrating on their commerce. I note this because it was typical of what I saw throughout the visit, both inside and outside the capital.

As would be expected, in observing the population in both the city and the countryside one sees much evidence of poor nutrition and inadequate health services, as well as the wounds of war. On the other hand, I did not perceive any overt signs of general anxiety or tension among the people I saw or spoke with.

The mass graves, and the torture center museum in Phnom Penh, present a truly appalling picture of the Khmer Rouge. At the latter site, a photograph of Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders (including Khieu Samphan, with whom I had spoken in New York, prior to the trip) forms the centerpiece of a large documentary exhibit. The Khmer Rouge took pictures of victims of their genocide and preserved these as a record. The pictures are hanging on the walls of the museum. The analogy with Auschwitz is irrefutable.

Much of what we saw during our stay in Cambodia constitutes the modest results of the decade-long effort to restore what the Khmer Rouge regime wrecked. Press descriptions of free market bazaars (selling Western goods in some quantity) and of building activity underway are accurate.

The overall level of physical rehabilitation that has been achieved remains low by our standards, and economic isolation continues to hurt. Nevertheless, progress is apparent. The government's determination to develop the economy more along market-oriented lines, and to encourage exchange of goods with the outside world, seems to have accelerated the pace.

During my conversations with advisors to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, and with officials of various ministries, the Phnom Penh government's interest in pursuing economic development through liberalization of the economy and through

trade was constantly emphasized. They discussed the need for outside investment capital and for infrastructure development. (Manufacturing and resource processing capacity seems to be extremely limited at the present time). They also described their program of privatizing land holdings, as well as the efforts they have made to rebuild the draft animal and crop base of their agriculture, much of which apparently was destroyed by the effects of Khmer Rouge policies.

One definitely gets the sense that they are trying to do the right thing, but it is also evident that they are still in the process of learning about the theories and practices that make open economies successful.

The Foreign Ministry and Council of Ministers officials with whom I met all appear to be quite young, which is not unusual, considering what has happened to the population. They seemed intelligent, from somewhat open to very open in manner, and able to conduct a conversation with some independence. I was told that the government includes nonparty members, at least a few of whom are holdovers from the Lon Nol regime.

In discussions about the political situation, I was told that repatriation of refugees would be welcome, notwithstanding the fact that incorporating large numbers into what is undeniably a fragile economy is likely to be difficult.

In my conversation with Hun Sen in particular, a lot was said about the issue of achieving a political settlement. Hun Sen described the proposal for a joint CGDK/State of Cambodia Council, to organize and monitor elections, and talked about how it would function in relation to an international control mechanism. He noted Cambodian plans for an election (currently envisioned for February, I believe). He indicated that if there is a political settlement beforehand, then that election would be a multiparty election; if not, another election would be required.

One can only conclude so much on the basis of less than a week's direct observations. Nonetheless, what I saw and heard during my stay in Cambodia does not justify a policy of complete noncontact by the United States. Indeed, my experience would argue just the opposite.

Judging the character of the Phnom Penh government, for example, is an area where the lack of actual contact must be particularly detrimental to effective U.S. policymaking. Gauging the degree to which the current government is accepted by the population at large is even more difficult in the absence of reliable firsthand information. Finally, I think that an objective look at Pol Pot time in relation to conditions in Cambodia today should be a prerequisite for supporting a particular political solution.

Withdrawal of Vietnamese troops

It appeared that the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops had been completed on schedule by the time of my visit. It was too early to tell at that point what the military implications of the withdrawal will be. Whether the results will prove to be good or bad for the future of the Phnom Penh government is still uncertain; however, there are possible results that are not taken into account by current U.S. policy—for example, a collapse of the Hun Sen government and a victory by the Khmer Rouge.

I spent some time with the Cambodian Defense Minister during a helicopter ride to the province where Angkor Wat is located. Although I was not able to examine the military situation directly, I did ask questions about it, and specifically about the withdrawal.

All of the Cambodian officials with whom we spoke, as well as the Vietnamese and most of the Thai said that Vietnamese troops had essentially withdrawn. I gather that this view is supported by at least some analysts within our own Government. It also was articulated publicly in the recent speech by Paul Wolfowitz.

Vietnam's Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, outlined the stages by which he said the troop withdrawal was executed over a period of several years. He said that in the early phases, the Vietnamese had judged that a political settlement would be necessary before they could effectively withdraw, but that the increasing political and military capacities of the Phnom Penh government had made it possible to accelerate the timetable.

Questions were expressed by some Thai and American officials with whom I met about the ability of the Phnom Penh government's forces, acting alone, to defend all of the outlying areas against resistance attacks, especially those of the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian Defense Minister seemed confident, however. He discussed the advantages of fighting during the upcoming dry season, and said that on balance those advantages would favor the government.

My general impression is that both the Vietnamese and the Cambodians believe that the resistance forces can and will be contained without the participation of Vi-

etnamese troops, and that this belief is fundamentally what has permitted the Vietnamese to withdraw. Whether it will prove correct is clearly another matter. I was told that the Vietnamese do not plan to go back, and will try to put the problem into the hands of the international community if a rescue seems necessary.

Obviously, if the Cambodian government's forces are threatened seriously by the Khmer Rouge, the effect will pose a major dilemma for present U.S. policy. Who will we support, and how will we do it?

Political settlement

My conversations both prior to and during this trip have persuaded me that a political settlement may still be achievable in principle, but it must be based on a means of dealing with the Khmer Rouge that is different from the one currently contemplated.

As noted above, Cambodia has not recovered from the effects of Khmer Rouge policies. In addition, however, both the Vietnamese and Cambodian leadership have deeply rooted political stakes in preventing the return to power of the Khmer Rouge.

Hun Sen seems to believe that he might weaken his political base significantly were he to agree to a return of the Khmer Rouge even on an interim basis. He obviously doesn't trust the Khmer Rouge leadership to participate fairly in a political process, although he clearly is prepared to deal with Sihanouk and Son Sann—and he seems also to be concerned about maintaining security with armed Khmer Rouge cadres in the capital.

Whether or not his judgment in each of these matters is accurate, it seems absolutely firm. He gave absolutely no indication that he is likely to change his mind on this point as a result of outside political pressure.

The Vietnamese, for their part, have spent 10 years and a lot of their resources, including international political capital, to defeat the Khmer Rouge and keep them from coming back to Cambodia.

Both Vietnam's Premier Do Muoi and Foreign Minister Thach said that they have been trying to end the war in Cambodia because its continuation has been adversely affecting their efforts to build their own country. Do Muoi talked eloquently in my conversation with him about policies to open cooperation with socialist and nonsocialist countries, and of his desire to normalize relations with the United States and China.

He made it clear that he knows that their refusal to consent to having the Khmer Rouge in an interim government is now essentially the single problem preventing progress toward these objectives. Yet, he said, "a decade of Vietnamese sacrifice" went into dealing with the Khmer Rouge, implying that the sacrifice would have been in vain if Vietnam were to concede on this point.

Thach, asking why one would want the Mafia in the government, spoke to the same point. He said that Vietnam feels that it worked hard and successfully to achieve a balance between two important objectives: preventing the return of Pol Pot, on the one hand, and not getting "bogged down" forever in Cambodia, on the other.

In addition, and perhaps even more important at this point, Vietnam's direct influence over the Phnom Penh government whatever it may be in general—seems to be limited when it comes specifically to the issue of the Khmer Rouge.

In sum, as a politician I come away from these conversations believing that pressing Vietnam on this point is as little likely to bear fruit as pressing Hun Sen. The Vietnamese rationale for refusing a quadripartite interim government is grounded in the history of their entire experience in Cambodia, and they can exercise only so much influence on this point in any case.

On the other hand, the desire to reach an accommodation of some kind is apparent. Both Thach and Hun Sen spent a great deal of the time I was with them going over the argument for, and workings of, the concept of a supreme council. It's possible, if I understand it correctly, that this formula is even meant to provide some room for participation by Khmer Rouge members (not Pol Pot though) who are willing to renounce genocide. I should note, however, that this proposal would not entail dismantling the present government.

Finally, a few of the conversations that occurred during the course of my trip provided hints of a possible lessening of Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge.

Comments I heard, in Bangkok, Hanoi, and Phnom Penh, included the following: China seems more interested in Sihanouk than in the Khmer Rouge; China is now prepared to accept a less than one-fourth share in an interim government for the Khmer Rouge; China wants to find a way out; China's position might be influenced by a verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces.

Vietnamese officials mentioned that their trade with China is growing, in spite of the tensions in the relationship.

Thach talked about a couple of specific occurrences of the Chinese making what sounded like exploratory (primarily business-oriented) contacts in Cambodia.

And, several people told a story about some Chinese technicians working to help get a Chinese-built Cambodian cement plant back in operation.

These may or may not be straws in the wind; they may be hints; they might even be signals. We don't know. But we do know that any solution will require a change in Chinese policy.

The logic of verification

An argument for separating out verification can be made in principle. There are very few cases in politics, in my experience, in which it is possible to negotiate every detail of a complicated set of compromises as a single package, at one stroke. In this case, however, I think there are specific reasons why verification should be the first, separate step toward a comprehensive settlement.

These reasons have to do with the nature of the logic on which support for the Khmer Rouge has been based.

In fact, the Vietnamese withdrawal has materially altered the situation already and, whether withdrawal has been verified technically or not, the Chinese are likely to understand quite clearly that the withdrawal affects the logic of their position.

China's policy of support for the Khmer Rouge and United States acquiescence in that policy, as you well know, was based originally on the longstanding fear of Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. The Khmer Rouge takeover, and their "scorched earth" political policies, similarly were justified largely as a means of cleansing Cambodia of Vietnamese influence. This justification remains the basis of Khmer Rouge rhetoric, both at the United Nations and among their troops and refugee camp inmates. Khieu Samphan asserted to me that he is engaged in "a war of national liberation" against the Vietnamese, who, he maintained, were still in the Cambodian forces in disguise, in large numbers.

Thus, and this is critical, both China's real interests and China's public rationale for supporting the Khmer Rouge movement are now changed from what they were until September.

Verification at this point would serve to ratify these changes, and therefore would permit the Chinese to change policy, should they choose to do so. It's even possible such a step might compel them to change policy, for reasons of logical consistency, but that's simply a possibility.

In any event, if the United States, ASEAN, and other Western governments were able to acknowledge the Vietnamese withdrawal, and concede the reality of a lessened outside influence over Cambodia, we could then turn our own policy concerns toward the important long-term objectives of preventing a Khmer Rouge return to power, and achieving self-determination for the Cambodian people.

We could be more flexible in searching for the right international mechanism under which a cease-fire could be monitored and an election held.

Lately, a couple of proposals for Cambodia have advanced the use of the Namibia model. It is important, therefore, to recognize what has been a critical element of this model: that is, the existing government was kept in place, throughout the process leading up to the formation of a new government after the elections. As I understand current proposals for a Namibia solution for Cambodia, they do not incorporate this key feature.

As some of you know, I was in Namibia during the election there, leading the U.S. observer delegation at the request of President Bush. With the existing government administration continuing in place, and a U.N. monitoring force to judge whether or not the elections were free and fair, authority for the process of the election was shared. So far as I was able to observe, this arrangement worked very well. Its results have not been challenged. It may or may not produce a government that the United States can readily identify with, but that's a very different issue. So Namibia is one example we could begin to explore, if we are prepared to keep the Hun Sen government in place.

Now, how are you going to get verification to happen? Again, as all of you know, this issue became a political football over the course of the Paris conference. The number of turnovers that took place around the issue of a verification process was impressive, even to someone who has been a faithful Redskins fan for years. But in fact I take this as a hopeful sign, a sign that there ought to be some flexibility here now, since there was earlier.

After the conference, for example, both the Vietnamese and Cambodians were apparently pushing for U.N. involvement in verification, in spite of the fact that Cam-

bodia's seat at the U.N. doesn't include the State of Cambodia. Our side at that point refused to go along, needing a means of legitimizing continued pressure on Vietnam.

Vietnam and the Cambodian government have taken the position with regard to an overall international control mechanism that there should be a joint U.N.-Paris team, what they call the grandfather and the father. This is because the State of Cambodia is formally a party to the Paris conference, as they are not in the U.N.

I personally believe that verification is a step that so much serves U.S. policy interests that it argues for accepting this joint team concept. However, it might also be worth asking the Vietnamese and Cambodians to accept a U.N.-only team, for verification only, with a commitment to go to the other concept at the next stage—say, the monitoring of a cease-fire.

In any case, if this one step is not doable, under one mechanism or another, I cannot see how a comprehensive political settlement that is vastly more complicated is to be achieved. Thank you very much.

[The Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1989]

DON'T LET THE KHMER ROUGE CALL THE SHOTS

(By Edmund S. Muskie)

For almost a decade, U.S. policy toward Cambodia has consisted primarily of support for the resistance coalition fighting against the Vietnamese-installed government of Cambodia.

This coalition was built around the Khmer Rouge, perpetrators of the genocidal reign of terror described in the film "The Killing Fields." Two non-Communist factions, one led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, were added, to make up the entity that holds the Cambodia seat at the United Nations today.

A policy that committed us in fact, if not in purpose, to an alliance with Pol Pot was never morally comfortable, but it was felt by many to be justified as a practical expression of our opposition to the Vietnamese invasion, and as support for the ASEAN nations who feared Vietnamese expansionism. The policy is no longer justifiable.

I have recently returned from a visit to Southeast Asia. After discussions with senior political figures in Bangkok, Hanoi, and Phnom Penh, and a close look at economic and social conditions in the Cambodian countryside, I am convinced that it is time for a change.

Cambodia is poor and isolated, but it also appears to be stable for the most part—a condition that could be destroyed by renewed recourse to the battlefield, now underway.

Its hardworking people can be seen proceeding through their daily lives on a relatively relaxed basis, although they are fearful about where they are going as a country.

The current government is run by young Cambodians, who are obviously struggling with the complexities of administering the country. The war, acts of terrorism by the resistance and economic sanctions all continue to undermine efforts to rebuild. In spite of this, there are signs everywhere of progress, the result of a more open economy and a more open approach to the world at large.

U.S. policy in 1979 was predicated on the invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese and on the continued presence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. This presence has clearly now diminished dramatically.

At the international conference convened in Paris last summer, there was utos are seen on the boulevards of Phnom Penh. But profits earned from exploiting Cambodia's abundant natural resources are seldom used to rebuild desperately impoverished rural areas. Instead, villagers speak of unfair taxation or "forced donations." Critics of party leadership continue to disappear. Prisons are reportedly full of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. Systematic torture is similar to prisons of the Pol Pot period.

Most damaging to the regime is that Chief of State Beng Samrin and Prime Minister Hun Sen (both former Khmer Rouge officers) are seen as proxies of Hanoi. A number of intellectuals inside and outside of government told me, "We have no voice of our own. All decisions come from Vietnamese advisers." They point to the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh as the ultimate authority. In addition, the unrestricted influx of Vietnamese merchants, farmers, and fishermen has created widespread resentment.

Many Cambodians fear that they may one day become a minority in their own land. Recent gains by the Khmer Rouge are partly due to material support from China. But they have increasingly won passive acceptance in some places, recruit and maintain the morale of their fighters based on nationalism. Until Hanoi's influence on Cambodian affairs and the Vietnamese presence is resolved the fighting will not end.

I spoke with a number of Vietnamese merchants and traders and learned that they had not previously lived in Cambodia. In the capitol's market areas, O-Reous-Sey and Chbar Ampoeu, Vietnamese language is common. In the important Mekong River port of Neak Luong, the majority of shopkeepers—even beggars—speak no Cambodian. En route to my hometown, along the Tonle Sap River I saw continuous clusters of Vietnamese families. Cambodians I spoke with north of the capitol and near the temples of Angkor Wat lamented that new Vietnamese settlers have become "the kings" of river fisheries. Hun Sen regime soldiers who come from eastern provinces along the Vietnam border speak Such a meeting can and should be convened, as soon as the Vietnamese withdrawal is verified.

Second, our Government should begin direct contacts with Hun Sen. We need to look realistically at his accomplishments. Currently, he is treated as an orphan, outside the door. Only a free and fair election by the Cambodian people will determine whether he has earned the right to continue his leadership. But by his actions to date he certainly has earned the right to be dealt with directly by foreign governments.

Third, and most critically, we must abandon the policy that would bring the Khmer Rouge back to power in Cambodia, even if only on an "interim" basis. Any basis is too much. If this means that we must part company with China, which backs the Khmer Rouge, so be it. China's interests are not our interests in every case, and here is one area in which we should be firm and clear that we differ.

MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS

Meetings and interviews with former Senator and Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie during his factfinding mission regarding Cambodia.

WASHINGTON

Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Kimmitt, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Military Affairs
Siddhi Savetsila, Foreign Minister of Thailand
Vitthya Vejajiva, Thailand's Ambassador to the United States

NEW YORK

Khieu Samphan, CGDK Foreign Minister and Vice President
Trinh Xuan Lang, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations

BANGKOK

(Assisted by Keith McCormick, Bruce Howard, Skip Boyce, and Vichai Kiyapat-
chya, U.S. Embassy)

Chatichai Choonhavan, Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Thailand
Pansak Vinyaratn, Kraisak Choonhavan, Advisors to Prime Minister Chatichai
Victor Tomseth, U.S. Charge d'Affaires
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Former Advisor to Prime Minister Chatichai, Director,
Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University
Daniel O'Donohue, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand
Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Commander-in-Chief of Sihanouk's Armed Forces
Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, Thai Commander of the Army
Sarasin Viraphol, Ambassador-at-Large, Thai Foreign Ministry
Paul Wedel, UPI Bureau Chief, Bangkok

Luncheon with five voluntary agency representatives working on the border and
inside Cambodia

HANOI

(Met by Le Bang and Lai Xuan Chieu, North America Department, Foreign Min-
istry)

Do Muoi, Prime Minister of Vietnam

Dang Nghiem Bai, Director, North America Department, Foreign Ministry of Vietnam
 Nguyen Co Thach, Foreign Minister of Vietnam
 Graham Alliband, Ambassador of Australia to Vietnam
 MURRAY HEIBERT, JOURNALIST, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW

PHNOM PENH

(Met at Moc Bai, Vietnam by Thon Hin and Ly Sor San, Department of America and Western Europe, Foreign Ministry, State of Cambodia)
 Hun Sen, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Cambodia
 (The Prime Minister was accompanied by a number of Foreign Ministry Officials and aides during the meeting. They are listed below.)
 Dith Munty, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Long Visalo, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Sok An, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Cham Prasidh, Vice Minister of the Cabinet of the Council of Ministers
 Uch Kim An, Director, Department of General Policy Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Chum Bunrong, Director, Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Him Smoek, Director, Department of Western Europe and the Americas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Visits to Cheung E. (mass grave memorial) and Tuol Sleng (torture and interrogation center under the Khmer Rouge)
 Dinner with representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the Council of Ministers (at the home of Jill Arace, Oxfam UK, and Eva Mysliwiec, PADEK)
 Gen. Tea Banh, Minister of Defense of Cambodia
 Ho Naun, Minister of Industry
 Khieu Khanarith, Editor of Kampuchea newspaper
 Chhea Song, Vice Minister of Agriculture of Cambodia
 Bun Than, Vice Director, Department of International Cooperation and Planning, Ministry of Agriculture
 Rehabilitation Center visit and discussions with amputees and staff
 Dessert with 8 representatives of American private voluntary organizations
 Leng Vy, Chairman of Siem Reap People's Committee
 Visits to Angkor Wat and Bayon Temple

 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE MUSKIE TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

May 31, 1989.—The Bush administration announces its decision to give covert military aid to the Cambodian non-Communist resistance. The administration plans to send 12,000 light arms and other material to forces led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann at a cost of \$25 million. The plan is debated in Congress where it faces opposition from Congressmen wary of U.S. reinvolverment in Southeast Asia.

June 26, 1989.—Thai officials and KPNLF leaders agreed to return to the Khmer Rouge 700 refugees who had fled Khmer Rouge camps.

June 26, 1989.—Responding to congressional moves to punish China for its violent suppression of dissent, Secretary of State Baker warns against a "hasty dismantling of a constructive United States-Chinese relationship."

July 6, 1989.—In a speech at the annual ASEAN conference, in Brunei, Secretary of State Baker indicates that the United States would accept a settlement that left the People's Republic of Kampuchea in place provided that Sihanouk is installed as head of state with "real power." The United States had maintained that the Vietnamese-installed government was illegitimate and would have to be fully replaced.

July 19, 1989.—The Phnom Penh government proclaims that it will become neutral upon the completion of the Vietnamese withdrawal in September.

July 21, 1989.—The Senate approves a bill allowing the administration to seek authority from Congress to send military aid to Prince Sihanouk.

July 24, 1989.—Sihanouk and Hun Sen, P.R.K. Prime Minister, begin meetings in preparation for the 20-nation Paris peace conference. Hun Sen wants Sihanouk to end his alliance with the Khmer Rouge and return to Cambodia as head of state. The two leaders are unable to reach an agreement. Khieu Samphan of the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann, head of the KPNLF, join the meetings but the talks remain unproductive.

July 29, 1989.—The United States drops its demand that an armed peacekeeping force supervise any transition to a new government in Cambodia. Instead the

United States calls for a U.N. control commission to supervise the Vietnamese withdrawal and subsequent elections.

July 31, 1989.—The Chinese insist on Khmer Rouge participation in any transitional government—a position opposed by Hun Sen, Vietnam, the United States, and the Soviets. Baker meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, who promises to join the other countries concerned in undertaking to cease military assistance upon a complete and genuine Vietnamese pullout.

Aug. 1, 1989.—The conferees agree to send a U.N. factfinding mission of up to 25 observers to Cambodia. The team's purpose is to help the conference determine what conditions are necessary in order to establish a cease-fire and to assess the possibility of holding free elections.

Aug. 20, 1989.—Phnom Penh's forces are reported in *The New York Times* as performing poorly in fighting against the Khmer Rouge along the Thai-Cambodian border from Poipet to Pailin.

Aug. 23, 1989.—Hun Sen offers to delay elections for 6 months after a cease-fire. A concession that would allow opposition candidates time to campaign. The talks, however, remain at an impasse over Khmer Rouge participation in a transitional government.

Aug. 27, 1989.—A spokesman for Prince Sihanouk announces his resignation as head of his guerrilla faction; however, the spokesman says that Sihanouk will remain president of the resistance coalition.

Aug. 31, 1989.—Baker, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Qian Qichen do not attend the closing sessions of the international peace conference due to the lack of progress. Disagreement remains on every major issue, including: how to monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal, how to arrange a cease-fire, the role of the Khmer Rouge, the fate of refugees, the fate of ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese settlers, and finally whether to apply the term "genocide" to the period of Khmer Rouge rule.

August 1989.—Vietnamese civilians are said to be leaving Cambodia at a rate of more than 200 per day. Many sell their homes and possessions below market rates.

Sept. 4, 1989.—The four Cambodian factions designate Angkor Wat politically and militarily neutral and agree to allow UNESCO to protect and renovate the site.

Sept. 1989.—Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach says that Vietnam will not send troops back into Cambodia after the scheduled pullout.

Sept. 20, 1989.—Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Thai says that at least 23,000 Cambodian resistance fighters moved from Thailand into Cambodia in preparation for attacks after the Vietnamese pullout. He says that 13,000 of what he estimates to be a total of 17,000 Khmer Rouge fighters are in Cambodia. The General puts the number of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia at 26,000 and the number of Vietnamese nationals living in Cambodia at 80,000.

Sept. 22, 1989.—Hun Sen is unsuccessful in his bid to assemble a group of U.N. military observers to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal. ASEAN opposes the mission saying that such a mission would legitimize the Hun Sen government.

Sept. 26, 1989.—Vietnam says the last Vietnamese soldier has left Cambodia meeting the self-imposed deadline for Vietnamese troop withdrawal.

Oct. 16, 1989.—United States proposes the Baker formula which calls for minimal participation of the Khmer Rouge. Under the plan the non-Communist factions would take over the ministries of interior, foreign affairs, and defense.

Oct. 23, 1989.—After a lengthy siege the Khmer Rouge capture Pailin defeating some of the regime's best troops. Pailin is important: economically—as a ruby and sapphire mining center, psychologically—because the Cambodian government had vowed to hold the town, and strategically—because its fall opens the approaches to the provincial capital, Battambang. By this time resistance is said to control large patches of territory and is reportedly beginning to set up civilian administration.

Oct. 26, 1989.—Prince Norodom Ranariddh predicts the resistance will capture Battambang and that its capture will force Hun Sen to negotiate a settlement. The Cambodian government imposes martial law in Battambang.

Oct. 27, 1989.—Son Sann calls for quick inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a coalition government to forestall their impending military victory.

Oct. 30, 1989.—Phnom Penh begins a dusk-to-dawn curfew.

Nov. 2, 1989.—Tie Banh, Cambodian Defense Minister, admits the loss of Pailin to the Khmer Rouge.

Nov. 10, 1989.—Thai Prime Minister Chatichai calls on Bush to accept a truce followed by U.N. verification. He refers to Hun Sen as a patriot.

Nov. 14, 1989.—Congress bars Bush from using CIA contingency funds to arm Cambodian guerrillas without prior congressional approval.

Nov. 16, 1989.—The U.N. adopts a resolution (124-17) recognizing the resistance movement. The resolution also blames the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia for the civil war and casts doubt on the Vietnamese withdrawal.

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